Eurasia Press & News
The Uzbek regime is losing stability because its objectives increasingly diverge from the public expectations that President Mirziyoyev himself worked to create.
Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev finds himself in something of a conundrum. Having positioned himself as a reformer, he is now finding that grassroots demand for change is impeding his campaign to consolidate power.
The new constitution that came into effect in Uzbekistan on May 1, following a nationwide referendum (the fourteenth time the basic law has been amended since 1991), was initiated by Mirziyoyev and presented as the foundation of a “new Uzbekistan.” Taking a leaf out of Russia’s playbook, it both resets the clock on presidential terms and extends those terms from five years to seven, potentially enabling Mirziyoyev to stay in power through 2037. The president has already announced snap elections in July, which he is sure to win.
This is nothing new: Uzbekistan’s first president, Islam Karimov, ruled in a similar manner until his death in 2016. What is new is the reaction of Uzbek society. Never before has it been so difficult for the government to push through unpopular decisions. The authorities were only able to pass the new constitution on their second attempt. The first attempt triggered the biggest political crisis of Mirziyoyev’s rule in the form of mass protests in the Karakalpakstan region.
A constitutional referendum had been anticipated since 2021, when Mirziyoyev was reelected for a second term. Under the previous constitution, that should have been his final term, so in order to run again, he needed to hold a referendum as soon as possible. The authorities also sought to hold the vote while people had not yet forgotten about the successful reforms in the early years of Mirziyoyev’s rule.
In the spring of 2022, the authorities initiated the process of amending the constitution. To pitch it in line with the image of an enlightened reformer, the new constitution was portrayed as a “people’s” constitution. Uzbeks were able to submit their proposals for amendments online, and a commission was supposed to select the most important ones.
When the authorities published the first draft of the new constitution, however, it did not go down well with the public: primarily because it would have deprived the Karakalpakstan region of its special status as a semi-autonomous region within Uzbekistan. Karakalpakstan, which is culturally and ethnically distinct from the rest of the country, remains the poorest region, with underdeveloped infrastructure and environmental problems to boot. The region accounts for almost a third of all emigration from Uzbekistan.
With more grounds there for socioeconomic discontent than anywhere else in the country, the prospect of having its autonomy revoked proved to be the spark that lit the fuse. In the summer of 2022, it took the authorities several days to forcibly suppress protests in Karakalpakstan. Almost eighty people were killed, and hundreds more were arrested, according to media reports. But the amendments revoking the region’s autonomy were scrapped.
The consequences of this first, failed attempt to rewrite the constitution were that the authorities became much more wary of any manifestation of public discontent, and that the Uzbek public saw that protests could compel the regime to make concessions.
Ahead of a second attempt, the authorities took a break to allow time for emotions to subside, but new sources of tensions continued to emerge. Last winter was abnormally cold, which crippled the country’s energy infrastructure. Even in Tashkent, people were reduced to building bonfires in front of their apartment buildings, waiting in long lines at gas stations, and storming power plants. Then, while all that was going on at the end of 2022, at least nineteen children across the country died after taking cough syrup that had been sold without proper testing.
There were also scandals over sexual abuse in orphanages involving high-ranking officials, as well as investigations into widespread graft in the gas industry and corrupt ties between Mirziyoyev’s relatives and Chinese businesses. On top of this was record inflation caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the influx of tens of thousands of Russian exiles into Uzbekistan.
Corruption and abuse of power are nothing new for Uzbekistan. Life was worse under Karimov, but it was pointless to protest, because no one at the top had promised a “new Uzbekistan.” What’s different now is the atmosphere of greater openness and reformist pathos that Mirziyoyev cultivated in the early years of his rule, which raised societal expectations. The new president needed to disassociate himself from his predecessor and boost his own popularity, and now he is paying the price.
The appetite of Uzbek society for change is growing: people want the authorities to deliver on their promises. But this demand for political change is now at odds with the needs of the president himself, since overtures to democracy and openness are obstacles to the consolidation of power.
The authorities understand that this divergence between the aspirations of society and the president will only grow, threatening stability. This is why they were in such a hurry to reset the clock on Mirziyoyev’s presidential terms and reelect him as soon as possible: this time for seven years instead of five.
The second attempt to hold a constitutional referendum was successful. Voter turnout was over 84 percent, and 90 percent voted in favor, according to official data. A week after the referendum, Mirziyoyev announced snap elections for July 2023. It is no secret who will win.
The Uzbek leadership may have achieved its goal in the end, but that’s not to say that it will be plain sailing for Mirziyoyev from now on. Tashkent understands this, and so is actively preparing for new crises. According to the Belarusian interior minister, since 2020—when Minsk brutally crushed a massive pro-democracy movement—Uzbek officials have been regularly visiting the country to “study the experience of ensuring that public order is upheld.”
Mirziyoyev also appears to be shoring up his inner circle with a growing number of relatives and close friends, including his eldest daughter Saida and his younger son-in-law Otabek Umarov. The presidential administration is now headed by Sardor Umurzakov, the son of Uktam Umurzakov, who once helped the young Mirziyoyev find his feet in the capital.
In the upcoming period of instability, it will be important for Mirziyoyev to be able to rely on his inner circle. Changing the constitution to allow him to remain in power has undermined his reputation as a reformer abroad; the country’s problems are going nowhere; and society will become increasingly demanding. In these conditions, relying solely on reformist rhetoric and playing around with constitutional provisions may no longer be enough to hold on to power.
