Eurasia Press & News
Although the UAE and Bahrain have formal diplomatic relations with Israel, and Saudi Arabia was considering such a move, Arab states in the region have their own reasons to be cautious.
As Israel’s offensive in Gaza grinds on, World War III in the Middle East has not yet erupted. Iran’s allies have exercised relative restraint, and nobody has a desire to fully escalate. However, a single misstep could spark a broader conflagration.
Already, the Houthis launched a barrage of ballistic missiles and drones that appear to be targeting Israel. Also, Iran-backed allies in both Syria and Iraq have claimed attacks on US positions there.
However, the current crisis unfolds in a region that has recently elevated diplomacy. In the Abraham Accords, the UAE and Bahrain reached agreements with Israel in 2020. Saudi Arabia was considering normalizing relations with Israel, contingent upon a US defense pact and a civilian nuclear program. This year, long-time adversaries Saudi Arabia and Iran re-established diplomatic ties following a China-brokered agreement. Discussions between Saudi Arabia and the Iran-backed Houthis are under way to resolve an eight-year conflict in Yemen. In 2021, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt ended the blockade of Qatar, restoring diplomatic relations. Additionally, Saudi Arabia has expressed willingness to mediate ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and Sudan.
Limited influence
The uptick in diplomacy activities raised hopes that the Gulf states could influence Israel’s campaign and avert a wider regional war. After all, they now have official communication channels with both Israel and Iran, which backs Hamas, and other regional resistance groups that Israel views as a threat, including Hezbollah in Lebanon. There was anticipation that Saudi Arabia would push Israel to de-escalate.
Kristian Ulrichsen, Gulf expert and fellow for the Middle East at Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy, said, “Saudi Arabia can hold hope in keeping the prospects of a Saudi-Israel deal alive.”
However, recent events have shown that Gulf mediation was weak to begin with and cannot succeed without the US. Apart from Qatar, Gulf Arab states have largely limited their actions to calling for a cease-fire, demonstrating minimal sway over Israel.
Gulf countries also appear reluctant to intervene in the conflict, as it has not yet extended into their region.
Their cease-fire calls are driven by two primary concerns. First, they fear that a US-Iran confrontation could escalate into proxy wars within their region. Elham Fakhro, an associate fellow at Chatham House’s Middle East and North Africa Program, said, “None of the Gulf states want a broader regional conflict. This is why they are all urging for an immediate ceasefire.”
Second, they recognize the anger among their Arab populations arising from Israel’s killings of Palestinian civilians in Gaza. This anger could spark mass protests that could morph into anti-regime demonstrations.
Gulf States now condemn Israel, but for the past six years they have overlooked the Palestinian issue and pursued deals with Israel. “There have been multiple regional reconciliations taking place, but none between the main parties to the region’s oldest conflict: Israel and the Palestinians” says Fakhro. “The Abraham Accords effectively sidelined the Palestinians from the focus of US regional diplomacy.”
Qatar is emerging as the most effective regional mediator because of its ties to Hamas. The tiny Gulf state is reportedly close to brokering an agreement with Hamas to release 50 civilians in exchange to facilitating more aid into Gaza. Hamas already released two American hostages on Oct. 20 and two Israeli women several days afterwards. Qatar’s Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al Thani also embarked on a regional tour to UAE, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia to discuss Gaza.
Moreover, Arab and Muslim leaders, including President Ebrahim Raisi of Iran, convened at a summit in Saudi Arabia on Nov. 11, uniting in their calls for a cease-fire and the unconditional provision of humanitarian aid to the enclave.
But these efforts alone will not persuade Israeli to de-escalate or deter a wider regional war if it occurs. Ultimately, the newly formed alliances are not robust enough to stop a regional conflict or pressure Israel. Even Qatar has struggled to transform the prisoner talks into a cease-fire initiative.
Abdullah Baabood, an expert on Gulf affairs and visiting professor at Waseda University in Tokyo, said, “These [new relations] are still tentative, and some of them are going through a testing period.”
While Iran and Saudi Arabia have opened communication channels, it may not be enough to deter Iran’s allies from striking US positions. Talks between the Houthis and Saudi to end the conflict in Yemen are ongoing, but the absence of a cease-fire agreement continues to pose a military threat to the kingdom and beyond. Hezbollah is acting with restraint, but the secretary general of the group, Hassan Nasrallah, voiced his readiness to escalate if Israel continued, which would bring the whole of Lebanon into the fray. Oman, an important Gulf mediator, only facilitates when both parties request it.
“Gulf States have not put in place mechanisms to solve regional issues that will be a logical next step to restoring relationships” says Ulrichsen. “They are still in the very first stages.”
There is also a lack of willingness to intervene. Despite having official communication channels with Israel, both the UAE and Bahrain have chosen to stay relatively passive. Bahrain, in a symbolic move, said its ambassador to Israel is back in Manama, but the Israelis claim that their relations remain. The UAE has signaled that it wants to maintain diplomatic ties with Israel. Meanwhile, Riyadh continues to host economic forums. The kingdom has chosen to delay its talks with Israel until after the Gaza war, which indicates it will not press Israel for a ceasefire.
Averted regional war
Given that the conflict has not yet triggered a full-out war in the Gulf, these countries now calculate that escalation may no longer be imminent, shaping their policies of non-intervention. “Now that the prospect for a regional war has declined, Gulf states are feeling more comfortable”, said Baabood.
This stance is partly influenced by the United States’ deployment of two aircraft carriers to the region, said Baabood — which signals that the US is prepared to provide security should the situation flare up.
Another important point is that Gulf Arab states generally oppose Hamas due to its Muslim Brotherhood ideology and ties with Iran. For these reasons, Gulf countries might prefer to stay on the periphery of the conflict as they continue to echo calls for a ceasefire to satisfy domestic public opinion.
But the risk of a wider Middle East war has not disappeared. A single miscalculation, like a missile striking Israel or killing American military personnel in Syria, Iraq, or the Gulf, could trigger an unwanted conflict.
The only actor that can effectively place pressure on Israel to commit to a cease-fire is the United States. “There is limited leverage the Gulf can exert until the US decides to push for the same measure which it has so far refused to do,” said Fakhro.
Ultimately, Gulf mediation is insufficient without redoubled US pressure on Israel. In that case, the US could leverage the new channels of communication among Gulf Arab states and Iran’s allies in the region to ensure that the situation does not escalate. This is a difficult task, but the Biden administration cannot afford embroiling the US in another Middle East conflict with no end at sight.
