Eurasia Press & News
For all the media hype they generated, Putin’s nuclear saber-rattling threats to provide weapons to target Western countries and his naval flotilla’s visit to Cuba failed to alter Western willingness to provide aid to Ukraine. Russian Navy visits of this type occur every few years, and this one seems par for the course.
The flotilla, which included a frigate, two support ships, and a guided missile submarine, was never going to stimulate another Cuban Missile Crisis on its own. When put into the larger context of Russian political and military activities, the flotilla’s arrival in Cuba was seemingly the centerpiece of Putin’s response to Western nations’ approval for Ukraine to use Western weapons to strike Russia. It also occurred amid a spate of activities meant to signal Putin’s ability and willingness to escalate further. These included Russian air force violations of Swedish airspace, an unscheduled tactical nuclear weapons exercise, and Putin’s presentation of a peace ultimatum in an attempt to undermine the Swiss-sponsored Summit on Peace in Ukraine.
Putin acted true to form and played the escalation card as is his modus operandi. While none of these moved the needle on Western support for Ukraine, Cuba’s willingness to play a role in Putin’s theater of escalation matters. The West needs to better understand how Cuba fits within Russian strategic thinking and why it will likely figure prominently in any future crisis with the West.
Nuclear Rhetoric, the Multipolar World, and Cuba
Nuclear threats are central to Putin’s escalation strategy and have deterred the Biden administration and our allies from providing Ukraine with timely and essential military aid. However—as Putin’s nuclear rhetoric and posturing no longer achieve their desired effects and with the war having a mounting toll on everything from Russia’s economy to social stability—to sustain the perception of being a great power, Putin will have to leverage allies like Cuba. To do so, certain things must be in place within Cuba to enable Putin’s confrontation with the West.
Russia has small contingents of intelligence and military personnel, including Professional Military Contractors (PMC), in Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua. They provide access within the Western Hemisphere and an ability to sustain its allies. The presence and deployment of these assets to Venezuela and Nicaragua have enabled the Maduro and Ortega regimes to wage repression campaigns against their domestic opponents. Since the Cold War ended, however, Cuba has played prominently in Russia’s broader strategic competition with the US
Despite the fact that he has been out of the Russian government for a quarter century and died almost a decade ago, Yevgeny Primakov’s foreign policy doctrine guides Russian foreign policy. For the last three decades, Russian foreign policy has focused on creating a more multipolar international system. During the post-Cold War period, Primakov was steadfast in his Soviet thinking regarding Cuba. He continued to view Cuba’s geopolitical position as a platform to undermine US influence, attract allies within Latin America, and threaten the US Gulf and East Coasts and access to the Panama Canal. What we are witnessing today is consistent with Moscow’s long-range geopolitical pattern of Cold War strategic thinking associated with Cuba.
Others also advocated for the role of Cuba. Vladimir Kozhemyakin authored a 2008 piece entitled “Three Painful Calluses for the US” Cited in retired US Army Lieutenant Colonel Tim Thomas’ 2016 report, “Thinking Like a Russian Officer: Basic Factors and Contemporary Thinking of the Nature of War,” it provides a portal into Russian strategic thinking. It offered a list of asymmetric response options to counter Western geopolitical advantages. Among these was getting Cuba back as an ally and developing a friendship with another Latin American country, such as Nicaragua. Over the last decade, almost all Kozhemyakin’s recommendations, including those in the Middle East, have come to fruition. Putin’s rhetoric, his flotilla, and leveraging Cuba against the West are nested within this type of strategic thinking.
After the 2014 annexation of Crimea, the Russians achieved their return to Cuba by reopening their intelligence facility at Lourdes, just 150 miles off the US coast. Russian-Cuban relations have been increasing ever since, and with it, Russian access to Cuba.
In 2019, Prime Minister Medvedev made numerous visits to Cuba, including one in October to finalize infrastructure agreements. Then-secretary of the Security Council Nikolai Patrushev, and Yevgeny Murov, the former head of the Federal Protective Service, accompanied him. They signed infrastructure agreements involving oil and gas exploration. Murov had previously served with both Putin and Patrushev in the KGB and FSB. Upon leaving the Federal Protective Service, he was appointed chairman of the board of directors of the Russian state oil company Zarubezhneft. The company was one of the chief beneficiaries of the agreements to build “infrastructure.” Tellingly, five years on, Cuba cannot fulfill its own petroleum needsand requires Venezuelan imports, prompting inquiry about what those infrastructure agreements actually provided.
A Willing Ally
Considering this history, alignment with the Axis of Upheaval, and willingness to play a part in Putin’s threats against the West, it is plausible that the physical infrastructure needed for the delivery, storage, maintenance, and employment of weapon systems that might serve as the catalyst for a second Cuban Missile Crisis could be in place. Regardless, Cuba has made it clear it will continue to support Putin’s challenging of the West, whether it be by delivering such weapons on its territory or by providing escalation options should Putin initiate a crisis elsewhere, such as by employing tactical nuclear weapons against Ukraine. There is no shortage of Putin advisors advocating for both of these options.
Russia has reopened intelligence facilities in Cuba, Cuban citizens are fighting for Russia against Ukraine, and their expanding bilateral relations have resulted in an increased Russian presence in Cuba. The aggregation of Primakov’s vision and realization of Kozhemyakin’s recommendations validate Western concerns over the expanding relationship. Looking through this lens helps bring the kaleidoscope of Russian rhetoric and military activities, including those involving Cuba, into focus.
Finally, Putin loves the spoiler role. In the wake of the lackluster US Presidential debate and President Biden’s missteps that overshadowed the 75th anniversary of NATO at the NATO Summit in Washington DC, as well as future elections within both the US and Europe, we should not be surprised if Putin again chooses escalation. Furthermore, the US-German bilateral announcement to begin rotational deployments of US Army Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF) assets to Germany in 2026 sets the stage for Russia to pre-empt the US move by deploying its own long-range precision conventional-nuclear dual capable strike weapons to Cuba. The Kremlin will view such an action as politically and strategically justifiable and necessary. If Putin chooses this course, Cuba will assuredly offer itself up as a willing ally.
NATO leadership should be prepared for this type of Russian reciprocal response and ready to take diplomatic, informational, military, and economic actions wherever necessary to address Moscow and Havana’s collusion to threaten the US This would include such things as highlighting Havana’s willingness to once again be a pawn in Russia’s strategic competition with the West at the expense of its people’s social and economic well-being. It might also involve explicitly connecting Russian military actions to reciprocal US deliveries of weapons to allies and partners who border Russia. If Putin believes Primakov and others Cold War approaches will somehow work this time around, we should show him again why they failed in the first place.
