Charting the Radical Right’s Influence on EU Foreign Policy

Summary:
Despite embracing democracy, radical-right parties pose a significant challenge to the EU’s fundamental values. European leaders and institutions must address this challenge to safeguard democracy in the EU and ensure a more effective foreign policy.

A New Political Landscape

The political landscape in the European Union (EU) is changing rapidly. For decades, the traditional mainstream parties of the center right and center left have been losing ground, while antiestablishment parties have been gaining support. According to research by the University of Amsterdam, 32 percent of voters opted for antiestablishment parties in 2021, up from 12 percent in the early 1990s.1 Radical-right parties make up about half of this share, and their support has risen faster than that of any other group.

Many of the fourteen parties examined in this study have achieved vote shares of 20 percent or more. The radical right is now in government, or supports the government, in Finland, Hungary, Italy, Slovakia, and Sweden. In the Netherlands, it is likely that Geert Wilders’s Party for Freedom (PVV) will be part of a governing coalition. In other countries, these parties have become the leading opposition groups. In France, Marine Le Pen’s National Rally (RN) has been carefully preparing to win the 2027 presidential election.

Setbacks for the radical right in Poland and Spain in the second half of 2023 have shown that the relentless rise of these parties is not a foregone conclusion. However, current polling for several national elections and the June 2024 European Parliament elections indicates a strong likelihood of their continuing electoral success.2 Chega (Enough), a recently established party that shot to 18 percent of the vote in Portugal’s March 2024 election, ended the country’s exceptionalism as one of the few European nations without a right-wing populist party.3 The June 2024 Belgian federal election may see the Flemish nationalist party Vlaams Belang (Flemish Interest), which so far has been strong in Flanders but kept out of national politics, break through at the federal level. Polling for Austria’s September 2024 parliamentary election suggests a surge in support for the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ).4

In contrast with populism, which has a thin ideology focused mainly on fomenting the anger of the so-called pure people against corrupt elites and which has risen on both the left and the right of the political spectrum, the radical-right parties of the 2020s have a more distinct ideological profile.5 All have national specificities, such as rural origins in Northern Europe or ethnonationalism in Central Europe. Several parties are rooted in postwar fascism, such as the FPÖ, RN, Brothers of Italy (FdI), the Alliance for the Unity of Romanians (AUR), and the Sweden Democrats (SD). For some groups, strong connections with society and well-developed party structures compensated for their marginal impact in national politics. Before its landslide victory in Italy’s 2022 parliamentary election, support for FdI hovered at around 5 percent, as it did for the party’s predecessor throughout the period since World War II.6 Other parties, such as Hungary’s Fidesz, gained ground as classic populist or even mainstream parties and benefited from an aura of respectability even as they shifted toward ethnonationalist or nativist positions.

Since the 1990s, liberal-democratic parties have started to adopt some of the ideas of the radical right while keeping the parties themselves out of government. In the 2000s, the radical right became normalized, in some countries becoming part of the political mainstream. During this process, as political scientists Cas Mudde and Jan-Werner Müller have argued, liberal-democratic parties have shifted toward the radical right in the hope—mostly in vain—of keeping their traditional electorates. Yet, in practice, this approach has led voters to prefer the real radical right to its imitators. In other words, the tactic of chasing the radical right has not paid off electorally. Voters have moved toward the radical right as a consequence, not as a cause, of liberal-democratic parties’ attempts to contain it.7

Today, the far right is dominated by the radical right, which, unlike the extreme right, accepts the essence of democracy but rejects its liberal elements: minority rights, the rule of law, and the separation of powers.8 The radical-right parties selected for this study all share deep antimigration sentiments, often determined by race or religion; a nationalism that makes these parties Euroskeptic and opposed to what they see as a Brussels-based dictatorship; and skepticism of climate change policies. Many of these parties also espouse deeply conservative family values that go against women’s and LGBTQ rights.

Foreign policy is usually not the strong suit of these parties, apart from their keen interest in the external dimension of migration policy. These parties pay close attention to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine but are sharply divided on this issue, with positions ranging from deep mistrust of Russia to close alignment with the Kremlin’s arguments. A future Donald Trump administration could lead to new divisions in the EU, as some member states are likely to align with the United States under any circumstances. This would mean that many of the EU’s current foreign policy positions, such as support for Ukraine, would come to an end. As radical-right parties rise to prominence at the national and the EU level, they are developing views on a range of foreign policy issues, building increasingly influential international networks and think tanks, and learning from each other’s successful tactics in solidifying their control of the state and propagating their values.9

For some radical-right parties that have been established in government, such as Fidesz and, until October 2023, Poland’s Law and Justice (PiS) party, the upgrading of foreign policy on their political agendas can be inferred by the fact that all diplomatic postings in the EU are political appointments. Hungary’s foreign policy machinery is under the direct control of the prime minister.10 Diplomatic colleagues of the Hungarian representatives in Brussels know that the country’s negotiating positions are micromanaged in Budapest.11 Other countries, such as Italy and Finland, have chosen to rely on the credibility of career diplomats to navigate the Brussels machinery, preferring compromise over confrontation and isolation.

For a long time, European politicians and EU institutions have assumed the radical right could be contained. Now, the challenge of the radical right needs to be addressed more seriously. Just as this phenomenon has eroded democracy and the rule of law in some EU member states, so foreign policy may become affected at a time when collective action is most needed to address international issues. As the radical right challenges the EU’s attempts to navigate a dangerous world, European politics can no longer afford complacency.

The New Euroskepticism

Radical-right parties’ views on EU foreign policy are, of course, to a large extent determined by their overall attitudes to European integration. Here, parties have moderated their positions in the years since the United Kingdom’s (UK’s) 2016 Brexit referendum. Demands for countries to leave the EU or the eurozone have mostly been abandoned. The UK’s messy and painful departure from the union has turned such initiatives into vote losers in electoral campaigns. But there is growing ambition in wanting to shape Europe. Le Pen, for example, rallies about an upcoming liberation of Europe’s nations and peoples from a meddling EU “that does not hold a federal but [an] imperial vision.”12 As Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has put it, “Our plan is not to leave the EU. Our plan is to conquer it.”13

Whether this shift represents a genuine change of attitude or just a tactical adjustment may vary from case to case. All of the parties covered by this study remain deeply skeptical of the EU. But tactics and goals differ. Many of these parties now propagate what Le Pen calls a “European alliance of nations,” organized strictly along intergovernmental lines, and this view is gaining traction.14 When in government, these parties can oppose specific policies not only based on their view of the policies’ merits but also with the aim of disrupting the policymaking process or undermining European integration generally—or as part of a tactical negotiation to get something in return.

Some parties demand a renegotiation of the EU’s treaties and a repatriation of powers to the member states. Others just reject any further transfers of competencies to the European level or the introduction of more majority voting, as opposed to decisionmaking by unanimity. Some parties, including the Alternative for Germany (AfD), threaten to leave the EU if returning powers to national capitals is unsuccessful. Insisting on the primacy of national law over EU law is another position broadly shared by these parties. With few exceptions, when national interests are directly concerned, radical-right parties are hostile to further EU enlargement.

There is no single pathway to interpret the behavior of the radical right when in government or opposition. The Finns Party and FdI have so far proved more pragmatic than many observers had expected, raising hopes that the radical right can be socialized into the system. In the case of the Finns Party, it is constrained by a carefully negotiated coalition agreement that has reined in some of the party’s foreign policy requests to ensure continuity with Finland’s traditional pro-European stance. In Italy, where FdI governs in coalition with another radical-right party and a populist center-right one, the government has chosen a pragmatic policy toward the EU, provided that Brussels responds to the country’s long-standing demands on migration—requests that have been made by Italian governments of all stripes.

Conversely, both PiS and Fidesz became more Euroskeptic during their terms in office and took steps to pursue confrontational relations with Brussels, mostly over rule-of-law issues but also by stoking bilateral relations with other member states and obstructing policy processes. Outside the eurozone and without the restraint associated with coming from a founding EU member state, these two parties have fewer inhibitions to creating tension with Brussels than, for instance, Italy, a large founding member.

Most of the radical-right parties covered by this study are represented in the European Parliament. Despite several attempts, they have so far failed to unite their forces within a single party group. Since the 2019 parliament elections, the parties are primarily organized in two groups: the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) and, farther to the right, Identity and Democracy (ID). Fidesz was a member of the center-right European People’s Party (EPP) until 2021, when it left following a two-year suspension from the group. There have been considerable fluctuations between these groups, with some parties and members of the European Parliament (MEPs) changing their alignment several times and others staying out of any group. There have been reports about Fidesz’s interest in joining the ECR.15 This could increase the group’s size, but it might hinder a rapprochement with the EPP.

An analysis of MEPs’ voting behavior on foreign policy issues confirms that these matters are contested on ideological grounds. Although nationality is a determining factor in the way an MEP votes, party affiliation tends to be more important.16 But these parties’ impact on the parliament’s foreign policy positions has so far remained modest. The mainstream party groups generally work well together on these issues, and the radical right remains divided.

This might change after the 2024 elections, when, according to current polling, both the ECR and ID can expect to make considerable gains.17 The two groups together might have around 25 percent of the MEPs in the new parliament. A significant rightward turn of the legislature could reduce support for measures to implement the European Green Deal, a package that aims to set the EU on the path to a green transition; for the enforcement of EU standards on the rule of law; and for EU enlargement. It could also result in a clear majority of MEPs supporting very restrictive immigration policies.18 And the parliament could become even more polarized on critical foreign policy challenges, such as supporting Ukraine’s defense against Russia’s invasion and responding to the Israel-Hamas war and the escalation in the Middle East.19

How the Radical Right Shapes EU Foreign Policy

Whereas populism has expanded in Europe over the past four decades, the radical right has only recently become politically important. The radical right’s achievement of positions of responsibility raises the need for deeper research into its foreign and security policy stances to better gauge its potential influence and impact in the near future. With this in mind, this study has three broad aims: to map the foreign policy positions of fourteen radical-right parties in different EU member states; to understand why and how these parties are influencing EU foreign policy; and to identify potentially divisive areas that could disrupt EU foreign and security policy.

Understanding how the radical right can influence EU foreign policy requires methodological rigor. Studies on the impact of populism—rather than of the radical right—on EU foreign policy have shown that there is more noise and media hype than concrete impact on decisionmaking. Alone, populist parties are rarely able to obstruct foreign policy decisions, show little interest in foreign policy, and often use critical rhetoric at home while falling into line in Brussels. Where they excel is in framing debates in polarizing and securitized terms, most notably on migration. And in doing so, they influence liberal-democratic parties, which take on positions that were previously prerogatives of populism.20

EU foreign policy making has always been fraught with divisions and obstructions. It is an intergovernmental process that allows each member state to exercise a veto power, regardless of its political weight. Common EU positions have frequently been blocked or made hard to achieve by the opposition of one or more member states that claim to be acting in their national interests, notwithstanding the political stripe of the government. This study explores the extent to which the rise of the radical right puts this fragile component of EU policymaking further at risk.

Through the fourteen case studies, a review of existing literature, empirical research, and confidential interviews with individuals in key positions in the EU policymaking system, we have identified several ways in which the radical right shapes EU foreign and security policy. This analysis can shed light on whether these diverse radical-right parties can come together with an EU foreign policy agenda and, if so, what issues may become hard to handle at the EU level.

The dynamics through which the radical right impacts foreign policy can be indirect, by putting pressure on mainstream actors, or direct, by blocking consensus building, aligning with external powers, resisting the development of EU foreign policy architecture, or abusing institutional positions. The consequences of these tactics include the EU’s inability to agree on certain policies, a downgrading of the content of these policies, an erosion of trust among the actors in the foreign policy system, and a weakening of the EU’s international impact and credibility.

Putting Pressure on Mainstream Actors

The most evident dynamic is pressure on mainstream politics. Concerned about increasing electoral competition from the radical right, some European centrist and conservative parties have moved significantly to the right in their positions. These parties now advocate more restrictive migration and asylum policies, and some have even become hostile toward EU-level solutions, preferring a stronger national approach. In 2015–2016, several countries joined Hungary in calling for tough immigration policies and fiercely defensive border controls; today, most governments have moved toward restrictive policies. The needle has shifted toward the radical right.

A similar dynamic is now visible in the EU’s climate change policies. Several center-right parties have become very cautious about EU legislation in this area, particularly when it affects the lifestyle choices of voters or entrenched interests, such as agriculture. This shift has not yet changed the EU’s ambitious climate diplomacy, but the risk of a backlash is undeniable.

Several mainstream parties are also becoming more reluctant to deepen European integration. Reform through changes to the EU’s treaties is widely perceived as unacceptably risky: the negotiations would reveal too many divisions among European governments, and even if they were to reach agreement, the national referendums that would be needed to amend the treaties might be exploited by the radical right for political ends. But even reforms short of treaty change, such as more majority voting, have become unpopular in some countries. Across the EU, there is growing support for protecting member states’ regulatory freedom in economic, fiscal, and other areas.

Blocking Consensus Building

The radical right has raised its game by disrupting EU unity and blocking EU-level initiatives. Consensus building is notoriously difficult in foreign and security policy, especially when national interests are at stake. National vetoes have always plagued EU foreign policy making, but they have been relatively rare. When a government found itself in isolation, it usually fell into line after gaining some face-saving concessions. In recent years, however, the international atmosphere has favored realpolitik tactics and transactionalism. In the EU, blockages have become more frequent, and governments’ aversion to isolation has receded.

To a considerable extent, this trend is due to countries led by radical-right parties, in particular Hungary, which is responsible for the largest number of blockages in EU foreign policy making.21 Vetoes by radical-right governments can express strong disagreement over policy, but they can also be employed as leverage to promote other, unrelated objectives—as Hungary showed with its veto of EU financial support for Ukraine in 2023.

A proliferation of national vetoes necessarily weakens the solidarity of EU member states. Many governments find themselves in disagreement with proposed EU policies from time to time. If some member states regularly employ their vetoes, others will be increasingly tempted to do likewise. And as the likelihood of obstruction by one or more states increases, the ambition of EU foreign policy making will inevitably diminish. What is more, time spent in long internal negotiations to overcome national vetoes comes at the expense of outreach to external actors and thus reduces the effectiveness of EU action.

Aligning With External Powers

When in government, radical-right parties have aligned their countries with external powers. The EU’s relative decline on the global stage comes as other major powers are exerting growing influence on the EU in general and on individual member states in particular. The number of cases in which member states have blocked EU positions to accommodate such external powers has grown. Hungary has done this most often, usually for the benefit of China, to restrain criticism of Beijing’s human rights record and territorial ambitions; of Russia, to limit the scope of sanctions since Moscow’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine; or of Israel, to curb criticism of its practices in the occupied territories. Some diplomats are concerned about U.S. interference if Trump wins the 2024 U.S. presidential election.22

Aside from external powers that willfully seek to influence EU positions, occasionally the radical right deviates from established EU policy and aligns with like-minded nonstate actors that operate outside the EU. For instance, on women’s and LGBTQ rights, the European radical right converges with global organizations such as evangelical churches and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation.

Often, alignment with outside powers is rhetorical and not followed through in practice. Nonetheless, it is harmful for EU cohesion, as the suspicion that some partners’ loyalties at times lie with such powers undermines trust within the bloc. In particular, aligning with external powers erodes confidence among foreign policy actors working in the EU system by affecting the habit of collegial cooperation and the behavioral practices of diplomats. This impedes practitioners’ readiness to share intelligence and confidential information, making work on some issues, such as strengthening economic security and enforcing sanctions, very challenging.

Resisting the Development of Foreign Policy Architecture

In line with their overall skeptical attitude toward EU integration and their nationalist philosophy, radical-right parties resist the further development of EU foreign policy institutions and procedures. They reject moving to majority voting on foreign policy and are skeptical of the empowerment of EU institutions and foreign policy actors. Most of these parties envisage EU foreign policy at best as a loose coordination mechanism that fully respects member states’ sovereignty to run their own national foreign policies. Most parties also take a negative view of efforts to develop the EU’s defense policy while looking more positively at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

These parties’ skepticism of European integration extends to external policies, particularly trade. Many of these parties sharply criticize the European Commission’s lead role in these areas and would prefer to put the member states in charge.

Abusing Institutional Positions

When they do take on roles in the EU system, radical-right parties perform unevenly. Fidesz and PiS were the first radical-right parties to nominate members of the European Commission. During the commissions of former presidents José Manuel Barroso and Jean-Claude Juncker, the commissioners from Hungary and Poland joined their colleagues and did not stand out by promoting national agendas. In the case of Hungary, this changed under the commission headed by the current president, Ursula von der Leyen.

In 2019, Fidesz’s first nominee as European commissioner, László Trócsányi, was rejected by the European Parliament for alleged conflicts of interest. His replacement, Oliver Várhelyi, was assigned the portfolio of EU enlargement and relations with the union’s neighborhood. His conduct in office soon became controversial. He was accused by officials and MEPs of neglecting the EU’s principle that progress toward accession should be conditional on the rule of law and democracy and of entertaining particularly friendly relations with Western Balkan leaders with autocratic tendencies, such as Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić and Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Milorad Dodik.23 Equally controversial were Várhelyi’s repeated efforts to curtail the EU’s support for the Palestinian Authority, both before and after Hamas’s October 7, 2023, terrorist attacks against Israel. His actions at various points triggered calls by MEPs for an investigation into his conduct and for his resignation.

The rotating six-month presidency of the EU Council, which brings together national ministers, offers another opportunity for governments dominated by radical-right parties to attempt to shape EU policies according to their agendas. Hungary’s first presidency in 2011, shortly after Fidesz came to power, was generally perceived as pragmatic and reasonably successful, even though restrictive legislation in the country, including a media law, caused some heated debates in the European Parliament.

Hungary’s next presidency comes in the second half of 2024 at a time of much greater estrangement between Budapest and Brussels. Many voices in the parliament and civil society have called for Hungary’s presidency to be suspended or postponed. However, the decision lies with the council, and most member states prefer to respect the established sequence of presidencies. It will be interesting to see how Hungary will handle the challenge—although as far as foreign policy is concerned, the presidency’s role is limited, because both the European Council, which brings together EU leaders, and the Foreign Affairs Council have permanent chairs.

Areas Where the Radical Right Can Have an Impact

Despite sharing similar worldviews, European radical-right parties have not formed a coherent block capable of reshaping EU foreign policy, with the exception of migration policy. However, the situation could change if more radical-right parties were to win power or if there were a change in international circumstances, such as a victory of the radical right in the next U.S. presidential election. Thus, it is worth mapping the areas in which the current EU consensus could be undermined or even altered.
Migration

Opposition to migration and, by extension, to EU migration policies is the single issue that unites all radical-right parties and the area in which they have had the most significant impact. Some, such as FdI, RN, and the AfD, go as far as to warn against “ethnic replacement.”24 These parties are particularly exercised about Muslim immigrants, with the PVV, for instance, having adopted Islamophobia as its primary ideology. Some parties are also opposed to European migration and hostile to Ukrainian refugees. Worries about the economic costs of asylum seekers and the impacts of migration on law and order and the labor market are common features, too.

Most parties advocate renationalizing migration and asylum policies and would resort to drastic measures, including extremely strict border management, naval blockades, the offshoring of asylum procedures to non-EU countries, and the return of unsuccessful asylum seekers to their countries of origin. Many radical-right parties oppose any significant EU role in regulating these matters as well as international rules such as the 1951 United Nations (UN) Refugee Convention or the 2018 UN Global Compact for Migration. A strengthening of the radical right could impede the implementation of regulations on migration, weaken the EU’s capacity to develop further common responses to the migration challenge, and result in a shift toward national policymaking on these issues.

Climate Change

Climate change policies have become fertile ground for exploitation by the radical right—and by external powers. For some radical-right parties, opposition to climate action is associated with nostalgia for a mythical rural past. These parties argue that the relatively small size of their countries compared with the biggest emitters, such as China, the United States, and India, makes national measures to reduce emissions irrelevant on a global scale. Many of the parties covered by this study accept the reality of climate change, but many of their members and followers question whether it is man-made.

The current European backlash against green policies, or greenlash, focuses on the European Green Deal and the Fit for 55 legislative package, which seeks to reduce EU emissions by at least 55 percent by 2030.25 The radical right criticizes this package as an authoritarian elite project that ignores the economic and social costs to citizens and infringes on individual freedoms. Indeed, PiS and Fidesz fought a rearguard action against several elements of the green deal, but as these matters were subject to majority votes, the parties were unable to block them. Poland’s attempts to challenge part of this legislation in the European Court of Justice were similarly unsuccessful.

However, as with migration, these parties’ main impact on EU climate change policies may be indirect. If the radical right is successful in framing the debate about the green transition as an elite conspiracy against the people, mainstream parties will water down the scope and timeframe of the green agenda. The narrow majority with which the European Parliament adopted the EU’s nature restoration law in February 2024 is an indication of this trend.26

Ukraine and Russia

EU policymakers have drawn comfort from the fact that the radical right was sharply divided by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In Poland and the Baltic states, Russia has long been perceived as a threat across the board. In Italy, the commitment of Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s FdI-led government to Western efforts contrasted with the pro-Russia sentiments of her coalition partners and the views of earlier governments. Other radical-right parties moved from a Russia-friendly position to a condemnation of the Russian aggression.

But the radical right maintains a critical stance toward U.S. and EU policies, which, in its view, share some responsibility for the crisis. Several parties, including the FPÖ, Fidesz, Bulgaria’s Revival, the Slovak National Party, and the AfD, view Russia favorably. So far, only Orbán has continued to pursue close ties with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Hungary has obtained exceptions to EU sanctions against Russia to protect its interests in the form of Russian investment and, more generally, has sought to limit the scope and soften the impact of the measures.

With several radical-right parties maintaining open sympathies toward Russia, and others having made scarcely credible U-turns, EU sanctions and military support for Ukraine could be affected if the international context changes. Should Trump, as the next U.S. president, pursue a peace deal with Russia, as he has promised to do, European unity over Ukraine would likely come to an end.27 Conversely, for the anti-Russia radical right in Northern Europe, including the Baltic states, a Trump-Putin rapprochement would be challenging. Diverse attitudes on this issue will remain a serious obstacle to efforts to unite the radical right.

Great-Power Competition

U.S. engagement with European security is likely to diminish—in an accelerated fashion if Trump becomes the next president and in a more gradual way if President Joe Biden is reelected. At present, most radical-right parties align with their country’s mainstream political stance on NATO. But anti-NATO and anti-U.S. sentiments also exist, usually tied to broader antiglobalist or sovereigntist ideologies and often coupled with pro-Russia sympathies or aspirations for an independent defense.

For example, the AfD wants Germany to distance itself from the United States and, by extension, from NATO. The party is more supportive of closer defense cooperation among EU countries. RN has called for France’s departure from the alliance’s integrated military command and is equally hostile to a stronger EU defense policy. The FPÖ opposes NATO, as it fiercely defends Austria’s neutral status. On the whole, an emboldened radical right would make it even harder for Europe to build a strategic defense profile, whether under the umbrella of NATO or of the EU.

Unlike Russia, China has not yet developed ties with the European radical right. Beijing is viewed with some skepticism, especially by Northern European radical-right parties. Meloni’s government has also pulled out of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Conversely, Fidesz and Revival are sympathetic to Chinese interests in Europe because they see Beijing as a source of investment. Because of its leanings toward external actors and its sovereigntist instincts, the radical right could become a hindrance to the EU’s work to bolster its economic security.

EU Enlargement

EU enlargement has long been the most important component of EU foreign policy and has assumed a new importance since the union granted candidate country status to Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia in 2022–2023. The great majority of radical-right parties see enlargement critically and consider it costly and potentially conducive to more migration. RN, the PVV, the FPÖ, and the AfD have been particularly outspoken on this issue. Other parties, however, support particular candidates: PiS considers Ukraine’s accession important for Poland’s security; AUR looks at Moldova as part of Romanian territory; and Fidesz believes that EU membership for like-minded Western Balkan countries would enhance Hungary’s own influence in the union.

Apart from their overall skeptical attitude to enlargement, radical-right parties tend to support the raising of historical grievances and identity issues in the context of EU accession negotiations. Attempts to leverage EU enlargement to extract concessions from candidate countries have become one of the biggest obstacles to moving the process forward.

Values

As illiberal parties, radical-right groups mobilize to defend national identity, family values, and their countries’ Christian heritage, which they see as under attack from an undemocratic, oppressive liberal elite that has captured the EU’s values agenda. These parties oppose the promotion of this agenda in EU foreign policy and block EU initiatives in this direction. Moreover, the radical right views foreign policy mostly in a transactional manner and shows little interest in promoting respect for human rights, democracy, or the rule of law at the international level. These parties see no reason to criticize powerful third countries for deficits in this area, particularly if doing so could have negative consequences for their own bilateral relationships.

Yet, diplomats agree that the EU’s values-based agenda, especially with respect to women’s and LGBTQ rights, has already been downgraded.28 Sweden has abandoned its feminist foreign policy. PiS was the most ideologically consistent actor in blocking common European positions and was joined by some—but not all—like-minded and conservative-led countries. Some radical-right governments, notably Italy’s, limit their skepticism of gender and LGBTQ rights to domestic politics, without letting their views affect their approach to EU policy.

Although the EU’s values debate is framed in ideological terms, diplomats see the obstructionism of some governments as transactional.29 As long as they are relatively isolated, radical-right governments are less likely to block EU consensus building unless they have something to gain. However, a strengthening of radical-right parties in the EU institutions, in particular the EU Council, would likely further downgrade the promotion of values as an element of EU foreign policy. As a consequence, the EU would lose credibility as a promoter of fundamental values and be exposed to criticism for hypocrisy and double standards. These European divisions also play out in international organizations and aggravate the EU’s tensions with third countries.

The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

One area in which the EU is experiencing global accusations of double standards and suffering reputational damage is the Israel-Gaza war, on which the union has divided and divisive positions. The reasons for these divisions run deeper than the rise of the radical right, but these parties do share a pronounced pro-Israel stance. Radical-right parties perceive Israel as a frontline state against Islamist terrorism, a view that resonates with their domestic policies against immigration and multiculturalism. In some cases, paradoxically, anti-Semitic sentiments coexist with a pro-Israel position. Indeed, adopting such a position has helped some parties distance themselves from their anti-Semitic roots. The recent rightward drift of Israeli politics, and contacts between like-minded parties in Israel and Europe, has reinforced the pro-Israel stances of radical-right parties.

The divisions among EU member states are so deep that the radical right’s influence plays only a small part in explaining the union’s problems in agreeing on a common position on the Israel-Gaza war. But the radical right did contribute to the EU’s paralysis. In February 2024, Hungary opposed the imposition of EU sanctions against Israeli settlers in the West Bank and blocked an EU statement that warned against Israel’s planned offensive into Rafah. And days after the October 7 attacks, a post by Várhelyi on X (formerly Twitter) announcing the EU’s suspension of aid to the Palestinians was viewed by 5 million people within the space of a few hours.30

Development Aid

The most significant impact of radical-right parties on development cooperation is their insistence on leveraging aid to obtain reductions in migration flows. In these parties’ view, recipient countries should make it more difficult for people to leave and should support the return of irregular migrants. The SD and the FdI have been particularly active in this regard, with Meloni in January 2024 launching a major investment program for Africa supposedly aimed at addressing the root causes of migration and promoting cooperation on these issues.31 Other parties, including the Finns Party and the PVV, place more emphasis on reducing overall levels of assistance. Central European rightist parties have generally been reluctant donors and slow in adopting EU guidelines on development aid. But whereas PiS remained close to the mainstream, Fidesz has been highly critical of EU aid policy while increasing bilateral funding aimed at promoting national objectives.

Radical-right parties have so far not significantly influenced development assistance provided by the commission and the European Investment Bank. But as many mainstream parties follow the radical right in linking aid to cooperation on migration, this idea is likely to become a prominent feature of future EU debates, including on new programs, such as the Global Gateway initiative for infrastructure investment.

Conclusions

All radical-right parties share a strong ethnonationalist orientation. This unites them in their reflexive mistrust of anything foreign and unfamiliar and in their skepticism of regional and global institutions and norms. But this orientation also divides them, as national interests and narratives vary a great deal and are often at odds with each other. As the fragmentation of these parties in the European Parliament shows, these divisions have so far hampered the parties’ ability to work together and reduced their overall impact.

There are variations in the radicalism of these parties’ aversion to European integration, but they all aim at protecting national sovereignty against further infringement by what they see as an unelected Brussels bureaucracy. They converge in their skepticism of the EU’s migration and asylum policies, which they hold responsible for the massive inflows of migrants in recent years, and they are increasingly hostile to the European Green Deal. In defense of Christian and traditional family values, radical-right parties criticize the EU’s gender and LGBTQ policies and are generally reluctant to raise human rights concerns in their relations with third countries. These parties are mostly opposed to further EU enlargement but make exceptions when national interests favor the inclusion of particular neighbors.

The sharpest divisions among radical-right parties concern their relations with Russia and China. A deep mistrust of Russia means that many parties support Ukraine’s efforts in the ongoing war, while others are openly sympathetic toward Moscow and buy into its anti-Western narratives. On China, many of these parties have not yet developed clear positions, but an interest among Central European parties in strong economic relations with Beijing contrasts with the skeptical attitude of their Nordic counterparts.

Where radical-right parties converge, such as on migration and climate change, they are also likely to find support from mainstream parties and influence EU policies. EU initiatives with objectives that these parties oppose tend to run into difficulties. Where the parties are divided, their influence depends on the EU’s decisionmaking procedures. On topics on which the EU decides by a majority vote, their impact is likely to remain limited. Where unanimity is required, such as on foreign policy, radical-right parties in governing coalitions still have an important blocking ability. In cases where a party that threatens to use its national veto can be isolated, as Hungary was on EU assistance to Ukraine, the chances of overcoming the blockage are good. But if other leaders with similar views are at the table, the risk of paralysis is high.

Contagion and Socialization

Interviews with foreign policy practitioners in Brussels have revealed two tendencies with opposite effects: contagion and socialization.

If individual actors aggressively assert narrow national interests, reject compromise, and block decisions, this tends to result in an overall lowering of solidarity in the entire group. This is particularly true in a setting such as the EU Council, which is based on cooperation and reciprocity and lacks effective means to penalize obstructionism. The more such actors appear on the scene and the more concessions they manage to extract, the greater the temptation will be—even for originally cooperative parties—to engage in similar behavior. Everybody has national interests to protect, and nobody wants to be played for a fool. As a consequence of this contagion, the quality of cooperation will deteriorate.

Orbán’s behavior has already had significant negative effects on EU foreign policy. However, on issues such as Ukraine, where the stakes are high and the vast majority of member states are united, the cohesion of the rest has so far been maintained. But if there are more EU leaders who prioritize purely national objectives and show little regard for the union’s common interests, centrifugal tendencies are likely to prevail.

Radical-right parties in opposition tend to adopt extreme positions to mobilize their voter base and attain a high national profile. When they come to power, these parties usually have to moderate their demands, either because they need to accommodate coalition partners or simply because their original views clash with a complex reality. Working in EU institutions can greatly reinforce this tendency toward greater pragmatism. Sitting in the European Council and the EU Council, radical-right leaders and ministers are drawn into a process designed to lead to negotiated outcomes based on compromise. For many—though by no means all—such politicians, this socialization effect will eventually overrule their ideological baggage. Gradually, outsiders can become insiders with a stake in the system.

Meloni’s FdI is currently the most prominent example so far of this trend. Fears that her government would become another disruptor in EU politics, possibly in close cooperation with Orbán’s, have not come true. Notwithstanding the traditionally pro-Russia views of her coalition partners, Meloni has supported Ukraine. Even on migration—a highly sensitive issue for her party—her policies have been more pragmatic than observers had expected. It remains to be seen how long this will last.

The two tendencies—contagion and socialization—work in parallel but also against each other. Should further crises and increased volatility in European politics bring several radical-right leaders, such as Wilders, Le Pen, or the FPÖ’s Herbert Kickl, to power in a short time, contagion would probably overwhelm the EU’s socialization capacity. A calmer period with only limited progress of the radical right might tame existing radical-right leaders and keep Orbán at bay.

Internal Cohesion and External Credibility

Radical-right parties’ contentious ideology, which is at odds with the EU’s fundamental values, as well as their transactional approach to foreign policy making and innate skepticism of the EU institutions trigger centrifugal dynamics in the EU. As a consequence, solidarity and trust among the member states and their willingness to deepen mutual interdependence are weakened.

All of these trends not only make the EU less able to withstand the pressures of future challenges, but they also have important ramifications for the EU’s effectiveness as an international actor. Diplomats already complain that the time spent in exhausting committee negotiations to reach a consensus on foreign and security policy issues is to the detriment of the EU’s engagement with the rest of the world.32 The EU’s international stances and multilateral policies are further undermined when radical-right governments align with external powers or global organizations, or simply do not follow the EU’s collective positions when voting in international bodies. As a consequence, the EU’s values-based agenda becomes downgraded, damaging the union’s credibility.

When democratic backsliding and the unraveling of the rule of law occur in the EU, the external impact is not only reputational damage. Such developments also give radical-right political forces in neighboring countries a blueprint to dodge the rule-of-law conditions the EU places on its closest partners. This trend weakens the union’s enlargement agenda and contributes to the consolidation of illiberal forces in countries close to the EU.

The Trump Factor

A return of Donald Trump as U.S. president would have a hugely disruptive influence on the EU, which would splinter into various factions, with some countries advocating a stronger and more autonomous EU and others seeking to assuage Trump for the sake of U.S. security guarantees. In this context, it would be very hard for the EU to find unity in the pursuit of many of its current foreign and security policies. This challenge would be made even more difficult by European governments that include the radical right and share ideological affinities with Trump.

Ukraine would be the first victim of this political constellation, as the EU would find it difficult to muster sufficient commitment to continue its financial and military support for the country. Efforts to strengthen the EU’s economic security would be paralyzed both by the influence of external actors seeking to shape EU positions and by the radical right’s skepticism of coordination from Brussels on economic and foreign policies. Europe would become a playground for a possible heightened U.S.-China rivalry, with some radical-right parties acting as Trojan horses and others invoking national sovereignty and protectionism.

What is less clear is whether Trump can be a unifying factor for the European radical right, which currently represents a spectrum with anti-U.S. and pro-Russia sentiments at one end and pro-U.S. and anti-Russia preferences at the other. In the case of a Trump-Putin rapprochement, these parties might find themselves in a schizophrenic predicament.

Responding to the Radical Right

For the political mainstream, the rise of the radical right offers important lessons and needs to be met with robust, coherent responses. First and foremost, the EU as a liberal, democratic project has no future without its core values. Parties committed to these values need consistent cooperation to isolate the most determined disruptors and persuade wavering partners to come on board.

The responsibility to contain the radical right lies primarily with mainstream parties working at the national level. These need to resist the temptation to mimic the radical right. Experience has shown that this tactic backfires and strengthens the radical right, which may become the new mainstream. Whenever a national coalition with a radical-right party is inevitable, mainstream parties should ensure to include binding guardrails in coalition agreements so that the entire government remains committed to European values and principles.

Mainstream political forces should actively engage in dialogue with all parties that are democratic and not racist, even if they are critical of EU institutions and policies. Many of these parties have not yet fully developed positions on most foreign policy issues. There should be space for persuasion and convergence.

At the EU level, member states should pursue efforts to make the EU foreign policy making process more flexible. The rise of radical-right parties has made the transition to majority voting even more difficult than it was already, but there might be opportunities for softer measures, such as more use of constructive abstention. In some cases of blockages, the EU’s treaty provisions on enhanced cooperation could offer a way forward. Also, making a declaration on behalf of a very large majority of member states is sometimes preferable to remaining silent.

The president of the European Commission has considerable influence over the nomination of European commissioners. She should make sure that they work in a nonideological manner for the EU’s common interests and are assigned portfolios for which their party backgrounds do not create conflicts of interest.

The rule of law is not only a key principle of the EU but also a crucial requirement for the functioning of the internal market. The EU institutions therefore need to remain strict and consistent in their handling of instruments to ensure respect for the rule of law. The institutions need to resist attempts to leverage other policy objectives to weaken the EU’s rule-of-law conditionality.

Finally, interviews suggested that Trump’s return as U.S. president would severely aggravate many of Europe’s external challenges and exacerbate the internal disruption from radical-right parties. Preparing for this eventuality in both the EU and NATO requires serious planning that should start now.33

Notes

1 “Home,” The PopuList, https://popu-list.org.

2 Mingo Garscha, “EU Parliamentary Projection: Three-Way for Third and Sixth Place,” Europe Elects, March 4, 2024, https://europeelects.eu/2024/03/04/february-2024/.

3 Paul Kirby and Alison Roberts, “Centre Right Wins Portuguese Election as Radical right Surges,” BBC News, March 11, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-68526833.

4 “Welche Partei würden Sie wählen, wenn am nächsten Sonntag Nationalratswahl wäre?” [Which Party Would You Vote For If There Were a National Council Election Next Sunday?], Statista, 2024, https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/288503/umfrage/sonntagsfrage-zur-nationalratswahl-in-oesterreich-nach-einzelnen-instituten/.

5 Cas Mudde, “The Populist Zeitgeist,” Government and Opposition 39, no. 4 (2004): 541–563, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2004.00135.x.

6 “Camera 04/03/2018” [Chamber of Deputies, March 4, 2018], Eligendo, https://elezionistorico.interno.gov.it/index.php?tpel=C&dtel=04/03/2018&es0=S&tpa=I&lev0=0&levsut0=0&ms=S&tpe=A.

7 Cas Mudde, The Radical right Today (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2019); Larry M. Bartels, Democracy Erodes From the Top: Leaders, Citizens, and the Challenge of Populism in Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2023); Jan-Werner Mueller, “Mainstreaming the Far right,” Project Syndicate, October 20, 2023, https://www.project-syndicate.org/onpoint/populism-far-right-relies-on-mainstream-conservative-elites-by-jan-werner-mueller-2023-10; and Werner Krause, Denis Cohen, and Tarik Abou-Chadi, “Does Accommodation Work? Mainstream Party Strategies and the Success of Radical Right Parties,” Political Science Research and Methods 11, no. 1 (2023): 172–179, https://doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2022.8.

8 Mudde, The Radical right Today.

9 “‘National Conservatives’ Are Forging the Global Front Against Liberalism,” Economist, February 15, 2024, https://www.economist.com/briefing/2024/02/15/national-conservatives-are-forging-a-global-front-against-liberalism.

10 Péter Visnovitz and Erin Kristin Jenne, “Populist Argumentation in Foreign Policy: The Case of Hungary Under Viktor Orbán, 2010–2020,” Comparative European Politics 19 (2021): 683–702, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41295-021-00256-3.

11 Authors’ off-the-record interviews with EU diplomats in January and February 2024.

12 “Discours de Marine Le Pen – Agde 18 septembre 2022” [Speech by Marine Le Pen—Agde, September 18, 2022], National Rally, September 18, 2022, https://rassemblementnational.fr/discours/discours-de-marine-le-pen-agde-18-septembre-2022.

13 Ben Hall, Marton Dunai, and Henry Foy, “Viktor Orbán: What Is the Endgame for Europe’s Chief Disrupter?,” Financial Times, February 1, 2024, https://www.ft.com/content/e158834e-1860-4dee-9d2f-3458ec71f287.

14 Davide Basso, “Marine Le Pen réinstalle le duel avec Emmanuel Macron dans ses propositions sur l’Europe” [Marine Le Pen Reestablishes the Duel With Emmanuel Macron in Her Proposals on Europe], Euractiv, January 18, 2022, https://www.euractiv.fr/section/elections/news/marine-le-pen-reinstalle-le-duel-avec-emmanuel-macron-dans-ses-propositions-sur-leurope/.

15 Henry Olsen, “If Fidesz Joins the ECR That Would Be Good for Hungary – and Good for Europe,” Brussels Signal, February 20, 2024, https://brusselssignal.eu/2024/02/if-fidesz-joins-the-ecr-that-would-be-good-for-hungary-and-good-for-europe/.

16 Simon Otjes, Harmen van der Veer, and Wolfgang Wagner, “Party Ideologies and European Foreign Policy. Examining the Transnational Foreign Policy Space,” Journal of European Public Policy 30, no. 9 (2023): 1793–1819, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13501763.2022.2096103.

17 “EU Election Projection 2024,” Europe Elects, https://europeelects.eu/ep2024/.

18 Cunningham and Hix, “A Sharp Right Turn.”

19 Max Becker and Nicolai von Ondarza, “Geostrategy From the Far right,” Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, March 1, 2024, https://www.swp-berlin.org/publikation/geostrategy-from-the-far-right.

20 Rosa Balfour et al., “Europe’s Troublemakers – The Populist Challenge to Foreign Policy,” European Policy Centre, March 8, 2016, https://www.epc.eu/en/Publications/EUROPES-TROUBLEMAKERS–The-p~257da8; and David Cadier and Christian Lequesne, “How Populism Impacts EU Foreign Policy,” Sciences Po, November 2020, https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-03592985.

21 Nicole Koenig, “Qualified Majority Voting in EU Foreign Policy: Mapping Preferences,” Jacques Delors Centre, February 10, 2020, https://www.delorscentre.eu/fileadmin/2_Research/1_About_our_research/2_Research_centres/6_Jacques_Delors_Centre/Publications/20200210_Policy_Brief_QMV_Koenig__1_.pdf.

22 Authors’ off-the-record interviews with EU diplomats in January and February 2024.

23 Zosia Wanat and Lili Bayer, “Olivér Várhelyi: Europe’s Under-Fire Gatekeeper,” Politico, October 5, 2021, https://www.politico.eu/article/oliver-varhelyi-eu-commissioner-enlargement-western-balkans-serbia-human-rights-democracy-rule-of-law/.

24 Steve Rose, “A Deadly Ideology: How the ‘Great Replacement Theory’ Went Mainstream,” Guardian, June 8, 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/08/a-deadly-ideology-how-the-great-replacement-theory-went-mainstream.

25 “Fit for 55,” European Council, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/green-deal/fit-for-55-the-eu-plan-for-a-green-transition/.

26 Louise Guillot, “EU Nature Law Survives Conservative Backlash in Final Parliament Vote,” Politico, February 27, 2024, https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-nature-law-survives-conservative-backlash-in-final-parliament-vote/.

27 Rosa Balfour, “Kriege und Wahlen: Europa muss sich für ein schwieriges Jahr wappnen” [Wars and elections: Europe must prepare for a difficult year], Der Tagesspiegel, December 21, 2023, https://www.tagesspiegel.de/internationales/kriege-und-wahlen-europa-muss-sich-fur-ein-schwieriges-jahr-wappnen-10948681.html.

28 Authors’ off-the-record interviews with EU diplomats in January and February 2024.

29 Authors’ off-the-record interviews with EU diplomats in January and February 2024.

30 Barbara Moens, Suzanne Lynch, and Gregorio Sorgi, “Europe Struggles to Present Consistent Messaging on Palestinian Aid,” Politico, October 10, 2023, https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-battles-to-present-common-front-on-palestinian-aid/.

31 Hannah Roberts, “As Meloni Embraces Africa, Europe Holds Its Breath,” Politico, January 29, 2024, https://www.politico.eu/article/meloni-italy-africa-energy-migration-far-right/.

32 Authors’ off-the-record interviews with EU diplomats in January and February 2024.

32 Authors’ off-the-record interviews with EU diplomats in January and February 2024.

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