Putin’s “Son”

The story of one of Russia’s most secretive officials – the chief personnel officer of the Russian regime

There is a special position in the Kremlin hierarchy. “This is a caste of chosen people,” said Alexey Dyumin, recently Secretary of the State Council, and before that, Putin’s long-time bodyguard. Dyumin spoke with such reverence about adjutants.

“An adjutant is an officer on special assignments who is always close to the president, accompanies him on all trips, sleeps with him in the next room, and carries out any of his requests, even the most delicate ones,” a former employee of the Federal Protective Service (FSO) explains to Important Stories.

The people who occupy this position are usually unknown to anyone: the nature of their activities requires special secrecy. However, paranoia and fear of conspiracy forced Putin to rely on those he could trust unconditionally: his adjutants and guards came out of the shadows and occupied key positions in the state.

One of them is Dmitry Mironov, a man who served as Putin’s adjutant and carried out personal assignments for many years. Over the years of working together, they became so close that Mironov essentially became a member of the presidential family. “My little son,” is how Putin affectionately calls his former adjutant, according to a friend of Mironov.

Recently, the “son” has become the chief personnel officer of the Russian regime. “Important Stories” tells the story of his rise to power and his family’s incredible enrichment.

Who is Dmitry Mironov
Dmitry Mironov’s name first became known to the general public in 2014, after Putin appointed him head of the Main Anti-Corruption Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

The idea of ​​placing his guards and adjutants in key positions in the state came to Putin after the mass protests of 2011-2012, Novaya Gazeta wrote. In addition to the opposition, representatives of the political elite showed up at the rallies, and even the presidential administration expressed approval of the protesters .

“Many are still convinced that these protests were planned by someone, that it was a failed attempt at a conspiracy. The president had no one to trust in law enforcement agencies because of the constant intrigues of the leaders. And the guys from the ” personal security” (personal security – Ed.) are loyal only to him. From them he received truthful, real information about what was really going on there,” Novaya Gazeta quoted a former employee of the Presidential Security Service (SBP).

Viktor Zolotov, who had guarded Putin for almost 15 years, was appointed to head the newly created Russian National Guard. Zolotov was given control of part of the Ministry of Internal Affairs – the internal troops, OMON and SOBR. Alexey Dyumin was sent to the Ministry of Defense. And Putin saw Dmitry Mironov as the Minister of Internal Affairs.

Mironov studied at the Moscow Higher Combined Arms Command School, specializing in “engineer for the operation of armored and automotive equipment.” While still a cadet in 1991, he was selected for the Kremlin Regiment, and then got a job at the Kremlin Commandant’s Office, where he was responsible for organizing sports and festive events.

At some point, Mironov was introduced to Oleg Klimentyev from the SBP. Later, Klimentyev introduced Mironov to Putin. Thus began the adjutant’s career.

After more than 20 years of working side by side with Putin, Mironov was transferred to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and just two years later he was sent to lead the Yaroslavl region. Other former guards and adjutants received similar appointments: Dyumin became governor of the Tula region, Yevgeny Zinichev of Kaliningrad, and Sergei Morozov of Astrakhan.

At the time of Dmitry Mironov’s appointment as governor, the Yaroslavl region was considered one of the most protest-ridden regions of Russia: in the 2011 Duma elections, United Russia showed the lowest result in the country.

“Mironov has access to the body, he can just go and call [the president],” the leader of the Yaroslavl communists, Alexander Vorobyov, told Novaya Gazeta. Immediately after Mironov took office, the region received a large budget loan from the Ministry of Finance for the first time, investments began to flow, and Gazprom, which had curtailed its investment program in the region due to debts, announced that it would invest about 3.3 billion rubles in the gasification of the Yaroslavl region. “What prevented your predecessors from coming to Miller and reaching an agreement?” Russia 1 correspondent Sergei Brilev pretended to be surprised in an interview with Mironov. “I don’t know,” he complained.

During the first two years of Mironov’s governorship, Putin visited the Yaroslavl region four times – at that time he traveled more often only to annexed Crimea. Under the previous governor, Sergei Yastrebov, Putin visited the Yaroslavl region only once. In public, the president addressed Mironov simply as “Dima”.

Nevertheless, Mironov was clearly uncomfortable in his post as governor; public speaking was difficult for him.

“An ordinary FSO officer (an employee of the Federal Protective Service (FSO) – Ed.) by mentality, he can’t stand publicity,” a former government employee describes Mironov. Yaroslavl residents were shocked by the inaccessibility of the new head of the region. He did not meet with the local administration and deputies, did not attend meetings of the regional Duma. In 2017, at the first gubernatorial elections in the Yaroslavl region in 10 years, Mironov ignored all the debates – other candidates had to talk to an empty podium.

The next career boost for the former adjutant came at the end of 2021. On the eve of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Putin appointed Mironov as his assistant. The following year, he headed the presidential commission on civil service issues.

All major appointments in the Russian government go through this commission – it is one of the key ones in the presidential administration, explains a former employee of the Russian government. Of course, it is not all-powerful – “Putin has the final say,” says the interlocutor, “but it is the one who puts folders with candidates with the entire dossier on his desk.” It is this commission that must decide whether or not a particular person can be appointed to a position; it proposes candidates to Putin, explains Nikolai Petrov, an expert at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs.

In addition, Mironov also chairs the presidential commission on personnel policy “in some federal government bodies,” where he is responsible for the selection of all high-ranking security officials.

Thus, Mironov became the chief personnel officer of Putin’s regime.

From time to time, news about the meeting of the personnel commission appears on the Kremlin website, but these are very sparse reports, mostly without photos, videos or transcripts. The only public events where Mironov appears are those of the Russian Cossacks, which the authorities have turned their attention to as a serious mobilization resource. Mironov heads the Presidential Council for Cossack Affairs, and personally sponsors the Cossack units participating in the war with Ukraine, supplying them with drones and various equipment.

Brotherly business
While Dmitry Mironov was making a career in the civil service, his younger brother Evgeny was engaged in business. Mironov does not like to talk about it.

“My own business,” was how he answered the question of a Komsomolskaya Pravda correspondent about what his brother was doing. He did not elaborate further.

All of Yevgeny Mironov’s successes in business are connected with the state-controlled Gazprom.

In 2015, he acquired a stake in Tekhnospetsstroy, a small Gazprom construction contractor. The company built village gas pipelines in the north, and its revenue was about 200 million rubles a year. After Mironov’s brother arrived, revenues increased sharply.

In 2016, Tekhnospetsstroy became a participant in one of Gazprom’s largest projects — the construction of the Power of Siberia gas pipeline to export Russian gas to China. Tekhnospetsstroy received at least 30 billion rubles from Gazprom as part of this project, according to the company’s available reporting.

In 2020, the founder of Tekhnospetsstroy, Evgeny Monastyrli, passed away, and Mironov became the sole owner of the company. Its revenue continued to grow and amounted to 19 billion rubles in 2023.

Even the creation of Gazstroyprom, Gazprom’s single mega-contractor, did not hinder the work of Tekhnospetsstroy. Mironov’s company became an intermediary between Gazprom’s subsidiaries and Gazstroyprom.

The scheme works like this: Tekhnospetsstroy receives contracts from Gazprom subsidiaries, but because the company cannot handle the entire volume itself, it brings in a subcontractor. As Vazhnye Istorii found out, this subcontractor turned out to be Gazstroyprom.

“This is a crooked scheme that has long been adopted in order to provide money to certain people,” says a person familiar with the work of state procurement. “Usually, to feed an ‘honorary shareholder’ or to carry out some task for which the state or state company does not want to allocate money directly. Such decisions are made at the very top.”

If a company has no other customers besides Gazprom and has political connections, the scheme could look like a cash grab, says Andrei Yakovlev, an associate researcher at Harvard’s Davis Center.

Mironov’s brother is not the only one connected to Gazprom. His wife, former model Tatyana Lyay, receives a salary from Peton Khimtek, a major oil and gas developer for Gazprom. The business of the family of Mironov’s former first deputy in the Main Directorate for Economic Security and Combating Corruption, Andrey Kurnosenko, who now heads the Main Anti-Corruption Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, is also connected to Peton .

Lyubertsy
With the exception of his brother, all the men in the Mironov family are military men.

Grandfather Timofey Mironov was a Hero of the Soviet Union and commanded a battery during the Great Patriotic War .

Father Yuri Mironov is a retired colonel, has served in the Central Sports Club of the Army (CSKA) since the 1970s , and has been an adviser to the head of CSKA since 2014. In 2023, Mironov Sr. organized a fund under the CSKA brand to help “members of the Central Military District”, which purchases drones , equipment , and humanitarian aid . The father of Putin’s adjutant also owns a private security company that receives contracts from the Moscow mayor’s office to protect bridges; in 2024, the contract amount exceeded 250 million rubles.

And now Yuri Mironov is trying himself out as a Moscow region developer. Lyubertsy is a desirable target for developers: there is a high demand for new buildings in the district. Since 2023, Mironov has owned 25% of the company Specialized Developer Parus from Lyubertsy, which currently has several development projects.

Parus received one of the large plots of land using a simple scheme: first, the company leased the plot, and then bought it from the city at a discounted price – just 15% of the cadastral value, which amounted to just under 16 million rubles.

“Parus” received this opportunity as the owner of a warehouse building allegedly built on the site. According to the documents, it was built in less than three months, but no building is visible on satellite images from that time.

After a short time, Parus resold the plot.

The head of the urban settlement, under which the company of Mironov Sr. received the plot, was Vladimir Volkov. He is not a stranger to the Mironov family.

When Dmitry Mironov became the head of the Yaroslavl region in 2017, the “outsiders” came after him . Mironov appointed a minor Lyubertsy official to the post of head of Pereslavl-Zalessky – the same Volkov who helped his father with a plot of land in Lyubertsy. Two years later, Volkov was already the head of Yaroslavl. And after Mironov left the post of governor in 2021, Volkov left too.

Father Mironov’s partners in Parus are also connected in one way or another with the Lyubertsy authorities.

Also, together with the wife of the former long-term head of Lyubertsy Vladimir Ruzhitsky, Valentina, Yuri Mironov owns a 25% share in the company “Specialized developer “Desna”. Other co-owners are Ekaterina Semaeva, the wife of Ruzhitsky’s former colleague in the Moscow Regional Duma Sergei Semayev, and Lyubov Komissarenko, the companion of the head of “Mosvodokanal” Ponomarenko.

“Desna” is building residential complexes in Lyubertsy. It currently owns over 70 hectares of land, intended primarily for multi-story residential development.

Parus CEO Dmitry Goryachev did not answer questions from the Vazhnye Istorii correspondent and blocked him. Desna CEO also ignored questions.

Bonuses
Before Putin allowed officials not to disclose information about their incomes — this happened in 2022 — Dmitry Mironov published rather modest declarations. Before moving to the presidential administration, he earned about 2-3 million rubles a year, after — about 4 million. His wife appeared in the declaration in 2019, but she could not boast of high income either.

Until 2016, the presidential aide-de-camp owned a nearly 128-meter apartment in Moscow, in the elite residential complex “Golden Keys”, located in the nature conservation area of ​​the Setunsky Reserve near the Ramenka River, on the territory of which there is even a mini-zoo with llamas. In the neighboring buildings are the apartments of Dmitry Medvedev and Alexei Ulyukayev .

But, apparently, this apartment was not enough for Mironov. As “Important Stories” found out, he took advantage of a scheme common among officials to obtain prestigious housing from the state as someone in need.

In May 2016, the Presnensky District Court received a claim from “Mironov D. Yu.” In it, the plaintiff claimed that he had donated his apartment to the state, after which, as someone in need of better housing conditions, he received a service apartment from the Presidential Property Management Department under a social rental agreement. After this, Mironov went to court and asked to recognize the apartment donation agreement as an exchange agreement and to recognize the service apartment as his property. The court met him halfway. In 2017, the 128 sq. m. apartment disappeared from Mironov’s declaration, but a new one appeared – with an area of ​​176 sq. m.

Dmitry Mironov did not answer questions from Important Stories.