Eurasia Press & News
How the Attack on Israel Could Backfire for the Group
Hamas’s October 7 terrorist attacks, which killed over 1,000 Israelis, provoked outrage around the world. Politicians from Washington to New Delhi condemned Hamas and offered condolences to the Israeli people. Leading politicians traveled to Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. The devastatingly high number of fatalities, relative to the size of Israel’s population, prompted U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to describe the attack as “the equivalent of ten September 11s.”
Blinken is not the only official to invoke September 11 when discussing Hamas’s strikes. Across the world, officials and analysts—both those who support and those who oppose Israel—have drawn comparisons between the two operations. It is easy to see why. Both assaults killed record numbers of people in their respective countries. Both stunned the world. And both were intended to trigger a chain reaction of global magnitude. The founding leader of al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, anticipated that September 11 would deliver what he termed a “decisive blow” to the Washington-led order and “destroy the myth of American invincibility.” Similarly, Mohammed Deif, the leader of Hamas’s armed wing, declared that the October 7 operation would “herald the dawn of a great revolution” by setting in motion a global domino effect that would shatter “the invincibility” of Israel and end its occupation of Palestinian territories.
Bin Laden’s attack, for its part, did change the world. But it was not in the way he expected. Al Qaeda’s leader believed his attacks would prompt Americans to take to the streets, replicating the Vietnam antiwar protests, and demand the withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Muslim-majority states. Instead, Americans united behind U.S. President George W. Bush, who sent troops to occupy Afghanistan, launched a wide-ranging “war on terror” that debilitated al Qaeda, and, eventually, invaded Iraq.
Hamas similarly believes that its attack will lead to regional escalation, culminating in the liberation of occupied Palestinian territories. Although it is too early to predict the longer-term consequences of Hamas’s October 7 operation, it is evident that the group was unprepared to handle the chaos that unfolded even during the operation itself. If the events that followed September 11 can serve as a useful analogy for the current crises, then the potential upheaval that might take place in the coming months is ominous for both Hamas and the entire region.
DREAMS AND DELUSIONS
In bin Laden’s mind, the September 11 attack was part of a greater plan. Al Qaeda’s leader wanted to compel the United States to withdraw its military forces from Muslim-majority states in order to weaken authoritarian regimes in these places, paving the way for jihadis to topple them and liberate Muslims who suffer under their oppressive rule. His ultimate goal was to resurrect the historical umma, that is, the global community of Muslims once held together by a common political authority.
Bin Laden’s plan, however, completely backfired. Contrary to his expectations, Washington quickly responded to the September 11 attacks by launching a full-scale invasion of Afghanistan to root out his group, and it largely succeeded. By December 2001, al Qaeda was shattered, and by late 2002, most of the group’s senior leaders had been killed or captured. Al Qaeda’s second-tier leaders struggled to hide even in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas, where they eventually sought refuge. Their troubles were largely because of the CIA’s sustained and effective drone campaign over the region, which halted al Qaeda’s international terrorism.
Hamas is not al Qaeda, and its stated goal—liberating Palestine—is much more targeted than bin Laden’s sweeping vision. But in Deif’s statement announcing the October 7 attack, there are clear echoes of bin Laden’s vision of change. The Arabic name of the operation, “Tufan al Aqsa,” likely alludes to the global flood involving Noah’s salvation, found in both the Bible and the Koran: in the Koran, “Tufan” is the deluge that God unleashed to cleanse the earth of sins. “Al Aqsa,” meanwhile, refers to the mosque that represents Islam’s third holiest site. Located in the same place as the Temple Mount, one of the holiest places for Jews, al Aqsa has witnessed numerous clashes between the Israeli police and Muslim worshipers, particularly in recent years. Deif’s speech was punctuated by a provocative phrase—the “wrath of al Aqsa”—designed to enrage Muslims worldwide by recalling the frequent police raids on the mosque and the all-too-familiar images of worshipers being fired at with rubber bullets and stun grenades.
When he announced the launch of the October 7 operation, Deif expressed hope that operational success would set off a chain reaction beyond Israel, drawing the broader Middle East into a conflict for Palestinian freedom. He implored Palestinians in Jerusalem and the West Bank to use all available means to target Jewish settlements, and he called on Palestinians inside Israel to “ignite the earth with flames beneath the feet of the oppressive occupiers.” He also appealed to Islamic “resistance” groups (which are distinct from jihadi groups) in Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen “to unite with their brethren in Palestine.” Deif even predicted that, driven by their zeal to defend al Aqsa, “all Arab and Islamic powers will unite behind the Palestinians and sweep away the occupation.”
Hamas appeared genuinely stunned by the temporary collapse of Israel’s defenses.
But it has not taken long for Hamas to realize that no plan survives first contact with the enemy. Though Deif’s fiery speech enjoined supporters to refrain “from killing the elderly and children,” the world learned of Hamas’s attacks through heart-wrenching images that show deaths in both demographics. The shocking photos prompted many states, including Israel’s main patrons, to endorse Israel’s intense retaliation, with the United States pledging to supply Israel with weapons.
In fact, the images from Hamas’s attack were so distressing that even some jihadi groups felt compelled to engage in information warfare to obscure the horrifying scenes. Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, for example, issued a public statement that claimed it “watched the mujahideen cover a Jewish woman to protect her modesty as they sheltered her children, assuring her that ‘we would treat you humanely for we are Muslims.’” In an interview with Al Jazeera, Saleh al-Arouri, one of Hamas’s leaders, asserted that the violence against civilians was not carried out by his group. Hamas fighters were “disciplined,” he said, but because of the rapid collapse of the “enemy,” civilian Gazans and other Palestinian factions crossed the border and engaged in indiscriminate killings and kidnappings. Khaled Mashal, Hamas’s leader abroad, made similar claims. In an interview with Al Arabi, he emphasized the group’s commitment to complying with international humanitarian law. To that end, he was confident that the group’s leadership in Gaza would release civilian hostages and those with dual nationalities once the fighting subsided and Hamas was in a position to coordinate with other factions.
Hamas’s commitment to international law is, of course, questionable. But the group appeared genuinely stunned by the temporary collapse of Israel’s defenses. In an interview with the New Yorker, Moussa Abu Marzouk, a Hamas political leader, said his group “never expected” to wreak the havoc it did. One anonymous diplomat told Al Monitor that Hamas’s success “surprised” the group—and worried it. “With two abductees, they could have negotiated with Israel for permission to build a seaport and freedom for hundreds of prisoners held in Israeli jails,” the diplomat said. “With more than 100 abductees, they will face the entire Israeli army inside Gaza.” What is more, judging by the public interviews Hamas’s leaders have given, they do not appear to know the total number of hostages Palestinian fighters captured, suggesting a lack of coordination among militant groups in Gaza. As of October 22, Hamas has freed two U.S. hostages, but the group may not be able to release all the nonmilitary hostages even if they wanted to.
The initial phase of what Mashal called a “calculated adventure” also appears to have turned into a grievous misadventure fraught with serious miscalculations. The global response that Hamas hoped to achieve has thus far fallen significantly short of its leaders’ expectations. Arab governments have criticized Israel’s retaliation, but they have not offered Hamas any support. Despite the ensuing clashes between Hezbollah and Israel along Israel’s border with Lebanon, both sides have been far more restrained than Hamas wanted. The group clearly banked on a more active role from Iran. In an interview with TRT Arabic, Abu Marzouk lamented that “there was no coordination with Iran” and regretted that Hezbollah’s military response “has been subpar.” Mashal shared this disappointment and bluntly called on Hezbollah to do “much more.” On October 19, Abu Obeida, the leader of one of Hamas’s armed wings, even released a statement pleading for broader and more active engagement, urging Muslims to recognize “that this is the umma’s opportunity to defend its dignity and its al Aqsa and mobilize its people on the borders with Palestine.”
BE CAREFUL WHAT YOU WISH FOR
In the immediate aftermath of the attack, Israel unleashed its wrath on Hamas, and Gaza’s civilian Palestinian population has borne the brunt of the casualties. The country has also readied itself for major combat, calling up hundreds of thousands of reservists and massing them on Gaza’s borders. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared that Hamas had “made a mistake of historic proportions” and threatened to “exact a price that will be remembered by them and Israel’s other enemies for decades to come.” His government began a siege—cutting off Gaza’s access to water, food, and fuel—that has made life for the strip’s stateless people into a living nightmare.
Despite Israel’s military might, the strategic objective of its current campaign is unclear. In light of the disastrous destruction in Gaza, Israel’s response will be judged not just by its enemies but also by its friends. Even U.S. President Joe Biden, who has repeatedly stated his “unequivocal” commitment to Israel’s security, also expressed his sorrow for “the tragic loss of Palestinian lives” and reminded Israeli leaders of the “critical need to operate by the laws of war.”
The greater the devastation Israel inflicts on the Palestinians in Gaza, the more likely that it will deliver the objective that Hamas’s October 7 operation has thus far failed to attain. If it overreaches, Israel will effectively follow in U.S. footsteps. After September 11, Bush declared that the nation’s “grief [. . .] turned to anger, and anger to resolution” and vowed that the “war on terror” would “not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated.” Yet despite the significant blows Washington dealt to al Qaeda, Bush’s open-ended and sprawling interventions gave rise to numerous regional jihadi groups.
The lessons of September 11 were on Biden’s mind when he spoke of the “mistakes” the United States made in response to those attacks and cautioned “the government of Israel not to be blinded by rage.” Millions of people across the Middle East are already protesting in the streets. Given that many in the region harbor anger not only toward Israel’s Gaza military campaign but also against their own corrupt regimes, these protests threaten the fragile stability of the Middle East’s and North Africa’s governments, including those that have signed peace agreements with Israel.
Even though al Qaeda was unable to achieve a “decisive blow” through its September 11 attacks, bin Laden continued to describe them as “victories.” For now, Hamas will likely continue to double down on its rhetoric and sing the praises of its achievements. But in the years after his attack, bin Laden found that most regional jihadi groups proved to be a liability to global jihad, and that their indiscriminate attacks “repulsed” Muslims. Hamas, too, might be unnerved and potentially eclipsed if the conflict assumes a regional dimension.
