Eurasia Press & News
Ukraine’s admission into NATO would help deter Russia and strengthen Euro-Atlantic security. Ambiguity at the Vilnius summit can only embolden Vladimir Putin.
Ian Bond Director of Foreign Policy at the Centre for European Reform
Ukraine’s NATO membership is essential if the West wants to deter Vladimir Putin—or a Putin-like future Russian leader—from attacking the country again. The alliance could certainly absorb Ukraine, which now has the largest, most battle-hardened armed forces in Europe, increasingly trained along NATO lines and using NATO-standard equipment.
Whether membership is realistic depends on the political will of NATO leaders. So far, the signs are that the Vilnius NATO summit will not offer Ukraine a clear pathway to membership and will suggest that membership will only be possible once the war is over—thus encouraging Putin to keep fighting.
NATO leaders should be more courageous. Putin has been reluctant to confront the alliance directly, but happy to exploit ambiguity. His hostility to Ukraine’s existence independently of Russia, expressed over many years, will not vanish because NATO shows restraint.
At a minimum, NATO should vastly increase the amount of weapons and ammunition it supplies: for most allies, keeping some back “just in case” makes little sense when there is already a war in Europe. Better still—though less effective than NATO membership—would be genuine defense guarantees, of the kind the United States offers Japan and South Korea, provided by a coalition of the willing on a bilateral basis, with Western forces stationed on Ukrainian soil, backed up by (at least) the UK and French nuclear deterrents.
Eric Ciaramella Senior fellow in the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Yes, but not for a long time.
NATO allies cannot credibly invite Ukraine to join until the war ends. Why not? Accession would entail one of four problematic scenarios:
First, Ukraine could fight until it liberates its entire territory in order to enter NATO whole. That could take years and come at enormous cost.
Second, Ukraine could enter NATO divided, as West Germany did in 1955. That would leave millions of Ukrainians under occupation and ensure an indefinite period of territorial partition.
Third, NATO could exploit Article 5’s textual ambiguity to apply Ukraine-specific caveats, as some have suggested. That would undercut NATO’s deterrent power.
Fourth, NATO could intervene to help Ukraine restore its borders. That is a nonstarter.
It is understandable why Kyiv seeks clarity from NATO at Vilnius. But a wartime invitation would merely restate the 2008 Bucharest summit declaration, providing no clear path to membership and no added security in the meantime.
Instead, Ukraine and its partners must develop a robust set of interim security arrangements to ensure that it can defend itself until Russia changes course. That day is not likely to come until Vladimir Putin is no longer president of Russia, at a minimum. After he is gone, Russia might experience another period of internal turmoil, as it did in 1917 and 1991. NATO should be ready then to move swiftly to admit Ukraine.
Marta Dassù Senior advisor for European Affairs at The Aspen Institute, Rome
Kyiv’s aspiration to membership will not be credible as long as the war continues.
Neither the United States nor most Europeans wish to cross the “red line” of direct confrontation between Russia and NATO.
Three dilemmas emerge from this potential gap between Ukrainians’ legitimate aspiration to membership and Western priorities. First, how to avoid repeating the mistake NATO made in 2008 at the Bucharest summit, where vague promises were offered to Ukraine—and Georgia—with no genuine commitment. That turned out to be the worst possible combination. Second, how to reassure Kyiv about reinforced and long-term security assurances, short of accession per se. Third, how to manage the timing factor. Vladimir Putin must be persuaded that time does not play in his favor—Western allies will not dither in their support to Kyiv.
Yet, linking Ukraine’s membership to the end of hostilities would possibly increase Russian incentives to continue the war. In the end, only Ukrainian military progress on the ground will force Putin to change his calculations. This requires more military assistance from the West, with the de facto integration of Ukraine anticipating full membership.
Ukraine’s position in the European security landscape has shifted irrevocably as a consequence of Russian aggression. It is not a buffer state—if it ever was—but a frontier state. Forms of “neutrality,” then, have lost any meaning—witness Sweden and Finland.
It is crucial to ensure that Moscow understands this key point: NATO is truly committed to protecting Ukraine’s independence in the long term, making it utterly impossible for Russia to replay 2014 and 2022.
Caroline de GruyterEuropean affairs correspondent for NRC Handelsblad
It must be made realistic. A credible prospect is vital for Ukraine, but also for “the West.”
Russia should ask itself why it is that every single population that has lived under its yoke only wants to break free once given a chance. Instead, Russia continues to see sovereign states as pawns on a board that hegemons play on to serve their own interests. Nothing could be further from the truth, from a NATO perspective.
Few actors in the West, when talking privately, want to expand NATO. Enlargement may give it additional strategic depth, but also adds vulnerability, strategic uncertainty, and tactical headaches. If Russia were smart, it would want NATO to expand, just like the UK wanted the EU to enlarge in order to dilute it and sap its strength.
The prospect of NATO membership for Ukraine and for Georgia in 2008, was one of the main reasons why Russia attacked both countries. The traditional view is that NATO can only include countries that have resolved their territorial issues. Russia has created those issues to make NATO membership impossible for these two countries. We cannot allow this strategy to succeed.
Martin EhlChief analyst at Hospodářské Noviny
Yes, but it depends on the timeframe. No, if we look at the Vilnius summit.
Yes if we—as the alliance—take seriously any security guarantees for Ukraine because the failed Budapest memorandum has shown the limits of the standard international treaties.
It is definitely unrealistic to expect membership during active war but on the other hand, many previously “unrealistic” things happened after February 24, 2022, among them Finland’s accession to NATO and heavy weapons deliveries.
I would expect the Central European and Baltic members to push in this direction and at least find some formula promising membership in the long term, if not now. We live in extraordinary times when innovative solutions are needed.
The expectations on the Ukrainian side are high and for the government in Kyiv, the management of expectations will be crucial for long-term public support of the war effort.
More realistic in the short term would be to send long-range weapons and planes as soon as possible while looking for lessons learned from the war for the alliance.
Ukraine must become a NATO member without any doubt. The sooner the better, for all of us.
Camille GrandDistinguished policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
In Vilnius, Ukraine expects a path toward NATO membership going beyond the compromise from the 2008 Bucharest summit. Kyiv has made clear that it expects interim guarantees more robust than the 1994 Budapest Memorandum “security assurances.”
In practical terms, this could combine the establishment of a NATO-Ukraine Council enabling a much more active participation of Ukraine in the work of the alliance and as a tool to prepare future membership, a credible path to NATO removing the prerequisite of a membership action plan (now perceived as a willingness to delay the process), and interim security guarantees.
The most sensitive issue remains the timeline, as bringing on board a country at war concerns some allies. Ukraine itself made clear that membership should come after the war, which could be defined as the moment a ceasefire is in place. Ukraine nevertheless deserves transparency and allies should make clear that Russia does not hold a veto to Ukrainian membership by creating a frozen—or not so frozen—conflict. The accession of the Federal Republic of Germany to NATO in 1955, which preceded by thirty-five years the unification of Germany in its current borders, provides a useful precedent.
François HeisbourgSpecial adviser at Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique
The alternatives to NATO membership are less realistic than full accession.
The Israeli model envisaged by some in the White House works for Israel in an endless absence of peace, with security ultimately relying on a national nuclear deterrent, whereas Ukraine is a non-nuclear state.
The Treaty on European Union Article 42.7—a mutual defense clause—does not commit the United States and many EU countries don’t see it as a bona fide NATO Article 5. So it would be rapidly put to the test by Russia.
For its part, a strengthened version of the ill-fated Budapest memorandum would struggle to be taken seriously either by Russia or Ukraine. All of these options are strategically unrealistic and dangerously unstable.
That leaves NATO.
Neither the former USSR nor Russia sought to challenge NATO’s Article 5, nor has its enlargement ever caused a sharp crisis, let alone a casus belli. The model for Ukraine would be West Germany’s accession to NATO in 1955, which was made possible by Bonn renouncing the option of seeking reunification by force in October 1954. The USSR retained de facto control of East Germany while the West reaffirmed that peaceful unification remained a fundamental goal—which was achieved in 1990. Could Crimea follow the same route?
In sum, the fact that Germany was a divided country with uncertain borders to its East didn’t prevent its entry into NATO. In a postwar setting, what applied to the German goose should apply to the Ukrainian gander.
Linas Kojala Director of the Eastern Europe Studies Center, Vilnius
Yes, Ukraine’s membership is realistic. Although not plausible today, the window of opportunity will open. Therefore, Ukraine must be prepared to seize the chance when it arrives.
Just a few years before the Baltic countries were admitted to NATO, many skeptics did not believe it would happen. A direct comparison of Ukraine and the Baltics is unreasonable yet it reveals that geopolitical dynamics can change suddenly.
Furthermore, NATO must clearly convey to Russia that it does not possess a veto right over Ukraine’s membership. The notion that Ukraine’s integration is only possible after the war would incentivize the Kremlin to prolong the conflict indefinitely, even if at a lower level of intensity.
Despite the numerous challenges that Ukraine faces, membership is attainable if it stays firmly on the right track. The country is actively preparing for accession daily by utilizing Western equipment on the frontlines. Additionally, nine out of ten Ukrainians support membership, which is indicative of the people’s choice.
If the NATO-Ukraine Commission is elevated to the status of a NATO-Ukraine Council, and Ukrainians are given a seat at the table to discuss security issues in alphabetical order with member states, it will be step forward. Similar things need to follow to quash any doubts about Ukraine’s direction.
John Kornblum Former U.S. ambassador to Germany
“Events, dear boy, events,” said Harold MacMillan.
The former British prime minister got it right as far as NATO is concerned. Enlargement becomes “realistic” when events motivate cautious allies to invite new partners. There is no other test.
Germany entered in 1955 after France voted down a European army in 1954; then came the post–Cold War expansion to central Europe, and most recently, Sweden and Finland. Events made the unthinkable “realistic.”
So why ask the question? Isn’t the collapse of the post–Cold War order enough? Or is Ukraine a corrupt society? With foreign forces on its territory?
Germany was divided until 1990 and was occupied by half a million Russian forces until 1994. France fought armed conflicts from 1946 to 1960 and several other members have since 1949.
And what about Montenegro? Does it satisfy NATO’s Article 10 by being “in a position to further the principles of this treaty?” Ukraine has already done much better.
Maybe we are just scared of Russia. Or underemployed think-tankers are trying to justify their paychecks by avoiding the obvious.
Ukraine has literally fought itself into the alliance. Events have placed the ball in the allies’ court. Armenia, Georgia, and Moldova also desperately need help. “Realism” has little to do with it.
Agnieszka LeguckaSenior research fellow at the Polish Institute of International Affairs
Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, NATO has identified Russia as a threat to the North Atlantic Alliance and Ukraine’s membership in NATO has become an issue.
Many are talking about security guarantees for Ukraine, but they mean different things to different people. Germany is saying it will provide missile defense systems and this will be a contribution to the security of the country. Others argue Ukraine will be covered by a network of international agreements, including the G7 countries.
But the fact is that today it is Ukraine that is holding back what is said to be the world’s number two army—Russia—and, of course, it is doing so with the strong support of NATO countries, led by the United States. The latter is a shield that strengthens the security of the Europeans, but are we able to continue to finance a shield? Is it not better to invest in an “umbrella”?
The NATO security umbrella will be a lasting guarantee in the European security architecture. This may be subject to conditions, such as the end of the war. Still, the decision should also be made to start rebuilding Ukraine, for more security in non-military dimensions (migration, energy, food) because having Ukraine in NATO is in our common Euro-Atlantic interest.
Linas Linkevičius Former defense and foreign minister of Lithuania
Ukraine’s NATO membership is not only realistic but also inevitable. In Vilnius, Ukraine still hopes to receive a clear signal of political support. They are well aware that they will not join NATO during the war.
But is NATO ready not to repeat the mistake made at the Bucharest summit fifteen years ago? At that time, Ukraine and Georgia were not given the NATO Membership Action Plan, which would have brought those countries closer to the alliance. Some of our skeptical colleagues did not want to “provoke” Russia. Russia read that message very differently—as an encouragement. After a couple of months, it occupied 20 percent of Georgia’s territory.
Are we ready today to show proper support to Ukraine? If so, we must take clear and concrete decisions. The upgrading of the NATO-Ukraine Commission into the NATO Council is an important step, but certainly not an essential nor a sufficient solution. We must remove the condition imposed on Ukraine—the requirement of the Membership Action Plan—the way it was removed for Finland and Sweden.
We must reiterate our commitment to providing Ukraine with the necessary military support until the war is over. We must state that we will consider the war over only after the complete liberation of the annexed and occupied territories of Ukraine. And we must also promise that after the war ends, we will consider inviting Ukraine to the alliance.
If NATO fails to demonstrate leadership, the meeting in Vilnius will disappoint not only Ukrainians.
Kristi Raik Deputy director of the International Centre for Defence and Security, Tallinn
Ukraine’s NATO membership is realistic if one thinks that Ukraine’s victory in the war is realistic. The answer to both questions depends heavily on Western determination to support Ukraine. Ukrainians themselves don’t lack determination to keep fighting. Unfortunately, it still looks like the West wants to support Ukraine enough for it to survive, but not enough to push Russia out of all the occupied territories.
The Western approach prolongs the war and makes Ukraine’s membership seem unrealistic in the foreseeable future, since NATO will not accept Ukraine as a member so long as the fighting continues.
However, the alliance has to look to the future of European security beyond the war and take a clear position on Ukraine’s path to membership at the Vilnius summit.
First, Russia will be deterred by a clear message that Ukraine will be fully integrated to the Euro-Atlantic security structures. Putin will not give up on his goal to force Ukraine into Russia’s sphere of influence, but Russia will back down when forced to do so, and when facing a superior adversary such as NATO.
Second, with Ukraine as a member, NATO as a whole will be stronger and more capable of deterring the Russian threat, which is likely to remain a major concern for European security for years to come.
Ben Tonra Professor in the School of Politics and International Relations at University College Dublin
Strategic ambiguity contributed to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Continuing ambiguity from NATO will only leave Ukraine in a dangerous and unstable no-man’s land, potentially engaging NATO partners in a downward spiral of ongoing regional conflict. To that end, the provision of security guarantees that are foreseen from the summit needs to be part of a wider and visible path to NATO membership. As someone who (incorrectly) would have originally argued against NATO membership for Ukraine, I am cognisant of the ironies here. However, the scale, cruelty, and recklessness of Russia’s actions leaves no other reasonable choice before the alliance.
To those that cry for “negotiation,” leaving NATO membership as a card yet to play, one has to ask—with whom and for what? Putin is weak and getting weaker—with no prospect of anything but worse to follow. Reifying any “line of control” and throwing the territorial issues into the long grass of “talks” promises nothing but regional instability into the long run—pace Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia.
There is no good choice for the alliance—only less bad ones. NATO’s obligation to its own members’ security requires it to offer the security of membership to Ukraine. And Ukraine has earned it.
Alexander Vershbow Distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and former NATO Deputy Secretary General
NATO membership for Ukraine will not be decided at Vilnius. Kyiv understands that many allies, including the United States, are reluctant to extend an Article 5 guarantee while the war is still raging. But allies are increasingly coming to the realization that, in the face of a continued threat from a revanchist Russia, the only real guarantee of long-term security and stability in Europe, and the only fully effective deterrent against renewed Russian aggression, is to anchor Ukraine in NATO as soon as possible.
In Vilnius, NATO leaders should not just reaffirm their unequivocal support for Ukraine, where the Ukrainian people are defending the values and security interests of the transatlantic community. They also need to give a clear and unambiguous signal that they are committed to Ukraine’s full integration into NATO on an expedited basis, bypassing the Membership Action Plan as did Finland and Sweden.
In the near term, allies should commit to an intensified program to arm, train, and equip Ukrainian forces to a level sufficient to restore Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity within its 1991 borders and to deter future Russian aggression. This program would serve as an interim security guarantee until Ukraine joins the alliance—hopefully by NATO’s seventy-fifth anniversary summit next year.
