Eurasia Press & News
In the wake of Finland and Sweden’s accessions to NATO, the alliance’s northern military power will be greatly expanded—if the Nordic and Baltic states adequately coordinate to overcome risks such as overstretching and competition.
Finland and Sweden’s entry into NATO is rightly hailed as a historic event: It represents the first time in centuries that all the Nordic countries are in a military alliance. As a result, enthusiasm for reinvigorated security and defense cooperation can be felt across the Nordic region. But this path is not straightforward, and the countries in the region face challenges ranging from overstretch to regional grievances to strategic messaging. Despite the fresh enthusiasm, it is worth remembering that the new Nordic defense integration must take place within the larger NATO framework. Finland and Sweden’s formal accession to the alliance represents the beginning of a lengthy process for both countries, and it will take time before they are fully incorporated into all NATO structures. This article discusses some of the opportunities and challenges the two countries and the broader Nordic-Baltic region are facing in this process.
The Return to Collective Defense in Northern Europe
NATO began its supposed return to collective defense at the Wales Summit in 2014. The move was a response not only to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the invasion of eastern Donbas but also to the closure of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Mission to Afghanistan. Allies realized that collective defense had been neglected during the many years of international operations. There were, for instance, no defense plans with dedicated forces for Europe. Hence, in Wales, new defense plans were adopted for all of Europe, the NATO Response Force was revigorated, allied troops were deployed in the Baltic states and Poland, NATO’s command structure was revised, and allies agreed to begin to increase defense spending again (by “work[ing] towards” spending 2 percent of their GDP on defense by 2024). All these processes represented a major structural, as well as organizational, shift of the entire alliance. Since then, these initiatives have been adjusted and adapted to the rapidly evolving security environment, particularly, of course, to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
Notably for northern Europe, these reforms have resulted in the establishment of a new Joint Force Command (JFC) headquarters in Norfolk, Virginia, where the chief is double hatted as the commander of the reestablished U.S. Navy Second Fleet. This development secures a U.S. lead of transatlantic reinforcements into northern Europe and ties the United States into the defense of Europe in a somewhat Cold War-era fashion. Once fully operational, the new JFC will also be responsible for the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR)’s new defense plan North-West, which covers the North Atlantic, the UK, and the Nordic countries. NATO has two other regional plans for Europe: Center and South, led by JFC Brunssum and JFC Naples, respectively.
Following these new plans, which were formally adopted at the 2023 Vilnius Summit, a new force model is also being developed, where the ambition is to have 100,000 troops ready within ten days (tier 1), 200,000 within thirty days (tier 2), and 500,000 within 180 days (tier 3). Nations have to fill these needs when designing their force postures, so NATO’s force requirements will be derived from the needs of the plans. The addition of Finnish and Swedish forces to NATO’s combined force structure represents a substantial increase and will facilitate military planning in the north.
At the same time, NATO’s so-called Enhanced Forward Presence has been expanded to cover NATO’s entire border area with Russia and Belarus, from the Baltic countries to the Black Sea. With the broader label “forward land forces” (FLF), these formations are also being altered from symbolic trip-wire forces to structures that can defend against aggression and rapidly receive reinforcements from tier 1 of the new force model. This evolution is in line with a general turn in the alliance toward deterrence by denial, where eventual Russian aggression toward a NATO country is supposed to be forcefully confronted and immediately stopped. No ally would like to expose their citizens to Russian war crimes, torture, and arbitrary executions, hence the strengthened forces along the borders and plans for rapid reinforcement.
Allies have approved Finland’s request to establish an FLF formation and a Multi Corps Land Component Command under JFC Norfolk on Finnish territory. No similar requests have emerged from Stockholm at this stage, but Sweden has agreed to lead the Finnish FLF. Crucial logistics hubs will also be needed in Sweden to support the Baltics and defend the Finnish-Norwegian border with Russia. Sweden will therefore contribute important elements to NATO’s new force structure. As JFC Norfolk achieves full operational capacity, scheduled by the end of 2025, Finland and Sweden will be incorporated into defense plan North-West together with Denmark, Iceland, and Norway. In this context, the Nordics will be given force requirements that fit the plan. Finland and Sweden will also need to contribute troops outside their own territories. They will jointly contribute a battalion to the Enhanced Forward Presence in Latvia, and both countries are currently supplying staff officers to the various NATO headquarters, such as in Brussels, Mons (known as Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe), Norfolk JFC, Allied Command Transformation, and several other places.
Bilateral Cooperation in Northern Europe
Collective defense in Europe has also always included bi- and multilateral security arrangements, which are not formally part of NATO but which in practice reinforce it. In the Nordic-Baltic region, the United States and the UK have been the primary countries to increase their footprints over the last few years. The United States has signed new bilateral Defense Cooperation Agreements (DCAs); these agreements allow for U.S. investments in numerous military facilities across the region. Washington has signed similar agreements with Poland and other allies, enabling the swift movement of U.S. equipment and personnel between allies, so that the United States can more rapidly respond to incidents or situations if needed. Storing U.S. gear and materiel is nothing new for Norway, but with DCA agreements across the region, the deterrence posture is more coherent and integrated.
Since 2019, the United States has regularly deployed its strategic bombers to Europe and flown missions over the continent, including the Nordic-Baltic space. These missions have often involved Nordic fighter jets, signaling integrated deterrence and interoperability. In spring 2024, a Bomber Task Force was deployed to Sweden for the first time to train with Swedish and other NATO allies.
The United States also regularly engages in military exercises in the Nordic-Baltic region and has been doing so for many years already; for instance, it has executed the naval Baltops exercise since 1971. In addition, the U.S. Marine Corps, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force have all participated in exercises led by Nordic countries, such as Aurora, Northern Forest, Arctic Challenge, and Nordic Response.
The UK has also traditionally focused on NATO’s north. British air and maritime formations, as well as Royal Marines and special forces, have trained regularly in Norway for decades. London also heads the multinational forward presence in Estonia and has turned its Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) into an asset assigned to the Nordic-Baltic region. JEF, originally conceived outside of NATO, is designed as a first responder in case of crises and serves to integrate the British, Dutch, and Nordic forces. With Finland and Sweden in NATO, JEF can now be fully integrated into the NATO umbrella and thereby increase its utility, if so desired by London.
New Nordic Initiatives
Nordic defense cooperation has been a widely discussed topic since the end of the Cold War. In 2008, military cooperation was formalized in the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO), with the primary aim to pool scarce resources to achieve greater effect, particularly in weapons procurement, maintenance, and international operations. NORDEFCO had limited initial success, but received a boost after Russia’s first invasion of Ukraine in 2014. The joint focus then turned to regional security, and the Nordic defense ministers agreed to cooperate in “peace, crisis and conflict.” Numerous new initiatives aimed to improve shared regional situational awareness, facilitate military mobility, and increase joint exercising. Nevertheless, the nonaligned status of Finland and Sweden represented an impediment to full defense integration: Finnish and Swedish forces were not guaranteed to be available in the case of war, so Norway and Denmark could not make themselves militarily dependent on them. Cooperation and conducting joint military exercises were possible; full integration was not. All that has changed now. Nordic ministers of defense as well as chiefs of defense all hail close Nordic defense cooperation to be the objective, and myriad new Nordic defense initiatives are popping up.
The Nordic air forces are currently leading the charge, signified by a letter of intent signed by Nordic air chiefs in March 2023. The signatories agreed to develop an integrated command and control structure within NATO; to utilize each other’s infrastructure for flexible and resilient deployment of air forces (for example, to spread their planes to many airfields and reduce risk in case of conflict); joint airspace surveillance; joint logistics; and joint education, training, and exercises. The nature of air forces facilitates these initiatives: their broad geographical ranges, ability to rapidly reinforce each other, as well as usage of similar planes (as Denmark, Finland, and Norway all purchase F-35s) make closer cooperation natural.
Nordic land forces are also working closer together, both with each other and under NATO’s shared defense plan. For example, joint operational plans for the Nordic region, fitting into NATO’s defense plan North-West, will be established. The land forces may also be organized in integrated units across land borders. Other initiatives support these developments, such as the Nordic Warfighting Symposium: an event that brought together officers from all the Nordic countries under the auspices of the U.S. Army V Corps to develop knowledge of large-scale combat operations (at the division or corps levels). These and other similar initiatives aim to ensure that the Nordic and U.S. land forces operate as seamlessly as possible within the Nordic joint operational area. There are but a few examples of the intra-Nordic activities that are consistently taking place.
Last but not least, logistics and civilian-military cooperation is being enhanced across the Nordic region. New or strengthened lines of communication (such as harbors, railways, and roads) are needed between Norway, Sweden, and Finland. Addressing this need requires close coordination between the countries, their militaries, nonmilitary actors (such as road and rail agencies), and the private sector. The Nordic countries have a long-standing good reputation for their total defense concepts, which nowadays are being revigorated and adapted for a new security situation. Heightened awareness surrounding the vulnerability of civilian infrastructure to attacks has led civilian-military cooperation to no longer mean how the civilian sector can support the armed forces but also vice versa. For example, how the military can and must engage with civilian public and private sectors to help deter and respond to strikes against targets such as energy infrastructure, digital networks, and subsea cables. The Nordic states need to improve their rapid information exchange, shared situational awareness, and joint response in case of incidents outside the traditional military sector.
Risks
While optimism and creativity dominate the Nordic military space these days (despite the brutal backdrop of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine that led to these developments), there are also a few risks that cannot be ignored.
The first possible risk is that the expected growth of all Nordic armed forces over the next decade could take place on a national level rather than in an integrated fashion. Military procurement is very complicated—technically, legally, and financially. Given this complexity, most states have limited capacity to also cooperate with other states in such processes. It simply becomes too cumbersome. However, interoperability, seamless cooperation, and integration are of rapidly increasing importance, so efforts must be made to overcome these obstacles. Nations need to become pragmatic and unlearn cultures of national specifications and requirements of equipment and procedures. They should prioritize products that are “good enough” and “off-the-shelf” to coordinate procurement with allies more easily.
Second, a Nordic “beauty contest” toward the United States, United Kingdom, and others must be avoided. It will be self-defeating if the Nordic armed forces begin competing with each other to attract, for example, the U.S. Marine Corps to participate in national exercises. The Nordics must be able to combine their bilateral relationships to the major powers with a coherent and unified approach to the overarching strategic issues. As for now, the request for joint exercising in the Nordic space from various U.S. military units reportedly exceeds the capacity to receive them, so the problem is not imminent. But this problem could become exacerbated if, for example, the United States decides to shift more resources to the Asia-Pacific.
Third, the speed at which these reforms are being made right now could lead to an overstretch. It is important to remember that the objective of all this collaboration is enhanced NATO military effect—not Nordic cooperation per se. In this context, Denmark and Norway must also be aware of the many simultaneous processes Finland and Sweden are undergoing when it comes to adapting to NATO. Examples include establishing secure communications systems, bringing NATO doctrines and procedures into staffs and headquarters, and filling positions in the organization. All of these put a strain on people and resources, at least for a period.
Fourth, the allies must coordinate their deterrence posture. While Norway and Denmark historically have had formalized restrictions on the use of their territories for nuclear weapons or permanent NATO bases, Finland, and to some extent Sweden, have been less pronounced when it comes to such self-imposed restrictions. As mentioned above, Finland wishes to have an FLF, while Norway is the only ally that shares a border with Russia but does not have a permanent NATO presence. Norway also has imposed restrictions on allied flights close to the Russian border (allowing no flights east of the 28°E), while Finland allows flights much closer to the border. As always with deterrence, it is hard to measure the implications of such mixed messaging and how negative it is for NATO’s overall deterrence and for stability in the High North region. But it is nonetheless something NATO, Finland, and Norway should reflect over, as diverging signals potentially could be exploited or tested by Russia. This is particularly important in the north due to Russia’s nuclear capabilities at the Kola Peninsula.
Fifth, the Baltic states have expressed some concern over the new Nordic euphoria, fearing it could come at the expense of Nordic-Baltic cooperation. As Finland and Sweden are being placed under JFC Norfolk and the North-West plan, a de facto NATO border might emerge in the Baltic Sea between JFC Norfolk and JFC Brunssum. Some Baltic officials have therefore suggested different organizational solutions, including placing the Baltic states under JFC Norfolk. However, as reinforcements to these states primarily will have to come over land, this makes little sense. NATO is therefore currently working on how the command and control over Baltic Sea operations can best be organized in the overall force and command structure, to make sure it is more of a bridge than a border between the JFCs. On the political level, the Nordic-Baltic Eight format is also actively used to prevent or preempt any perception of division between the Nordics and the Baltics. Having Finland and Sweden in NATO is, after all, a huge benefit for both the Nordic and the Baltic states.
Conclusion
NATO enlargement in the north has created a range of opportunities across branches, regions, and sectors. The potential to find solutions that increase NATO’s overall military capacity is huge. Therefore, more Nordic defense cooperation and integration is likely, both within a NATO framework and in close tandem with major allies. However, some risks must also be mitigated to avoid overstretch, intra-Nordic rivalry, or grievances from other allies in the region. Nonetheless, just as it was Russia’s war that made Finland and Sweden decide to join NATO, the continued, brutal warfighting should serve as a stark reminder of the gravity of the situation—thus helping to overcome whatever obstacles Nordic-Baltic defense planners are facing.
