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Policy Analysis | This paper deals with the scenario of Iran becoming a nuclear state. Many estimates indicate that Tehran is close to crossing the nuclear threshold for military purposes. This analysis investigates two views, one sees Iran’s possession of a nuclear weapon as a condition that can be tolerated, while the other sees that Iran constitutes a model of an expansionist state that is hard to be lenient towards regarding the possibility of its possession of a nuclear weapon.
Since the administration of the former U.S. President Donald Trump withdrew in 2018 from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), known as the Iran nuclear deal, the political and intelligence communities raised many questions about whether the world is prepared to deal with the assumption that Iran will become a nuclear-armed state. This assumption emerged in light of the stalemate and complexity of the August 2022 Vienna talks aimed at reviving JCPOA under the impact of a number of international and regional changes, including the Iranian-Russian-Chinese rapprochement and several reliable estimates indicating that Tehran is close to crossing the nuclear threshold for military purposes.
The most notable indication came from this statement Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Mark Milley made before the Armed Services Committee in the U.S. House of Representatives last March: “Iran possesses all elements it needs to build a nuclear weapon within several months if necessary” … and that Iran is “capable of manufacturing a sufficient amount of materials needed for a nuclear weapon in less than two weeks.”
Is it Possible to Co-exist with a Nuclear Iran?
Iran continues to assert that its nuclear program is intended for peaceful use, such as generating energy and producing medical diagnostic isotopes. However, assuming that Iran will declare its possession of a nuclear weapon cannot be excluded, as there are no real guarantees that might drive Iran to abandon a potential development of its nuclear weapons, especially since Iran could produce enough fissile materials to manufacture a nuclear bomb within 12 days, U.S. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Colin Kahl told Congress in February 2023. In addition, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors told Bloomberg, a U.S.-based financial news agency, that Iran’s uranium enrichment rates reached 84 percent, making it close to the 90 percent required to build a nuclear bomb. Taken together, this indicates that the chances for reaching a new nuclear deal are lessening.
While the United States and the European countries view JCPOA as the only guarantee to prevent Iran from possessing nuclear weapons, countries like Israel do not just rely on the American efforts to prevent Tehran from developing its nuclear program. In April 2023, Axios, a U.S.-based news website, reported that Israeli officials are concerned about the United States’ commitment to its policy of preventing Iran from possessing a nuclear weapon after Milley told Congress that the United States “remains committed as a matter of policy that Iran will not have a fielded nuclear weapon.”
Israel was concerned that Milley specifically used the word fielded instead of the custom use of the word development since it implies that the United States has adopted new policies that include tolerating Tehran having a nuclear weapons program. The use of this word from the most prominent U.S. military authority raises many questions about its significance, especially since it is known that military leaders such as Milley choose their words very meticulously because of the important, dangerous, and even catastrophic repercussions they entail.
However, Israel’s efforts to neutralize the Iranian nuclear capabilities are facing many logistic obstacles and difficulties, in parallel with the associated caveats and threats. This might eventually force Israel “to co-exist with nuclear-armed Iran,” wrote Max Hastings, a British journalist and in The Times on April 10, 2023 that explained the difficulty and futility of resorting to a military option as a final solution.
In all cases, raising such questions has become a subject of discussion in Western think tanks and research centers. This represents an important shift because it undermines one of the main postulates or principles that govern the policy adopted by the United States, the West, and Israel towards Iran’s nuclear program, which is to not allow Tehran to become a nuclear state at all costs.
Will Iran Become a Nuclear State?
Many considerations underly the question of whether it is logical to assume that Iran will declare its possession of nuclear weapons. Below is a summary of the five most important.
- The stumbling course of the nuclear talks, especially in light of Iran’s possession of many leverages augmenting its position in the face of Western pressures, encourages Iran to never accept retreat from or make concessions to such pressures. At the forefront of these leverages are Iran’s robust ties with Russia and China, given its position on the Ukrainian crisis, which largely weakens the U.S. sanctions imposed on it.
At the same time, Tehran is making advances in its nuclear program, where it has come close to possessing the full capability to manufacture nuclear weapons, according to U.S. estimations.
- Resorting to the military option of neutralizing Iran’s nuclear program will neither completely destroy this program nor limit Iran’s capability to possess nuclear weapons. Assuming that Iran’s nuclear facilities could be entirely destroyed with a military strike, Iran would simply rebuild its nuclear program within a short period due to the in-depth experience it gained over many years in this field and the large number of nuclear scientists and experts it has.
To underscore this point, Hasting’s article in The Times quoted the former Israeli Deputy National Security Advisor Chuck Freilich: “Iran has the requisite knowledge today to reconstitute the program, even after a completely successful attack. Military action is thus no longer an option for eliminating the program, only for gaining time.”
- Resorting to the military option can be counterproductive since the factors of instability may increase the Iranian regime’s insistence on possessing nuclear weapons, especially since estimations indicate that Iran has not yet taken the decision to acquire nuclear weapons to avoid the risks that it may bring about. Thus, any attack against Iran may make it break free from its obligations and reservations, or it may even lead Tehran to officially abandon Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khameini’s 2003 fatwa prohibiting the possession or use of nuclear weapons.
- Theoretically speaking, Iran’s possession of a nuclear weapon doesn’t prevent its coexistence with Israel on the basis of the balance of terror rule, as is the case with the relations between India and Pakistan, whose relations didn’t witness any major military confrontation since they both possessed nuclear weapons, contrary to how it was during the preceding period that witnessed major military confrontations.
- The worries of the Middle East countries about Iran’s nuclear program does not mean they want a military confrontation that Israel or America may lead against Iran, and which may have serious repercussions on the region at a time when it is witnessing a state of openness after its countries experienced a decade full of conflicts and disputes.
In this regard, some point out that the significant improvement in the Iranian-Gulf relations during the past period, especially Saudi-Iranian relations, came at a time when negotiations to revive JCPOA significantly stalled. However, there are frequent Western and Israeli intelligence estimations that Tehran is close to possessing nuclear weapons.
The Issue is Much More Complicated
Despite the importance of the previous considerations, the issue seems more complicated and intertwined, as there are many factors that make it difficult for Israel, the United States, or the countries of the region to accept co-existing with a nuclear Iran.
First, the Iranian regime has adopted an ideology that legitimizes its interference in the affairs of the countries of the region, such as the persistent declarations of the regime’s prominent figures about Tehran’s intention to bring Israel’s existence to an end, not to forget the role of the Iranian regime in the state of instability that the region is still witnessing since 2011. In light of such behaviors, talking about establishing the “balance of terror” principle may not apply to Iran, which adopts hostile policies towards most countries in the region. Its mere possession of nuclear weapons will be reflected in strengthening its own influence as well as its affiliated armed groups.
Second, Milley’s use of the word “fielded” can be interpreted in a way that does not mean the United States would possibly accept or condone Iran’s possession of nuclear weapons if one interprets the statement as targeting the Chinese efforts of mediation between Saudi Arabia and Iran by hinting at the possibility that the United States may accept Tehran’s possession of nuclear weapons within certain limits and conditions. Washington is aware of the sensitivity of this issue to Saudi Arabia and what it may bring to the course of its relations to Iran. In addition, the United States may seem to be more realistic than Israel in dealing with the Iranian nuclear file; hence, the statements of America’s military chief of staff can be understood as a test balloon directed at Israel.
Third, the case of Iran and Israel cannot be compared to that of India and Pakistan, for neither Islamabad nor New Delhi openly adopted a discourse calling to wipe the other out or target the other’s very existence, as is the case in the relationship between Iran and Israel.
Fourth, Iran’s possession of a nuclear weapon will create a dangerous nuclear arms race in the whole region, which may include Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, and other countries, especially given that Riyadh has already hinted more than once that it would be pushed to obtain a nuclear deterrent if Iran possesses a nuclear weapon.
Fifth, despite the significant development of Iran’s relations with both Russia and China during the past period, the two countries do not accept Iran’s possession of nuclear weapons because it will threaten their interests in the region. In this regard, it can be noted that Russia voted in favor of six UN Security Council resolutions against Iran between 2006 and 2010, and it also imposed sanctions on Iran because of its nuclear program.
Russia is aware of the change that Iran’s possession of nuclear weapons will bring to the balance of the region, thereby harming many of Russia’s interests, especially in Syria. On the other hand, China is keen to preserve its strategic relations with the Arab Gulf countries, chiefly Saudi Arabia and the UAE. It is in China’s interest to stabilize the region on the basis of establishing normal relations among its countries, and this is one of the main reasons behind its recent mediation between Tehran and Riyadh.
Sixth, although the experience of Pakistan and India was cited while talking about the possibility of coexistence with a nuclear Iran or the balance between Iran and Israel, Pakistan’s nuclear experience itself is ironically one of the important reasons why the United States and the West are preventing Iran from possessing a nuclear weapon. The presence of this weapon in Pakistan triggers a constant concern that it may fall into the hands of extremists or radical militants, causing a massive disaster. The same applies to Iran, where there is no guarantee that its nuclear weapons will not fall into the hands of the extremists, who adopt perilous attitudes and positions towards the neighboring countries and the world in general.
In light of all of the above, it can be said that the West in general and the United States in particular are aware of the difficulty of completely stopping or neutralizing Iran’s nuclear program, and that the options are limited in dealing with Iran’s nuclear program, including the military one. This is the reason why some—for the first time—are calling for the possibility of coexisting with a nuclear Tehran. However, this pushes the United States in particular to adopt a more realistic vision in dealing with Iran’s nuclear file, including the possibility of making some concessions, although accepting Iran’s possession of nuclear weapons remains one of the main red lines that the United States will not cross over in dealing with the file.
Despite the obstacles that hinder reaching an agreement on reviving the 2015 JCPOA, and caveats associated with the military option in dealing with Iran’s nuclear program, this does not mean that there are no American or Israeli options to deal with this file.
While Israel finds it difficult to completely destroy Tehran’s nuclear program, it uses intelligence strikes to slow down the pace of the program and delay Iran’s possession of nuclear weapons, and it pursues this policy with determination and force.
As for the United States, it continues imposing economic sanctions while working to put forward ideas about an interim agreement on the Iranian nuclear file that prevents Tehran from acting freely to develop its nuclear capabilities. This means that Washington does not surrender to the fact that the nuclear talks have stumbled or that it would let Iran take the opportunity to further develop its nuclear capabilities.
Finally, Iran itself is aware of the danger of exceeding certain limits in its nuclear program, as it knows that the West and Israel will not allow it to acquire nuclear weapons. Iran is also aware that taking such a step may pose a threat to its political regime, and experience indicates that Tehran can make any concessions if it sees that its political regime is exposed to a real and serious threat.
