Eurasia Press & News
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the nations of the former Eastern Bloc began to pursue joint European military and security cooperation. This shift was embodied in various treaties and agreements, including the Maastricht Treaty, the Treaty of Amsterdam, the St. Malo Declaration, the Cologne Conference, and the Treaty of Nice. However, the upheavals in Eastern Europe—marked by the Balkan crisis, the Bosnian and Kosovo wars, and the eruption of ethnic conflicts in the newly independent Soviet republics—exposed the limitations of Europe’s independent defense policy. These events provided strong justifications for the continued expansion of NATO eastward, reinforcing the alliance’s role and ensuring a sustained U.S. military presence in Europe as a means to manage risks and crises.
However, NATO’s eastward expansion had significant implications for the European security architecture, ultimately contributing to the annexation of Crimea by Russia and the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. This tension was exacerbated by the West’s insistence on Ukraine’s potential membership in both the European Union and NATO.
The United States supported NATO’s eastward expansion, arguing that Russia should not be allowed the opportunity to reorganize after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. Consequently, the U.S. sought to bring Russia’s former satellite states in the Baltic region—Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia—into the NATO fold, which occurred in 2004. Russia holds these countries in high strategic regard, largely due to the Kaliningrad region, a Russian exclave bordered by NATO members and critical for controlling Northern European territories. Any perceived threat to Russia’s access to Kaliningrad, especially during times of crisis, is a significant concern for Moscow.
What aggravated the situation for Russia, however, was the prospect of NATO membership for Caucasus nations like Georgia, and Eastern European countries, particularly Ukraine, with which Russia shares deep cultural, historical, and economic ties. At the 2007 Munich Security Conference and later at the 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest, Russia issued stark warnings. It declared that Ukraine’s accession to NATO would signal the end of its sovereignty, hinting that Russia could annex Crimea and eastern Ukraine in response. Dmitry Peskov, Kremlin spokesman at the time, warned that Ukraine’s NATO aspirations would compel Russia to take countermeasures.
The intensification of military buildup in the Baltic states, coupled with increased pressure on Russia in the northern region and the Barents Sea following Finland and Sweden’s NATO membership bids, heightened tensions further. The deployment of anti-missile shields in Romania and Poland, along with pressure on Russia’s southern flank through the Caucasus, and Ukraine’s potential NATO membership, ultimately drove Russia to consider violating Ukraine’s sovereignty as the most viable means of safeguarding its security. This chain of events culminated in the outbreak of war with Ukraine in February 2022.
As the initial optimism over Russia’s defeat wanes, the long-term trajectory of the war appears to be shifting in Moscow’s favor. Despite early setbacks, the Russian military has made significant advances by altering its strategy, now controlling nearly 22% of Ukraine’s territory. Additionally, Russia has gained an edge in both personnel and weapons production, and there are no visible signs of instability within Putin’s regime. Western sanctions, intended to tip the scales of the conflict against Moscow, have had limited impact on Russia’s economic stability. Meanwhile, the government in Kyiv faces mounting challenges, including shortages of manpower, ammunition, and weapons, along with internal conflicts. Moreover, Western support has been dwindling. As a result, the situation on the ground increasingly favors Russia, potentially strengthening its position in any future peace negotiations. Furthermore, Moscow has extended its influence by supporting and arming Houthi forces in Yemen, aiming to solidify its standing in Eastern Europe. Control over the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, a crucial energy transfer route to Europe, presents a significant strategic advantage for Russia in any potential confrontation with the West.
In light of these developments, Russia is pursuing three primary objectives in the Ukraine conflict: securing Ukraine’s neutrality, redefining the European security architecture, and reshaping the international order. Evidence suggests that Russia has made notable progress toward these goals. Although Russia now faces a NATO presence in its northwestern region, it has successfully kept NATO from expanding into Ukraine. Statements by U.S. officials, such as John Kirby’s remark that Ukraine must first win the war before being considered for NATO membership, indicate that Washington is not prepared to bring Ukraine into the alliance. This reluctance was underscored at the recent NATO summit, which failed to declare Ukraine’s “irreversible path” to membership.
While the European security architecture has not undergone a fundamental transformation, the war in Ukraine has deepened transatlantic divides and fueled the rise of anti-establishment parties in recent European elections. The conflict has also heightened the risk of prolonged military tensions in Eastern Europe. The European Union’s efforts to deter Russian aggression and bolster regional security have not only failed to maximize safety but have also provoked stronger reactions from Russia, complicating the path to a new and sustainable security order.
Significant shifts are underway in the international system. Although these changes do not necessarily favor Russia, and other regional and global players such as India and China have arguably benefited more, the emergence of a Global South where regional powers exercise greater independence is evident.
In terms of world order, despite much support for strengthening Ukraine with the aim of engaging Russia in a war of attrition, important global and regional actors such as China and India prefer the end of the war even if Ukraine has to hand over its territory to Russia. In fact, apart from the challenges and the crisis that has emerged in the European security order, in the global dimension, actors with important global and regional powers are looking for an opportunity to create a multipolar world order that their interests require. In fact, these emerging countries will act according to their own conditions and are looking for a flexible and dynamic actor against being caught in the bipolarity of the US and Russia.
As a result, it can be said that the war in Ukraine has divided the actors of the international system into three groups. The victory of each of these three groups can be effective in the development of the future order. These three groups include supporters of Ukraine on both sides of the Atlantic who are seeking to realize their planned goals, supporters of Russia who want to deal a blow to the US-based order in the world at any cost, the third group who are seeking the best opportunities by adopting a neutral policy, and China as an exceptional case, with a calculated and controlled favor of Russia and an attempt to take advantage of the economic opportunities of this war, it considers the advantages and disadvantages of the war for the unification and unification of Taiwan.
