Eurasia Press & News
The Iranian president’s ability to implement his electoral program remains limited, given what his previous reformist presidents have achieved, as none of them were able to bring about fundamental changes in Iran’s domestic and foreign policies. Pezeshkian’s presidential program is likely to strongly confront the conservatives who have controlled parliament and the Assembly of Experts since their victory in the elections held in March 2024.
Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian took office on July 6, 2024, amid a complex Iranian landscape surrounded by many internal and external challenges; most notably the gap between his reformist tendencies and the hardliners’ control over the state’s joints and institutions, the worsening economic crisis, and the circumstances of the president’s assumption of office, succeeding former President Ebrahim Raisi, who died in a plane crash on May 20, 2024. In addition to the geopolitical tensions accompanying the war in the Gaza Strip, and the Iranian role in leading secondary arenas involved in the escalation against Israel, which raises questions about the president’s program, orientations, and the shape of his future policies.
Hard Wins and Challenges
The first challenge relates to the circumstances of the president’s candidacy and his difficult victory – although it was expected – as the first round of the presidential elections in Iran ended without any of the candidates being able to achieve an absolute majority of the voters’ votes, as Pezeshkian received about 10 million votes, compared to about 9.4 million votes for his competitor Saeed Jalili, before the elections headed to the second round, which Pezeshkian was able to win. In fact, his victory ends the temporary state of intellectual and ideological harmony that characterized the relationship between state institutions during Ebrahim Raisi’s term, and the stability of the relationship for the first time relatively between the president and the Supreme Leader, and all of this surrounds the path of his presidency with a set of subjective and objective challenges, in terms of:
First: The Turkish-Azerbaijani origins of the Iranian president, as he was the only candidate of non-Persian origin among the six candidates for the presidential elections, and during his candidacy he was subjected to campaigns by his competitors for ethnic reasons, in addition to the fact that the votes of the non-Persian provinces for him were what largely decided the result in his favor in the second round of the elections.
Second: The difficult internal conditions at the economic level, with the debt rising to $118 billion, the national currency losing more than 30% of its market value, the inflation rate remaining above 40% until the end of 2023, the general unemployment rate among young people – who constitute more than half of Iranian society – reaching 15.4%, and 30% of the Iranian people falling below the poverty line.
Third: Developments in the regional situation after the outbreak of the war in the Gaza Strip on October 7, 2023, and Iran’s direct and indirect involvement in it, and the repercussions that resulted from it on Iran, whether in terms of the continuous Israeli attacks on Iranian interests and figures at home and abroad, or in terms of targeting Iran’s allies in what is known as the “Axis of Resistance.”
Fourth: The complexities of the international situation related to the Iranian nuclear program after the United States of America withdrew from the agreement in 2018, the lack of any progress in the course of negotiations for that program, and the possibility of Donald Trump returning to the presidency of the United States, and thus the increase in those complexities due to Trump’s hardline positions on Iran’s weapons programs.
Fifth : The security challenges inside Iran, whether in terms of the Israeli intelligence superiority that enabled it to assassinate Ismail Haniyeh in a facility affiliated with the Revolutionary Guards on July 31, 2024, or in the increasing activity of armed opposition groups, specifically the “Army of Justice,” which claimed responsibility for an operation on August 23 in which it assassinated the deputy commander of the “Security Police” in the city of Khash in Balochistan Province. This event comes after a series of operations carried out by the group, including the clash with the Border Guards on April 4, as well as its claim to the assassination of a brigadier general in the Revolutionary Guards in January.
How capable is the president of achieving his electoral program?
The Iranian president’s electoral program raised several issues at the domestic and foreign levels. In domestic issues, he focused on achieving social justice, economic development, and implementing structural reforms. Among his electoral promises were: establishing a transparent economic system capable of combating corruption, attracting investments, creating new opportunities, and implementing reforms in the health and education systems. He also focused on the roles of Iranian women and the need to empower them socially, politically, and economically, and to provide space for expanding the participation of ethnic minorities in the government.
Externally , Pezeshkian has adopted a discourse that focuses on reducing international tensions, restoring active diplomacy, and working to revive the nuclear agreement in exchange for easing sanctions imposed on the country. On this point, the new president is in complete contradiction with his predecessor, Ebrahim Raisi, who adopted an economic vision based on self-sufficiency and adapting the economy in light of the sanctions imposed on the country. The new Iranian president has chosen his foreign policy cadre from figures open to dialogue with the West and supporters of the nuclear agreement negotiations. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi was part of the Iranian negotiating team for the Group of Six when the nuclear agreement was reached in 2015 before former US President Donald Trump withdrew from it in May 2018. In addition, Mohammad Javad Zarif, who holds the position of Vice President for Strategic Affairs, played a pivotal role in the nuclear agreement in 2015, and has been a supporter of the active diplomatic track since he was Foreign Minister under Hassan Rouhani. This suggests that the trend of opening up to the West and the region may be the main feature of Pezeshkian’s presidency in terms of seeking to reduce tensions with the United States and restore relations with Europe. In mid-July 2024, the Iranian president wrote to the Tehran Times about his readiness to enter into a “constructive dialogue” with European countries. This path is clearly supported by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. In his first meeting with the Iranian government on August 27, 2024, he stated that “there is no obstacle to dealing with the enemy when necessary,” apparently referring to the president’s intention to resume negotiations on the nuclear program.
However, Pezeshkian’s path remains determined by two main factors: the results of the US elections, as the victory of former President Donald Trump would mean a return to sanctions and the “maximum pressure” policy, and the government’s ability to push parliament to review the “Strategic Action to Lift Sanctions and Protect the Rights of the Iranian People” law, which was passed by parliament in early 2020 and imposes restrictions on the government’s authority in negotiations over the nuclear program.
On the other hand, the president’s ability to implement his program remains limited, given what the previous reformist presidents achieved, starting with Hashemi Rafsanjani (1979-1989), then Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005), and up to Hassan Rouhani (2013-2021), as none of them were able to bring about fundamental changes in Iran’s domestic and foreign policies. Pezeshkian’s presidential program is likely to strongly confront the conservatives who have controlled parliament and the Assembly of Experts since their victory in the elections held in March 2024. The differences between the reformist and conservative camps quickly emerged, as Mohammad Javad Zarif resigned from his position as vice president 11 days after his appointment, in protest against the conservative movement’s interference in the president’s government formation, before he backed down on August 27, 2024.
In addition, the nature of the political system in Iran limits the president’s ability to freely implement his directives. It is true that the “Presidency of the Republic” is considered one of the institutions charged with formulating state policies, as it is the highest political authority in the country according to the constitution. However, it is restricted by the powers of the “Supreme Leader” of the Republic in the country, who has absolute powers to decide on all state affairs, including nuclear policy and war decisions. He is responsible for the armed forces, the Expediency Discernment Council, the Shura Council, the judiciary, and the presidency. In addition to the “Supreme Leader” and the “Presidency of the Republic,” other joints contribute to formulating state policies, and are linked to one degree or another to the Supreme Leader, most notably the Guardian Council, the Shura Council, and the Assembly of Experts for Leadership.
Pezeshkian’s presidency also faces the most important challenge in Iran’s history, which is the figure who will succeed the current Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. This is an issue that various ruling institutions are competing over and that is increasing divisions within the conservative movement itself. After the death of Ebrahim Raisi, who was the most prominent figure to succeed the Supreme Leader, institutions such as the Revolutionary Guards and conservative political and religious figures are competing to nominate and export new names. All of this will limit the president’s ability to make any reforms to the political system or intellectual and structural changes.
Based on all of the above, the future policies of the Iranian president can be anticipated at three main levels, which are:
First: The level of internal policies
The new president’s influence on domestic policy may be limited to expanding the scope of political and social freedoms, and implementing some economic reforms that will be reflected in the youth sector, all facilitated by the state’s joints, which will be the biggest beneficiary of these reforms in order to alleviate the state of tension in Iranian society. However, it is unclear whether these reforms will be able to exceed the limits permitted by the Supreme Leader, who focused in his first meeting with the government on imposing restrictions on the Internet and controlling it.
Second: The level of regional policies
It is expected that it will not witness a radical change due to its connection to other levels of decision-making joints, as the new president has no choice but to continue implementing these policies, especially with regard to Iranian regional behavior, which was expressed in Pezeshkian’s letter to Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah in July 2024, in which he renewed Iran’s support for “the resistance of the peoples of the region to the illegitimate Zionist regime,” and its encouragement of “resistance movements to stand up to Israel and prevent it from continuing its aggressive and criminal policies against the oppressed Palestinian people and other countries in the region.” However, the path of Iranian-Arab reconciliations, specifically Saudi Arabia, could receive a strong boost, in terms of the president’s moderate discourse and his focus on an investment-based economy, and it is likely that Saudi Arabia will be on the list of the first countries in the president’s upcoming foreign visits.
Third: The level of international relations
Iranian-Western relations are expected to witness a relative thaw, and may witness a breakthrough in the nuclear file if Democratic candidate Kamala Harris wins the upcoming US presidential elections, and vice versa if Republican candidate Donald Trump wins.
