



Hamas' Perception of Hezbollah's Role in the Multi-Arena Hostilities as Reflected in Documents from the Gaza Strip

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Overview

- ▶ Hezbollah and Hamas are two of the main organizations within the "axis of resistance" which Iran has cultivated for years throughout the Middle East by transferring funds, weapons and expertise to promote its ideology and national interests.
- ▶ The election of Yahya al-Sinwar as head of Hamas' political bureau in the Gaza Strip in 2017 led to closer cooperation between Hamas and Hezbollah after years of tension in the wake of the Syrian civil war. Al-Sinwar regarded Hezbollah not only as a role model for confronting Israel, but also as an intermediary for Iran and a way to make Hamas an integral part of a regional alliance. Accordingly, he worked to establish a strategic partnership with Hezbollah while employing the religious motif of defending al-Aqsa.
- ▶ The Sword of Jerusalem (Hamas' name for Operation Guardian of the Walls in May 2021) provided the first opportunity to implement the strategic cooperation between Hamas and Hezbollah in a multi-front campaign. Hamas documents brought back by the IDF from the Gaza Strip¹ contained details of bilateral coordination through a joint operations room which functioned throughout the hostilities, including the transfer of real-time intelligence and Hezbollah's authorization for Hamas to fire rockets from Lebanese territory.
- ▶ The sense of achievement and victory felt by Hamas' leadership following the Sword of Jerusalem led al-Sinwar and Muhammad Deif to promote plans for a multi-front military campaign designed to realize their vision of the "destruction of Israel." Hamas documents revealed how senior Hamas figures persuaded Hezbollah secretary general Hassan Nasrallah to participate in the campaign, even if only partially, while Nasrallah was initially cautious position before eventually becoming willing to cooperate in the hostilities.
- ▶ Hamas' decision to launch its invasion of Israel on October 7, 2023 caught Nasrallah by off guard, forcing him to decide quickly how to respond to Hamas' call for assistance in the new

¹ Most of the documents mentioned in this study can be viewed at the archives of The Amit Terrorism and Intelligence Research Institute at the Israeli Intelligence Heritage and Commemoration.

war. Hezbollah entered the war a day later to "support the Gaza Strip" and conducted controlled fighting based on a unilateral "deterrence equation" consistent with the organization's interests until the escalation in September 2024. Hezbollah's cautious and limited conduct was initially criticized by the Hamas' leadership, which later praised Hezbollah's "sacrifice."

► **The Hamas documents reveal the Hamas leadership's understanding that Hezbollah's involvement would be a force multiplier in any hostilities against Israel, whether through intelligence cooperation, limited operations which would occupy IDF forces along the northern border and thereby ease the fighting in the Gaza Strip and other arenas, or full-scale involvement which could help realize the vision of the "destruction of Israel." At the same time, al-Sinwar and Deif's decision to launch the attack without informing Hezbollah in advance reflected their understanding that the organization had its own interests in the Lebanese arena and its commitments to Iran, as manifested by Hezbollah's operational concept during the war and statements by its senior figures.**

The Strengthening of Hamas-Hezbollah Relations

► Iran, under the leadership of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' Qods Force commanded by Qassem Soleimani,² worked to establish a regional force based on the "axis of resistance,"³ a network of proxy organizations the Islamic Republic cultivated for years through transfers of funds, weapons and expertise. From Iran's perspective, the "axis of resistance" is a means of promoting its national interests and forms part of its military power and ability to deter its enemies, chiefly Israel and the United States, increase its strategic depth and expand its influence and power beyond its borders.

► Among the proxy organizations, Hezbollah in Lebanon was developed as the favorite strategic arm for promoting Iranian ideology and regional influence, conducting the direct struggle against Israel and assisting the organizations of the "axis of resistance." Iran also began cultivating Hamas to the "axis" after the movement took control of the Gaza Strip in 2006. However, relations between Iran and Hezbollah on the one hand and Iran and Hamas

² Eliminated in January 2020.

³ Iran, Hezbollah, the Palestinian terrorist organizations, the Houthis in Yemen and the Shi'ite militias in Iraq, whose collective objective is the destruction and elimination of the State of Israel.

on the other deteriorated after the Hamas leadership supported the uprising against the Assad regime in Syria in the Arab Spring of 2011.⁴

► Cooperation between Hamas and Hezbollah intensified beginning in 2017, when Yahya al-Sinwar⁵ was elected head of Hamas' bureau in the Gaza Strip and worked to restore the movement's relations with Iran, Hezbollah and Syria. In addition, following the Turkish government's reconciliation with Israel in 2016, senior Hamas figures were forced to leave Turkey and relocate to Lebanon. Most prominent among them was Salah al-'Arouri, deputy head of Hamas' political bureau, who became Hamas' principal liaison with Hezbollah until he was killed in an Israeli strike in the Dahiye al-Janoubia in Beirut on January 2, 2024, together with six other Hamas operatives, including Samir Fendi, who was responsible for the military wing's activities in Lebanon (New Lines Magazine, November 3, 2023).⁶

► Al-Sinwar regarded Hezbollah as a role model in the "struggle" against Israel and held secretary general Hassan Nasrallah in high esteem.⁷ He also viewed Hezbollah as an important intermediary with Iran and as the executor of Iranian policy. Al-Sinwar's decision to strengthen ties with Hezbollah was not merely as a tactical move, but a doctrinal shift whose objective was to transform Hamas from an independent Palestinian movement operating in the Gaza Strip to a member of a regional alliance.

► During those years Iran provided Hamas with funding and equipment while Hezbollah supplied experience and training. Since 2017 there has been a significant increase in joint training conducted by Hamas and Hezbollah operatives: Hezbollah's Radwan Force trained Hamas' military wing operatives in invasion tactics and the seizure of communities and Hezbollah transferred expertise to Hamas in tunnel warfare and rocket production. As part of the closer relationship, Hamas established its own military branch in Lebanon and occasionally fired rockets into Israel from south Lebanon with Hezbollah's full approval and coordination.⁸ For example, a document dated March 13, 2022, reported the deployment of

⁴ See the October 2023 Amit Institute report, [Operation Iron Swords The development of Iranian-Hamas-Hezbollah cooperation](#); the January 2024 report, [Iranian media references to military aid provided by Iran to Hamas in the past](#); the November 2024 report, [Captured Documents Show Iranian Support for Hamas in the Gaza Strip](#).

⁵ Eliminated in October 2024.

⁶ See the November 2023 Amit Institute report, [Profile of Saleh al-Arouri, a Senior Hamas Terrorist](#); the January 2024 report, [Reactions to the killing of Saleh al-'Arouri](#).

⁷ Eliminated in September 2024.

⁸ During several rounds of fighting in the Gaza Strip, rockets were also fired from south Lebanon by Palestinian terrorist organizations with Hezbollah's knowledge and approval.

a Hamas "field headquarters" from the Gaza Strip to Lebanon, including commanders and specialists in weapons production, intelligence and operations (IDF Spokesperson, March 25, 2026).⁹

► A Hamas document showed that the movement's leadership had already been promoting the idea of a strategic partnership with Hezbollah and Iran as early as 2019. In a position paper drafted by the office of the head of Hamas' political bureau in January 2019, apparently in preparation for a Hamas delegation visit to Iran, one of the stated objectives was the establishment of a strategic alliance to prepare for the war of the "liberation of Jerusalem" and to activate all fronts against Israel. Hamas requested Iran adopt the movement through Hezbollah to develop its military capabilities in training, force development, armament and other fields. Hamas also sought expanded cooperation, intelligence sharing and the supply of weapons and the expertise required to operate them. Another request was to increase financial assistance and establish a regular monthly allocation, in addition to special funding for military projects.

❖ **What we want from them:**

- To establish a strategic alliance with Iran by increasing the candid, in-depth strategic dialogue and agreeing on more stable principles for the nature of the relationship to reach a four-way alliance (Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas and Syria) which will oppose the occupation and fight its supporters in the West to restore our rights, through:
 - Iran's adoption (Hezbollah) of a strategy to develop al-Qassam's strength (training, armament, experience), while taking into account the time required (the end of the current term of the leadership).
 - Increasing cooperation and intelligence exchange regarding "the enemy and the rivals," and participating in providing the tools and knowledge required in a way which will lead to the realization of the alliance's general objectives.
 - Providing the basic conditions for establishment in terms of increasing financial assistance and regular periodic allocations, in addition to special funding for the major military projects

⁹ See the January 2025 Amit Institute report, [Activities of Saeed Izadi, Head of the Qods Forces' "Palestine Branch," Reflected in Captured Documents](#)

❖ ماذا نريد منهم:

○ بناء تحالف استراتيجي مع ايران، من خلال تعزيز الحوار الاستراتيجي الصريح والمعمق والاتفاق على محددات اكثر رسوخاً لطبيعة العلاقة وابعادها للوصول إلى حلف رباعي (إيران، حزب الله، حماس وسوريا) يقاوم الاحتلال ويناهض داعميه في الغرب لاسترداد الحقوق، وذلك من خلال:

- تبني ايران (حزب الله) استراتيجية لتطوير قوة القسام (تدريب، تسليح، خبرات)، مع مراعاة الوقت اللازم لذلك (نهاية الدورة الحالية للقيادة).
- تعزيز التعاون والتبادل الاستخباري "العدو والخصوم"، والمساهمة في توفير الأدوات والمعارف اللازمة لذلك، بما يحقق الأهداف العامة للحلف.
- توفير المتطلبات الأساسية للبناء من حيث زيادة الدعم المالي وتنشيط مخصصات دورية، إضافة لتمويل خاص للمشاريع العسكرية الكبرى.

- **Reaching a joint defense alliance agreement which will include the Qods Force, Hezbollah and Hamas in preparation for the war to liberate Jerusalem [sic] and activate all fronts against the common enemy, Israel, and the preparation of a timetable and practical plan which will culminate in a surprise attack on the enemy from all fronts.**

○ الوصول لاتفاقية حلف الدفاع المشترك يضم فيلق القدس وحزب الله وحماس للإعداد لحرب تحرير القدس وتفعيل كل الجبهات ضد العدو المشترك إسرائيل واعداد جدول زمني وخطة عملية تنتهي بشن هجوم بباغت العدو من كافة الجهات

Document 1: Working paper of the office of the head of Hamas' political bureau in the Gaza Strip, January 2019¹⁰

► Even in the early stages of its effort to promote a strategic partnership, Hamas used the pretext of "defending the Temple Mount and al-Aqsa Mosque." Using a religious argument and portraying Hamas as the defender of Islam's holy sites, particularly al-Aqsa Mosque, was meant to provide Hezbollah with additional motivation, confer broader legitimacy to its activities and serve as the foundation for extensive cooperation among the members of the "axis of resistance."

► In an undated letter, apparently from February 2019 (based on the events it described), sent by Hamas political bureau chairman Isma'il Haniyeh¹¹ to Hassan Nasrallah,¹² Haniyeh thanked him for Hezbollah's support of the Palestinians and briefed him on Israeli actions on the Temple Mount, the latest of which was the entry of Jewish settlers into the Dome of

¹⁰ Underlined in the original.

¹¹ Eliminated in July 2024

¹² The same letter was sent to Iranian leader Ali Khamenei (eliminated in February 2026).

the Rock and the closure of Bab al-Rahma (the Golden Gate).¹³ Haniyeh said the Palestinians were confident Hezbollah would not abandon them in the campaign against Israel and would find a way to participate in it.

We also [thank you] for your courageous stand and your constant readiness to confront the oppressive enemy on every front, including holy Palestine [*sic*], and for your tireless, continuous efforts to mobilize the [Muslim] nation, wherever it is found, to establish an axis of resistance against the enemy. Although I know with certainty that you constantly follow events in Jerusalem in terms of the aggressive, oppressive policy whose objective is to Judaize the Holy City and erase its Islamic and cultural identity, the most dangerous aspect is what the enemy is doing with determination and persistence, namely its policy toward al-Aqsa Mosque, the site of the night journey of the messenger of Allah, may peace and blessings be upon him, and of his ascension to heaven.

التي هي مقدسات وحق أمة الإسلام كاملة في الماضي والحاضر والمستقبل وكذلك تصديكم الباسل وإستعدادكم الدائم لمواجهة هذا العدو الغاشم في كل الساحات بما فيها فلسطين المقدسة وجهودكم الحثيثة والدائمة في حشد مكونات الأمة حيثما كان لتشكيل محور مقاوم لهذا العدو الغاشم ومع علمي الأكيد أنكم تتابعون بشكل دائم ما يجري في القدس من سياسات عدوانية غاشمة تستهدف تهويد المدينة المقدسة وطمس معالمها وهويتها الإسلامية والحضارية إلا أن الأمر الأكثر خطورة هو ما يقوم به العدو وبإصرار وتماذي وهو سياساته تجاه المسجد الأقصى مسرى رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم ومعرجه الى السماء، أولى القبلتين وثالث الحرمين الشريفين التي تبدأ بمنع معظم المسلمين من الوصول إلى القدس ابتداءً ويشمل ذلك أهلنا في غزة والضفة الي

Your Eminence, Sayyid, your brothers and family in Palestine are fully confident that you will not let them down in their campaign against their enemy and that you will always help and support them until victory is achieved. [They are confident] that you will always find a way to participate in their campaign of steadfastness, through a firm and clear statement of support and in embracing their cause, which we know is your cause, your concern and your foremost preoccupation, and through direct action that always serves this sacred cause, as we have always known you, and forever.

¹³ In February 2019, members of the *waqf* and Muslim worshippers forced open the Golden Gate, which had been closed since 2003. The incident was accompanied by clashes with Israeli security forces. The Palestinians perceived the events as an achievement in the "struggle" over the status quo on the Temple Mount.

سماحة السيد إن إخوانك وأهلك في فلسطين يتقون أنك لن تخذلهم في معركتهم مع عدوهم وأنك ستكون العون والسند دوماً حتى تحقيق الانتصار وأنك ستجد دوماً الطريق التي تشاركهم معركة صمودهم بالقول الفصل الواضح في نصرتهم وتبني قضيتهم التي نعلم أنها قضيتك وهمك وشغلك الشاغل وبالفعل المباشر الذي يصب دوماً في خدمة هذه القضية المقدسة وكما عهدناك دائماً وأبداً.

Document 2: Letter from Haniyeh to Nasrallah, apparently from February 2019

Operation Guardian of the Walls, the First Hamas-Hezbollah Multi-Front Collaboration

► On May 10, 2021, Hamas' military wing launched the Sword of Jerusalem (the name Hamas gave to Operation Guardian of the Walls) by firing rockets at Jerusalem during the Flag March which was held as part of Israel's Jerusalem Day celebrations. Hamas claimed it had attacked in response to the "crimes and aggression of the enemy in occupied Jerusalem" and the "harassment of the residents of Sheikh Jarrah and al-Aqsa Mosque." In response, Israel launched Operation Guardian of the Walls, which lasted 11 days, during which the IDF struck more than 1,500 Hamas and other terrorist organization targets, while the organizations fired more than 4,360 rockets into Israel. During the fighting violence erupted on additional fronts. In Judea and Samaria and east Jerusalem, Palestinians rioted against Israeli security forces and increased terrorist attacks; clashes and riots broke out between Arabs and Jews in mixed cities inside Israel; at least 13 rockets were fired from south Lebanon, one of which landed in Israeli territory, and terrorist operatives attempted to infiltrate Israeli territory; three rockets were fired from Syria; and an armed UAV infiltrated the Beit She'an Valley area.¹⁴

► The hostilities marked a turning point in Hamas' operational concept. Whereas previous rounds of fighting had erupted following local events in the Gaza Strip, this time Hamas positioned itself as the "defender of Jerusalem" and Islam's holy sites after firing rockets at Jerusalem "in response to events on the Temple Mount." The hostilities also strengthened the concept of the "unity of the arenas," as Hamas mobilized the Palestinians and Israel's Arab citizens along with attacks from Lebanon and Syria. As a result, the Hamas leadership developed the theory that a large-scale attack from the Gaza Strip could ignite a multi-front war which would undermine Israel's internal stability.

¹⁴ See the May 2021 Amit Institute report, [Escalation from the Gaza Strip – Operation Guardian of the Walls – Summary](#)

► A meeting of Hamas' political bureau in the Gaza Strip chaired by Yahya al-Sinwar on June 11, 2023, noted that they had wrought a strategic change regarding the alliance with Hezbollah and Iran by reviving the fundamental principles, particularly the "struggle" for Jerusalem and al-Aqsa Mosque, and by positioning themselves as the defenders of al-Aqsa Mosque. One of their conclusions was to continue and intensify cooperation and coordination with their allies to recruit them to take an active part in future fighting with Israel.

2.	Tht Political File: Emphasizing the strategic directions outlined by the political bureau, as follows:	
	Movement chairman Everyone	2.1 Continue reviving/promoting and disseminating the fundamental principles, particularly the struggle for Jerusalem, al-Aqsa and its holy sites, as the leaders of the liberation project, the defenders of al-Aqsa and the guardians of the fundamental principles.
	Military operations department	2.2 Continue force buildup and strengthening, increase cooperation and coordination with the allies to manage future rounds of fighting and the confrontation with the enemy at the highest possible level of coordination, assistance and active participation through multiple arenas.
	Information department	2.4. Disseminate the major national issues, especially the issue of al-Aqsa, and use the term "religious war" being waged by the enemy against Jerusalem and the holy sites.

2.	الملف السياسي: التأكيد على المسارات الاستراتيجية التي رسمها المكتب السياسي وهي على النحو التالي:	
2.1	استمرار إحياء الثوابت وتصديرها وتحديث الصراع على القدس وعلى الأقصى	رئيس الحركة الجميع
2.2	الاستمرار في بناء القوة ومراكمتها، وتعزيز التعاون والتنسيق مع الحلفاء لخوض الجولات والمواجهة مع العدو بأعلى درجات التنسيق والإسناد والمشاركة الفاعلة عبر تعدد الجبهات	دائرة العمل العسكري
2.4	تصدير القضايا الوطنية الكبرى وتحديث موضوع الأقصى واستخدام مصطلح الحرب الدينية التي يشنها العدو على القدس والمقدسات	الدائرة الإعلامية

Document 3: Summary of the meeting of Hamas' political bureau in the Gaza Strip, June 11, 2023

Hezbollah's Involvement in the Hostilities

► In an interview with Hezbollah's al-Manar TV, Ibrahim al-Amin, editor in chief of the Hezbollah-affiliated Lebanese daily *al-Akhbar*, related to the Hezbollah-Hamas coordination during the fighting. He said that during the hostilities, a joint operations room [operations center] was established in Beirut, staffed by Hezbollah military operatives, officers from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and representatives of Hamas and other Palestinian organizations. He said the operations room was responsible for coordinating the exchange of both tactical information and intelligence activities. According to al-Amin, Hezbollah transferred Hamas field officers to Beirut "by special means" and successfully transferred equipment to the Gaza Strip. He added that the entire pro-Iranian camp, from south Lebanon to Sana'a [the capital of Yemen] was on alert, anticipating that Israel would expand the campaign. Stressing Iran's involvement, he noted that during the fighting, the commander of the Qods Force, Esma'il Qa'ani, had visited Beirut twice (al-Manar TV, May 29, 2021).

► Hezbollah deputy secretary general [now secretary general] Sheikh Na'im Qassem said Hezbollah and Hamas maintained an intelligence-sharing partnership which influenced the course of the fighting. He said intelligence included details of the IDF's ground activity in the Gaza Strip, which was in fact a deception operation preceding the strike on the so-called "Metro" (Hamas' tunnel network).¹⁵ He said the coordination took place on a "moment-by-moment" basis and Hezbollah, having learned of the plan, passed the information on (al-Mayadeen TV, September 6, 2021).

► At a press conference after the hostilities, Yahya al-Sinwar said the "resistance"¹⁶ in the Gaza Strip had been "highly coordinated with the brothers in Lebanon," and they had been certain that if the campaign intensified, the other "resistance forces" would enter the fighting on the other fronts. He said the rocket fire from Lebanon and Syria had been carried out "in full coordination between the resistance in Gaza and the resistance in Lebanon, through joint action" (Al Jazeera, May 26, 2021). His brother, senior Hamas military wing operative Muhammad al-Sinwar, also told Al Jazeera that the members of the "axis of resistance" had

¹⁵ During Operation Guardian of the Walls the IDF carried out a deception operation whose objective was to influence Hamas' perception of the situation and make Hamas believe that a ground incursion had begun and, as a result, that it would instruct its operatives to enter the tunnels, which the Israeli Air Force would then strike. In practice, Hamas operatives did not enter the tunnels and the operation failed.

¹⁶ Hamas and the other terrorist organizations operating in the Gaza Strip.

cooperated through a joint operations room staffed by intelligence officers from the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, Hezbollah and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (Al Jazeera, May 28, 2026).

► Hamas documents from the Gaza Strip reinforce such statements and help explain the role played by Hezbollah in cooperation with Hamas and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. "Ahmed" (apparently Khaled Ghanem, who was head of Hamas' "external" military intelligence) sent a report to "Dear Brother Osama" (whose identity is unclear) and the members of the intelligence council on May 23, 2021, entitled "Comprehensive report regarding our activities with our friends during the campaign." It said that about two weeks before the hostilities began, establishing an intelligence operations room was discussed with the team of Muhammad Saeed Izadi (Hajj Ramadan), head of the Palestine branch of the Qods Force, proposing that the operations room be established in Beirut to assist the Gaza Strip by transferring intelligence from Lebanon and in case war broke out in Lebanon. He said establishing the operations room was contingent upon creating parallel intelligence frameworks in the Gaza Strip and they decided to postpone further discussion until June 2021 to allow Izadi and his people to examine the matter.

Two weeks before the hostilities, the idea of an intelligence operations room was discussed with Hajj Ramadan's team. We proposed they establish an operations room in Beirut to provide Gaza with immediate intelligence assistance in the event a campaign began in Gaza, and vice versa, in the event a war broke out in Lebanon, but only after the completion of the intelligence networks in Gaza. A detailed discussion of the matter was postponed until June so that the idea could mature on their side.

1. قبل المعركة بأسبوعين تم مناقشة فكرة غرفة استخبارات المعركة مع فريق الحاج رمضان، حيث اقترحنا عليهم إقامة غرفة في بيروت إذا ما حصلت أي معركة في غزة، لإسناد غزة فوراً بالمعلومات، والعكس إذا حصلت حرب في لبنان لكن بعد استكمال بناء المنظومات الاستخبارية في غزة. وتم تأجيل الحديث التفصيلي في الأمر إلى شهر 6 حتى تنضج الفكرة لديهم.

Document 4: Report by "Ahmed" on coordination with Hezbollah during the Sword of Jerusalem, May 23, 2021

► According to the document, the joint operations room in Beirut was active from the second day of the hostilities until the day after they ended, while Izadi removed obstacles with the Hezbollah and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps intelligence bodies to ensure the flow of intelligence. The operations room was staffed by Izadi's deputy, three of his personal

assistants, intelligence personnel and technical personnel. The operations room provided Hamas with intelligence at its request on various subjects, including IDF deployments, aerial intelligence activity and Israeli Air Force operations. It also supplied detailed information about Israel's intentions to assassinate senior operatives and information about the deception carried out by the IDF concerning the ground offensive. "Ahmed" admitted that he had been surprised by the extent of "our friends'" interest in the details of the campaign, as the level of monitoring and effort they invested was "as if they were conducting the campaign themselves."

3. The operations room was active from the second day of the campaign until the day after it ended. Present were Hajj Ramadan's deputy, three of his direct assistants, intelligence personnel and technical personnel. They asked us what information we wanted, and we requested the following:

- A. Information about the reinforcement and reduction of the [military] deployment.
- B. Information about aerial intelligence activity.
- C. Aerial activity of fighter aircraft.
- D. Suitable area targets for mortar fire.
- E. Their immediate and overall situation assessments.

4. They provided us with the following:

- F. Information on the thinning and reinforcement of ground forces, from their movement from the Golan Heights and the Galilee until their arrival in the Gaza Strip.
- G. Monitoring the aerial movement of military aircraft: they tracked aircraft flying in holding patterns and the movement of air forces from the bases to the Gaza Strip, especially in cases of "fire belt" bombardments, which we were able to anticipate in the operations room 15-20 minutes before the strikes began.
- H. Monitoring the movement of aerial intelligence assets at the operational level (some could not be monitored because they were below 8,000 feet and therefore could not be tracked from the north) and above the operational level, as well as monitoring signals intelligence collection flights. Throughout the campaign, they provided us with information regarding concentration areas.
- I. A collection of targets within mortar range around the Gaza border area.
- J. Their analyses of the enemy's intentions, such as:

- 1) The assassination of Commander Abu Anas al-Ghandour¹⁷ (without naming him) two hours before the operation. They identified an intelligence concentration over the Jabalia refugee camp area, together with intelligence efforts on the ground, and concluded that an important person was about to be assassinated or that a special force would infiltrate from the east.
- 2) Their assessment regarding a ground operation two hours before it began, stating that it was a deception intended to create a bank of targets on the ground (although they were not aware that it was a major deception operation).
- 3) Information about the deployment of electronic warfare units, stating they were intended to monitor wireless communications (their assessment was that communications positions would be bombed to force us to switch to radio and GSM communications).
- 4) The enemy discovered our intentions regarding a naval operation against the enemy 12 hours before they struck our brothers in the naval force, and they updated you accordingly.
- 5) Continuous assessment that the enemy did not want to launch a ground invasion and was seeking only an image of victory through an assassination.
- 6) They updated us throughout the campaign regarding every aerial concentration point, together with their analysis of each area.

¹⁷ Commander of Hamas' Northern Brigade, Ahmed Ghandour. Eliminated in November 2023.

4. وقد استجابوا لنا فقدموا لنا التالي:

- ح. تسهيل معلومات التخفيض والتعزيز للقوات البرية، من عند انتقالها من الجولان والجليل إلى وصولها لقطاع غزة
- خ. مراقبة الحركة الجوية للطيران الحربي: حيث كانوا يراقبوا الطيران في دوائر الانتظار (المطارات المعلقة) وحركة القوات الجوية من القواعد إلى قطاع غزة، خصوصاً في حال قصف الأحزمة النارية حيث أصبحنا نتنبأ بما في الغرفة قبل 15-20 دقيقة من بدء الضربة.
- د. مراقبة حركة استخبارات الجو على المستوى العملياني (بعضها لم يكن يُرصد لأنها تقع أدنى من 8000 قدم لا يمكن رصدها من الشمال) وما هو فوق العملياني، ومراقبة طيران استخبارات الإشارة، وقد أفادونا طوال المعركة على مناطق التركيز.
- ذ. قدموا لنا مجموعة من الأهداف في نطاق الهاون في غلاف غزة.
- ر. قدموا لنا تحليلاتهم بخصوص نوايا العدو، مثل:
 - (1) أفادونا بعملية اغتيال القائد أبو أنس الغندور (دون تحديد اسمه) قبل العملية بساعتين، حيث رأوا بوجود تركيز استخباري فوق منطقة معسكر جباليا مع جهود للاستخبارات على الأرض فهموا أن هناك اغتيال لشخصية مهمة، أو قوة خاصة مستنفذ من الشرق.
 - (2) أرسلوا تقديرهم بخصوص الهجوم البري قبل بدئه بساعتين على أنه هجوم خداعي من قبل العدو لانتاج بنك أهداف ميداني (لكنهم لم يكونوا يعلموا بأنه خديعة كبرى).
 - (3) أرسلوا لنا معلوماتهم حول انتشار وحدات حرب إلكترونية، وقالوا أنها خاصة بمراقبة الاتصالات اللاسلكية (وقد كان التحليل أنه سيتم قصف عقد الاتصالات حتى تخرج على اللاسلكي وال GSM).
 - (4) أبلغونا بأن العدو اكتشف لنا نوايا عمل بحري من طرفنا ضد العدو قبل استهداف الإخوة في البحرية بـ 12 ساعة وقد أبلغناكم بذلك.
 - (5) أرسلوا تقديرهم المستمر بأن العدو لا يريد الدخول البري، وأنه يبحث عن صورة النصر من خلال عملية اغتيال فقط.
 - (6) أبلغونا بكل أماكن تركيز الطيران وتحليلهم الخاص بكل منطقة على مدار فترة المعركة.

Document 4: Report by "Ahmed" on the coordination with Hezbollah during the Sword of Jerusalem, May 23, 2021

► According to the document, in addition to the operations room, a joint council of Qods Force and Hezbollah representatives operated and met regularly throughout the hostilities. During the final five days, Qods Force commander Esma'il Qa'ani, who had come to Lebanon, also participated. The report further stated that every 12 hours a report was prepared and distributed to Hassan Nasrallah, the commander of the Revolutionary Guards, the Iranian leader and all relevant leaders. Senior Iranian and Hezbollah figures were in regular contact with Hamas operatives in Lebanon and why the rate of fire had declined, why Hamas operatives had stopped firing at Tel Aviv and the effectiveness of certain Israeli tactics. Reportedly, the Hezbollah and Revolutionary Guards leadership were prepared for direct intervention if the "resistance" in the Gaza Strip were in real danger.

B. They [the staff officers from Hezbollah and the Revolutionary Guards] agreed to the request of Hajj Ramadan that if the resistance in Gaza came under a strategic threat they would enter the hostilities, and that was approved by the Hezbollah and Revolutionary Guards leadership.

- C. They allowed the brothers in the military wing to fire rocket barrages, and accordingly, the brothers in the military wing abroad carried out all the rocket barrages launched from Lebanon and the Golan Heights.
- D. When your second message arrived, regarding the need for them to exert more pressure, I sent it to Hajj Ramadan. That night, Hajj Ramadan called me and asked me to send a message to Brother Abu al-Baraa [deputy head of the military wing, Marwan Issa] and ask for his approval. He informed me that Hassan Nasrallah had given approval for the brothers in the military wing abroad to carry out a preliminary offensive military operation against the enemy. He requested that if I obtained Abu al-Baraa's approval, I would meet with Brother Khaled and inform him of the decision. I sent this to you, and after your approval, I met with Khaled and informed him. It became clear to me that they were prepared in terms of personnel, but they were not prepared in terms of intelligence.
- E. They also ordered Iraqi Hezbollah to launch the UAV toward northern Palestine [sic]. The UAV was launched toward occupied Palestine [sic] in the final days of the hostilities.

ب. وافقوا على طلب قدمه الحج رمضان أنه لو تعرضت المقاومة في غزة لخطر استراتيجي فإنه يجب دخول المعركة، وقد أقر هذا الأمر من قيادة حزب الله والحرس.

ت. سمحوا للإخوة في الدائرة العسكرية برشقات صاروخية، وعليه فقد قام الإخوة في الدائرة العسكرية في الخارج بكل رشقات الصواريخ التي تمت من لبنان والجولان.

ث. لما جاءت رسالتكم الثانية بضرورة أن يضغطوا أكثر أرسلتها للحج رمضان وفي الليل دعاني الحج رمضان وطلب مني أن أرسل رسالة للأخ أبو البراء باستئذانه، حيث أبلغني بأن السيد حسن نصر الله أعطى موافقة على إمكانية قيام الإخوة في الدائرة العسكرية في الخارج بعملية عسكرية هجومية إيدائية ضد العدو. وطلب مني: إذا حصلت موافقة من أبو البراء أن ألتقي بالأخ خالد وإبلاغه بالقرار، وقد أرسلت لكم وبعد موافقتكم التقيت به خالد وأبلغته، وتبين لي أن لديهم جهوزية أفراد لكن ليس لديهم أي جهوزية استخبارية، أو أي نوع من أنواع الاستعداد في هذا الجانب.

ج. كما اوعزوا لحزب الله العراقي بإطلاق المسيرة باتجاه شمال فلسطين، حيث انطلقت المسيرة باتجاه فلسطين المحتلة في الأيام الأخيرة للمعركة

Document 4: Report by "Ahmed" on the coordination with Hezbollah during the Sword of Jerusalem, May 23, 2021

► "Ahmed" also reported that during the hostilities senior Hamas and Hezbollah figures close to Hassan Nasrallah met several times, including the individual responsible for south Lebanon, and with Revolutionary Guards personnel.

10. Hajj Ramadan organized five meetings for us with commanders from the Revolutionary Guards and Hezbollah. The first meeting was with Hassan Nasrallah's assistant for operations; the second with Hajj Ramadan and his staff officers; the third with the military assistant to Hassan Nasrallah and former figure holding the Palestine portfolio, Hajj Khalil Harb Abu Hassan; a meeting with the figure responsible for the southern region in Hezbollah, Hajj Abu al-Faisal;¹⁸ and a meeting with Hajj Esma'il Qa'ani, head of the Qods Force, and Hajj Abu Mahdi, commander of the Revolutionary Guards in Lebanon.¹⁹

10. رتب لنا الحاج رمضان خمسة لقاءات مع قيادات من الحرس وحزب الله، كان اللقاء الأول مع مساعد السيد حسن نصر الله لشئون العمليات، والثاني مع الحاج رمضان وأركانها، والثالث مع معاون العسكري للسيد حسن نصر الله ومستول ملف فلسطين سابقاً الحاج خليل حرب-أبو حسن، ومستول منطقة الجنوب في حزب الله الحاج أبو الفضل، ولقاء مع الحاج اسماعيل قاتني مستول قوة القدس والحاج أبو مهدي قائد الحرس في لبنان. مرفق لكم ملخصاً لمحاضر اللقاءات التي تمت.

Document 4: Report by "Ahmed" on the coordination with Hezbollah during the Sword of Jerusalem, May 23, 2021

► According to the minutes of the meeting "Ahmed" held with Hajj Khalil Harb, Nasrallah's military adviser, on May 17, 2021, he reported he had told him that relations with Hezbollah intelligence had been good during the campaign compared with the situation before the fighting. In response, Harb promised that he would have a "harsh" discussion with the intelligence personnel to ensure that the flow of intelligence would proceed without interruption.

He asked: What are your relations with Hezbollah intelligence? I told him that before the fighting they were good but certain things were lacking. During the fighting relations were very good. He said, I know them. They are influenced by elements inside Hezbollah. Now I will speak with them and teach them a lesson. They must give you everything they have. I told him: We do not want a harsh discussion. He said, No, I do not want to speak with them in your presence. After our meeting ends I will speak with them sharply. An hour after we returned from the meeting with him he called and said, I spoke with them for half an hour, nothing will be blocked from you (this remains to be tested).

¹⁸ Ali Karaki, commander of Hezbollah's Southern Command. Eliminated in September 2024.

¹⁹ Mohammad Reza Zahedi (Hassan Mahdawi), commander of the Quds Force in Syria and Lebanon. Eliminated in April 2024.

سأل: كيف علاقتك باستخبارات حزب الله؟ قلت له قبل الجولة كانت في مستوى جيد، كانوا متمنعون عن بعض الأمور، أثناء الجولة العلاقة في مستوى جيد جداً، قال انا عارفهم، هم يغلبوا جهات داخل الحزب. الآن سأحدث معهم وألقنهم درساً، يجب أن يقدموا كل ما عندهم لكم. قلت له لا نريد حديثاً خشناً. قال لا، لا أريد أن أتحدث معهم أمامك، بعد انتهاء لقائنا سأحدث معهم بكلام قاسي. بعد عودتنا من لقائه بساعة اتصل وقال لقد تحدثت معهم نصف ساعة ولا شيء مغلق عليكم (يبقى هذا رهن التجربة).

Document 5: Minutes of "Ahmed's" meeting with Khalil Harb, May 17, 2021

► Further evidence of Hezbollah's contribution was found in a letter Isma'il Haniyeh sent to the head of Hamas' military wing, Muhammad Deif, on July 10, 2021, in which he quoted Nasrallah's listing the many areas in which Hezbollah had assisted Hamas during the hostilities. In addition to the transfer of intelligence, Nasrallah mentioned keeping Israeli forces occupied on the northern border to ease the pressure on Hamas, preparations for firing rocket and coordination with the Houthis and the militias in Iraq.

A. Sayyid Hassan noted, in light of the above, that during the Sword of Jerusalem the party [Hezbollah] carried out the following actions:

- Exchanged intelligence with the brothers "inside" through the operations room designated for that purpose.
- Raised the level of readiness among its fighters to occupy the enemy and confuse its calculations, and remained on alert for three days after the hostilities ended.
- Cooperated with the brothers in Lebanon, allowed them to fire rockets from south Lebanon and reached understandings with them regarding the possibility of carrying out operations along the border from the coastal sector and from the east. They had no objection to the enemy attributing responsibility to Hezbollah for it and were prepared to deal with its response
- A decision regarding the response was prepared, through rocket fire targeting the enemy along the border, sniper fire, etc.
- Fire at enemy military targets in the Golan or northern Palestine.
- They prepared several UAVs for launch in two stages: the first without warheads, to occupy the enemy, and the second with warheads, the matter having been

agreed upon between them and Hajj Esma'il [Qa'ani], following a meeting held during the first days of the hostilities.

- B. Regarding the Yemenis, they asked Hezbollah for a list of targets inside the enemy entity, and it was sent to them with coordinates. Sayyid al-Houthi informed Hassan Nasrallah that they were ready and told him, "The decision is yours." It was decided that if they entered the hostilities it would be with UAVs and missiles targeting high-value targets, designating targets in Bab el-Mandeb and the Red Sea, with a focus on that axis at a later stage.
- C. The Iraqis: The work was carried out by Sayyid Hassan (Nasrallah) with the Iraqi factions, whose technical capability was high, especially Hezbollah Iraq, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, al-Hashd al-Shaabi, etc.

أ. وذكر السيد حسن في ضوء ما سبق أن الحزب خلال معركة سيف القدس قام بالآتي:

- تبادل المعلومات الاستخباراتية مع الأخوة في الداخل من خلال الغرفة المخصصة لذلك.
- رفع مستوى الجهوية في صفوف المقاتلين لإشغال العدو وإرباك حساباته، وظل في استنفار لثلاثة أيام بعد انتهاء المعركة.
- السماح والتعاون مع الأخوة في لبنان لإطلاق الصواريخ من الجنوب والتفاهم معهم لإمكانية تنفيذ عمليات حدودية من جهة الساحل ومن الشرق ولم يكن لديهم مشكلة أن يحمل العدو المسؤولية لحزب الله في ذلك والاستعداد للتعامل مع ردات فعله.
- قرار الرد على الرد كان جاهزاً من خلال ضرب العدو على الحدود سواء كان بالصواريخ أو القنص والخ.
- ضرب أهداف عسكرية للعدو سواء كان في الجولان أو في الشمال الفلسطيني.
- كانوا مجهزين بعض المسيرات لإطلاقها على مرحلتين الأولى دون أن تحمل رؤوس متفجرة ولكن لإشغال العدو، والمستوى الثاني محمولة برؤوس متفجرة (وكان هذا الأمر باتفاق بينهم وبين الحاج إسماعيل) حيث كان لهما لقاء خاص في بداية أيام المعركة.

ب. بالنسبة لليمنيين فقد طلبوا من الحزب قائمة بأهداف داخل كيان العدو وتم إرسالها لهم مع احداثيات، وأبلغ السيد الحوثي حسن نصر الله بأنهم جاهزون قائلًا له (القرار عندك). وكان من المقرر في حال دخولهم على الخط أن يتم ذلك من خلال المسيرات + صواريخ ضد أهداف ممتازة إلى جانب تحديد أهداف في باب المندب والبحر الأحمر بما في ذلك التركيز لاحقاً على هذا المحور.

ج. العراقي: تم العمل من قبل السيد حسن مع الفصائل العراقية والجهوية التقنية لديهم عالية خاصة (حزب الله العراقي - عصائب الحق - الحشد الخ).

Document 6: Letter from Haniyeh to Deif on the meeting with Nasrallah, July 10, 2021

► A secret meeting was held by Haniyeh, Nasrallah and Izadi, which Haniyeh reported to Yahya al-Sinwar in a letter he sent on July 10, 2021. Nasrallah praised Hamas' success in the hostilities, which he called a "divine victory," adding that it might have prevented a broader campaign, since it postponed the exercises the IDF had intended to carry out (which Hezbollah viewed as about to turn into an attack against it). He added that Hezbollah had

planned "a campaign from the point where the July War ended" [the Second Lebanon War in 2006], and they had intended to focus on Tel Aviv and attack it with large quantities of missiles, but Hamas' military wing had beaten them to it.

Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah called what happened a divine victory. First, because Allah enabled its path to make the decision to confront Israel for the sake of Jerusalem; then, consistency in implementing the decision; and afterward, Allah granted victory. He [Nasrallah] added that Allah may have spared them a greater test, referring to the military maneuvers that began with the start of the hostilities, and it led to their postponement. He said they had planned to do something bigger in a future campaign, and they were consulting on the matter under the leadership of the Sayyid himself [Nasrallah]. He said, We planned to begin the campaign from the place where we ended the July War [the Second Lebanon War], and we focused on Tel Aviv, to fire at it in large quantities, but [the] al-Qassam [Brigades] came and beat us to it. He added jokingly, (You took that from us).

ومما قاله السيد حسن نصر الله أن ما حصل هو نصر إلهي أولاً أن الله وفق لاتخاذ قرار المواجهة من أجل القدس ثم الثبات في تنفيذ القرار ثم أكرم سبحانه بالنصر، مضيقاً لعل الله صرف عنا بهذه المعركة ابتلاء أكبر مشيراً إلى المناورات العسكرية التي بدأت مع بداية المعركة وأدت إلى تأجيلها، وأنهم

كانون يخططون لعمل كبير في أية معركة قادمة ويدور عندهم مشاورات في هذا الأمر بقيادة السيد نفسه وقال كنا نخطط أن نبدأ بالمعركة من حيث انتهينا في حرب تموز وصار التركيز في توجهاتنا على تل أبيب وأن يتم استهدافها بحجم كبير من النار ولكن القسم قام وسبقنا في ذلك وقال مازحاً (أخذتوها منا).

Document 7: Letter from Haniyeh to al-Sinwar on the meeting with Nasrallah and Izadi, July 10, 2021, Document 282



**From right to left: Izadi, Haniyeh and Nasrallah
(Hamas military wing Telegram channel, June 21, 2026)**

► Despite Hezbollah's praise for senior Hamas figures, the joint activity in the operations room throughout the hostilities and Nasrallah's statements of commitment, in practice Hezbollah's contribution was relatively limited. The rocket fire at Jerusalem on May 10, 2021, which marked the opening of the hostilities, was a Hamas decision and not a move coordinated in advance with other groups. Hezbollah tried to maintain the "deterrent equation" with Israel and not drag Lebanon into hostilities under unsuitable conditions. The organization publicly supported Hamas with speeches by senior Hezbollah figures, representing the campaign as part of an overall struggle for Jerusalem and al-Aqsa Mosque, while leaving the fighting to Hamas and the Palestinian terrorist organizations. The few rockets fired from Lebanese territory during the hostilities were launched by operatives of Palestinian organizations, with Hezbollah's turning a blind eye.

► The documents indicate that both Hamas and Hezbollah felt Hezbollah could have done more in the campaign. For example, Hajj Khalil Harb himself admitted to "Ahmed" that Hezbollah's response had been insufficient.

A. He cried when I spoke about the fact that entering the campaign was Commander Abu Khaled's [Muhammad Deif's] response to the calls of the residents of Jerusalem, and said, He answered the call for help of the *mourabitoun* [defenders of al-Aqsa], and what did we do? Nothing?

أ. بكى عند حديثي عن أن دخول المعركة كانت استجابة من القائد أبو خالد لنداءات المقدسين. وقال هو استجاب لاستغاثة المرابطين، وماذا نحن فعلنا؟ لا شيء؟

G. We in Hezbollah are reproaching ourselves because our intervention is not at the required level.

ح. نحن نؤنب أنفسنا في حزب الله لأن مستوى تدخلنا ليس بالمستوى المطلوب.

Document 5: Summary of "Ahmed's" meeting with Khalil Harb, May 17, 2021

► In the meeting between "Ahmed" and Nasrallah's anonymous assistant for operations, held on May 15, 2021, "Ahmed" asked for Hezbollah's intervention to occupy IDF forces in the north. He said Hezbollah's intervention up to that point had been limited and Hamas expected more. In response, the Hezbollah secretary general's assistant replied that the request was justified.

After he finished speaking, I told him that there was a message from the brothers and a recommendation from me:

- A. The brothers' message is that Hezbollah must intervene more than it currently is in order to occupy the forces in the north. Your intervention so far has been limited, and the brothers sent me a message, which I passed on to Hajj Ramadan, that they do not want you to enter the hostilities, but they want a greater effort than what is currently being invested.
- B. My recommendation is clear: the enemy's defensive tactics, Iron Dome, sonar, signal jamming and the like, are somewhat effective. Our effort must be joint in order to find a mechanism to deal with them in the future. You did not cooperate with us as required previously, and you did not benefit from the Gaza combat arena in choosing some of the things you are thinking about.

He responded as follows:

- C. Regarding our entry into the campaign, inform your brother that our assessment at the end of April was that the enemy could no longer tolerate the progress on a certain track of ours, regarding guided missiles, and would therefore carry out a strike deep inside Lebanese territory. The maneuver they announced was supposed to serve as cover for this strike. Therefore, we raised our alert level by 75%. The opening of the hostilities with you postponed their measures against us, and we remained on alert.
- D. Personally, I was not aware of your leadership's desire for us to escalate our measures, and it is a legitimate request. Therefore, I will now go to his eminence the Sayyid [Nasrallah] to discuss the matter with him. I am convinced by what you are saying.
- E. We decided with Hajj Ramadan that any strategic threat against you will be met with strong intervention on our part.
- F. Regarding dealing with Israeli defensive tactics, now send me your requests so that we can send our response. We will not withhold any information from you, and I commit to that.

My response to his statement:

- A. Your entry into the campaign should not depend solely on our request. The principle is that there should be an agreement between our two commands on reference scenarios. If the enemy deploys a force at a certain level on one front, the other front should be prepared to intervene directly at a level agreed upon in advance.

B. He said, the idea of reference scenarios is very important, and it requires joint discussion and agreement between the two sides. I will present it to our command.

بعد انتهاء حديثه قلت له يوجد رسالة من الإخوة وتوصية مني:

أ. رسالة الإخوة هي ضرورة تدخل الحزب بشكل أكبر مما عليه الآن بغية تثبيت القوات في الشمال، فتدخلكم حتى الآن محدود، والإخوة أرسلوا رسالة قدمتها للحاج رمضان بأنهم لا يريدونكم دخول المعركة، ولكنهم يريدون فعلاً أكثر مما هو موجود.

ب. توصيتي: واضح بأن تكتيكات العدو الدفاعية (القبة، والسونارت، والتشويش وغيره) تكتيكات فعالة إلى حد ما، يجب أن يكون جهدنا مشترك لإيجاد آليات مستقبلية للتعامل معها، أنتم لم تتعاونوا معنا بالشكل المطلوب سابقاً، ولم تستفيدوا من ميدان غزة في اختبار بعض ما تفكرون به.

ود بالتالي:

ت. بخصوص دخولنا في المعركة أبلغ إخوانك بأن تقدير الموقف كان لدينا نهاية شهر أبريل بأن العدو لم يعد يحتمل تقدم مساراً خاصاً لدينا (بقصد الصواريخ الموجهة) وعليه فإنه سيقوم بتوجيه ضربة خاصة في العمق اللبناني، وأن المناورة التي أعلن عنها ستكون غطاء لهذه الضربة. لذا فقد رفعنا الجهوية بنسبة 675%. وإن فتح المعركة معكم أجل خطواتنا، ونحن لا زلنا في حالة استنفار.

ث. أنا شخصياً لم أكن أعلم برغبة القيادة طرفكم برفع التوتر من طرفنا، وهذا طلب مشروع، لذا أنا الآن سأذهب إلى سماعة السيد لمناقشته في الأمر، أنا مقتنع بما تقولون.

ج. لدينا قرار اتخذناه مع الحاج رمضان: أي تهديد استراتيجي ضدكم، سيقابله تدخل قوي من طرفنا.

ح. بخصوص مواجهة تكتيكات الدفاع الإسرائيلية، الآن أرسل لي طلباتك لترسل لكم ردنا، ولن نبخل بأي معلومة بهذا الشأن، وأنا كفيل بذلك.

تعليقي على حديثه:

أ. يجب ألا يتوقف دخولكم في المعركة على الطلب منا فقط، الأصل أن يكون هناك اتفاقاً بين قيادتنا على سيناريوهات مرجعية، إذا فقل العدو قوة بمستوى ما على إحدى الجبهات، تكون الجبهة الأخرى جاهزة للتدخل مباشرة بمستوى متلف عليه.

ب. قال: فكرة السيناريوهات المرجعية فكرة جداً مهمة، وبحاجة إلى نقاش مشترك، واتفاق بين الطرفين. سأطرحها على القيادة لدينا.

Document 8: Summary of the meeting between "Ahmed" and Nasrallah's assistant, May 15, 2021

► When "Ahmed's" met with Hajj Abu al-Faisal (Ali Karaki), the Hezbollah operative responsible for the southern region, held on May 18, 2021 at Khalil Harb's request, he also noted that Hezbollah's involvement had not been on the scale Hamas had expected. In response, Abu al-Faisal mentioned the rocket fire and the demonstrations along the border and said they hoped Nasrallah would approve additional measures.

So far, Hezbollah's involvement in the campaign does not meet the hopes the brothers had placed in you. They do not want you to enter the campaign, but at the very least occupy the IDF forces in the north.

لحتى الآن تدخل حزب الله في الموكبة ليس ضمن أمل إخواننا منكم، لا يريدونكم أن تدخلوا معركة، لكن على الأقل تثبيت القوات في الشمال.

Regarding Hezbollah's activities, he said your message was received. You saw the rocket fire. We have just completed a maneuver in the south. We carried out sabotage operations at the border fence. There are many demonstrations along the border.

After your message arrived, we sat down and presented an advanced plan, which we submitted to Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah. We are trying to pressure him as much as we can to approve advanced steps. We pray to Allah that things proceed as you hope and that the Sayyid approves some of the steps.

Regarding Hajj Khalil Harb's message, his instructions are orders. We are now appointing the committee you requested and it will begin working after the hostilities end.

بخصوص فعاليات حزب الله: قال لقد وصلت رسالتكم، رأيت إطلاق الصواريخ، الآن أنحننا مناورة على مستوى الجنوب، ندير عمليات تخريب للسلك الفاصل، يوجد العديد من المظاهرات على الحدود.
بعدها وصلت رسالتكم جلسنا، وقدمنا تصوراً متقدماً، ورفعناه للسيد حسن نصرالله، ونحاول أن نضغط عليه بما نستطيع للموافقة على خطوات متقدمة، نسأل الله أن تمضي الأمور كما تريدون، ويوافق السيد على بعض الخطوات.
بخصوص رسالة الحاج خليل حرب فتوجيهاته أوامر، الآن تشكل اللجنة التي تريدونها ونبدأ بالعمل بعد انتهاء المعركة.

Document 9: Summary of "Ahmed's" meeting with Abu al-Faisal, May 18, 2021

Hamas-Hezbollah Coordination during Preparations for the October 7, 2023 Invasion

► The Hamas leadership viewed the Sword of Jerusalem as a major achievement for the movement and a defeat for Israel, contrary to Israeli statements claiming the operation had strengthened deterrence against Hamas. The victory narrative was reflected in public statements by senior Hamas figures in the days after the ceasefire, who declared a strategic victory and downplayed the severity of the damage to the military capabilities, and also in Hamas documents which included conversations and correspondence among senior

movement figures and with senior figures in Iran and Hezbollah, in which expressions such as "legendary power" and "divine victory" appeared.²⁰

► The success of the hostilities, from Hamas' perspective, strengthened the belief among the movement's leadership, especially Yahya al-Sinwar and Muhammad Deif, that the vision of the "destruction of Israel" would be realistic if the decisive campaign were launched from several fronts simultaneously. Correspondence among senior Hamas figures indicates that within weeks of the end of the hostilities, Hamas had already defined its objective as achieving "the great victory and removing the cancer" and "eliminating the entity and removing it from our land and our holy sites," in coordination with the other members of the "axis of resistance," especially Hezbollah and Iran.

► As early as the meeting between "Ahmed" and Khalil Harb on May 17, 2021, in the midst of the hostilities, Harb praised Hamas' conduct and promised that the campaign would lead to the establishment of joint coordination headquarters.

D. Your success in foiling the enemy's plan was inspired by Allah. Allah granted you success, for Allah inspires his servants as he inspires his messengers; he inspired you as he inspired the mother of Moses, and as he inspired the Virgin Mary.

E. What is happening is a truly creative move whose effects will continue to exist.

ث. نجاحكم في افشال خطة العدو هو وحي من الله، لقد وفقكم الله، فالله يوحى لعباده كما يوحى لرسله، فقد أوحى إليكم كما أوحى إلى أم موسى، وكما أوحى إلى مريم العذراء.
ج. ما يحصل هو إبداع حقيقي مفاعيله ستبقى مستمرة.

My response:

A. I responded by thanking him and expressing appreciation for his efforts in the service of Palestine over the past years.

B. I spoke about how long we would remain within the theoretical framework when talking about the unification of the fronts.

²⁰ See the April 2025 Amit Institute report, [Operation Guardian of the Walls as a watershed moment in Hamas' strategy for the "destruction of Israel," as reflected in documents found by the IDF in the Gaza Strip](#)

الرد على حديثه:

- أ. عقت بالشكر له وعلى جهوده التي بذلها في خدمة فلسطين على مدار السنوات السابقة.
ب. تحدثت معه إلى متى سنبقى في الإطار النظري نتحدث عن توحيد الجبهات

His answer to me:

A. The 2021 campaign will open many doors. We were occupied in Syria and with our internal situation. I promise you there is a new, genuine discussion about establishing joint coordination headquarters for the entire axis to invest efforts in a real way to liberate Palestine. This matter is now being discussed seriously.

رد علي:

أ. معركة 2021 ستفتح كثيراً من الأبواب، نحن كنا منشغولون في سوريا، ومنشغولون في وضعنا الداخلي، أؤكد لك أنه يوجد نقاش جديد حقيقي لإقامة أركان تنسيقية مشتركة لكل المحور لاستثمار الجهود بشكل حقيقي لتحرير فلسطين. وهذا الأمر يُناقش الآن بشكل جدي.

Document 5: Summary of "Ahmed's" meeting with Khalil Harb, May 17, 2021

► However, the letters reveal the complex relationship between Hamas and Hezbollah. Alongside principled support for Hamas' plans, senior Hezbollah were hesitant and reserved. One reservation concerned the urgency of the attack as Hamas presented. it Another concerned its objectives, and senior Hamas figures were asked to formulate them in greater detail.

► Isma'il Haniyeh sent a letter to Muhammad Deif and his deputy Marwan Issa on July 10, 2021, reporting that in response to their request, he had held meetings with senior Iranian figures and with Nasrallah, during which they discussed "future strategic courses" and the establishment of a "resistance" front defense alliance. They noted that the performance of Hamas' military wing in the Sword of Jerusalem had had a profound impact on them and that the victory, military management and coordination between military and political activity had impressed them greatly. They noted the strategic dimension of the victory, which they believed would affect future activity in many arenas. According to Haniyeh, Nasrallah informed him that the Houthis and the militias in Iraq stood with Hezbollah, and that "fighters" from Syria were also prepared to immediately enter any future regional war. However, Nasrallah raised reservations, noting that it required formulating a position regarding the rules of engagement, the role of each party at the various levels and the

political decisions. According to Nasrallah, the strategy should also be adopted at the political level, and the nature of participation would be determined for each front according to need and in accordance with what would be agreed.

- The performance of [the] al-Qassam [Brigades] in the campaign had a tremendously profound effect on them. They were amazed by the victory, the military management and the harmony between what was happening on the ground and the political level. They made it absolutely clear that the campaign and its results had a strategic dimension and opened the door wide to the great victory and to planning future activity in many arenas in order to decide the struggle with the enemy, Allah willing.

- لقد كان لأداء القسام في المعركة تأثير كبير وعميق في نفوسهم وهم مفعمون بالنصر وبالإدارة العسكرية والانسجام الميداني والسياسي، وعبروا بكل وضوح أن المعركة ونتائجها ذات بعد استراتيجي وفتحت الباب واسعاً للنصر الكبير ولتصميم العمل مستقبلاً على جبهات متعددة لحسم الصراع مع العدو بإذن الله تعالى.

- We discussed strategic and future courses, including what appeared in the letter regarding the establishment of a defense coalition of the resistance fronts. We presented the issue to Hassan Nasrallah based on what we had formulated during our previous visit and noted that the Yemenis and the Iraqis stand alongside Hezbollah, together with thousands of "fighters" in Syria who are prepared to take part in any future regional war.
This matter requires the brothers concerned, both on our side and on theirs, to formulate the concept, the rules of engagement, the roles, the levels and the political decisions. This matter is based on two principles:
The first: Adoption of this strategic direction at the leadership and political levels.
The second: The nature and level of participation will be determined for each front at the appropriate time and in accordance with what is agreed upon, should a request come from the active front.

- وقد تناولنا في حديثنا المسارات الاستراتيجية والمستقبلية بما في ذلك ما ورد في الرسالة بشأن بناء تحالف دفاعي بين جهات المقاومة، وقد استعرضنا في هذا المجال مع السيد حسن نصر الله ما كنا قد أسسنا له في زيارتنا السابقة حيث وضعنا في صورة ما تم بعد الزيارة حيث ذكر بأن اليمينيين والعراقيين الى جانب حزب الله مع آلاف المقاتلين في سوريا جاهزون للدخول في أي حرب إقليمية قادمة. وهذا يتطلب من الأخوة المختصين طرفنا وطرفهم وضع الرؤية وقواعد الاشتباك والأدوار والمستويات والقرارات السياسي، ولهذا الأمر ضابطان: الأول: اعتماد هذا التوجه الاستراتيجي قيادياً وسياسياً. الثاني: طبيعة المشاركة ومستواها يحدد لكل جهة في حينه وحسب ما يتفق عليه في حال الطلب من الجهة الساخنة.

Document 6: Minutes of the Haniyeh-Nasrallah meeting in a letter from Haniyeh to Deif and Issa, July 10, 2021

► Isma'il Haniyeh wrote a private, urgent letter to Yahya al-Sinwar on May 21, 2022, regarding talks he had held in Lebanon with senior movement figures, including Salah al-'Arouri and Khalil al-Hayya, about expanding the arena of confrontation with Israel, including the need to examine the position of the "allies" (Iran and Hezbollah) regarding entering a regional war and their willingness to intervene in a future campaign.

- The matter should be examined with the allies to determine their true position regarding the regional war that Sayyid Hassan [Nasrallah] spoke about, or the level of their intervention when the moment of truth arrives. That requires a face-to-face meeting and an in-depth dialogue regarding our move.

▪ فحص الأمر مع الحلفاء للوقوف على حقيقة موقفهم من الحرب الإقليمية التي تحدث عنها السيد حسن، أو مستوى تدخلهم إذا "جد الجد" وهذا يتطلب اللقاء المباشر بهم والحوار المعق حول التوجه لدينا.

Afterward, we held a four-way meeting, Abu al-Abd [Haniyeh], the Sheikh [al-'Arouri], Abu Osama [al-Hayya] and Abu Omar Muhammad [political bureau member Muhammad Nasr], at the end of which we agreed the following:

1. The move under discussion should be established as part of a complete concept, part of a plan which will determine the roles of the [different Hamas] areas, the manner of their participation and the way they will connect and complement one another, especially with regard to the West Bank.
2. A delegation should be formed to visit Lebanon and meet with Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah and Hajj Ramadan, without media and without noise, to examine the matter and

understand their position. The Sheikh [al-'Arouri] and Abu Osama [al-Hayya] traveled to Lebanon yesterday, and I sent Abu Omar Muhammad with them.

3. The discussion in the executive committee should deal with examining developments, assessing the situation and defining general processes which will serve our practical preparations, but those preparations or the steps we take should not be discussed at all.
4. If we reach a concept or agreement with the allies, a visit to Lebanon should be organized and a meeting held with Sheikh Hassan and Hajj Ramadan, possibly in the presence of Hajj Esma'il [Qa'ani], to outline the agreement and the understandings regarding connected practical steps and as the means and assistance required for it.

ثم عقدنا لقاء رباعي (أبو العبد، الشيخ، أبو أسامة، أبو عمر محمد) وتم في النهاية الاتفاق على ما يلي:

1. اعتماد التوجه ضمن رؤية متكاملة وخطة تحدد أدوار الأقاليم وطريقة مشاركتها وتكاملها وتواصلها خاصة في الضفة.
2. تشكيل وفد لزيارة لبنان واللقاء بالسيد حسن نصر الله والحاج رمضان بدون اعلام أو ضجيج، وبحث الأمر ومعرفة موقفهم، وهذا قد توجه أمس إلى لبنان كل من الشيخ وأبو أسامة وأوفدت معهم أبو عمر محمد.
3. أن يتم التطرق في (ل ت) إلى بحث التطورات وتقدير الموقف وتحديد توجهات عامة تخدم ترتيباتنا ولكن دون أي حديث عن هذه الترتيبات أو الخطوات التي سنقوم بها.
4. في حال تم التوصل مع الحلفاء إلى رؤية أو اتفاق يتم ترتيب زيارة لي إلى لبنان واللقاء بالشيخ حسن والحج رمضان وبإمكانية حضور الحاج إسماعيل لترسيم الاتفاق والتفاهم على خطواته المحددة والإمكانات والدعم اللازم له.

Document 10: Letter from Haniyeh to al-Sinwar regarding the meetings he held with senior Hamas figures, May 21, 2022

► On May 25, 2022, Haniyeh sent al-Sinwar a letter briefing him on a roughly four-hour meeting held four days earlier in Lebanon between a delegation of senior Hamas figures, al-'Arouri, al-Hayya and Nasr, and Nasrallah and Izadi. The Hamas representatives said that based on several indications, they believed there was an opportunity at that time to expand the confrontation with Israel into a broad, open, ongoing campaign which would include additional arenas such as Lebanon. They listed several factors which they thought made war possible at the current timing, including the weakness of the Palestinian Authority and the rise of the "resistance," inside Israel as well, Israel's "fragile" internal situation, the centrality of the "struggle" for Jerusalem, the international situation and preoccupation with the Russia-Ukraine war. Hamas' position was that the attack should be carried out quickly, before the end of the Russia-Ukraine war and before Israel and the Palestinian Authority

were free to deal with the "Palestinian resistance." Senior Hamas figures asked, together with Hezbollah and Iran, to conduct a situation assessment regarding the timing, challenges and consequences. They also asked for discussion regarding the required partnership between the parties, the role of each arena at home and abroad and the role of the allies and the "axis of resistance" in such a campaign.

Meanwhile, the power of the resistance forces inside Palestine is rising, especially in the West Bank, Jerusalem and Gaza. There is an increase in national awakening inside the 1948 territories and an expansion of popular support for the resistance in Palestine *[sic]*. The resistance has recorded major achievements, especially in the Sword of Jerusalem and afterward, to the point of creating a state of deterrence against the occupation.

2. The internal situation of the occupation, both as a Zionist society and as a political echelon and government, is fragile.
3. The centrality of the struggle today over Jerusalem and al-Aqsa and its implications inside Palestine and for the entire nation.
4. The regional situation and the progress of the current of resistance and rejection within the nation, the achievements of the resistance in a number of places and the stability of the Islamic Republic.
5. The international situation in light of the Russia-Ukraine war and Western support for Ukraine against Russia on the grounds that it is an occupying power, which places the "Israeli" occupation of Palestine on the agenda of international attention today.
6. The efforts of the Zionist enemy and the Americans to keep the region calm, especially Palestine, because of their preoccupation with other issues, such as the confrontation with Russia and China.

وفي المقابل تصاعد لقوى المقاومة داخل فلسطين، وخاصة في الضفة الغربية والقدس وغزة، وتصاعد حالة النهوض الوطني داخل ٤٨ وتوسع الحاضنة الشعبية المؤيدة للمقاومة في فلسطين، وتحقيق المقاومة لإنجازات كبيرة وخاصة في سيف القدس وما بعدها حتى شكلت المقاومة حالة ردع مع الاحتلال.

2- ظروف الاحتلال الداخلية أيضا كمجتمع صهيوني وكطبقة سياسية وحكومة هشة.

3- محورية الصراع اليوم على القدس والأقصى وأثرهما في داخل فلسطين والأمة جمعاء.

4- الواقع الإقليمي وتقدم تيار المقاومة والممانعة في الأمة، وتحقيق إنجازات للمقاومة في أماكن عدة بالإضافة إلى حالة الجمهورية الإسلامية المستقرة.

5- الظرف الدولي في ظل الحرب الروسية الأوكرانية، والتأييد الغربي لأوكرانيا ضد روسيا بحجة أنها قوة محتلة؛ مما يضع الاحتلال الإسرائيلي لفلسطين على طاولة الاهتمام الدولي اليوم.

6- حرص العدو الصهيوني والأمريكان على بقاء المنطقة وخاصة فلسطين في حالة هدوء؛ لانشغالهم في قضايا أخرى كمواجهة روسيا والصين.

Therefore, we want to escalate the resistance and the confrontation with the occupation to place the Palestinian issue back before the world, achieve gains in the liberation project, [sic] stop the wave of regional [political] normalization and defend Palestine from Zionist plots, especially regarding Jerusalem and al-Aqsa. The involvement of other fronts outside Palestine will be a factor uniting the nation around Palestine and bypassing the sectarianism exploited to divide the nation.

لكل ما تقدم نريد تصعيد المقاومة والمواجهة مع الاحتلال؛ بهدف وضع القضية الفلسطينية أمام العالم مجدداً، ولتحقيق إنجازات على مشروع التحرير، ووقف مسلسل التطبيع في المنطقة وحماية فلسطين من المخططات الصهيونية وخاصة القدس والأقصى، وإن انخرطت جهات أخرى خارج فلسطين سيكون عاملاً موحداً للأمة نحو فلسطين، متجاوزاً للطائفية التي تُستغل لتفريق الأمة.

Document 11: Letter from Haniyeh to al-Sinwar regarding the Hamas delegation's meeting with Nasrallah and Izadi, May 25, 2022

► According to the letter, Nasrallah seemed to have reservations about Hamas' plan. He said that in principle the idea seemed reasonable, but he had several questions, mainly regarding the timing and the objectives of the war, which he said would determine its scope. He stressed that it was essentially a Palestinian campaign, and for Hezbollah to support it they had to first understand the Palestinian side's ability to sustain it. Nasrallah noted the need to exploit the situation and carry out lone-wolf attacks. He added that to prevent

international intervention, it would not be in Iran's interest to enter the campaign actively, but only to support and assist.

❖ His eminence the Sayyid's response:

- In principle, the idea is good, logical and worthy of discussion.

❖ رد سماحة السيد:

- الفكرة من حيث المبدأ جيدة ومعقولة وجديرة بالنقاش.

We prepared, and continue to prepare, for this moment, but how do we reach it? Israel is weakening, and the occupation's statements indicate internal weakness because the occupation is suffering from internal collapse. Meanwhile, the Palestinian resistance is escalating, and operations against the occupation must be exploited, especially lone-wolf attacks. We prepare day and night, and our "soldiers" do not interfere in our internal affairs, but are busy preparing.

نحن كنا وما زلنا نحضر لهذه اللحظة، ولكن كيف نصل إليها؟ فإسرائيل تضعف، وتصريحات الاحتلال تظهر ضعفاً داخلياً، وهذا بسبب ما يعانيه الاحتلال من انهيارات داخلية لديهم، والمقاومة الفلسطينية تتصاعد، ولا بد من استثمار العمليات ضد الاحتلال وخاصة العمليات الفردية، ونحن نعد العدة ليلاً ونهاراً، وعساكرنا لا يتدخلون في شأننا الداخلي ومهتمون بالإعداد.

- In my personal assessment, the timing is right to think about the issue, and it requires we have an internal discussion with our brothers. I will discuss it in a narrow circle with my brothers because the decision belongs to the leadership and not to me personally.
- However, our goals must be defined, since they will determine the scope of the action required and the scope of the expected victory:
 - Do we expect this confrontation to lead to the complete retreat of the occupation?
 - Do we want the occupation to leave the 1967 lands?
 - Do we want the occupation to leave 1967 and part of the 1948 territories?
 - Do we want to impose new equations, as happened in Sword of Jerusalem and the July war?
 - Do we want to prevent the Jews from entering al-Aqsa Mosque and its surroundings?

These are modest goals which do not need a war and can be achieved through actions from Gaza and Lebanon.

- If you have defined goals, let us know and focus our thinking.

- بتقديري الشخصي أن التوقيت سليم للتفكير في الأمر، ومن ناحيتنا يحتاج إلى نقاش داخلي مع إخواننا، وسأناقشه في حلقة ضيقة مع إخواني، لأن القرار للقيادة وليس لي شخصياً.

- ولكن لا بد من تحديد الأهداف التي نريدها؛ لأنه ينعكس على الأهداف تحديد حجم العملية المطلوبة وحجم الانتصار المتوقع بعد ذلك:

- هل نتوقع مع هذه المواجهة هروب الاحتلال تماماً؟
- هل نريد خروج الاحتلال من أراضي ٦٧؟
- هل نريد خروج الاحتلال من ٦٧ ومناطق من ٤٨؟
- هل نريد فرض معادلات جديدة مثل ما تم في سيف القدس وحرب تموز؟
- هل نريد منع اليهود من دخول المسجد الأقصى وباحاته؟

فهذا هدف متواضع لا يستدعي حرباً، ويمكن تحقيقه بعمليات من غزة ولبنان.

- إذا كان لديكم أهدافاً محددة فأخبرونا لتعينونا على التفكير.

Document 11: Letter from Haniyeh to al-Sinwar regarding the Hamas delegation's meeting with Nasrallah and Izadi, May 25, 2022

► The Hamas delegation noted that they had not yet defined the objectives of the war and had left the matter for discussion with Hezbollah, which could raise any objective for which they had the means and capabilities to implement, whether limited or broad. They decided that each side would return to discuss the issue, including with military levels in Iran, and would meet again in Lebanon. Haniyeh asked al-Sinwar to appoint a limited team of military and security representatives who would define the objectives of the war and detail the demands from each of the arenas and participating parties.

Our side must now:

- Determine a narrow circle to discuss the issue, together with the expert/authorized security and military brothers.
- Define the objectives and the requirements of each objective and the expected scenarios.
- Define what is required from each of the arenas and from each of the parties participating in this confrontation, inside Palestine and outside it.
- Define the expected results, opportunities and challenges.

- Then summarize and provide a situation assessment which can be discussed, and hold a limited meeting between the "inside" and the "outside" to agree on the direction we agree upon and which we will bring for discussion with the allies.

المطلوب الآن من جانبنا:

- عمل حلقة ضيقة لنقاش هذا الموضوع ومع الإخوة المختصين الأمنيين والعسكريين.
- تحديد الأهداف والمتطلبات لكل هدف والسيناريوهات المتوقعة.
- تحديد المطلوب من كل ساحة من الساحات وجهة من جهات المشاركة في هذه المواجهة، سواء من داخل فلسطين أو خارجها.
- تحديد المآلات المتوقعة، والفرص والتحديات.
- لنخلص بعد ذلك بتقدير موقف يمكن مناقشته وعقد لقاء مصغر بين الداخل والخارج للاتفاق على الوجهة التي نتفق عليها ونحملها للنقاش مع الحلفاء فيها.

Document 11: Letter from Haniyeh to al-Sinwar regarding the Hamas delegation's meeting with Nasrallah and Izadi, May 25, 2022

► With the questions raised by Nasrallah, a letter was sent from "our brother" (apparently al-Sinwar) to Haniyeh on June 19, 2022, asking him, when he met in Lebanon with senior Hezbollah and Revolutionary Guards figures, to present three possible scenarios for a "major strategic campaign that would change the face of the region and the rules of the game," with each scenario also including a degree of Hezbollah involvement:

- ◆ The first scenario, **the major strategic campaign, the Wad al-Akhira campaign**.²¹ all components of the "axis of resistance," except Iran, would attack Israel to "bring down and end the occupation state and end the wretched situation in the region." According to the scenario, "Such a campaign will completely change the face of the region, its systems and its political reality, while also bringing about the realization of the great Islamic revolution." It was an attainable objective" assuming that Hezbollah had one third of the capabilities being discussed and participated with full force," alongside "reasonable participation" by "axis" forces from Yemen, Iraq and Syria, as well as forces from Jordan, Judea and Samaria and Israel's Arabs ("the inside"). It was Hamas' favorite scenario and "the symbol of the campaign must be al-Aqsa and

²¹ The expression Wad al-Akhirah ("the Second Promise") comes from the Quran, Surah 17, al-Isra, "The Night Journey," verse 7, which is translated as "the second time." Hamas interprets it as referring to the campaign to destroy Israel and seize control of "Palestine" and al-Aqsa Mosque.

Jerusalem, since they can cause a nuclear explosion throughout the region." The best timing would be one of the Jewish holidays, preferably Passover.

1 - Scenario of a major strategic campaign, the Wad al-Akhira campaign:

We and Hezbollah and the resistance forces and the regional Axis of Jerusalem, without Iran, will enter it in a surprise confrontation from all arenas, with all available force, with the aim of bringing down the occupying state and eliminating it, and ending the state of regional collapse, which will change the shape of the region, its systems and its political reality as a whole and lead to the rise of the great Islamic revolution. The brothers in the military are convinced that if the party has one third of what has been discussed in terms of military capabilities and participates with all its strength, together with logical participation from Yemen, Iraq and Syria, from the axis forces, not the states, and participation in guerrilla action across the borders of Jordan, together with our solid participation and the explosion of the West Bank and the inside [Israel's Arabs], we will be able, Allah willing and with his help, to achieve the desired objective. That is the preferred scenario, and we must reach an agreement on it. The banner of the campaign must be al-Aqsa and Jerusalem because it is an element of nuclear explosion throughout the region, and the timing will certainly be connected to one of the Jewish holidays when their incursions into al-Aqsa, their attacks and their Talmudic prayers increase. Certainly Passover, which coincides in one way or another with Ramadan, is the most appropriate, but there are other Jewish holidays that could provide the spark for the explosion.

١- سيناريو معركة استراتيجية كبرى (معركة وعد الآخرة) :-

ندخل فيها نحن والحزب وقوى المقاومة ومحور القدس في المنطقة (غير ايران) بكل قوتنا في مواجهة مباغته من كل الساحات وبكل قوة متاحة بهدف اسقاط دولة الاحتلال وإنهائها ، وإنهاء حالة السقوط في المنطقة ، والتي ستغير شكل المنطقة وأنظمتها وواقعها السياسي بالمجمل وستؤدي إلى قيام الثورة الإسلامية الكبرى في المنطقة والإخوة في العسكر على قناعة انه اذا كان لدي الحزب ثلث ما يتم الحديث عنه من مقدرات عسكرية وشارك بذلك بكل قوة ، مع مشاركة معقولة من اليمن والعراق وسوريا (من قوى المحور وليس الدول) ، ومشاركة فدائية عبر حدود الأردن ، مع مشاركتنا القوية وتفجير الضفة والداخل فإننا قادرون بإذن الله وتأييده على تحقيق الهدف المنشود ، وهذا هو السيناريو المفضل ، والذى ، يجب أن ، نسعى ، للوصول ، للاتفاق ، عليه ، ، عنوان المعركة يجب أن يكون الأقصى ،

والقدس لأنه عامل تفجير نووي في المنطقة كلها ، والتوقيت سيرتبط بالتأكيد بأحد الأعياد اليهودية التي تزيد فيها اقتحاماتهم للأقصى واعتداءاتهم وصلواتهم التلمودية ، وبالتأكيد فإن عيد الفصح الذي يتزامن بصورة أو أخرى مع رمضان هو الأنسب ولكن هناك أعياد أخرى لدى اليهود يمكن أن تكون فيها شرارة الانفجار .

Document 12: Letter from "our brother" to Haniyeh, June 19, 2022

◆The second, **intermediate campaign scenario**: Hamas would play the central role in the campaign against Israel, while Hezbollah would participate partially, along with forces from the other arenas. The assessment was that in this scenario, significant damage would be caused to Israel, many of its citizens would want to emigrate and Judea and Samaria would be liberated, as would the prisoners. He noted it would also lay the foundation for Israel's final elimination in the future.

2 - Intermediate campaign scenario:

Its objective is to defame and discredit the enemy, destroy its capabilities, prestige and motivation to fight, shatter its morale and kill many, destroy the image of the occupation as a force capable of being the axis of the (Sunni-Zionist) alliance, change the regional popular and political atmosphere, end the Palestinian Authority, change internal Palestinian political dynamics, release the prisoners, liberate the West Bank, defend Jerusalem and al-Aqsa, and establish the Battle of the Second Promise. We enter this battle with force, and Hezbollah enters it with a quarter or a third of its strength, while the other parts remain for deterrence

and the strategic campaign. The forces of the Axis of Jerusalem²² enter from the other arenas, and we detonate the West Bank and the occupied inside.

٢- سناريو معركة متوسطة :-
تهدف إلى إساءة وجه العدو وتهشيم قدراته وهيبته ودافعية القتال لديه . وتحطيم معنوياته ، وتدفع
الكثيرين للهجرة المعاكسة . وتكسر صورة الاحتلال كقوة تصلح ان تكون محور للتحالف (الصهيوني
السني) . وتغيير المزاج الشعبي والسياسي في المنطقة وتنهى السلطة . وتغير قواعد السياسة
الفلسطينية الداخلية . تحرر الاسرى ، وتحرر الضفة الغربية وتحمي القدس والأقصى وتؤسس لمعركة
وعد الآخرة . هذه المعركة ندخل فيها بقوة . ويدخل فيها الحزب بربع أو ثلث قوته ويبقى الأجزاء الأخرى
للردع ومعركته الاستراتيجية . وتدخل فيها قوى محور القدس من الساحات الأخرى ونفجر فيها الضفة
والداخل المحتلين .

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► **The third scenario:** Hezbollah would not be a direct partner, at least not in the first stage. The main burden would fall on Hamas, joined by forces from the "axis of resistance" and fedayeen from Jordan and Syria. That would be the minimum scenario with which Hamas could be satisfied, the "necessity," and it would not require the approval of Iran's leader, but only that of Nasrallah and Hezbollah.

3 - The third scenario:

This is a scenario of necessity, which we enter with all our strength and detonate the situation in the West Bank and inside the interior. In it, Hezbollah enables the operation of our forces with increasing effectiveness from Lebanon, and the support of the forces of the Axis of Jerusalem is activated from other arenas, Iraq and Yemen, and guerrilla activity is activated with the maximum possible capability through the Syrian and Jordanian arenas. Hezbollah does not participate directly but ensures the activation of everything mentioned above, while at the same time it is at the highest levels of preparedness and capability to move to a medium- or high-level attack according to an assessment of the developments on the ground. This scenario is the minimum that can be agreed upon, and according to our assessment, agreement on it and the decision regarding it are within Nasrallah and Hezbollah's authority and do not require the guide [Iran's leader]. Accordingly, an agreement must be the minimum for this visit, while presenting the first two scenarios and arranging a

²² Hezbollah, the Palestinian terrorist organizations, the Houthis in Yemen and the Shi'ite militias in Iraq.

joint visit to Tehran to meet with the guide and present the first two scenarios, especially the first, in an attempt to obtain his agreement to it.

٣- السيناريو الثالث :-

وهو سيناريو الضرورة ندخل فيه نحن بقوتنا ونفجر فيه الوضع في الضفة والداخل ، ويسمح فيه الحزب بتفعيل قواتنا مع زيادة فعاليتها من لبنان ، ويتم تفعيل إسناد قوى محور القدس من الساحات الأخرى (العراق واليمن) ويتم تفعيل العمل الفدائي بأقصى قدرة ممكنة عبر ساحة سوريا وساحة الأردن ، ولا يشارك الحزب فيها بصورة مباشرة ، ولكن يضمن تفعيل كل ما سبق ، وفي نفس الوقت يكون على أعلى درجات الجهوزية والقدرة والاستعداد للانتقال إلى حالة الهجوم بالمستوى المتوسط أو المستوى الأعلى وفقاً لتقديره لتطورات المعركة ، وهذا السيناريو أقل ما يمكن أن ترضى الاتفاق عليه معهم وحسب تقديرنا أن الاتفاق عليه والقرار فيه من صلاحيات نصر الله والحزب ولا يحتاج رجوع للمرشد ، وعليه يجب الاتفاق كحد أدنى في هذه الزيارة ، مع عرض السيناريوهين الأولين والترتيب لزيارة مشتركة لطهران للقاء المرشد وعرض السيناريوهين الأولين ، خاصة الأول في محاولة لأخذ موافقته عليه،،

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► Haniyeh sent al-Sinwar a letter on July 1, 2022, noting that the meetings in Lebanon had been successful and strengthened Hamas' status as the "leader of the Palestinian project." Haniyeh reported that after most of the Hamas delegation members left Lebanon, another secret meeting was held in which he and al-Arouri met with Nasrallah and Izadi. According to Haniyeh, they presented only the first and second scenarios of the three al-Sinwar had mentioned in the previous letter, and Nasrallah and Izadi expressed support for the first, the major campaign, as the option they thought best. However, the letter shows that again Hamas did not receive an unequivocal answer, as Nasrallah and Izadi again asked that before any progress on the matter, the means be examined and the obstacles and challenges be fully understood. Ultimately, it was agreed that Nasrallah would brief Iran's leader on the matter. At the same time, Haniyeh would raise the issue during his expected visit to Iran.

We held a discussion on what was stated in your honorable letter, and the meeting ended in the presence of Hajj Ramadan as follows:

First: The strategic track of the conflict

We presented our vision regarding the course [of action] and explained that we had studied the issue in our internal circles in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Regarding our brothers

abroad, they are conducting a general study of the state of the conflict with the enemy at this stage, but not in the form of scenarios or a detailed vision. We presented the first and second scenarios mentioned in your letter to them, and did not mention the third. After a lengthy, in-depth dialogue, his eminence the Sayyid's position was clear and determined: he supports the first scenario and believes that the data and circumstances prove it is realistic and can be achieved, and will end Israel's existence. Hajj Ramadan supported it in general, but said it was necessary to examine the means and know what the obstacles and challenges were before moving forward on the matter. Regarding the scenario, **the following was agreed:**

- 1 .Raise the situation before the leader of the revolution in Iran and brief him on what we agreed. Sayyid Hassan will take care of that and I will speak with the leader during our next visit to Iran.
- 2 .Therefore, the appropriate authorities are asked to formulate a comprehensive plan which takes into account factors of strength and weakness, the means, the roles and the parties which will participate in it.
- 3 .The participating parties are we in Palestine, Hezbollah in Lebanon and our people organized within the resistance, Syria, Iraq and Yemen. As for Iran, it is the state assisting in achieving victory without entering the campaign. We noted the importance of the participation of the people in Jordan, in accordance with what we discussed, through self-sacrifice operations across the border. Each side will have a role, as determined by the plan which will later be approved by the leadership.
- 4 .Jerusalem and al-Aqsa are the banner of the campaign, and the campaign must begin from within.

وقد بحثنا الأمور التي اتفقنا عليها مع ما ورد في رسالتكم الكريمة وانتهى الاجتماع وبحضور الحاج رمضان على النحو التالي:

أولاً: المسار الاستراتيجي للصراع

فقد عرضنا رؤيتنا في هذا المسار وأوضحنا لهم بأننا درسنا هذا الأمر في دوائرنا الخاصة في غزة والضفة وأما الأخوة في الخارج فهم في صورة البحث العام لوضعية الصراع مع العدو في هذه المرحلة لكن هم ليسوا في صورة السيناريوهات والرؤية التفصيلية، وقد عرضنا عليهم السيناريو الأول والثاني الذي ورد في رسالتكم ولم نتطرق للسيناريو الثالث، وبعد حوار معمق وطويل كان فيه الموقف واضحاً وثابتاً لدى سماحة السيد بأنه مع السيناريو الأول ويرى أن المعطيات والظروف تؤكد بأنه سيناريو واقعي ويمكن تحقيقه، أي إزالة إسرائيل من الوجود، والحاج رمضان بشكل عام أيد ذلك ولكنه أشار إلى ضرورة دراسة الإمكانيات ومعرفة العقبات والتحديات قبل السير في الموضوع، وبعدما توافقنا على السيناريو، تم الاتفاق على الآتي:

1. رفع الموقف لسماحة مرشد الثورة في إيران وإبلاغه بما اتفقنا عليه وسيتولى السيد حسن إلى جانب أنني سأحدث مع المرشد خلال زيارتنا القادمة لإيران.
2. في ضوء ذلك يتم الطلب من جهات الاختصاص وضع خطة متكاملة تأخذ بالاعتبار عناصر القوة والضعف والإمكانيات والأدوار والساحات والأطراف المشاركة.

3. الأطراف المشاركة في هذه المعركة نحن في فلسطين والحزب في لبنان وأبناء شعبنا المأثر في المقاومة، سوريا والعراق واليمن، وأما إيران فهي الدولة الداعمة لتحقيق الانتصار دون أن تدخل المعركة، وقد تم التركيز على أهمية مشاركة الأهل في الأردن وفق ما تحدثنا عنه بعمليات فدائية عبر الحدود، ولكل طرف دوره الرئيس الذي تحدده الخطة التي سيتم اعتمادها لاحقاً من القيادة.
4. القدس والأقصى عنوان المعركة ويجب أن تبدأ المعركة من الداخل.

Document 13: Letter from Haniyeh to al-Sinwar, July 1, 2022

► Even after intensive meetings, the impression was that Hezbollah had not yet formulated a definite position and had delayed its response to Hamas regarding partnership in the campaign. Evidence of that appeared in a document from December 18, 2022, which summarized a limited meeting of Hamas' military council in the Gaza Strip, chaired by Yahya al-Sinwar and Khalil al-Hayya, at which Hamas' activity to strengthen ties with Arab and Muslim countries was discussed. They agreed that urgent secret meetings should be arranged for a Hamas delegation with the Hezbollah leadership and in Iran to discuss the future of joint operations against Israel, and it was emphasized that because of the sensitivity of the message, no one except Isma'il Haniyeh should know its content.

► They also agreed that a message should be conveyed to Nasrallah stating that if Iran and Hezbollah were attacked, Hamas and its military wing would be prepared to take part in the fighting with full force. Conversely, they expected that if an open confrontation occurred between Hamas and Israel regarding the future of Jerusalem and al-Aqsa Mosque, the members of the "resistance axis," especially Hezbollah, would intervene. It was noted that Iran's participation would be at its own discretion and Hamas would not impose it on Iran, but it was important for Hezbollah to play an active role. The alliance with Hezbollah and the

"resistance axis" would be primarily for the purpose of a strategic confrontation with Israel, and potential tactical confrontations would not require the involvement of additional parties.

- The United Fronts:

- It was agreed with Brother Abu Osama [al-Hayya] that the brothers should visit Hezbollah + the State of Iran to deliver a message regarding the future of joint action against the Zionist occupation. Of course, we will update Brother al-Abd [Haniyeh] regarding the situation. The visit should be secret and urgent so that no one except Abu al-Abd knows the content of the meetings, because of the sensitivity of the message.
- An unequivocal message must be conveyed to Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah stating that if Iran or the resistance in Lebanon is involved in future war, then we in the Hamas movement and al-Qassam (Brigades) are ready and prepared to participate in those battles with full force. If confrontations, (the war), occur, the opportunity should be turned into a fateful confrontation with the occupation, we hope its end will come, Allah willing.
- Likewise, in those messages, (it should be noted) that if a confrontation occurs between us and the occupation regarding the future of Jerusalem and al-Aqsa, and an unlimited confrontation occurs, there should be intervention by the axis of resistance, led by Hezbollah and the other factions, (Iraq-Yemen-Syria). The participation of the Republic (Iran) is at its discretion, and we do not set it as a condition for it, but it is very important that Hezbollah have an active role.
- It is understood that the messages should be conveyed to Sayyid Hassan, as well as to Hajj Esma'il Qa'ani and the Revolutionary Guards leader, (Hossein Salami). If possible, contact should also be made with the leader [Khamenei] to update him on this important position.

• الجهات الموحدة :

- تم الاتفاق مع الأخ أبو أسامة أنه من الضروري أن يتم عقد زيارة للإخوة في الحزب + دولة إيران من أجل نقل رسالة واضحة حول مستقبل العمل المشترك ضد الاحتلال الصهيوني ، طبعاً نضع الأخ أبو العبد في صورة الموقف ، والزيارة يجب أن تكون سرية وعاجلة بحيث لا يطلع على فحوى هذه اللقاءات أحد سوى الأخ أبو العبد لحساسية الرسالة .
- وقد تم الخلوص أنه مطلوب نقل رسالة واضحة للسيد حسن نصر الله أنه إذن تعرضت إيران أو المقاومة في لبنان لأي حرب مستقبلية ، فإننا في حركة حماس - والقسام مستعدون وجاهزون من أجل المشاركة بكل قوة في تلك المعارك ، حيث أننا نطمح أنه في حالة كانت المواجهات (الحرب) فالأصل أن نحول تلك الفرصة إلى مواجهة مصيرية مع الاحتلال ، حيث نطمح أن تكون فيها نهايته بإذن الله .
- كذلك في نفس الرسائل أنه مطلوب في حال حصلت مواجهة بيننا وبين الاحتلال حول مستقبل القدس والأقصى وحدثت مواجهة مفتوحة فالأصل أن يتم تدخل محور المقاومة وعلى رأسه الحزب والفصائل الأخرى (العراق - اليمن - سوريا) ، والأمر متروك للجمهورية من حيث المشاركة ، وألا نشترط عليها ذلك ، ولكن من الأهمية بمكان أن يكون للحزب دوراً فاعلاً .
- طبعاً هذه الرسائل الأصل أن تنقل للسيد حسن ، وكذلك للحاج إسماعيل قآني ، وكذلك لممثل الحرس الثوري (حسين سلامي) ، وإن أمكن التواصل مع المرشد لوضعه في صورة هذا الموقف الهام .

Document 14: Minutes of a meeting of Hamas' limited military council in the Gaza Strip, December 18, 2022

► The documents show that in the following months some progress was apparently made regarding Hezbollah, since at the meeting of Hamas' political bureau chaired by Yahya al-Sinwar on June 11, 2023, it was noted that Hezbollah and other organizations in the arena were highly motivated to form an alliance with Hamas to fight Israel in a future campaign. It was further noted that Hamas felt that during the meetings with senior Hezbollah figures they had brought the Lebanese organization out of the "consciousness-searing" state in which, they claimed, it had been since 2006 (the Second Lebanon War).²³ Al-Sinwar noted that a strategic change had occurred after the Sword of Jerusalem regarding the alliance with Hezbollah and Iran, and that activity on the issue was accumulating. It was proposed that to continue recruiting Hezbollah to participate, the movement's information department should adopt the principle of the struggle for Jerusalem, al-Aqsa Mosque and

²³ In August 2006, shortly after the end of the Second Lebanon War, Hassan Nasrallah told al-Jadeed that if he had known the abduction operation would have the outcome it did, they would not have carried it out.

Islam's holy sites, and what he called the "religious war" Israel was waging against Jerusalem and the holy sites.

- As part of the preparations for the brothers' visit to Iran, during Brother Abu Osama al-Hayya's visit to Gaza, several matters required from Iran were emphasized to him again. Recently, we have succeeded in acting effectively and bringing Hezbollah and the Iranians out of their "consciousness-searing state" since 2006 in the Dahiyeh, when Nasrallah said that he would not have entered that campaign had he known the price he would pay.
- Therefore, the Israelis are saying there is a strategic shift among Hezbollah and the Iranians regarding the confrontation and greater readiness.
- Now the Iranians and Hezbollah are highly motivated to form an alliance with Hamas to fight the enemy in any future campaign, and there has been a significant development in preparations and readiness, and we sense this in our talks and discussions with them. We can say that they have emerged from the "consciousness-searing state," and there are statements indicating that.

- في ظل التحضير لزيارة الإخوة لإيران خلال زيارة الأخ/ أبو أسامة الحية لغزة؛ تم تجديد معه بعض الأمور المطلوبة من إيران، وفي الفترة الأخيرة استطعنا أن نعمل بشكل جيد في إخراج حزب الله والإيرانيين من "حالة كي الوعي" خلال الفترة الماضية عام 2006م في الضاحية، وقتها قال نصر الله لو كنت أعرف أنني سأدفع هذا الثمن لما ذهبت لهذه المعركة، من أجل معالجة ذلك.

- ولذلك يقول الإسرائيليون أن هناك تحول استراتيجي لدى الحزب والإيرانيين في الصدام ومزيد من الاستعداد.

- الإيرانيون وحزب الله الآن لديهم استعداد عالٍ في عمل حلف مع حماس لمقاتلة العدو في أي معركة قائمة، وهناك بطور ملموس في الاستعدادات والجهوزية، وهذا ما نلمسه في الحوارات والنقاشات التي تكون معهم، نستطيع القول أنهم خرجوا من "حالة كي الوعي"، وهناك تصريحات قوية لهم في ذلك.

Document 3: Summary of the meeting of Hamas' political bureau in the Gaza Strip, June 11, 2023

► The first evidence of the alliance with Hezbollah appeared in the summary of the political bureau meeting on June 11, 2023, according to which during a round of confrontations between Israel and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) in the Gaza Strip in May 2023,

Hezbollah turned a blind eye to rocket fire at Israel from south Lebanon and even threatened Israel it would respond forcefully to any Israeli response against Lebanese territory.²⁴

- **The most recent rocket-fire operation:** Although the party [Hezbollah] had no information about it, it assisted us in the media and prevented the state from carrying out any act of aggression that could harm any of the jihad fighters. Hezbollah even threatened the enemy that it would respond forcefully to any act of aggression against Lebanon.

- عملية إطلاق الصواريخ الأخيرة رغم أن الحزب ليس لديه معلومات بها، إلا أن الحزب قام بإسنادنا إعلامياً، كما كف أيدي الدولة على أي اعتداء يمكن أن يلحق بأي أخ من المجاهدين، وتأتي هناك تهديد من الحزب للعدو بأن أي اعتداء على لبنان سنرد عليه بالقوة.

Document 3: Summary of the meeting of Hamas' political bureau in the Gaza Strip, June 11, 2023

► At the Hamas political bureau meeting on July 22, 2023, al-Sinwar said significant progress had been made with Hezbollah and with other forces, such that whenever the campaign began they would be ready to surprise Israel from all arenas.

- Building the unity of the arenas and developing work with the allies: We have developed significantly in this matter with Hezbollah and the other forces, and if a campaign occurs for a strategic objective at any moment, we will be ready to surprise the occupation from every direction and from all arenas and fronts.

• بناء وحدة الجبهات وتطوير العمل مع الحلفاء: ما وصلنا إليه اليوم مع الحزب ومع قوى أخرى، نحن تطورنا في هذا الموضوع تطور كبير جداً جداً، وفي أي لحظة لو حدثت معركة من أجل عنوان استراتيجي، سنكون جاهزون لمفاجأة الاحتلال من كل فج ومن كل الساحات والجبهات.

Document 15: Summary of the meeting of Hamas' political bureau in the Gaza Strip, July 22, 2023

► Al-Sinwar gave a speech at the sixth convention of Hamas' Shura Council on August 12, 2023, in which he spoke about the completion of preparations for a campaign with Israel. He

²⁴ The meeting was held shortly after the round of fighting during Operation Shield and Arrow (May 9-13, 2023) between Israel and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). Hamas did not participate actively in the fighting, but it allowed the PIJ to use the launch pits of its military wing. See the January 2026 Amit Institute report, [Hamas Criticism of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad Revealed in Seized Documents from the Gaza Strip](#)

said significant progress had been made in recruiting the "resistance axis" for the campaign, thanks to visits by Hamas delegations to Lebanon and meetings with Nasrallah and Iranians. He said that when the campaign began many fronts would be opened against Israel, and reiterated that Hezbollah had emerged from its state of rigidity and "consciousness-searing," and it appeared ready once again to act against Israel. He added there was even evidence for that in the form of military exercises conducted by the organization's operatives and statements by Hezbollah leaders regarding Jerusalem and al-Aqsa. As an example of cooperation with Hezbollah, he mentioned the rocket fire from Lebanon by Palestinian elements under Hezbollah's sponsorship and with its support on April 6, 2023, because of clashes at al-Aqsa.²⁵

► Al-Sinwar said the current state of affairs with Hezbollah was much better, and if a campaign broke out over the issue of al-Aqsa, Hezbollah would take an active part in it. Even if Hezbollah did not participate with all its strength, at a minimum it would force IDF forces to concentrate military efforts and attention on Israel's northern border for fear of the organization's intervention in the campaign.

On the third level, work is continuing to consolidate and strengthen the axis of resistance and to reach multiple arenas if a major campaign breaks out, Allah willing. The work has progressed significantly and is being carried out primarily by our brothers in the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades and their leadership under the auspices of the movement's leadership in Gaza and of the movement's central leadership, headed by Brother Abu al-Abd [Haniyeh] and Abu Osama [al-Hayya] by virtue of his responsibilities in the Arab and Islamic relations portfolio and his contacts with the brothers in Hezbollah, the Revolutionary Guards and the others that are supposed to be partners in the campaign. Thanks to Allah, we have made exceptional progress, and we are confident that if the major strategic campaign breaks out, Allah willing, many fronts will be opened against the enemy. Everyone can follow the enemy's media through translations, especially on al-Aqsa TV. Many reports on al-Aqsa and others have been translated, of course from al-Hodhud network and others. All our sons are doing wonderful work; anyone who follows can see the enormous fear and panic inside the occupation because of the state of harmony and connection that is developing today, which was symbolically expressed in the Ramadan round, when rockets were fired by our brothers

²⁵ See the April 2023 Amit Institute report, [Rocket Fire Targeting Israel](#)

in Lebanon under the sponsorship, agreement, assistance, support and provision of cover by Hezbollah.

على المستوى الثالث أيضاً العمل يتواصل لبلورة محور المقاومة وتعزيزه والوصول إلى تعدد الجبهات في حال نشوب معركة كبرى بإذن الله سبحانه وتعالى وقد تطور هذا العمل تطوراً كبيراً، والعمل يقوم به تحديداً إخواننا في كتائب الشهيد عز الدين القسام وقيادهم برعاية قيادة الحركة في غزة ورعاية قيادة الحركة المركزية بقيادة الأخ أبو العبد وأبو أسامة من خلال مسؤوليته في ملف العلاقات العربية والإسلامية وتواصله مع الإخوة في حزب الله وفي الحرس الثوري وفي غيرها من الجهات التي من المفترض أن تكون شريكة في هذه المعركة، تقدمنا بفضل الله سبحانه وتعالى تقدماً كبيراً ورائعاً في هذا الموضوع ونحن نثق أنه إذا ما نشبت المعركة الكبرى الاستراتيجية إن شاء الله رب العالمين سيكون هناك جبهات عديدة تنفتح على هذا العدو، وكل من يتابع إعلام العدو اليوم، - هناك فرصة متاحة للجميع أن يتابع إعلام العدو من خلال التراجم وتحديداً على فضائية الأقصى ترجمت الكثير من التقارير الموجودة على فضائية الأقصى وغيرها طبعاً من شبكة الهدهد وغيره، كلهم أبناءنا يعملون عمل كبير - من يتابع يرى حالة الرعب والهلع الكبيرة جداً الموجودة عند الاحتلال من حالة الانسجام والترابط التي تنمو اليوم بفضل الله سبحانه وتعالى، والتعبير كان عنها بصورة رمزية في جولة رمضان حين انطلقت الصواريخ من إخواننا في لبنان، برعاية وموافقة ودعم وإسناد وتشكيل الحاضنة من حزب الله لها،

Document 16: Al-Sinwar's speech at Hamas' Shura Council, August 12, 2023

► Despite al-Sinwar's optimism, apparently even in August 2023, two months before the October 7 invasion and massacre, Hezbollah had not yet formulated its final position regarding partnership in the campaign. A letter from Hamas' military intelligence sent by "Ahmed" to "Brother Yasser" (whose identity is unknown) on August 19, 2023, noted that Hezbollah still had a "psychological barrier" and they were hesitant regarding the plan. Accordingly, he proposed acting with particular delicacy and not exerting unnecessary pressure on Hezbollah. Despite the hesitations, discussions were being held regarding the establishment of a joint intelligence headquarters for Hamas and Hezbollah which would include teams from other organizations and have Iranian representation; Hezbollah was reportedly enthusiastic about the idea. They decided the headquarters would be located in Beirut and for the time being, the headquarters would include only representatives of Hamas, Hezbollah and the Qods Force. However, disagreements arose when Izadi sought to begin the activity with technical specialization, while Hamas wanted to begin immediately with active operations which included a general situation assessment and to proceed from there to specialization.

► Hamas apparently viewed the establishment of the joint headquarters primarily as symbolic and the beginning of the realization of the idea of the unity of the arenas. However, they noted they were aware a joint headquarters would not necessarily benefit them in terms of intelligence, since in their opinion, Hamas' military wing was capable of providing quality intelligence to the forces on its own.

Regarding the issue, I would like to inform you of the recent discussions concerning joint intelligence. I held several meetings with the members of the intelligence team, each separately, and with Hajj Ramadan, head of the Palestine Branch in the Qods Force, Saeed Izadi. I concluded the discussions with a meeting with the commander of the intelligence team. The results of the discussions were as follows:

1. They are enthusiastic about the idea of an active joint intelligence headquarters, to be based in Beirut.
2. They agreed that the idea would begin with the intelligence of [the] al-Qassam [Brigades], the Guards [Revolutionary Guards] and Hezbollah, and the others' joining would be postponed until after an examination.
3. Everyone asked to act delicately toward Hezbollah, while convinced it would be enthusiastic once its psychological barrier was removed. Everyone fears we will begin in the wrong way.
4. They disagreed over how to begin: Hajj Ramadan supports beginning with specialization, technical specialization and specialization in combat information, while the commander of the intelligence team believes that we should begin with a general situation assessment and overall issues, and from there proceed to specialization.
5. They are enthusiastic about the approved joint projects and see them as an important opening for joint intelligence.
6. It is evident from the discussions that they are under pressure from us, since we are the initiators of the discussions and are pressing them to implement their decisions. That is a positive point in our favor.

7. We are awaiting their final opinion, which will be based on parallel work between the general assessment and the specialization tracks.

بالإشارة إلى الموضوع أعلاه أود اطلعكم على آخر النقاشات بخصوص الاستخبارات المشتركة، حيث أجريت عدة جلسات مع أعضاء فريق الاستخبارات كل على حدا، ومع الحاج رمضان، وفي ختام النقاشات ختمتها مع قائد فريق الاستخبارات، وكانت نتائج النقاشات على النحو التالي:

1. هم متشجعون جداً لفكرة مقرة الاستخبارات المشتركة الفعال، على أن يكون مقره بيروت.
2. وافقوا على أن تبدأ الفكرة باستخبارات القسام والحرس وحزب الله، وتأجيل فكرة انضمام الباقيين إلى ما بعد الدراسة.
3. الجميع طلب الإيغال برفق خصوصاً مع حزب الله، مع قناعتهم بأن الحزب سيكون متشجعاً للغاية بعد أن يزول الحاجز النفسي لديه. والجميع يخشى أن يبدأ خطأ.
4. اختلفوا كيف يبدأ، فالحاج رمضان مع البدء بالمسارات التخصصية، التخصص الفني، وتخصص المعلومات القتالية، فيما أن قائد فريق الاستخبارات يرى أن يبدأ بتقدير الموقف العام، والمسائل الكلية، وننتقل من خلالها للمسارات التخصصية.
5. بخصوص المشاريع المشتركة التي تم اقرارها هم متشجعون لها، ويعتبرونها مدخلاً مهماً للاستخبارات المشتركة.
6. واضح من نقاشنا معهم أنهم مضغوطون لنا، حيث أننا نحن المبادرين لهذه النقاشات، ونضغطهم بضرورة تحويل قراراتهم لواقع عملي. وهذه نقطة ايجابية لصالحنا.
7. ننتظر تصورهم النهائي بعد أن ناقشناهم في رؤيتنا التي قامت على التوازي بين التقدير العام والمسارات التخصصية.

Document 17: Letter from Hamas' military intelligence from "Ahmed" to "Yasser," August 19, 2023

Hezbollah's Involvement in the War after October 7, 2023

► Despite the rounds of talks among senior Hamas, Hezbollah and Revolutionary Guards figures to formulate the vision for the decisive campaign to destroy Israel and the efforts to formulate strategic coordination within the unity of the arenas concept, the final decision on the timing of the invasion and massacre on the morning of October 7, 2023 was made by a narrow circle at the top of Hamas, led by Yahya al-Sinwar and Muhammad Deif. Alongside the complex deception perpetrated against Israel, there was deception within Hamas, with information concealed from the political and the military wing leaders, and from the allies, including Iran and Hezbollah.²⁶ Hamas sources admitted that although senior Hezbollah figures were aware of the plan, they were surprised by its timing on October 7, 2023 (al-Sharq, January 15, 2024).

► Immediately after the attack began, Deif, al-Sinwar and Marwan Issa sent personal letters to Hassan Nasrallah and Izadi. The three briefed the Nasrallah on the invasion of Israeli

²⁶ See the January 2026 Amit Institute report, [The Deception Plan Practiced by Hamas before the October 7, 2023 Attack \(Including documents from the Gaza Strip\)](#)

territory and the intention to take over military and civilian targets and seize hostages. They explained that Hamas' main motive for launching the invasion was connected primarily to defending Jerusalem, al-Aqsa and Islam's holy sites, but also noted the approaching normalization with Saudi Arabia and their assessment that Israel was about to launch a campaign against the various fronts, including Hezbollah, following a security cabinet meeting on August 22, 2023. They also admitted that they had been forced to conceal the timing of the attack because of concern about civilian intelligence capabilities, and immediately urged Nasrallah to join the campaign and open a second front. The following are excerpts from the letter (Ben Caspit, *Maariv*, May 16, 2026; translation from the article):²⁷

By Allah, we ask for support and assistance as our fighters²⁸ flow one after another into our occupied lands to deliver the strongest blow against the occupier in recent decades. It is fitting punishment for its attacks on our al-Aqsa Mosque, especially in recent weeks.

It [the enemy, Israel] is about to begin a campaign against Hezbollah in Lebanon against the development of precision missiles and against all resistance activities against it in which Hezbollah has a part or against any Palestinian group that wants to act against it through the northern border or is working to build a force capable of taking part in the war effort against it.

Talks have already been held in the past between you and our brothers who visited you regarding joint action against the occupier, and all agreed that the banner of the campaign must be Jerusalem and al-Aqsa. It was agreed that we would begin when there was a cause to justify it, namely the enemy's crimes at al-Aqsa. You understand the difficulty of the security situation and the enemy's intelligence capabilities, and therefore the greatest challenge before us is to carry out a surprise attack. That required such a level of concealment, even within our command and leadership ranks, especially those abroad and most of those inside, and limiting the transmission of the operational order until the final minutes lest the enemy expose the intentions and initiate an attack against us with a crushing assault, and you know its capabilities.

²⁷ The Amit Institute is not in possession of the full document.

²⁸ Terrorist operatives.

We believe you must hurry and take part while placing your trust in Allah and believing in his help for us to win. If you help Allah by defending his religion, he will help you against your enemies. Concentrated rocket bombardment of the occupation's basic arteries in large barrages will disperse the Iron Dome, during which airports, military headquarters and strategic targets will be bombed, paralyze the capabilities of the air force and exhaust Iron Dome missiles. The enemy will be in a state of shock and fear, a situation which will be suitable for beginning a major ground attack to take control of the land and the residents, which, with Allah's help, will lead to rapid collapse.

As previously presented, the Islamic Republic and Syria do not need to intervene, but all the other forces of the axis of resistance must cooperate, the various groups, from all arenas with their maximum strength. Continued concentrated and intensive bombing and an attack using UAVs for two or three days will achieve the objective, by Allah's will.

The letter from senior Hamas figures to Nasrallah, October 7, 2023 (Ben Caspit, May 16, 2026)

► Hamas' surprise attack put Hezbollah in a complex position. On the one hand, it was clear that the organization did not want to be dragged into an all-out war with Israel when the timing was inconvenient and contradicted Hezbollah's and Iran's interests. On the other hand, the organization felt obligated to assist Hamas because all supporters of the "resistance axis" expected it to fulfill the promise of the unity of the arenas. Therefore, Nasrallah did not respond to the call by senior Hamas figures to open an all-out war, preferring instead to provide limited assistance.

► An article published by Assad Abu Khalil in the Hezbollah-affiliated daily *al-Akhbar* analyzed the complex situation in which Nasrallah and the organization found themselves: if Hezbollah did not open an all-out war, it would be accused of stabbing its allies, and the Arabs in general, in the back. If it did, it would be held responsible for Lebanon's destruction. Moreover, even if Hamas were victorious, and despite Hezbollah's contribution to such a victory, its opponents would claim that Hamas achieved victory on its own while Hezbollah stood aside and the Gaza Strip was subjected to the greatest systematic destruction in its history (*al-Akhbar*, December 30, 2023).

► In practice, Hezbollah joined the campaign on October 8, 2023, one day after the Hamas invasion and massacre, with an attack on IDF posts on Mount Dov. According to its claim of

responsibility, the attack was carried out "in solidarity with the victorious Palestinian resistance and with the struggling and patient Palestinian people." Throughout the campaign, which continued until the ceasefire on November 27, 2024, most of Hezbollah's claims of responsibility stated that the attacks against Israeli targets were carried out "in support of the steadfast Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip and in support of their brave resistance," sometimes alongside other reasons, such as harm to Lebanese civilians.²⁹



Hezbollah's first claim of responsibility (SIMIA, October 8, 2023)

► Until September 2024, when the escalation in the hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah began with the pager explosions and the launch of Operation Northern Arrows, in which senior Hezbollah figures, foremost among them Nasrallah, were killed, Hezbollah's fighting was limited and controlled to prevent deterioration into all-out war, while continuing to support Hamas within the unity of the arenas. Hezbollah used a unilateral "deterrent equation," according to which attacks on Hezbollah operatives would be answered with attacks on military targets; attacks on Lebanese civilians would be answered with attacks on civilian targets in Israel; attacks on senior figures, whether military or civilian, would be answered with escalation in the response, range and intensity of the attacks; attacks deep inside Lebanon would be answered with deeper attacks inside Israel; and activity would escalate in the event of Israeli escalation in the Gaza Strip or Lebanon.

► On November 3, 2023, Nasrallah gave his first speech since the hostilities began. He said the October "attack" had been "a Palestinian decision carried out by Palestinians" and planned by the Palestinians. To explain why senior Hezbollah figures had not been briefed in advance, he said the operation's secrecy had been so high that even close allies had not been informed and had not taken part in the planning. He claimed Hezbollah's "military activity" was meant to ease the pressure on Hamas in the Gaza Strip because it forced Israel to

²⁹ See the July 2024 Amit Institute report, [Hezbollah's Policy for the Use of Force against Israel](#)

transfer military forces to the north instead of directing them to the fighting in the Gaza Strip, and he said he was willing to escalate the confrontation if Israel escalated the fighting in the Gaza Strip or its attacks in Lebanon.



Nasrallah delivers the speech (al-Manar, November 3, 2023)

► Nasrallah's successor, Na'im Qassem, who was Hezbollah's deputy secretary general at the beginning of the hostilities, also said there had been no prior coordination with Hamas and the message they received from the Gaza Strip on the first day of the war was from Muhammad Deif and Yahya al-Sinwar. He said that about two months after they joined the campaign, senior Hamas figures, in Nasrallah's presence, said they were convinced their support was sufficient and would achieve the desired objective. Qassem added that in every activity in support of the Gaza Strip they took into account the internal situation in Lebanon and how support for Hamas would not harm Hezbollah. He said that throughout the hostilities until the ceasefire, about 5,000 Hezbollah "fighters"³⁰ had been killed and an additional 13,000 wounded, thereby showing the scale of Hezbollah's sacrifice for the Palestinians (al-Mayadeen, July 8, 2025).

► Hamas had to face the fact that Hezbollah had chosen to provide only limited assistance and to consider internal interests over the unity of the arenas. It is unclear whether Hezbollah's response surprised or disappointed Hamas' leaders, especially Yahya al-Sinwar, who had worked extensively to recruit the organization to the campaign. The documents show that in the Hamas-Hezbollah meetings held in the two years preceding the invasion and massacre, they did receive a kind of principled commitment from Hezbollah to take an active part in Hamas' plan for the "great liberation project." However, from those same documents it can also be understood that Hamas took into account several possible

³⁰ Terrorist operatives.

scenarios, including the possibility that Hezbollah would not participate or would participate only partially.

► Hamas almost never publicly criticized Hezbollah, apart from a few hints by senior figures who, in the first weeks of the hostilities, expressed some frustration and disappointment with the extent of the active partnership of the "resistance axis" in the campaign. Asked about coordination between Hamas and the "resistance axis" and the expectations from Hezbollah, Hamas "abroad" leader Khaled Mashal, who was not party to the contacts with senior Hezbollah figures, said he thanked everyone who stood with them. He said the Lebanese front was active and the confrontations in south Lebanon had helped them. However, he hinted that "greater things" were needed (al-Arabiya, October 19, 2023).³¹

► Mashal's deputy, Musa Abu Marzouq, also said he had given up expectations regarding Hezbollah and the "resistance axis," and Hezbollah had not acted as Hamas had expected (Anadolu Agency, October 30, 2023). Senior Hamas figure Ghazi Hamad said they "need more from their allies," without explicitly naming Iran and Hezbollah (AP, October 26, 2023).

► However, as the fighting on the northern front escalated, senior Hamas figures began to put more emphasis on the "assistance and sacrifice of the brothers in Lebanon." For example, Abu Obeida, spokesman for the Hamas military wing, frequently described the fighting on the northern front as "effective assistance" which was part of an overall effort to ease military pressure on the Gaza Strip (i24News, July 2024).

► In addition, in all attempts to reach political arrangements to end the fighting, senior Hezbollah figures stated that any arrangement had to take into account the interests of both Hamas and Hezbollah. In a joint statement issued by Hezbollah and Hamas on July 5, 2024, following a meeting between Nasrallah and a Hamas delegation headed by Khalil al-Hayya, they committed to continued coordination in the military and political spheres, including cooperation at every level to achieve the desired objectives (al-Mayadeen, July 5, 2024).

³¹ Khaled Mashal's remarks were criticized by Lebanese journalists and politicians, who said he lived in a hotel in Qatar while calling on Lebanon to destroy itself for the sake of Hamas.