Eurasia Press & News
Corruption revelations, one of the worst COVID-19 death rates in the world, open warfare with the EU: no serious scandal has put much of a dent in the poll numbers of Poland’s ruling PiS party. Will anything happen in 2022 to alter that?
As 2021 closed, the popularity of Poland’s ruling Law and Justice party (PiS) stood at around 30 per cent in the polls. That’s not a historically great figure for the party, but neither is it devastating. While that level of support is not enough for the party to govern alone, if it joins ranks with the far-right Confederation, it seems likely it will be able to hold on to power in the future.
The next elections are not scheduled until the autumn of 2023, so plenty could happen before then. On the other hand, not that much has changed on the Polish political scene since the ruling party returned to power in 2015: PiS continues to poll above 30 per cent, while the opposition remains fragmented and lacks a charismatic leader.
A black swan event could still occur to cause the government’s popularity to plummet, of course. But lacking that, it’s doubtful whether Poland’s opposition has what it takes to defeat even a mildly weakened PiS.
At war with Europe
The past year has seen Warsaw’s battle with Brussels over the rule of law reach new heights.
Poland’s Constitutional Tribunal, the highest court in the land which is politically controlled by PiS, ruled this autumn that not all articles of EU Treaties – or rulings handed down by the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU), for that matter – were compatible with the Polish constitution.
The implication of that, legal experts explain, is that PiS wants to be able to pick and choose which CJEU rulings it wants to implement. For example, it would definitely not apply those that directly seek to block PiS’s ‘reforms’ aimed at establishing political control over the country’s judiciary.
In a separate decision, Poland’s Constitutional Tribunal also undermined rulings by another European court, this time the European Court of Human Rights, which had more recently ruled on the nature of the Polish justice system.
In essence, experts argue, PiS wants to be able to exempt itself from the European common legal system while still enjoying the benefits of EU membership – primarily, in the form of cash. But this stance by an EU member state risks undermining the entire European project.
Faced with such a prospect, Brussels finally determined it needed to take some concrete steps. It has been withholding EU recovery funds destined for Poland and moved to implement a new ‘rule-of-law mechanism’ attached to the EU budget, which could lead to the suspension of regular EU budget payments and the loss of tens of billions of euros to a country that has historically relied on EU money to provide European-level prosperity to its citizens.
Warsaw’s tough stance in its rule-of-law conflict with Brussels is thought to be primarily driven by hardliners within the government coalescing around Justice Minister Zbigniew Ziobro. But PiS’s leader, Jaroslaw Kaczynski, will most likely need their support at some point this year as well as possibly that of the far-right Confederation alliance if it is to maintain power after the next general election in 2023. Unlike PiS, Confederation is unambiguously Eurosceptic and would not shy away from initiating steps for the country to leave the EU.
No one is panicking yet in Poland about a possible ‘Polexit’. But, as political commentator Galopujacy Major pointed out during his regular podcast on TOK.FM, we might be witnessing the beginning of a slow process towards Polexit, which could last as long as 10-15 years.
In this context, a meeting of Europe’s main far-right actors that took place in Warsaw in early December could be an ominous sign despite its modest outcome. Alongside Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban and French presidential hopeful Marine Le Pen, Kaczynski signed what seemed like a pretty toothless declaration of cooperation.
Without even announcing the formation of a new right-wing grouping in the European Parliament, the politicians made vague promises to create “a model of European cooperation” that “puts a stop to the idea of creating a Europe governed by a self-appointed elite” – one in which “European institutions… play a subservient role in the political architecture to the nation state.”
As Major pointed out, the hosting of the meeting in Warsaw could nevertheless be taken to mean that Kaczynski’s message to Europe is: “we’re keeping our options open”. So far, it’s been widely understood that the Polish government’s strong anti-Russian feelings are one of the main obstacles to the creation of this new right-wing alliance in the European Parliament. The migration crisis at Poland’s borders, orchestrated by the Belarusian regime with what is believed to be Russian President Vladimir Putin’s consent, has certainly not helped improve Warsaw’s feelings towards Moscow.
On the other hand, as Major and his colleagues point out in the discussion, voters and potential voters of PiS at the moment might be less concerned by geopolitical issues than they are by worldview ones (i.e., women’s and LGBT rights). Basically, they might turn out to be more interested in opposing an EU reckoned to be ‘imposing’ liberal values, than they are in sticking to old anti-Russian tropes.
Incidentally, despite polls indicating a majority supporting PiS’s tough measures to solve the border crisis, this has not in turn led to any increase in support for PiS in the polls. As political scientist Aleks Szczerbiak pointed out in an article for Notes from Poland, “the escalation of the Belarusian border crisis should have increased support for Poland’s right-wing ruling party given the tendency of citizens to rally around governments when their country appears to face an external threat.” But it hasn’t. Voters, it seems, simply have other priorities.
At the end of 2021, Kaczynski found himself more vulnerable than back in 2015 when it came to domestic support. His need for alliances with hardliners and extremists means he has to remain open to all options. Those might include taking steps that eventually put Poland on a path that takes it further away from the EU.
The opposition’s offer
In his article, Szczerbiuk argued that it’s still “bread and butter” issues that are most important for Polish voters, and particularly those of PiS – who more often come from lower income categories and, at least partly, have voted for the party because of its promises to help the poorest. The end of the year was blighted by economic difficulties – inflation and rising energy prices. Help is needed more than ever.
PiS has been struggling to come up with a new economic offering for its voters. Its much-vaunted “Polish Deal”, unveiled last year, would bring changes to the tax system designed to benefit the neediest. Yet not only is this new proposal not as ‘sexy’ as the party’s ‘500+’ assistance for families with children during the 2015 campaign, but PiS is also struggling to find the cash to implement the new policy.
The 58 billion euros due to Poland from the EU’s coronavirus recovery fund, currently being withheld by Brussels, is essential for turning some of the government’s promises into reality. If those funds remain suspended, the party’s social credentials could be under threat.
The problem for the opposition is that it’s not been any better at coming up with any attractive proposals either. A series of political figures promoting themselves as the one to save the country from PiS have, over the years, come and gone: left-wing small town mayor Robert Biedron, Warsaw’s liberal mayor Rafal Trzaskowski or independent conservative Szymon Holownia. 2023 is probably too far ahead for even the freshest of them.
Trzaskowski, who had built his brand as a more ‘modern’ politician in Civic Platform (the main opposition force) – mostly because of his intention to reach out beyond the urban elites – has had the spotlight taken off him by former prime minister Donald Tusk, who has returned from a stint in Brussels to take over leadership of the party.
Tusk may be charismatic and enjoy strong support among some liberal voters, but he is also a controversial figure for many. In some respect, he’s a progressive politician only against the backdrop of the very conservative Polish political scene: he took pride in his tough stance on migration when he was president of the European Council (2014-2019) and he continues to shy away from endorsing gay marriage. His record on implementing social policies while Poland’s prime minister (2007-2014) was poor.
The recent experiences of the opposition in the Czech Republic and Hungary would appear to indicate that unity amongst the opposition is crucial to defeating the region’s powerful illiberal forces. Yet the Polish opposition has been having this debate for years: will going it it alone or running together bring more success at the polls? So far, at least, the opposition parties do not appear to have decided which approach to take.
Nevertheless, some efforts have been made towards creating unity at least on policy. In early December, the main pro-democratic opposition forces and some civil society groups signed an agreement listing measures they would support to roll back the government’s assault on the judiciary and deescalate the conflict with the EU. Further attempts are being made by opposition forces to think through what governing might look like in a post-PiS era and what would be needed to restore the democratic checks and balances that have been weakened since 2015.
None of that is particularly inspiring. The Polish opposition could definitely benefit from Santa Claus leaving some fresh ideas under its Christmas tree.
