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This paper presents a reading of the results of the recent Jordanian parliamentary elections in relation to the partisan aspect, and presents a set of scenarios for the parliamentary scene of the twentieth council on the one hand, and for the path of political modernization on the other hand.
Executive Summary
The paper presents a reading of the results of the parliamentary elections in Jordan, addresses the expected trends of the twentieth parliamentary scene, and examines the possible scenarios for the next council in light of the new election law, the path of political modernization, and the fundamental difference in the composition of the current council from previous councils, in addition to considerations of the correlation of the reform path in Jordan with external circumstances and data, as happened in the years 2005 and 2012, and what could happen as a result of the war in Gaza and its repercussions on the Kingdom and the region.
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan witnessed the holding of parliamentary elections for the twentieth parliament with a party character according to a new electoral law, in which the Islamic Action Front Party obtained the largest number of seats, followed by the National Charter Party, then the Irada Party, while the National Charter Party topped the number of party seats in the local district, followed in order by the Irada Party, then the Islamic Action Front Party.
The expected trends for the new council can be summarized in three: the first is the stability of the composition of the House of Representatives , in light of three determinants: party blocs that have exceeded the 10% threshold, parties below the 10% threshold, and independent representatives, with the likelihood that the House of Representatives will witness two types of parliamentary blocs: party blocs and parliamentary blocs in this scenario. The second is the trend towards forming parliamentary alliances and coalitions , in light of two determinants: forming a parliamentary majority or forming an opposition minority. The third is the trend towards a parliamentary composition that keeps the “Labor Front” as the most effective .
The possible scenarios for the next council are also three: the first is the success of the experiment and moving to the next step of modernization, the second is the limited success of the experiment and amending the election law, and the third is the failure of the experiment and changing the election law . Each one of them is linked to a set of internal and external determinants that the paper addressed through reading and analysis, while stopping at the importance of the path emanating from the Royal Committee for Modernizing the Political System for the state, in contrast to the surrounding caveats that are no less important, whether related to the behavior of political parties, or the correlation of the reform path in Jordan with external circumstances and data, and the consequences of the war in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank and the accompanying regional escalation on Jordan, and the efforts of Iran and its agents to incite the popular mood sympathetic to the Gaza Strip against the official positions on the war, in addition to the position of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, which believes that it has achieved its best electoral results in the history of the Kingdom. In light of the weakness of the group’s branches in various countries of the region, and the division between the center and the branches, it may try to present itself as a regional and international center as the strongest branch of the group currently, which warns against making the country an arena for political Islamic activity, or a starting point for interference in the affairs of And the issues of other countries.
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan witnessed the holding of its parliamentary elections for the twentieth council on the morning of September 10, 2024, and its results were announced the following evening. The elections were held in a partisan manner according to a new electoral law for the House of Representatives for the year 2022, amended for approval in April 2022, which included updates to the electoral system; most notably, granting the voter two votes for the election, one for the closed proportional list for parties, and the other for the open proportional list at the local level in 18 electoral districts. Accordingly, this paper provides a reading of the results of the recent Jordanian parliamentary elections in relation to the partisan aspect, and presents a set of scenarios for the parliamentary scene of the twentieth council on the one hand, and for the path of political modernization on the other hand.
The first axis: The party scene in the twentieth council elections
The 2024 Jordanian parliamentary elections represented a partisan nature in forming the twentieth House of Representatives according to the new election law, according to which voting was conducted at two levels; general in a closed party list, and local in open lists. According to data from the Independent Election Commission in Jordan, the voting rate in the Kingdom reached (32.25%), with 1,638,351 voters out of 5,115,219 eligible voters, an increase of more than a quarter of a million in the number of voters over the previous session, which reached (29.9%).
The Elections Law had set the number of seats in the twentieth House of Representatives at (138) seats, an increase of (8) seats over the 2020 elections, with (41) seats for the general constituency and (97) seats for local constituencies. The parties that won seats in the general and local constituencies obtained a total of (108) seats, and thus the percentage of party members is (78.3%) of the twentieth House of Representatives formation, and this percentage is divided into (29.7%) for the general constituency according to the number of seats (41), and (48.5%) for party seats in the local constituencies, which amount to (67) seats.
The Islamic Action Front Party won the largest number of seats out of the total number of seats of the parties that won seats in the general and local lists, amounting to (31), followed by the National Charter Party, which won (21) seats according to the announcement of the Independent Election Commission, but it was later announced that the total number had reached (30) seats by announcing nine new names of winning candidates in the local constituencies who belong to the party, followed by the Irada Party, which won (19) seats, then the Progress Party, which won (8) seats, the National Islamic Party, which won (7) seats, and (5) for the National Union Party, while the Blessed Land, Workers, Azm, and the Nama and Work Party Alliance won two seats each.
Accordingly, the election results reflected several new indicators in the history of the electoral process according to its partisan nature imposed by the course of political modernization, which calls for reading and discussion in this axis according to the following titles:
First: General party list results
36 parties out of 38 registered parties in Jordan ran in the parliamentary elections. 10 of them won seats in the general district, for which the current new law allocated 41 seats for party nominations, according to the following numerical order, which represents the distribution of the 41 seats in the general “party” district with the quota (Circassians/Chechens and Christians) among the ten winning parties.
The Islamic Action Front won the largest number of seats in the general constituency compared to the seats of the other nine parties, as the party won 17 seats out of 41 seats allocated to parties, while all other parties won 24 seats.
The total number of votes in all the lists of the general district reached about 1,378,000, of which the Islamic Action Front Party obtained 464,350, representing approximately 45%. The party also came in first place in the lists of 17 out of 18 electoral districts, coming in second place in the list of the Central Bedouin District after the Blessed Land Party. Its highest votes on the general list in the local districts were in Irbid I, with approximately 50,000 votes, followed by Amman I, with approximately 45,000 votes. As for the percentage of the total votes in the local electoral district, the highest was in Tafilah Governorate, with a percentage of (55.3%), followed by Aqaba Governorate, with a percentage of (46.3%), then Amman II and Ma’an districts, with percentages of (45.8%) and (44.3%), respectively.
The National Charter Party came after the Front Party in the number of votes in the general district, which reached 93,650 votes, representing all the votes of the four seats it won. As for the parties that won three seats, the number of votes varied, as they came in descending order as follows:
The number of votes for the remaining four parties out of the ten, each of which won two seats in the general district, was as follows in descending order:
Second: The results of the local list/what is related to it in the party aspect
According to the results of the Independent Election Commission, the National Charter Party leads the number of party seats in the local district with (17) deputies, followed in order by the Irada Party with (16) deputies, then the Islamic Action Front Party with (14) deputies, then the Progress Party (5) deputies. Although the difference in votes between the three parties (the Front, the Charter, and Irada) with the largest number of seats in the twentieth House of Representatives is small in the local district, the number of party deputies is expected to increase. On September 12, 2024, the National Charter Party announced its victory in the largest number of seats in the local districts; as it obtained 26 parliamentary seats from the local lists; meaning that there is an increase of nine deputies to be added to the seventeen announced by the Commission. This increase comes within the framework of announcing these nine winners who competed in the free competition track and after the results were issued that they are partisans in the National Charter Party. This may apply to other parties such as Irada and Progress in the next stage until the opening of the twentieth House of Representatives.
Another difference between the Islamic Action Front and other parties regarding the local list is that it is the only party that has disclosed the names of its candidates in the local electoral districts, unlike other parties that have not. Therefore, the votes of local voters who voted for party candidates in the Front Party in the local lists may have been mostly given based on voting for political representation in the first place, regardless of the individual candidate. While in other parties, votes were given according to the individuals nominated on the list. In addition, the Front Party won (4) women’s quota seats in the local districts out of (18) seats allocated to the women’s track, and a Christian quota seat out of (7) local seats allocated, and the party won the two Circassian/Chechen quota seats allocated to the local districts.
The total votes of the local constituencies amounted to (1,101,967), of which the National Charter Party obtained approximately 219 thousand votes, which is the total number of votes for the (26) seats it won according to its statement. It was followed by the Islamic Action Front Party, which obtained (14) seats with approximately 159 thousand votes, then the Irada Party, which won (16) seats with a total of more than 119 thousand votes, and finally the Progress Party, whose votes in the local lists amounted to approximately 54 thousand votes.
The second axis: Scenarios for the upcoming parliamentary scene in light of party pluralism
The election results came with a new composition for the House of Representatives, different from the usual composition of previous councils. The current council includes (108) party representatives, where the council is controlled by 4 main parties, which are (the Islamic Action Front Party, the Charter Party, the Will Party, and the Progress Party, in addition to members from other parties such as the National Islamic Party), and the party seats range between 31 seats and two seats.
This structure is supposed to be reflected in the formal multi-party nature of the council, in terms of the majority and minority equations, the form of possible alliances and their partisan and non-partisan justifications, in addition to the determinants of the relationship with the future government and its controls, especially in light of an effective and interactive set of data. In this context, the scenarios of the upcoming parliamentary scene can be identified as follows:
Scenario 1 : Stability of the composition of the House of Representatives
The formation of the House of Representatives according to the composition produced by the parliamentary elections means that the House will be very similar to previous Houses, in terms of the centrality of the parliamentary blocs in it, compared to the limited number of independents. With the difference that the twentieth House witnessed the formation of three party blocs, resulting from the electoral results before its convening, in addition to what may be formed in it of new parliamentary blocs after its convening. In light of this, the form of the next House will be as follows:
First: Party blocs that exceeded the 10% threshold
The Council will be opened with three parliamentary blocs, produced by the elections and including representatives of the parties of the Islamic Action Front, the Charter and the Irada parties, as these parties have requirements for establishing blocs according to the internal regulations, which stipulate a number of members not less than 10% of the Council. The representatives of these blocs constitute a total of 80 representatives, or approximately 58% of the Council’s members.
In fact, the three party blocs have the same influential power and the same relative weight in using various legislative and constitutional oversight tools, as they can all interrogate ministers or propose draft laws, but none of them has the number of members sufficient to propose a vote of no confidence in the government, which amounts to 33 members. They are often considered a pressure card for the House of Representatives against the government, and therefore it is likely that the party blocs, specifically the Islamic Action Front, will seek to increase the size of their parliamentary bloc by forming alliances with parties with limited seats or independents. In contrast, the other two blocs seek to balance the weight of the Action Front, as the Mithaq Party was quick to announce that its members in the Council reached 30 members, although the number registered with the Commission is 21 members, which means that the party preempted the convening of the Council to include a number of independent winning members.
Second: Parties below the 10% threshold
There are 7 parties with 28 members in the House of Representatives, but none of them has the required percentage to form a parliamentary bloc. Accordingly, it is expected that:
1- That the three previous parties submit offers to these seven parties to join their parliamentary bloc.
2- The preference of the next three parties in terms of the number of seats (Progress, the Islamic National Party, and the National Union) to agree to form a parliamentary bloc, as an alliance of the Progress and Islamic National Parties can form a parliamentary bloc with 15 representatives, and the National Union Party can also work with the Progress Party.
3- The remaining four parties, each of which won two seats, need to either join the party blocs affiliated with the Front or a charter and will, which is a possible goal for the three party blocs, each of which seeks alliances that will achieve a parliamentary majority.
4- The possibility of agreement between the two-seat parties and the three parties (Progress, the Islamic National Party, and the National Union) to form one or more parliamentary blocs, such that the two-seat parties will have a better voting weight compared to if they join the three party blocs of the Islamic Action Front, the Charter, and the Will.
Third: Independents
There are 30 independent MPs in the House of Representatives, and this number of MPs theoretically allows the formation of a large bloc competing with the party blocs, or two small blocs, but this remains unlikely in light of the inability of the independents to organize their work collectively, especially with the presence of MPs with more experience in previous parliamentary experiences with party blocs, especially with the large number of MPs for the first time. This means that the independents have two possibilities: 1) Remaining as independent MPs 2) Joining existing or forming blocs.
On the other hand, the number of independents is likely to increase if the representatives of parties with limited seats remain without forming a bloc or joining existing blocs, and are content to represent their parties in the Council as independents. This is very likely and is reinforced by the calculations of party representatives more than the considerations of independent representatives, especially since the joining of party representatives to the three party blocs may feed the power of those blocs at the expense of the smaller parties in the Council, and limit the ability of parties with limited seats to implement their own policies, whether popular ones or those consistent with their ideology, thought, and electoral programs.
On the other hand, there are benefits to joining a larger party or parliamentary bloc, as in light of the party blocs’ need for a majority, the weight of parties with limited seats increases in terms of negotiations, and they can obtain seats in the council’s committees or bodies that they would not have obtained if they preferred their representatives to remain independents. Therefore, this group gains its weight as a target for polarization, especially for the parties (Mithaq and Idarah) in particular, in order to compensate for the difference in seats with the Islamic Action Front and Mithaq in relation to Irada, or to obtain a majority in relation to Mithaq.
In light of this trend, it is likely that the House of Representatives will witness two types of parliamentary blocs, namely:
1- Party blocs: This includes the three party blocs that exceeded the 10% requirement.
2- Parliamentary blocs: those that may be formed by parties with fewer representatives, or by independents, or by both.
This is considered a real test for the idea of parliamentary blocs, which were applied for the first time in the 17th House of Representatives, in that party blocs are the global standard for parliamentary blocs, and their application came to constitute an alternative solution to the absence of parties in the House, as they suffered on several occasions from fragility and the control of influential representatives over them, with the absence of a political and intellectual basis among their members. However, the upcoming experiment in light of the House of Representatives’ internal regulations – which may witness amendments – the 2022 Elections and Parties Law, assumes fundamental changes between the parliamentary and party blocs, especially with regard to the provisions of membership and the ability of members to withdraw, which will not be available to party members, as well as in the continuity and sustainability of the blocs, as the party blocs of the parties that exceeded the 10% requirement will remain fixed in their origins throughout the life of the House, in contrast to the possibility that the parliamentary blocs will witness changes in their members at the beginning of each permanent session, or even their dissolution.
Scenario Two : Forming parliamentary alliances and coalitions
The difference in the composition of the House of Representatives by strengthening partisans at the expense of independent representatives may be accompanied by more developed and advanced parliamentary practices that go beyond the experience or form of parliamentary blocs, to the formation of partisan alliances and coalitions within the parliament, and what this means in global experiences of majority and minority, given the connection of the majority or minority to the government, and the degree of its control over the agenda of the House of Representatives. This means that the parliamentary scene is heading in more than one direction as follows:
First: Forming a parliamentary majority
The formation of a parliamentary majority through a bloc comprising half the number of members of the House of Representatives (more or less) is possible in light of the pivotal convergence between the characteristics of many parties that were able to send their candidates to the Council, as the parties (the Charter, Irada, Progress, the Islamic National, the National Union, Azm and the Blessed Lands) are relatively new, and their political discourse is consistent with the official discourse. These parties have a total of 73 representatives in the Council. Theoretically, these parties can form alliances that give them a parliamentary majority, and they can even reach an absolute majority through their alliances.
Objectively speaking, the selection of ministers from among those parties in Prime Minister Jaafar Hassan’s government (including: Minister of State Communications Mohammad al-Momani, who holds the position of Secretary-General of the party, and member of the Will Party Khairallah Abu Sa’alik, who held the portfolio of State for Public Sector Development, and Secretary-General of the Progress Party Khaled Bakkar, who was assigned the portfolio of Labor) indicates that the alliance or coalition between those parties is either implicit or awaiting registration when the parliament convenes. Without that, it will be difficult for the government to justify choosing them over others.
On the other hand, the existence of a party alliance that has the majority is in its favor, along with the government’s, in terms of its control over the council’s bodies, committees, and presidency, as the Mithaq Party is looking forward to the presidency of the council, according to what the party’s representative, Mazen Al-Qadi, stated. It has nominated three of its representatives for this purpose, among whom the name of former Speaker of the House of Representatives, Ahmed Al-Safadi, stands out, in exchange for the support of other parties in obtaining seats in the permanent office and committees, so that these parties share control over the council’s bodies, and thus take the initiative to control the council’s agenda, priorities, and outcomes. In addition, such an alliance balances its electoral weight in the general district against the electoral weight of the Islamists, as it obtained approximately (475 thousand) votes compared to (460 thousand) votes for the Islamists.
However, all the components that may form an alliance have other factors that may undermine the chances of achieving this alliance, as both parties with high seats (Al-Mithaq and Irada) have their own aspirations and ambitions, whether at the level of parliamentary work or participation in future governments, and their joining one parliamentary bloc would undermine their ability to distinguish each other, especially at the popular level, and with regard to the programs of the two different parties.
Second: Formation of an opposition minority
The consultations conducted by Prime Minister-designate Hassan with the parties, and his choice to meet the parties of Irada and Mithaq first, despite their not having – so far – the largest party blocs, indicate that the next government has a preliminary reading of the possibility of the two blocs merging, or at least their remaining a base to support the government in the face of the parties that have determined their approach from the opposition. Regardless of the alliance or coalition of parties in the council, a spectrum of parties with similar positions have the largest number of representatives, compared to (31) representatives for the Islamic Action Front party. These parties will work in a harmonious manner, especially in their relationship with the government and in their position on domestic and foreign policies, whether in the framework of collective or individual work. This makes it likely that the Islamic Action Front will announce itself as an “opposition” force, as it has influence within the council, but below the threshold of obstruction. The Islamic Action Front has the required number of seats to influence the Council’s agenda, but without disrupting it or obstructing the work of the government. It is unable to obstruct the constitutional quorum for the Council of Representatives’ meetings, or obstruct the approval of laws that require two-thirds of the Council’s members, or even propose a vote of confidence or vote on them.
Scenario 3 : A parliamentary structure that reduces the effectiveness of party and parliamentary blocs
The majority of the twenty members of the Council are party members, and it is expected that the number of parliamentary blocs after its convening will range from (5-7) blocs. This party scene, despite the equal opportunities it provides for the various parties to have weight in the Council’s agenda, decisions and outcomes, faces a challenge in the ability of the parliamentary blocs, especially the party ones, to maintain their cohesion and the harmony of their members.
On the one hand, the parliamentary scene is dominated by a number of new parties that have never practiced parliamentary party work before, and it is still too early to judge their strength and power, not only in front of the Islamic Action Front, but also in front of its members of parliament, whose electoral constituencies played a role in bringing the parties to the House of Representatives, whether in the general or local lists, in addition to the presence and experience in parliamentary work of some party representatives in a way that exceeds the age of the party itself. It is likely that these representatives will exercise their influence and weight within the parties, especially since many of these parties won their seats from local constituencies and not general ones, and in several cases, a party candidate from the local lists won approximately 35% of the party’s total votes in the local list, and the equivalent of 20% of the party’s votes in the general list.
On the other hand, the election law did not address controls for party candidates on local lists, as the law did not outline the features of the relationship between the representative and his party, with the exception of party list candidates in the general district. Article (58) stipulated in its fourth clause that the resignation or dismissal of the representative who won on the party list by the party to which he belongs requires filling his seat in the House of Representatives for the next candidate on the party list. Accordingly, the parties may face challenges in controlling their successful representatives on local lists, who constitute 67 representatives in the council in general, and their number increases significantly in some parties compared to the representatives on the general list, as their number in the Mithaq Party is 26 representatives out of 30, and 16 in the Irada Party out of 21.
Axis Three: Scenarios of the House of Representatives and the Path of Political Modernization
The House of Representatives faces a real test in its performance, with a fundamental difference in its composition compared to previous parliaments, as the twentieth parliament is seen as a laboratory for parties to gradually move towards increasing the number of seats allocated to them in the upcoming elections and the ones that follow. Thus, the impact of the House of Representatives, which is scheduled to convene soon, goes beyond parliamentary work, towards influencing the entire path of political reform and modernization, as any success of the parliament is credited to the path of modernization, and any failure will negatively reflect on that path.
Accordingly, the appropriate criteria for moving to the next step of the update can be determined as follows:
1- Organizing the party scene, reaching quality parties, and reducing the party congestion that accompanied the elections, in which 36 parties participated, 10 of which won.
2- Qualifying parties capable of achieving pluralism in the party scene and political arena, and diversifying the voting options for voters, especially since the elections for the twenty-first House of Representatives raise the size of the party list to (50%) of the House of Representatives seats.
3- Maintaining the principle of separation of executive and legislative powers, and the integrity of the relationship between the government and the House of Representatives.
4- Improving parliamentary work and raising levels of public satisfaction with the performance of the House of Representatives, which will positively reflect on participation rates in the upcoming elections.
Scenario 1 : Success of the experiment and moving to the next step of the update
The next House of Representatives, with its current composition and in light of the various scenarios above, is likely to support the government. On the one hand, a majority of new parties control the parliamentary scene with 73 deputies, or 53%, and their alliance will enhance their voting weight against the votes of the Islamic Action Front in the general constituency. In addition, there is an influential bloc of independents, which, if diminished, is expected to eventually feed the Mithaq and Irada parties. In addition, there are party figures in the next government.
On the other hand, the Islamic Action Front, which is classified as an opposition party within the House of Representatives, announced its rejection of the approach of “competing with the government,” especially since it was represented by members of the Royal Committee for Modernizing the Political System, and was part of the tours of the Prime Minister-designate before announcing his government formation, which means that it contributed to producing the current scene and bears national and popular responsibility for its success. Moreover, under the current parliament, it is surrounded by other parties, unlike its previous experiences in monopolizing party representation in exchange for the predominance of independents.
On another level, the structure of the twentieth council is considered suitable for developing the party scene in Jordan. First, three party blocs have a majority of council members (58%), which makes it easier for the Mithaq and Irada parties to form a popular base for themselves and solid social bases, similar to the Islamic Action Front, and keeps the door open for parties with fewer seats to follow popular policies or merge into larger parties.
In a related context and considering the changing set of circumstances and factors, the chances of new parties are higher in the elections for the twenty-first House of Representatives compared to the last elections, on the one hand, the success in raising the voting rates will increase their chances of winning seats on the party list, especially after the Islamic Action Front tested its maximum limits in mobilization, taking into account the regional circumstances surrounding Jordan that worked in the Front’s favor, and on the other hand; the rules and data for selecting candidates changed, as the Action Front benefited from attracting influential figures on its party list, to obtain votes from governorates outside its established popular bases.
Scenario 2 : Limited success of the experiment and amendment of the election law
The limited success of the experiment means that the parties pass the requirements of parliamentary work and succeed in improving parliamentary life, which is positively reflected in the levels of popular confidence in the House of Representatives, which has suffered from a decline throughout the previous years. This applies to all parties, in terms of the ability of the parties participating in the government to harmonize their requirements between public and political work, and the ability of the Islamic Action Front to practice a rational and mature opposition, far from political bickering, pressure, or obstruction of the approval of policies, whether inside or outside the Council.
However, this success may not necessarily be reflected in the form of popular support for the new parties, which theoretically need many years to consolidate their popular bases and transform their reliance on socially influential figures into political programmatic parties that meet national aspirations. Today, these parties face a real test in preventing them from being drawn into personal, service, or factional parties.
In this case, it is likely that the government or the House of Representatives itself will preempt the elections for the twenty-first council by making amendments to the 2022 elections law, similar to the first amendment to Article 49 of the law in June 2024, to address the threshold percentage for local lists, from 7% to 1% in the amended law, which allowed for multiple local lists that produced representatives compared to one or two lists before the amendment, which was positively reflected on the new political parties, which relied almost entirely on local lists to bring their members.
Thus, this scenario envisions that the House of Representatives will meet all the criteria supporting the transition to the next step of modernization, with the exception of qualifying parties capable of multi-party scene in the elections for the twenty-first House of Representatives.
Scenario Three : Failure of the experiment and changing the election law
The state attaches great importance to the path emanating from the Royal Committee for Modernizing the Political System. However, there is a broad awareness of the sensitivity of the political modernization path compared to the paths of economic and administrative reform, as its success depends primarily on social components and political parties, and is linked to a variety of considerations, including voter behavior, party practices, the balance between the executive and legislative authorities, and the form of the political arena. Any imbalance in these considerations would negatively affect the path of political modernization in general.
In the case of the twentieth council, despite the availability of data supporting the success of the experiment, the surrounding caveats are no less important, especially those related to the behavior of political parties. On the one hand, it is likely that the Islamic Action Front will form the opposition pillar in the House of Representatives, and it has the required numbers to exercise effective opposition, but the opposition framework that the front seeks is still unclear, specifically whether it is based on the principle of participation or dominance, and both options have different impacts on the front itself, on the relationship with the government, and on the path of political modernization. The front realizes that the returns of the principle of participation completely contradict its populist policies and discourses. This requires it to continue its approach of dominance in its relationship with the government and the state, which may have a negative impact on the political arena, especially since it will justify its positions with the large voting power it received, amounting to nearly half a million votes, which is a theoretical pressure card in the party’s hands, and will remain so if the parties fail to form alliances or coalitions that equal that voting power. The party had anticipated the evaluation of the new government’s performance by criticizing the government formation in a statement it published on September 18, 2024, in which it described the government as “contrary to the will of the Jordanian street that it expressed in the elections,” despite the fact that the party announced after its meeting with the prime minister that it did not request to participate in the government.
On the other hand, the new parties have a role in the success or failure of the process. If the practices of their representatives reflect an individual character, and their representatives repeat the same mistakes of some of the representatives of the previous parliament, two of whom were referred to the State Security Courts, then this is a warning sign of the incompetence of those parties despite their positions close to the government.
Moreover, the reform path in Jordan has always been accompanied by external circumstances and data. The national agenda stumbled in 2005 due to the regional circumstances at the time, which were accompanied by the violent events in Iraq. Meanwhile, the events in Syria since 2012, and their negative impact on Jordan and its security, have hindered the implementation of the outcomes of the national dialogue in 2011. The current modernization path faces the consequences of the war in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank and the accompanying regional escalation on Jordan. This has previously had a negative impact in the attempts of armed groups on the borders with Jordan to exploit the war to intensify their hostile activity. Iran and its agents have tried to exploit the popular mood sympathetic to the Gaza Strip against the official positions on the war. On the other hand, The Muslim Brotherhood believes that they have achieved their best electoral results in the country’s history. In light of the weakness of the group’s branches in various countries in the region, and the division between the center and the branches, the group may try to present itself as the center of gravity for the group regionally and internationally, as it is currently the strongest branch, which may make the country an arena for political Islam activity, or a starting point for interference in the affairs and issues of other countries.
