Eurasia Press & News
Despite Ukraine’s achievements, experts believe that a frozen conflict or a poor ceasefire is most likely. Here’s why.
The war in Ukraine evokes a strong sense of historical déjà vu. Although filmed in a more modern way, with mobile phones and drones, the high-resolution footage of artillery duels and trench warfare evokes impressions of the last century.
Like Stalin’s invasion of Finland in the Winter War of 1939, the Russian army was pinned down and bloodied by a much smaller enemy.
Both sides are now digging in as Moscow’s “special military operation”, which was supposed to last several days, turns into another year of attrition. Russia throws large numbers of conscripts and mercenaries into close battles around cities such as Bakhmut and Vuhledar.
Meanwhile, Western powers have promised Ukraine battle tanks, and there is much talk of a new Russian spring offensive.
“Probability of quick completion is low”
“Ukraine will never be a victory for Russia. Never,” said US President Joe Biden last week in Poland, a day after a previously unannounced visit to Kiev.
It’s the kind of conflict that Margaret Macmillan, a war historian and professor at Oxford University, said “we didn’t think we’d see again”. Now, as the bombing of Ukraine enters another year, what do past conflicts, especially those of the modern era, tell us about how the war might end?
Short answer: While each conflict is unique and tends to defy history, a clear defeat for either side in this war is unlikely, experts say. A more likely scenario is a protracted struggle that exhausts both sides, but they don’t want to admit defeat, leading to a frozen conflict or an eventual uneasy truce. The probability of a quick end to hostilities is low, writes AJB .
The war in Ukraine took on international proportions the moment Russian armored columns crossed the border in February 2022. A conflict in which a major nuclear power and a major energy exporter violated the sovereignty of a country that is the foundation of global food security could not remain solely an issue between the two sides. .
American support and interests in the Middle East
The US and its allies quickly provided aid that was critical to Ukraine’s ability to defend itself.
Previous wars, such as the eight-year Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s, also depended on such foreign aid. At various points in this conflict, Russia has been closer to Iran’s position, and Ukraine has emulated Iraq’s position — albeit only incompletely — said Jeremy Morris, a professor of global studies at Aarhus University in Denmark.
This conflict, also between neighbors, was basically over territory and resources. Western weapons helped Iraq achieve early successes on the battlefield against the much larger Iran, which had to resort to more expensive tactics such as infantry wave attacks, in which artillery columns stormed Iraqi formations, risking heavy casualties in the hope of overwhelming the enemy. .
“And there was a proxy war,” Morris told Al Jazeera, referring to US support for Iraq in pursuing its own interests in the Middle East.
Of course, there is a key difference. Iraq, unlike Ukraine, started that war.
Yet Western weapons—though delivered gradually and cautiously—in Ukraine have similarly been instrumental in halting Russian advances. In theory, this gives the West influence over the direction of the war. The West could – as Ukraine requested – deliver even more sophisticated weapons, faster, in the hope of convincing Russia that it cannot win.
Russia, unlike Iran and Serbia, is a nuclear power
McMillan pointed out that external pressure is sometimes the most important factor in ending an open conflict and getting the warring parties to talk.
“Serbia’s war against Kosovo ended because outside forces intervened,” she told Al Jazeera, referring to the 1999 NATO bombing of Serbia.
“The civil war in Northern Ireland ended in part because outside powers [especially the US] exerted a lot of pressure and helped build the framework [for peace].”
But the calculus in Ukraine is not subject to external direct solutions.
Russia, unlike Iran and Serbia, is a nuclear power. It has a domestic war machine and huge reserves of manpower and resources, and Morris believes there is a good chance Russia can sustain the conflict for years.
The war and Western sanctions have damaged Russian society and the economy, but Moscow has mitigated the worst effects and is unlikely to remain so weak that it is unable to continue the war. Russia’s economy shrank by just over two percent last year – far less than expected.
“Russia was already isolated due to the intervention in Donbas in eastern Ukraine in 2014, so it is ready to be isolated,” Morris said.
“There is no chance that NATO will join the action against Russia”
“Russia’s standard of living may plummet, but it will never be in a position like North Korea’s – even North Koreans have endured the conditions they live in for more than 50 years.
Unlike the case of Serbia, experts do not foresee a scenario in which the Western alliance led by the USA would actively attack Russia.
“Serbia was weak compared to NATO,” said Dan Reiter, a political science professor at Emory University and author of How Wars End.
“There is no way that NATO will get involved in an unprovoked action against Russia.”
Equally, Ukraine’s dependence on their weapons gives Western powers a say in how Kiev plans its strategy. In theory, they could threaten to cut aid if they tire of war or if Ukraine, emboldened by military progress, crosses a threshold that could trigger an escalation unacceptable to the West.
But the idea that Ukraine can be pressured into some kind of peace is “false” and “undoes everything Ukraine is doing,” says Branislav Slanchev, a professor of politics at the University of California, San Diego and an expert on war negotiations and ways to stop war.
“Ukrainians will decide when to stop”
He said the West could do little to prevent the Ukrainians from trying to reclaim all of their territory – including parts that Moscow had formally, if illegally, annexed.
“Actually, we cannot put pressure on the Ukrainians,” he said.
While the West could warn Kiev that it will cut off arms supplies or financial support if Ukraine insists on defying the US or Europe, “this kind of threat is not credible,” Slanchev told Al Jazeera. This is “because the Ukrainians know” that it is in the interest of the West “that they do not fail”.
Slanchev said the West knows that any cracks in its unity against Russian aggression would only embolden the Kremlin.
“Essentially, when the West made a decision that Ukraine is important… they should be supported to the end, and that means the Ukrainians will decide when to stop,” he said.
At this point, there is little evidence that either side is willing to negotiate.
“For the fighting to stop, both sides must be willing to negotiate,” said Slančev.
“Both sides must expect more from peace than from continued fighting.
“They are not safe even if they give up Donbas”
As things stand, it seems that Russian President Vladimir Putin, despite major setbacks on the battlefield, is ready for a long fight and believes that Russia will win. Russia’s allies like China – which has been a lukewarm friend of Putin’s in his war against Ukraine – have also been unable or unwilling to force him to the negotiating table.
Emory University’s Reiter cited two main reasons for Ukraine’s lack of appetite for any negotiations that would mean accepting the loss of territory.
“The war was so brutal that they were afraid of what would happen in the territories handed over to Russia,” he said.
Ukrainians simply do not trust Moscow, Reiter added.
Even if they are ready to give up the Donbass region, for example, they cannot be sure that this will be the end and that Russia will not come back and ask for more,” he said, referring to the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, in which Russia has agreed to respect Ukraine’s borders.
The more losses there are, the harder it is for Putin to step down
In many ways, the man who started the conflict could end it if he wanted to. The problem, according to experts, is that he has no incentive to do so.
This is “Putin’s war,” said Macmillan, the Oxford professor. The Russian president “invested his prestige in it, and the more losses there are, the harder it is for him to withdraw.”
Putin’s presidency began with the Second Chechen War in 1999, when separatist rebels sought independence from Russia. The war, which ended with the Chechen capital razed to the ground and Chechen resistance largely rooted out, has left a lasting mark on Putin’s approach to regions struggling to break free from Russian influence, analysts say.
Experts see Putin’s grandiose vision — laid out in his long historical debates and brutally enforced in places like Chechnya — as what brought him to Ukraine. But they argue that the roots of Putin’s worldview lie in earlier events: the end of the Cold War.
Russian imperial prestige and historical mistakes
Wars are rarely marked neatly by the first and last blows. There was, for example, a thread of continuity between the First and Second World Wars. Truth be told, a lot has happened in the past few years that could have changed the course of what followed. But, Macmillan said, “The First World War laid the foundations that made the Second [World War] possible.” The danger lay in the humiliating peace treaty imposed on defeated Germany.
Experts see a similar connection between the end of the Cold War and the war in Ukraine.
Putin and the Russian elite have a deep sense of humiliation due to the collapse of the USSR. The years that followed were “terrible for many Russians,” Macmillan said.
“The country looked weak, its economy was in chaos, there was resentment that the West did not do enough and did not offer the Marshall Plan.
Marija Popova, an associate professor of comparative politics at McGill University, argues that Putin is motivated by a desire to restore Russia’s imperial prestige and correct perceived historical wrongs.
Russia’s ruling elite saw the collapse of the USSR only as a reconfiguration in which former Soviet countries would “in some way continue to be together,” Popova told Al Jazeera, while Ukraine saw it as an opportunity to be fully independent.
“There is no alternative while Putin is healthy and alive”
For Ukraine it was a “civilized divorce”, for Russia it was a “rewriting of the covenant”, said Popova.
That difference in how the two nations saw the end of the Cold War is now manifested through blood and bullets.
Something existential is at stake in this conflict for both sides, which makes it even more intractable.
Some observers suggest that further defeats on the battlefield could lead to Putin’s downfall. After all, Russia’s defeats in the Crimean War in the 19th century and losses in Japan and Afghanistan in the 20th century catalyzed profound internal changes. The long and expensive First World War helped start the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917.
But for analysts like Morris, the chances of Putin being ousted are slim, and the chances that his replacement will be less predatory are even slimmer.
“There is really no source of alternative power while Putin is alive and well,” Morris said.
And that has direct consequences for the future of the war in Ukraine.
“I don’t think this can end while Putin is in power,” said Slančev.
“Even if the Ukrainians push the Russians to the limit, if he is still in power, I don’t think he will negotiate.
“Two sides face eternal war”
Protracted and slow-moving conflicts have helped Russia establish breakaway, pro-Kremlin enclaves in Ukraine (Donbass), Georgia (South Ossetia and Abkhazia), Moldova (Transnistria), and Azerbaijan (Artsak).
The current war is different, backed by the West, which is helping Ukraine reclaim large swathes of territory seized by Russia in the first weeks of last year’s invasion.
If Slančev is right, the two sides are facing an eternal war.
It could end up like what happened on the Korean peninsula, with a demilitarized zone between the territories controlled by the Russians and Ukrainians, or intermittent clashes of greater or lesser intensity and a loose ceasefire.
In any case, one thing is certain – much more pain for Ukraine, Russia and the rest of the world.
