Eurasia Press & News
The prolonged tension between Serbia and Kosovo has enabled the far right in Serbia to flourish – and link up with like-minded foreign counterparts.
Some 23 years after Kosovo achieved its autonomy from the rump Yugoslavia of Montenegro and Serbia and 14 years after its unilateral declaration of independence from Serbia, Serbia’s staunch refusal to recognize Kosovo’s independent statehood is still a dominant issue in its politics.
From the government parties to the extremes of the political spectrum, though their distinction is hardly recognizable, the Kosovo issue remains a uniformly relevant political issue. This in turn perpetuates not only a state of prolonged tension between the two countries and a flourishing of far-right actors internally but also an intensification of the Serbian right’s links with like-minded counterparts.
A research project conducted within BIRN, focusing on understanding the far right in the Western Balkans and particularly the influence of Serbia’s far right regarding Kosovo, demonstrates how the Kosovo issue is still a point of vital importance for Serbian national identity and for far-right mobilization, both in Serbia and in its international likeminded counterparts. Their influence stretches geographically till the northern, Serbian-dominated part of Kosovo.
After the fall of Slobodan Milosevic in 2000, far right groups and ideas remained part of the political repertoire and society of Serbia. But over the last few years, especially since the parliamentary elections in 2022, far-right groups and views have gained significant electoral legitimacy.
This strengthening has been influenced by a “normalization” of far-right rhetoric and ideas in the public sphere, also thanks to the far-right views propagated by Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic in the framework of his authoritarian turn. This does not constitute an exceptional paradox. It is a common development in politics not only in Serbia but in other countries of the Western Balkans where, since the fall of the Berlin wall and the disintegration of Yugoslavia, far right ideas and hate speech have been present in the public sphere also in “mainstream’’ parties. Thus the borders of far right are blurred because it exists within a political system where party lines fail to neatly follow ideologies.
The research findings of the project also demonstrate that the Kosovo issue does not constitute a central point only for the political agenda of the Serbian far right, which in fact comprises an archipelago of diverse parties, movements and subcultures. On the contrary, converging on the narratives of the Serbian far right, diverse streams of the international far right and illiberal actors such as Russia consider Kosovo an equally important issue also for their political agenda.
More specifically, Kosovo is considered an emblematic cause for their ideological battles. As a result, the Serbian far right and the transnational likeminded counterparts unite in harnessing common activities and strategies, thus exaggerating ultranationalist tendencies.
Specifically, transnational far right actors, mainly from the US, Italy, England and France, provide Serbian far right actors with a plethora of sustainable organizational means.
Joint activities promote links on many levels
On the organizational level, support can be seen in their joint activities and strategies as perceived from their physical presence in Serbia and other Serbian populated territories (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro).
One of the most striking presences is that of one of the leading members of the US neo-Nazi movement Robert Rundo. Similarly, the presence of one of the members of the French Generation Identity and founder of Solidarité Kosovo, Arnaud Gouillon, promoted to a state position in Serbia, demonstrates the patchwork of the far-right links with Serbian far right and state authorities.
Links are manifested through different activities and events of “humanitarian aid” such as delivering of presents for Serbian children in northern Kosovo, for example. However, the support includes more than “humanitarian aid”. Provision of organizational know-how on protests and rallies, social media training, such as setting up websites, visits to historical religious monuments in Kosovo and provision of military material to Serbian far right groups operating in Northern Kosovo are some of the dimensions of their support.
Analysis also indicates that some far-right groups are involved in illegal activities and synergies with the organized criminals operating in Northern Kosovo and in Serbia, such as in smuggling, drug trafficking etc. This has increased the extent of illegal business seizures not only in Northern Kosovo but also in Serbia.
Illegal activities include the field of “political struggles” in which they thrive by developing a parallel market of paid-for thugs, as was with the case of the assassination of the moderate Kosovo Serbian politician Olivier Ivanovic in 2018.
So far, these groups have gone unpunished by the authorities. The weak rule of law and the reluctance of Kosovo institutions to exercise their full state authority for fear of provoking tensions with Kosovo Serbs are some of the factors of this phenomenon. In the end, these activities challenge the legitimacy of the state of Kosovo, undermining its democracy-building process and discrediting law enforcement agencies for not having the mechanisms to appropriately address these phenomena.
Links between the transnational far right with the Serbian far right are established also on an ideological level too. Transnational far right groups interpret Kosovo through the looking lens of Serbian far right groups, as a prime case of alien Muslims removing Christians from their ancestral lands, who thus become a minority in their homeland.
This position echoes a broader thematic of the European contemporary far right about the allegedly deliberate replacement of the indigenous white, Christian population of Europe with non-white Muslims and migrants. This is exemplified in the so-called “Great replacement” theory shared by far-right groups around the world, which has been inspired partly by the Serbian nationalist cause and wars during the 1990s.
From neo-Nazi Anders Breivik to the terrorist attacks against Muslims in Christchurch in New Zealand, and in Hanau and Halle in Germany, the Balkan war’s narratives and motives have significantly inspired violent attacks. The Christchurch attacker uploaded an online “manifesto” with the name “Great Replacement” before his attack, and was shown to listening to a Serbian song glorifying the Bosnian Serbian leader and convicted war criminal Radovan Karadzic.
Generally, far right in Serbia has always been international in nature. During the 1990s, the cause of Greater Serbia attracted far-right supporters and volunteers from every corner of the world. However, as analysis shows, a recent trend is that these groups operate beyond country borders in an increasingly interconnected online world. This trend creates further challenges in dealing with far-right activities which cannot be siloed in individual state policy and civil society responses.
The findings also show that there is a significant mobilization from state actors regarding Kosovo issue, such as in Russia, by financing and supporting far right groups in Serbia.
Besides differences among far-right groups and state actors, the Kosovo issue is a basis for hostility, mobilization and hatred, therefore impeding the process of peace-building in the Balkans. Being at the crossroads of different geopolitical and ideological influences, tackling the far-right phenomenon in Western Balkans requires holistic approaches and action plans. These will include preventive measures and a social policy approach; a securitized approach; a social-integration linked approach; a multi-agent and multi-level approach. Above all, it requires a change of the governance pattern and of authoritarian politics, which help the far-right to flourish.
