Eurasia Press & News
Georgia’s ruling party is mirroring the strategies of Viktor Orbán and Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The government’s illiberal measures complicate Brussels’s decision on Georgia’s EU candidacy.
Georgia is having a hot summer in which the main news is the tragic loss of life in a massive landslide in the Racha region. But in September its never-ending political crisis will reignite.
By the end of 2023 the European Union will have to decide whether Georgia has addressed the twelve key priorities set out last year to qualify for EU candidate status. That would put the country on the same level as Moldova and Ukraine, the two other members of the so-called Association Trio which were given a clear path to accession talks last year.
It’s not so long since Georgia was talked of as the frontrunner of the six Eastern Partnership countries—and on many technical criteria it is still closer to the EU than Moldova or Ukraine. Public levels of support for the EU remain extremely high.
But the slide away from democracy is alarming. Instead of sweating to meet the EU’s priorities, Georgian officials flatly declare that they are already entitled to accession. This while the ruling party doubles down on illiberal policies, extending their political control of the judiciary and even the country’s acclaimed cultural institutions. A new strategic partnership agreement with China worries Western capitals, but what exactly the Georgian leadership is up to with Russia is the main source of alarm.
In collective international resolutions at the United Nations and elsewhere, Tbilisi condemns Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. It complies with the Western sanctions regime on Moscow—with some caveats that apply to its neighbors, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Türkiye. But Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili seems pathologically afraid of mentioning the words Ukraine, Zelensky, or Putin. He accuses those who ask Georgia to support Ukraine more strongly of being a “party of war” and says that restricting trade with Russia would “destroy Georgia’s economy.”
It goes further than that. Despite allowing in tens of thousands of ordinary Russians in, his government has mysteriously banned the entry of high-profile critics of Vladimir Putin’s regime. Since the resumption of direct air traffic to Russia, Georgia has become a new conduit for Russians to reach destinations such as Nice via a new flight from Tbilisi.
How far will this dance with Russia go and what’s behind it?
Inevitably, there is speculation that Bidzina Ivanishvili, the mercurial former prime minister, founder of Georgian Dream—and Georgia’s wealthiest man—is doing a deal with the Kremlin. It remains speculation. Ivanishvili is a deeply enigmatic figure who made his money in Russia in the 1990s, and then got out, and also promoted Georgia’s association agreement with the EU in 2014. As veteran political scientist Ghia Nodia says, “The issue is not that Ivanishvili is pro-Russian, is it that he was Russian.” In other words, the mentality of Georgian Dream’s leader was formed in Russia and Georgia’s ruling elite plays by Russian business—some would say mafia—rules, not those of Europe.
Instead of fretting about a direct Russia link that may or may not be there, it’s probably more useful to pay attention to a foreign partner that is already out there in the open: Viktor Orbán’s Hungary.
On May 4 Garibashvili addressed the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) in Budapest, hosted by Orbán and attended by a cabal of worldwide extreme conservatives. His speech is highly revealing. Hungary, and Orbán specifically, is said to be Georgia’s chief European and friend. There are words condemning Russia, but the goal is said to be “peace.” Proper European values are defined as “Christian” values: “our main weapon and foundation is traditional, Christian, conservative, family values.” LGBTQ “propaganda” is a “false freedom.”
This is the version of Europe that Georgia aspires to. Orbán is the main ally, but it is no secret in Brussels that European Commissioner for Neighborhood and Enlargement, Hungary’s Olivér Várhelyi, is another cheerleader. Hungary’s well-documented problems with Ukraine suggest that these men will argue that it is double standards for the EU to reward Ukraine and not Georgia.
By enlisting in Orbán’s global culture war the Georgian elite is aligning itself with two authoritarian governments who are playing both sides in the Russia-Ukraine war: Türkiye and Azerbaijan. The same civilizational discourse comes from their respective presidents Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Ilham Aliyev, as they bash a world conspiracy of George Soros, Western non-governmental organizations, and LGBTQ rights activists to justify their hardline rule.
Orbán and Erdoğan, both recent victors in elections, also show Georgian Dream a successful strategy for defeating an opposition alliance. The chief weapon is polarization. You tell voters you are the bastion of stability and decency, mortally threatened by an opposition linked to degenerate globalist forces.
In Georgia, the other (willing) protagonist in this polarization battle is the former ruling party, the United National Movement, and its leader former president Mikheil Saakashvili, now in jail—and poor health. Despite fading poll figures, Georgian Dream knows that it can still win a straight fight with UNM. (It’s worth noting that Orbán’s Georgia connection began with Saakashvili, who hosted him in 2012 and even enlisted him in a campaign rally against Georgian Dream. Saakashvili must be seething in his prison cell.)
There is evidence that Georgian Dream’s messages resonate with a core group of Georgian voters—and they are not the ones we see on the streets of Tbilisi carrying European and Ukrainian flags. The illiberal—and generally anti-LGBTQ—message ensures support from parishioners of the powerful Georgian Orthodox Church. The “peace” message works on those worried about being dragged into war. Concerned about their livelihoods, 55 percent of Georgians in a recent National Democratic Institute poll say that Georgia should either deepen economic ties with Russia or maintain them at their current level.
So will Georgia get EU candidate status or not? At the moment, it looks like the decision could go either way. Some of the twelve priorities are huge structural issues (de-polarization and de-oligarchization) that several existing EU members would find hard to achieve and that will require a political judgement from Brussels.
Some civil society and opposition leaders think Georgia should get the reward, despite this being a win for the government. Acceptance will give the EU more leverage over democratic backsliding, they say, while a refusal could just push Georgia further away.
If the EU does give Georgia the prize, good messaging will be essential. Public consultation with a platform such as the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum will be important. The decision needs to be framed as a choice of deeper partnership with the whole of Georgian society—not just the government, which, on current projections, will not give up power any time soon.
