Eurasia Press & News
The West’s permission to hit Russia with long-range weapons was the overcoming of another important red line in this war (and the first missile strikes immediately followed). In response, Putin said that Russia can put its weapons in the regions from where strikes will be carried out on the “sensitive objects” of Ukraine’s allies, but it may be another threat that Putin is not implementing. The West and Moscow chose different strategies in determining and complying with the red lines: Putin immediately moved to the threat of nuclear weapons and raised the stakes as much as possible. In response, Ukraine and its allies were testing the readiness to implement the declared threats – one after another, in accordance with the “Salami strategy”: if two years ago the West was afraid to transfer even obsolete tanks to Ukraine, now preparing to send contingents of their military instructors there.
Red lines of the Russian-Ukrainian war
The war in Ukraine is the largest conflict in Europe since World War II: the military losses of the sides in killed and wounded last year reached half a million people, the number of refugees exceeds 6 million people, economic damage is approaching $500 billion, tens of thousands of civilians have become victims of constant violations of the rules conduct of war on the part of Russia. But there could be many times more casualties if the war completely gets out of control, since the aggressor country has nuclear weapons and has threatened to use them from the very beginning of the war. This forces Kyiv’s allies to act cautiously, trying, on the one hand, to protect Ukraine, and on the other, to prevent nuclear escalation. One of the main tools of deterrence is the so-called red lines – the parties designate conditions, violation of which will inevitably lead to serious escalation.
One of the main instruments of deterrence in war is the so-called red lines.
Putin outlined his red lines at the very beginning of the war, saying on February 24, 2022:
“Whoever tries to interfere with us, and even more so create threats to our country, to our people, should know that Russia’s response will be immediate and will lead you to consequences that you have never encountered in your history.”
The message was very clear – if Western countries enter the war on the side of Ukraine, Putin is ready to use nuclear weapons. That is, the scale of escalation was immediately declared as the maximum possible, but what is considered a “threat to the country” is unclear; Putin, as it were, reserved the right to decide in each specific case what is considered to be crossing the red line and what is not.
The West has chosen a different line of behavior. No statements were made publicly at all, but a non-public signal was sent to Moscow : if Russia uses nuclear weapons in Ukraine or attacks any of the NATO countries, the entire Russian military infrastructure will be destroyed by conventional (that is, conventional) weapons. The same conclusion followed from NATO war games , which simulated the escalation of the conflict and were carried out even before the start of a full-scale invasion. Thus, the West (represented by NATO), firstly, outlined the red lines much more clearly, and secondly, threatened not the maximum level of escalation, leaving the move in reserve. This makes the threat much more realistic, because it is quite possible to believe that the West is ready to strike Russian military infrastructure with conventional weapons, counting on the fact that the Kremlin will not dare to respond with nuclear weapons and provoke a retaliatory nuclear strike on Russia.
Drawing the lines is only the first step; the most difficult thing is to make the enemy believe that you are ready to carry out the threat. Here the parties chose different strategies. Putin was interested in the West developing an image of him as a person who does not think about costs and is ready, if necessary, to die in a nuclear war and destroy the entire country with him. This strategy was borrowed from the DPRK, whose leaders have been successfully exploiting it for decades, without participating in any war and only periodically launching ballistic missiles on holidays. It was not difficult for Putin to form such an image: threats with nuclear weapons became constant both in the speeches of Putin himself and in political talk shows of state propaganda. The strengthening of the military dictatorship left no doubt that the Supreme Commander-in-Chief makes decisions alone, and Putin’s interviews, where he gave lengthy lectures in the genre of alternative history and said that Russians are ready to sacrifice themselves in order to go to heaven as martyrs , made it clear: count on his sanity is too risky.
Putin borrows North Korea’s nuclear blackmail strategy
For the West, demonstrating determination is much more difficult, since the addressee of any statement from Western leaders will be not only Putin, but also the internal voter, who would not like the rhetoric of readiness to sacrifice oneself. In this regard, Ukraine and NATO countries chose a different tactic, known in conflict studies as the “salami strategy” and made famous in the film “Dr. Strangelove” (which Putin is known to have watched ). The essence of the strategy is to escalate the situation progressively, in small steps, understanding that the enemy will not be ready for a full-scale nuclear clash because of a single step. And this is how it happened.
How Ukraine and NATO tested Russian red lines
When launching a full-scale invasion, Putin was counting on a blitzkrieg – special operations forces would land at Gostomel airport and seize key government offices in Kyiv. In these early days, Putin apparently hoped that after his special forces captured or destroyed the Ukrainian leadership and Russia proclaimed its proteges as the new leaders of Ukraine, Russian troops would be able to take the country without a fight and the West would simply not dare to oppose it. After the landing at the airport failed, Russian troops had to face fierce resistance, but the superiority of forces on the Russian side was so colossal that it was clear that without the intervention of Western allies, Ukraine would not last long. But NATO countries were in no hurry to support the Ukrainians – even at the level of military supplies, and not so much because of the red lines, but because the memories of how American military equipment supplied to Afghanistan were ultimately too fresh ended up in the hands of the Taliban.
In the first weeks of the war, Ukraine was forced to make do almost exclusively on its own and, in addition to the moral and volitional qualities of Ukrainian soldiers and militias, it was saved only by the catastrophic lack of professionalism of the Russian military. But it was precisely this stage that turned out to be fundamental for the Western allies – contrary to the forecasts of their own intelligence services, Ukraine was able to resist, and therefore, the issue of military support could already be seriously discussed.
Initially, military assistance was minimal, although relatively large shipments of American Javelin anti-tank systems, grenade launchers and ammunition were delivered before the full-scale invasion. On February 27, Germany agreed on the supply of nine howitzers from Estonia, the United States transferred 200 Stinger MANPADS (and even then as part of previously approved assistance), Poland on February 28 transferred 100 mortars with ammunition and began discussing the transfer of several of its fighters and attack aircraft to Ukraine, France – weapons worth €120 million, including Milan and Javelin anti-tank systems, as well as Mistral MANPADS. Many other countries sent similar weapons – grenade launchers, mortars, MANPADS, shells, body armor. All this was, of course, useful, but could not change the course of hostilities.
Only at the end of March, when it became clear that Russian troops had failed to take Kyiv and the Ukrainian Armed Forces launched a counter-offensive, did the Western allies become somewhat bolder. Since April, Ukraine begins to receive heavy artillery, armored personnel carriers, Czech T-72M1 tanks, and the United States finally declares its readiness to supply HIMARS multiple launch rocket systems (however, there will be only four of the first HIMARS and they will reach Ukraine only by June). The German tank manufacturer Leopard also volunteered to start deliveries to Ukraine, but the German government did not dare to cross this red line.
Western countries also did not dare to introduce a “no-fly zone” – this would essentially mean direct involvement of NATO in the war, since it would have to shoot down Russian planes over Ukrainian territory. But this problem largely resolved itself – due to the effectiveness of Ukrainian air defense, Russian planes almost stopped flying deep into Ukrainian territory.
Starting in the fall of 2022, the flow of weapons begins to flow into Ukraine as if from a cornucopia. For example, Germany donated its own multiple launch rocket systems to Ukraine, the United States donated new HIMARS, a thousand Javelins, howitzers, and other European countries donated artillery systems and armored vehicles. Gradually, all Western countries are joining in with military assistance – looking at each other and seeing that no catastrophic consequences are observed, they are increasingly bolder in sending the most modern weapons to Ukraine.
In October 2022, Ukrainians tested a new red line – the Crimean Bridge, Putin’s favorite brainchild, was blown up. And again nothing happened. In general, Crimea is gradually becoming a constant target of Ukrainian attacks, and if before the full-scale invasion it would never have occurred to anyone that Ukraine might try to return the peninsula by military means, now they are starting to talk about such plans seriously. The red line from 2022 to May 2023 moves to the internationally recognized Russian borders – Crimea and Donbass in fact turn out to be a legitimate target for the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
In 2023, new red lines will be tested. In February, Germany decided to provide Leopard tanks to Ukraine – not that they could decisively change the situation on the battlefield, but for Germany itself it was a symbol of full commitment to its allied obligations to Ukraine. And in May 2023, the Ukrainians launched their first attack on Moscow – several drones crashed into the Moscow Kremlin building. Although they do not cause any damage, psychologically it has had a colossal effect: for the first time, residents of the Russian capital understand that the war zone could extend to them. Later, drone attacks on the capital will become regular , and the damage from their hits will no longer be symbolic. Putin has no response to such an escalation because Russian missiles have been hitting residential areas of Ukrainian cities since the first day of the full-scale invasion, and there is simply nothing in the Kremlin’s arsenal that can be used for escalation. Except for nuclear weapons.
Observing all this, the Western allies, under pressure from public opinion, in August 2023 agreed to supply Ukraine with F-16 fighters (albeit without crews, so it will take many more months to train Ukrainian pilots). But already in September, Russian troops felt the crossing of another important red line – Ukraine began to systematically use long-range cruise missiles. The first target for them is Crimea, where the British Storm Shadow arrives in September . And in October, Ukraine receives ATACMS missiles . After this, Crimea loses its former strategic importance, because all military installations there become easy targets, and even the Russian military fleet is forced to partially relocate to Novorossiysk.
In fact, the very transfer of long-range missiles occurred so late precisely because in the first year of the war, Western countries feared that strikes on Crimea could lead to an excessive escalation of the conflict. Having lifted this taboo, Ukraine’s Western allies have maintained a ban on their missile strikes on internationally recognized Russian territory. In these territories, Ukraine has long carried out sabotage on its own, attacking oil refineries and blowing up military warehouses (and again, Russia had nothing to respond to), but the West kept Ukraine from direct missile attacks (although Russia has been attacking Ukraine from its territory since 2014 ). Who knows how long this red line would have lasted if Putin had not come up with the idea of a “sanitary zone” in the Kharkov region. After Russian troops launched an offensive from their territory, taking advantage of the fact that Ukraine could not hit the rear with high-precision Western weapons, the ban was lifted.
In the first year of the war, the West feared that attacks on Crimea could lead to an excessive escalation of the conflict
Finally, one of the last of the red lines – sending NATO troops to Ukraine – was also overcome on the initiative of the French President . Before this, NATO instructors trained Ukrainian troops on the territory of their countries, which extremely slowed down the process. Their presence in Ukraine, even if they do not hold weapons in their hands, can fundamentally increase the combat effectiveness of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. But the symbolic meaning of this red line is also equally important, precisely because it is the last. Then there is only full participation in the war by NATO armies.
Red lines and military strategies
According to some analysts, Putin made a strategic mistake when, at the beginning of the invasion, he immediately publicly outlined Western participation in the conflict as a red line beyond which catastrophic consequences were inevitable. Politicians generally try not to publicly draw red lines, notes Branislav Slanchev, a specialist in game-theoretic analysis of war and peace negotiations, professor at the University of California at San Diego (USA):
“First, the state declaring red lines does not want to be in a position where it is forced to respond just because a red line has been crossed. It always wants to retain freedom of action to choose the best course under the circumstances. Secondly, you don’t want to back your opponent into a corner. Public statements that they will not cross the line can be perceived as weakness. This may give the opponent additional incentive to cross the line to avoid such conclusions. Neither side would like such a situation. That’s why real red lines are communicated privately.”
As Nobel laureate Thomas Schelling noted in the classic book “Strategy of Conflict,” in order for the enemy to believe in the reality of the threat, he must see that you have somehow already cut off your path to retreat and are bound by the need to carry it out, even if this harms yourself. For example, if you accelerate too much in a car, you force those who are moving towards you to swerve, because they understand that you cannot stop. Perhaps this was partly Putin’s calculation when, by making a public statement in front of all Russians about the plan to seize all of Ukraine, he cut off his path to any intermediate decisions, and therefore, it is useless for the West to put pressure on him. In addition, the reality of the threat is helped by the fact that under dictatorship, Putin can ignore the costs and risk hundreds of thousands of lives of his fellow citizens.
Putin’s calculation could have been justified if Ukraine had been captured in the first days, as planned. But as soon as the war dragged on, several problems arose. First, the horrors of the humanitarian catastrophe awakened the electorate of Western countries, which demanded that their states intervene. Secondly, the Western allies had enough time to coordinate and begin to act together. This is a huge problem for Putin: he can try to intimidate one country or several, but no one will believe that Putin is able to fight against the whole world, he simply does not have the resources for this.
As a result, it is enough for only one country to test some kind of red line, and immediately other allies muster up the courage to do the same, notes Slanchev:
“Most countries do not want to be the first to supply advanced weapons systems. Germany is a good example of this: they waited for the US to take the initiative, as we did with tanks, although this initiative was very symbolic. Other countries, such as Britain and the Netherlands, are trying to push the US to take more action by taking the first step themselves, hoping that this will make things politically easier for the US.”
Every single step the West takes changes the status quo so little that it gives Putin no political justification for nuclear war, and in true salami strategy, the allies are gradually crossing red lines one by one. Moreover, the Western allies are taking some steps only as retaliatory measures. For example, deliveries of the first long-range versions of ATACMS were agreed upon after the Kremlin ignored a warning not to use North Korean ballistic missiles on Ukrainian territory, and the authorization of missile attacks on Russian territory followed only an offensive in the Kharkov region.
Using the “salami strategy,” the allies are gradually overcoming Putin’s red lines one by one
Ukraine understands that the West is paralyzed by fear of nuclear war, and is trying with all its might to prove that Putin’s threats are a bluff. Perhaps it was for this purpose that in recent months Ukrainian drones have attacked several objects related to the combat command and control system of the Russian strategic nuclear forces (SNF):
the receiving part of the over-the-horizon radar station (ZGO radar) 29B6 (code “Container”) in Mordovia ;
ZGO radar “Voronezh-DM” in Armavir ;
Radar station ZGO “Voronezh-M” near Orsk .
All of the listed objects are included in the Russian missile attack warning system (MSRN) – one of the key elements of the strategic nuclear forces. And each such attack formally meets the criteria for Russia’s retaliatory use of nuclear weapons. The American administration expressed concern about attempts to damage Russian early warning systems, which do not play any role in the Ukrainian war. But these attacks achieve their psychological effect: if Russia does not react to attacks on nuclear facilities, then there is definitely no need to fear a nuclear war due to attacks on military airfields in the Belgorod region.
