Eurasia Press & News
Deploying troops to Ukraine, even for non-combat duties, entails risks most European countries are currently unwilling to take. The priority right now must be ramping up aid to Kyiv.
Stefanie Babst
Strategic advisor and former NATO deputy assistant secretary general
Acknowledging that the West’s strategy in support of Ukraine has failed is hard. But the mix of providing piecemeal military support to Kyiv, upholding a weak economic sanctions regime against Russia, and offering ritualized political assurances have not deterred Russian President Putin from advancing his sick plans to destroy and subjugate Ukraine. Not by one inch. By contrast, Russia’s current offensive in the Kharkiv region is another brutal illustration.
If the Western allies really want to turn the tide in Ukraine, they must pursue other avenues. This is what the governments in the Baltic and Nordic countries, in Poland, and perhaps even in France have seemingly now understood. Since neither NATO nor the EU can generate consensus for a strategy shift, a coalition of the willing is the only way forward to avoid a complete disaster.
Looking at options for non-combat roles of their troops makes sense: from providing in-situ training for Ukrainian troops and offering logistical and repair support, to assisting with demining and cyber-defense efforts. The prime objective of such efforts would be to help Ukrainians free up some of their military forces and help protect Ukrainian lives, infrastructure, and military assets. Clearly, even a small European military footprint in Ukraine would entail risks for NATO’s broader defense efforts; but if properly assessed and managed, these wouldn’t outweigh the operational and strategic advantages.
The time is ticking not just for Ukrainians but for the Europeans, too. After the U.S. presidential election in November, they will be the most important military, financial, and economic lifeline for Ukraine. The sooner they prepare for this in deeds and not words, the better.
Thorsten Benner
Co-founder and director of the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi)
If Russia were to achieve a major breakthrough and advance on Kyiv before the U.S. election, the United States—along with some European allies—would almost certainly directly intervene in the fighting on Ukrainian soil. As a U.S. colleague remarked, top decisionmakers right now might well be unaware that they would end up doing this. But this is how things would play out, not least given U.S. President Joe Biden’s need to look strong ahead of a pivotal election. This just goes to show that in the fog of war, events can often overrule the word “never.”
But this in no way means that speculating about European boots on the ground right now, without either U.S. support or EU political unity, is a smart political move. Far from deterring Putin, what French President Emmanuel Macron and his fellow travelers have managed to do is expose European divisions and embolden those on both the far right and far left in key Western European states who criticize support for Ukraine.
Macron and others should focus on marrying words with deeds in terms of military and financial support for Ukraine. There is a lot of room to run on that front rather than playing with the divisive idea of boots on the ground.
Ian Bond
Deputy director of the Centre for European Reform
This is one of the easier questions Judy has asked us: most Europeans are clearly not prepared to send troops to Ukraine. That was obvious from the negative reactions of other European leaders when President Emmanuel Macron first raised the possibility of European boots on the ground—saying that “nothing should be excluded”—in February.
He has repeated his point since then, most recently setting it in the context of Russia possibly breaking through Ukrainian defenses. However unpopular it makes him, Macron is right. Europeans must understand what is at stake if Russia defeats Ukraine: the security of other states in Russia’s neighborhood would be severely threatened. Moldova is already vulnerable to Russian subversion but is protected against any more direct attack because it is separated from Russia by Ukraine. If Putin occupied Ukraine’s Black Sea coast and the port of Odesa, Moldova would be defenseless.
And Putin might draw the conclusion from the West’s failure to protect Ukraine adequately, despite its strategic significance, that NATO allies might back down rather than confront Russia if it attacked the Baltic states. Sending European troops to fight in Ukraine would be terrible; fighting Russian troops on NATO territory would be worse.
Andrew Cottey
Professor in the Department of Government and Politics at University College Cork
Since February 2022, Western strategy toward Ukraine has had two central elements: firstly, massive military and economic support to Ukraine to ensure it can survive as an independent state, but—secondly—avoidance of the direct involvement of Western militaries because, as President Joe Biden has put it, that would risk World War Three.
The result has been two bright lines preventing escalation: no Russian attacks on NATO countries; no Western forces directly fighting Russia in Ukraine.
The recent debate, with suggestions of deploying small numbers of European forces to help operate air defense systems, lacks seriousness. What would happen if European troops were killed? If European states did nothing, their bluff would have been called. The alternative would likely be to deploy even more forces.
What would happen if European troops killed Russian soldiers, or were drawn into firefights with Russian forces? Would Russia escalate, potentially even attacking those countries which sent forces?
We don’t know how deploying European forces might play out, but the risk of escalation cannot simply be dismissed. If European forces were deployed without U.S. forces alongside them, there would also be the risk of a major split between Europe and America if things go badly.
Rather than debating something they are unlikely to do, European states should double down on providing Ukraine with the military assistance it needs. This should include more from existing European weapons stocks (especially air defenses), long-term (five to ten year) commitments to arm Ukraine and speeding up the rebuilding of defense industrial capacity.
Liana Fix
Fellow for Europe in the David Rockefeller Studies Program at the Council on Foreign Relations
No, Europeans are not prepared to send troops to Ukraine, nor should they be. European troops in Ukraine—regardless of what “hat” they would be wearing, and regardless of whether it is a combat role or not—would inevitably risk NATO’s involvement.
Any stray missile from Russia could provoke a direct U.S.-Russia escalation. Otherwise, if the United States does not get involved because there are only European and not NATO troops in Ukraine, the credibility of Article 5 is at risk—to the detriment of the frontline countries.
Macron’s ill-advised initiative has not been coordinated in advance with allies, nor does it have a majority among Europeans. He also vastly oversells Europe’s military capabilities. It is naïve to hope that European “strategic ambiguity” would keep Moscow guessing at what Europe’s next steps might be and thus restrain Russia’s behavior in Ukraine. The Kremlin knows very well that European armies are not up to the task to risk a confrontation without the United States. European troops in Ukraine appear a bluff that is even less credible than Obama’s “red lines” in Syria.
Macron’s initiative is also blurring the lines in domestic debates. Most European publics are ready and willing to support Ukraine militarily, now and in the future. But they are not ready to fight in Ukraine. If the goalposts are constantly shifted, public support for Ukraine could be seriously damaged. It also distracts from the real challenge that Europeans are facing. The outcome of the war will not be decided by European troops in Ukraine but by the amount of money and weapons Europeans pour into Ukraine.
Ulrike Franke
Senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
No one in Europe wants to send troops to Ukraine. The risks are all too obvious. First and foremost, there is the danger to the lives of European soldiers; that Russia would see a decision to officially send troops as a provocation is certain.
Equally as dangerous would be the uncertainties over the public’s response to wounded or even killed soldiers and over what a testing of the mutual defense clauses within NATO and the EU might reveal, such as disunity or limits to solidarity. And of course, such a decision risks drawing more and more actors into the conflict.
Still, as Emmanuel Macron has underlined, it is strategically unwise to exclude sending troops. We have drawn too many red lines for ourselves, instead of drawing them for the opponent, and there is no benefit in pre-emptively limiting our options.
Also, no one knows how the war will evolve. A Russian victory endangers not only the state of Ukraine and its citizens, but also Europe’s own security. As much as we hope to avoid it, as much as we should work to avoid it, it is possible that the war evolves in such a way that sending European troops becomes the better of a set of bad options. This is a scary scenario. And preparing for it is responsible European security planning in 2024.
François Heisbourg
Special adviser at the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique
When Macron raised the issue of boots on the ground on February 26, his stance was sometimes portrayed as a provocation toward a dovish German chancellor, or a bizarre electoral ploy, or as a way of emphasizing the break with his earlier attempts to woo Putin to the negotiating table.
On its own terms, his initiative was a justified attempt to create strategic ambiguity—to keep the Russians in the dark about our intentions, in contradistinction to the West’s counterproductive policy of telling the Russians what we wouldn’t do.
Reality on the battlefield has now turned this hypothetical question into a real-world issue, with Ukraine’s overstretched forces struggling to resist the onslaught. The West has repeatedly stated that a Ukrainian defeat would have unacceptable consequences for European security. Yet apart from support from the Baltics, Macron is very much alone, when he states as he did in the Economist that troops may be deployed if the Russians broke through and Kyiv were to ask for help.
For the time being, Germany and the United States will have none of it. France’s military means are limited and the West is split. Hoping that the Russian breakthrough doesn’t happen is hardly a policy.
Dominik P. Jankowski
Deputy Permanent Representative of Poland to NATO
This is, indeed, a question on how far Europeans are ready—and able—to go in supporting Ukraine. Europeans should continue to discuss this option as it creates strategic dilemmas for Russia and frames different opportunities to help Ukraine win this war. At the same time, this option should not stop Europeans from doing more right here, right now. In fact, European allies should provide more weapons to Kyiv, train more Ukrainian troops, and assure the sustainability of financial support to Ukraine. The current discussions in NATO on a long-term security pledge for Ukraine and additional training opportunities respond to that necessity.
Linas Kojala
Director of the Eastern Europe Studies Centre, Vilnius
From the outset of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, NATO’s primary goal was to avoid direct military confrontation with Russia. Therefore, deploying troops to Ukraine would represent a significant policy shift with profound implications.
Merely debating this option enhances European strategic ambiguity, which is insufficient with regard to Russia. It also reminds Western societies that the war in Ukraine is indeed of existential importance to Europe. If the situation is truly critical, then all options must be on the table.
Yet, it is essential for European leaders to coordinate their rhetoric, as some countries were quick to deny that troop deployment could ever take place. Envisioning the deployment in practice remains challenging, except in very limited and specific capacities like training missions, which, for instance, the Lithuanian government has already expressed support for. But even such limited engagement would bring risks, and Europeans are generally risk-averse. Moreover, only some countries have spare troops for all the eventualities that could arise from it. Therefore, it is hard to imagine it taking place without tacit support from the United States.
Finally, these considerations, while certainly valuable, should not overshadow the immediate task of bolstering military and financial support to Ukraine. The urgency of the situation demands swift and practical decisions.
Jacek Kucharczyk
President of the Institute of Public Affairs, Warsaw
President Macron’s statement on the need to send Western troops to Ukraine is a welcome provocation. It is aimed at stirring up debate about our ability and willpower to defend ourselves against Putin’s increasingly aggressive posture.
For too long this debate was dominated by the “non-escalation” camp in the United States and the EU. Thus far, the European public eschewed the consideration of tough choices so that we have consistently fallen short of doing the right thing at the right time. Looking back at the debate following the aggression on February 24, 2022, one cannot avoid the feeling that the right decisions came too late, while others—such as the “closed sky” initiative—never came at all.
It is clear that at this point most Europeans are not prepared to send their troops to Ukraine. In Poland, a country rightly perceived as hawkish on Russia, the debate is focused on the military capacity to defend Polish rather than Ukrainian territory and people. Poles believe that Ukraine deserves our help in terms of weapons, economic support, and acceptance of refugees, but there has been no significant discussion about sending Polish troops to fight against the Russians.
At the same time, a recent opinion poll shows that the vast majority of Poles feel that the war in Ukraine is a threat to Polish security. More than 80 percent of Poles agree with such a statement, while only 3 percent—a statistical margin—reject it. In a similar vein, nearly 60 percent said that a Russian attack against NATO is possible within the next few years and once again very few disagree. The sense of threat is therefore acute. Prime Minister Donald Tusk and other leading Polish politicians made military security a centerpiece of their political agenda. Asked about Macron’s statement, Tusk said he does not consider such a scenario at a given moment, but one can easily imagine that the idea of NATO intervention in Ukraine might become politically acceptable in Poland and in some countries directly facing Russia.
Alena Kudzko
Vice president for Policy and Programming at GLOBSEC
A growing number of countries are starting to contemplate whether sending a limited troop deployment of some kind to Ukraine could become the least bad option on the table. How far Ukraine’s allies prove willing to go will depend on the shifting dynamics of the war and domestic public perceptions of threats and risks.
For some countries, like Germany and the United States, but also Hungary and Slovakia, it is unlikely that any form of deployment will become a plausible policy option any time soon. For others, like the Baltics or Poland, taking action at all costs to stifle Russia in Ukraine could still be a better alternative than facing an emboldened Russia at their doorstep. If Russia gains more momentum on the battlefield and Ukraine exhausts its combat-capable human resources, pressure could grow to expand the spectrum of actions.
As with other types of support for Ukraine, any potential deployment is likely to be cautious and incremental by design. Non-combat missions with minimized risks of casualties are not yet palatable but are no longer outright dismissed. This could include providing logistical support and deploying personnel for weapon repair and demining missions, potentially bolstering border protection in areas where there are no ongoing combat activities, such as Belarus or the Transnistria border, or assisting with air defense.
However, even in places with the most acute threat perception toward Russia, any option that puts citizens in harm’s way will remain the option of last resort. Sending combat troops to Ukraine will require a far more significant and tangible Zeitenwende than the shock of the 2022 invasion.
John Lough
Associate fellow in the Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House
No. Not yet and it is almost impossible to see a European country placing troops in a combat situation in Ukraine except in an extreme scenario if the Ukrainian state collapsed and the country began to break apart. Given continued Western support and Ukraine’s ability to demonstrate sustained resilience, this is a highly unlikely possibility.
Although European capitals are not talking about how an eventual peace agreement might be policed, the examples of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo are relevant. Ukraine might reasonably insist on internationalizing any peace deal to ensure a European military presence, perhaps under NATO command. Yet this could only happen with Russian consent and there is no possibility of the Putin leadership agreeing to such terms unless the Russian army were facing defeat.
For now, European leaders are generally reluctant to explain to their publics that Russia is at war with the West. However, they are waking up to the fact that Putin is committed to a long war and is subordinating the Russian economy to the goal of defeating Ukraine. This is prompting long overdue investment in rebuilding defense industry capacity and re-equipping armies. The issue of troops on the ground is certainly not on the agenda.
Oana Lungescu
Distinguished fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)
President Macron is right to call for greater Western “strategic ambiguity” in terms of support to Ukraine at this existential moment. NATO countries have been extremely careful to prevent escalation with Russia, and for good reason, but there is an increasingly fine line between escalation management and self-deterrence.
As Russia tries to take advantage of the delays in the delivery of both U.S. and European military aid by intensifying its attacks around Kharkiv, the West should shift from its pledge to support Ukraine “for as long as it takes” to doing “whatever it takes, as fast as needed.” That could include military trainers and demining experts, but not combat troops, as French Minister of Defense Sébastien Lecornu said in March, in an attempt to clarify Macron’s remarks and limit the damage done to Western unity.
Ukraine has made amply clear that it is not asking for European troops but for European weapons, ammunition, and air defense systems. So Macron’s pronouncements would be more credible if France did not rank eighth in military allocations to Ukraine in the latest Kiel Institute Ukraine support tracker, behind the Nordic countries, Germany, the UK, and Poland.
Denis MacShane
Former UK minister for Europe
This is a very good question but not one anyone will answer ahead of the European Parliament elections!
President Macron floated the idea as he seems to be the only European leader prepared to think the unthinkable on geopolitics. Sadly, he is not putting his money where his mind is and France lags behind other leading NATO or G7 nations in sending the munitions Ukraine needs.
There are high-quality military missions from nations like Britain in Ukraine but so far no one has greenlighted combat troops. Yet if Europe is serious about facing down Putin, Ukraine’s soldiers cannot do it alone. Twenty-five years ago, former UK prime minister Tony Blair put together a coalition with Bill Clinton, Gerhard Schröder, Lionel Jospin, and Massimo D’Alema which used air power and ground troops to face down Slobodan Milosevic and end the Serb decade of mass murder, torture, killing innocent women and children—or the genocidal slaughter of Srebrenica. Europeans had wrung their hands about Serb killings, ethnic cleansing, and driving millions into exile much as we wring our hands over Putin’s brutality in Ukraine.
Twenty-five years ago, Europe took a risk and used its military power to end the Serb attack on European democracy and innocent Europeans. Is it too much to hope that a similar coalition of brave leaders can emerge after the European Parliament elections and say to Putin “enough is enough”?
Pol Morillas
Director at the Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (CIDOB)
Strategic ambiguity and strategic division are two sides of the same coin. Not ruling out the possibility of boots on the ground serves the purpose of not drawing red lines on what Europeans are ready to do to defend its partner. At the same time, it provides a renewed sense of leadership by Europe—and Macron.
But when other key partners such as Germany consider that sending soldiers to Ukraine is not the right decision, strategic ambiguity gives way to a dangerous sign of internal disunity, precisely at a time when Ukraine is suffering and struggling to defend itself. Putin, whose preferred foreign policy toward the EU is fostering divisions among member states, probably cherishes France’s and Germany’s different views on the future steps in Ukraine. European leaders should first agree on their long-term strategy for the defense and support to Ukraine, before giving Putin the gift he enjoys the most.
Hanna Ojanen
Research director at Tampere University
The idea of sending troops from NATO countries to Ukraine meets opposition as it would mean risking escalation—bringing the whole of NATO to war with Russia.
And still, it might happen anyway. According to an advisor to the Estonian president, the country’s government is seriously discussing the possibility of sending troops for support missions in western Ukraine. They would replace Ukrainian troops that could be sent to combat missions at the front.
This sounds like a continuation of the bit-by-bit approach of the EU and NATO countries: first arms, then more potent arms, then security guarantees of some kind by some countries—so why not then troops for support functions?
Meanwhile in Finland, an opinion poll shows that nine out of ten say Finland should be ready to defend another NATO country under armed attack. Now, Ukraine is not in NATO, but it is on its way there. Would Finland then send troops to defend Estonia if Estonia defends Ukraine? Or, could a case be made for protecting candidate countries on their way to NATO, too?
Or, is there room for a real game changer—bringing forward Ukrainian NATO membership? NATO would hardly be in peril militarily, but what could surface are internal problems of decisionmaking and leadership.
Kristi Raik
Deputy director of the International Centre for Defence and Security, Tallinn
Macron’s invitation not to exclude sending troops to Ukraine exposed some unfortunate truths. Firstly, Europeans are terribly poor at strategic communication. Rather than embracing the statement that created uncomfortable uncertainty on the Russian side, a number of countries rushed to shoot it down. Hence, secondly, it showed once again the limits of unity among Europeans (hardly a surprise to anyone). Thirdly, and most importantly, it showed that many European countries were not prepared to even consider the possibility of sending troops to Ukraine.
However, I believe Macron gave a much-needed push to the European debate. Now we are all discussing such a step. It is within the realm of the possible. The question we may be facing at some point is: are we prepared to send troops to Ukraine if that’s what is needed to prevent Russia from winning the war? If forced to choose, are we prepared to send our troops to operate on Ukrainian soil—not necessarily on the front, there are also other supporting tasks—or do we wait for the fighting to reach NATO territory? I do hope military assistance to Ukraine will be stepped up fast enough for us to avoid such a choice.
Paul Taylor
Senior visiting fellow at the European Policy Centre
Neither the EU nor NATO is likely to find consensus on sending troops to Ukraine. So any European intervention would have to be by bilateral agreement or by a coalition of willing nations without a UN mandate. This is far harder to mount in a country at war than for a peacekeeping or stabilization mission.
Who would be in command? Would European forces be integrated into Ukraine’s military or perform non-lethal tasks in the rear, such as protecting arms factories and infrastructure? How would they be armed, with what rules of engagement if they came under Russian attack and suffered casualties?
None of these questions has been thought through, at least in public. Yet a growing number of governments no longer rule out sending troops. France, Estonia, Lithuania, Finland, Sweden, and Poland have kept the option open. They seek to deter Russia from going too far by “strategic ambiguity,” but Putin may call their bluff.
In private, the French president has talked of possible action if Russia moved to capture Odesa, Ukraine’s Black Sea lifeline. Few European armies have the capability for high-intensity warfare. The French would be unlikely to act without the UK at their side, and neither without at least indirect U.S. support.
Bruno Tertrais
Deputy director of the Fondation pour la recherche stratégique
The short answer is “it depends.” I don’t know any European country who would be willing to die for Kyiv today. Absent a deliberate attack against NATO, which would trigger Article 5, it’s hard to imagine that Europeans would fight alongside Ukraine. Especially without the Americans, who do not relish at the prospect of possible escalation if Europeans were involved.
Conversely, few European countries have rejected the idea that a number of soldiers in uniform could be sent to Ukraine for limited, non-combat duties mentioned by Macron such as manning air defense systems or helping to protect the country’s borders. Especially since some Western countries have almost certainly sent special forces there.
In the medium run, it is hard to exclude some missions by national air forces in the Ukrainian skies, in case Ukraine’s military situation were to degrade. Yes, it’s a red line today but several European countries have crossed their own red lines since 2022. At the end of the day, the question is whether this idea is good for deterrence of Russia. We are often seen as weak by Putin. Can we change his calculus? How can we sow doubt in his mind? That, I think, was a key reason behind Macron’s reasoning.
