Eurasia Press & News
As Vladimir Putin tightens his circle of trust, a former secret service officer has emerged as one of his closest aides.
Dmitry Mironov cuts an inscrutable figure. In recent years, the stocky Russian official has seldom appeared in public, and when he does, he usually fronts his signature scowl.
Over the past three decades, Mironov has risen from the ranks of the presidential security service to become one of Putin’s closest advisers — and sources inside Russia say his power goes far beyond his official titles. One source said Putin even calls him “my little son.”
Mironov belongs to an elite class of former security service officers who have ascended to the top of Putin’s power pyramid in recent years, and reaped financial benefits along the way. Putin began to bring this cohort into government after mass protests rocked Moscow in 2011 and 2012 demanding political reform.
After over two decades in the Federal Guard Service (also known by the Russian abbreviation FSO), which offers protection to the president and other senior officials, Mironov was elevated to a key department in the interior ministry in 2014 and has since held a series of roles bringing him closer to Putin and the heart of government.
In addition to his post as presidential aide, he is now the Kremlin’s chief personnel officer, approving or rejecting candidates for senior posts across government and the civil service. The Commission on Civil Service he has led since 2022 is charged with preparing proposals for the president regarding senior personnel.
“In a bureaucratic system, this is extremely important,” said Alexandra Prokopenko, a researcher at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center in Berlin. “Through this commission, any appointments can be stopped.”
Two sources inside Russia who spoke to OCCRP’s partner IStories on condition of anonymity said Mironov’s duties extend beyond these official responsibilities. They said he is now a highly trusted aide who carries out “special projects” for the president.
Unlike other Putin allies, whose influence is tied to their accumulation of financial or other resources, the status of former bodyguards is based on the “‘personal trust’ of their patron-in-chief,” said Nikolay Petrov, a Russia expert and visiting fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs.
Petrov, who has written about the rise of this class, says the group has become increasingly influential as Putin has closed ranks around his inner circle in recent years, particularly since the pandemic and his full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
“Those guys are not efficient in terms of professional services except for serving as bodyguards, but what is more important, they are absolutely controlled by him,” he told OCCRP, describing the former guards as Putin’s “avatars.”
“Putin, who is very good in making personnel decisions, sees this quite well.”
While some of these former bodyguards are well-known in Russia, Mironov has largely flown under the radar.
After learning of his prominence, reporters probed further and found a pattern: as Mironov’s star has risen, so have the fortunes of his family, whose businesses work closely with the state.
In particular, his younger brother’s construction firm has welcomed a windfall of multi-million-dollar contracts from the state-controlled energy giant Gazprom and its subsidiaries.
Ilia Shumanov, the director of Transparency International’s Russian chapter, described the disbursement of state contracts as one of the ways that benefits can be extended to those within Putin’s inner circle.
While Mironov is not directly involved in supervising Gazprom, his high status may have afforded him the “power to lobby [for] his brother’s company to receive state contracts,” he added.
The office of Russia’s presidential administration and Gazprom did not respond to questions sent by reporters.
The Road to Power
Mironov’s route to the top has taken him from presidential road-trip wingman to uncomfortable postings as a public official to his current role managing appointments across the Kremlin.
Born in 1968 in the southeast city of Khabarovsk, Mironov’s father and grandfather were colonels, with the latter anointed a “Hero of the Soviet Union” for his service in World War II.
Mironov initially followed in their footsteps, studying at the Moscow Higher Combined Arms Command School. In 1990 he was selected as a cadet for the Kremlin Regiment, a special military unit that protects the government and state officials.
His first job, according to one of IStories’ sources, involved managing cultural and sporting events for the regiment.
Mironov still keeps his sporting hand in: He plays in the amateur Night Hockey League set up by Putin in 2011, in which Russian officials, businessmen, and former hockey pros face off in evening matches on the ice.
According to a 2016 interview Mironov gave to a Russian newspaper, he and the president usually play on opposing teams.
While it’s not known when the pair first met, they were introduced by Oleg Klimentiev, a member of the Presidential Security Service, according to an IStories source. (Klimentiev is another former guard who has benefited under Putin and has served as first deputy director of the Federal Guard Service.)
Mironov later became an adjutant — a designation within the Presidential Security Service for people who fulfill special tasks rather than providing physical protection for the president.
While the specific duties involved could not be confirmed, another former bodyguard once described the president’s adjutants to a Russian newspaper as “a select caste of people.”
According to Petrov, an “adjutant can serve [as] a moderator to convey [the] president’s orders and to track their implementation.”
During this period, he was also seen by Putin’s side on various outings. In 2010, when the president drove 2,000 km from Khabarovsk to Chita in a yellow Lada Kalina, a Russian-manufactured car, Mironov was photographed with Putin. The following year, Mironov accompanied Putin to a mourning event in the city of Yaroslavl after its entire “Lokomotiv” ice hockey team died in a plane crash.
Putin began to move his bodyguards into the government itself as he faced street protests in 2011 and 2012, raising fears that discontent was also simmering within the administration.
His trust in the guards was shaped in part by their years of physical proximity, said Petrov, explaining that the round-the-clock nature of the job, and the frequent travel required, prevented them from building other relationships or alliances.
This “made them absolutely loyal and absolutely dependent [on] Putin and nobody else. And this is their huge advantage in Putin’s eyes.”
In some cases, they were brought into government to perform “the function of ‘cleaners’ within law enforcement agencies,” he has noted.
One of Mironov’s early assignments offers an example. In 2014 he was appointed head of the Interior Ministry’s Main Directorate for Economic Security and Countering Corruption after the bureau had been rocked by a series of graft scandals, leading to the arrest of its former chief.
Mironov, in comparison, was seen as tidy, free from scandal, and generally “stayed away from groups that, due to certain circumstances, were formed within the Interior Ministry,” according to reporting by the Russian newspaper Kommersant at the time.
Starting in 2016, another reshuffle saw Mironov and other former bodyguards and adjutants dispatched to take over the civilian posts of governors across the country — even though they sometimes had no experience in government administration. Mironov was assigned to lead the Yaroslavl region, which borders Moscow, where voters had turned against Putin’s United Russia party.
🔗Official Benefits
Mironov’s official financial declarations have always included rather modest sums. When he became an aide under the Presidential Administration in 2021, he declared an income of 4.4 million rubles (around $59,000). In the four preceding years, he had earned between 2 and 3 million rubles ($33 000 – 40 000) a year. His wife appeared in the declaration in 2019, with an income of 4.2 million rubles ($67,000). (As of 2022, public officials are no longer required to file these declarations.)
But Mironov owned luxury property that seemed out of kilter with his declared salary. In 2014 and 2015, he declared ownership of a 128.5-square-meter apartment in Moscow, which reporters traced to the elite residential complex known as the Golden Keys. Sitting in a verdant area near the Ramenka River, the complex features a mini-zoo with llamas. A similar apartment was listed for sale in 2016 at 60 million rubles (over $900 000).
Despite already having a luxurious residence, Mironov appears to have employed a well-known scheme used by officials to obtain an even larger apartment from the state.
According to court filings, he donated his Golden Keys apartment to the state in 2016, and was leased another, larger apartment in return. Several months later, the court approved a request to recognize the new apartment as Mironov’s property. In his asset declarations starting in 2016, , the 128.5-square-meter apartment had disappeared and was replaced with the larger flat, with an area of 176.3 square meters. Reporters were unable to find information about the location of that property.
Leaked phone book contacts indicate Mironov’s wife is also linked to luxury real estate: she is listed in some places as “Tatyana Mironova Polyanka De Lux” or “Mironova Tatyana Soloslovo” – apparent references to a collection of cottages named “Polyanka de Luxe”, that were built for officials in the village of Soloslovo by the Department of Presidential Affairs.
She is also listed as “Tatyana Wardrobe Tishinsky Lane”, a prestigious location in the center of Moscow where some houses have been built on the orders of the administration.
A newcomer in a region normally led by locals, Mironov was seen as remote and uncomfortable in the spotlight. He shied away from public appearances, rarely met with local officials or media, and struggled when speaking in public.
But he also brought an advantage: access to Moscow.
Immediately after Mironov took office, the region received a large budget loan from the Finance Ministry for the first time, local media reported. Investments started pouring in, and the state-controlled energy giant Gazprom, which had reportedly curtailed its investment program in Yaroslavl because the region was in debt, announced an investment of around 3.3 billion rubles ($58.7 million) to gasify the region.
The people of Yaroslavl also saw a lot more of their president. During the first two years of Mironov’s governorship, Putin visited four times, compared to once under the previous governor. That was more visits than any other region received, except Crimea.
On one occasion, Putin publicly addressed the governor by the nickname “Dima,” in an indication of their closeness. (He later switched to using Mironov’s full name in the same conversation after he was apparently unsatisfied with the governor’s answer to one of his questions).
In 2021 Mirnonov was brought back to Moscow and elevated to a series of new roles, including presidential aide, and head of the presidential commission for personnel across the state’s security bodies, including the Ministry of Justice, the Prosecutor’s Office, the Investigative Committee, the Ministry of Civil Defense, Emergency Situations and Disaster Relief, and the Federal Penitentiary Service. It also deals with applications for senior military positions.
In 2022, he sealed his position as the Kremlin’s chief personnel officer when he was also appointed head of the presidential Commission on Civil Service.
A former government official who requested anonymity described this as one of the “key” positions in the President’s administration.
“All top appointments to positions in the Russian government go through this department. Putin has the last word, but this department puts folders with candidates with all their dossiers on his desk.”
Despite the power of his official roles, and the influence that sources say he wields behind closed doors, Mironov keeps a low public profile.
He has abandoned the Facebook account where he had reported on his governorship work, and appears not to have noticed the page has been hacked — it currently contains several photos with erotic content.
From time to time, his name appears in brief internal government announcements about meetings of the presidential personnel commissions he leads, but the details are not made public.
Meanwhile, his family also appears to have been quietly accumulating wealth thanks to deals with the Russian state.
A Brother in Business
Mironov does not like to talk about his younger brother, Evgeny.
“Evgeny has his own business,” was all he said when asked about his brother’s profession in 2016 by a Komsomolskaya Pravda correspondent.
IStories dug deeper and found that Evgeny Mironov’s businesses have been rather successful — largely thanks to contracts with state-controlled companies.
In 2015, Evgeny acquired a stake in Technospetsstroy, a small construction contractor building gas pipelines in Russia with an annual revenue of just over 200 million rubles (around $3.5 million).
In the following years, Technospetsstroy’s revenues increased significantly: The company secured contracts worth at least 28.9 billion rubles (over $450 mln) for “Power of Siberia”, a gas transmission project by state-controlled energy giant Gazprom to help construct a major gas pipeline through Siberia, which would transport Russian gas to China, according to publicly available company reports.
In 2022, Evgeny became the sole owner of Technospetsstroy after its co-owner passed away. Since then the company’s revenue has continued to grow, amounting to almost 19 billion rubles in 2023 ($211.5 million).
But behind the revenue surge is a curious arrangement. Despite Gazprom’s announcement in 2021 that an affiliated mega-contractor, Gazstroyprom, would become its main construction contractor, Technospetsstroy continued to receive work from Gazprom subsidiaries. In fact, in 2023 Technospetsstroy received virtually all of its revenue from subsidiaries of Gazprom.
And yet, the company didn’t carry out the work on its own — it hired Gazstroyprom to perform construction work, according to documents obtained by IStories. The documents show almost half the value of the Gazprom contracts were paid to Gazstroyprom for construction and installation work, raising the question of why Technospetsstroy’s involvement was necessary at all.
Technospetsstroy and Gazprom did not respond to questions sent by reporters.
Shumanov, from Transparency International, said it “looks suspicious that Mironov’s brother company received a multi billions contracts from Gazprom,” though he said more detailed information from its contracts, which are not publicly available, would be needed to assess the nature of how it structured its subcontracting arrangement with Gazstroyprom.
A Father’s Friends
IStories found that Dmitry Mironov’s father Yuri has also tried his hand in business in recent years — alongside other relatives of local officials.
When not advising the head of the Central Army Sports Club of the Ministry of Defense, Yuri Mironov has been investing in property development in the town of Lyubertsy, a suburb of Moscow.
Since 2023, Mironov has owned 25 percent of the company Specialized Developer Parus, which now has several development projects, IStories found. Other owners include the then-general director of Lyubertsy’s housing management company and a woman who appears to be the wife of a former local official.
According to court records, Parus obtained a large plot of land in 2014 at a major discount from the administration of Lyubertsy’s Kraskovo district, which at the time was led by a former colleague of Dimitry Mironov from his days as governor.
After initially renting the land, the firm bought the plot from the town at a reduced price — only 15% of the cadastral value — which amounted to just under 16 million rubles ($293,000). Parus received the favorable deal as the owner of a newly built warehouse on the plot, according to the court records, which note the structure was built within three months.
But even with this bargain price, the company never finalized the payment for the land. A few years later the town sued for the recovery of the funds, with limited success, according to a case handled in arbitration court. In the meantime, Parus had successfully resold the land. Reporters were unable to determine how much the company sold it for, and Parus did not respond to requests to comment.
Yuri Mironov also owns 25 percent of another real estate development firm, Specialized Developer Desna. The other owners of the company include the wife of the former long-time head of Lyubertsy, Vladimir Ruzhitsky, as well as the wife of Ruzhitsky’s former colleague in Moscow’s regional parliament.
Reporters found Evgeny also makes money from the state through another construction company he co-owns called SK RusTrest, according to publicly accessible data.
The company’s main customer is Russian Railways, though it also receives contracts from a Gazprom subsidiary, Moek, and the Moscow government-owned water and sewage company Mosvodokanal, who signed contracts for 2.7 billion rubles ($36 million) with RusTrest in 2020-2022.
In 2023, the company’s revenue amounted to 11.6 billion rubles ($130 million), providing its owners with 1.58 billion rubles (over $17 million) in dividends, according to its financial statements. Evgeny Mironov has a 50-percent stake in the company.
OCCRP previously reported in 2018 on how Evgeny was among a group of mainly former Putin bodyguards who acquired valuable land outside Moscow at major discounts.
