Eurasia Press & News
Iranian leaders view the Arab states of the Persian Gulf as pivotal to their efforts to deter Israel from attacking key targets in Iran.
Iran is pressuring the Gulf states to deny Israel access to their airspace for any retaliatory strike on Iran.
Iranian officials display no hesitation to threaten the Gulf states with strikes by Tehran or its regional allies if they help Israel or the United States.
Attacks on Gulf energy installations would significantly expand the regional war and rattle the global economy.
Over the past five years, Iran has sought to ease tensions with the Arab states of the Persian Gulf, which are grouped in a four-decade partnership, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). With the exception of Bahrain, which hosts the headquarters for U.S.-led naval forces and accuses Iran of supporting its Shia Muslim oppositionists, all six Gulf states have restored ties to Iran that were downgraded or severed in 2016. The Gulf leaders have joined Iranian officials in expressing outrage against Israeli tactics against Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah that have caused mass civilian casualties and destruction of civilian infrastructure. However, all six GCC countries still host significant numbers of U.S. forces and military equipment – forces that have been augmented since the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack on Israel to deter Iran. Two Gulf states, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), have normalized relations with Israel, and preserved the relationship despite the October 7 crisis. Several Gulf states, particularly the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, helped Israel and the United States intercept Iranian missile attacks against Israel on April 13 and October 1, which crossed all established red lines.
Although recognizing they cannot break the strategic relationship between the Gulf states and the United States, Iranian leaders have come to view their rapprochement with the GCC countries as pivotal to their efforts to deter Israel from attacking vital Iranian facilities. Iranian leaders view the Gulf leaders as essential conduits for influencing both Israel and the United States to keep any Israeli attack on Iran limited, if not avoided outright. The Gulf states take seriously Tehran’s stated or unstated threats to strike their key oil and gas export facilities if Israel hits Iran’s energy sector. More broadly, Tehran has been able to utilize the ever-present concerns Gulf leaders have about Iranian intent and capabilities to intimidate them to remain on the sidelines of the expanding struggle between Israel and the United States, on one side, and Iran and its Axis of Resistance partners, on the other.
Iran’s strategy to both engage and intimidate the Gulf states is evident in the visits and statements made by Iranian officials in the days after the October 1 Iranian missile barrage against Israel. Although Iran’s missile attack drew condemnation from the West, GCC officials largely refrained from commenting, seeking to maintain their delicate balancing act. Tehran has sought to compel the GCC states to complicate any Israeli retaliation by closing their airspace to Israeli overflights. Only hours after the October 1 Iranian barrage, the recently elected Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, an advocate of broad Iranian engagement with the West, visited Doha, where he met senior officials, including Qatar’s Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, as well as Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud.
Perhaps the more pivotal Iran-Gulf meetings were conducted by Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, who made a rare October 9 trip to Riyadh to meet with Saudi Crown Prince and de-facto leader Mohammad bin Salman (MBS) to discuss the “latest regional developments,” the Saudi state news agency said. The meeting with MBS came one week after Araghchi held talks with Gulf foreign ministers on the sidelines of a meeting of GCC – the first time in years that Iran was invited to meet with GCC senior officials on a multilateral basis. Two Arab officials reportedly described the meeting as “conciliatory” and “cooperative.” An Iranian official described to journalists Tehran’s messaging, saying Iran sought to persuade the GCC states to help bring about a ceasefire in the region and “warning them that if Israel attacks Iran, they should not in any way facilitate that attack.” One Saudi analyst close to the Kingdom’s leaders, Ali Shihabi, described Tehran’s messaging as stating: “If the Gulf states open up their airspace to Israel, that would be an act of war.”
The implicit Iranian threats, reinforced by Gulf leaders’ intent not to become embroiled in the regional conflict, appear to have accomplished Tehran’s objectives. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Qatar reportedly have told Iran they will refuse to let Israel fly over their airspace for any attack on Iran and have conveyed this decision to Washington, according to sources close to Gulf government circles. Gulf states are lobbying Washington to stop Israel from attacking Iran’s oil sites because they are concerned their own oil facilities could come under fire from Tehran or its allies if the conflict escalates. The closure of Gulf airspace to Israeli combat aircraft is sure to limit the scope of Israel’s retaliatory attack and the range of targets Israel might be able to strike with precision.
Officials in Washington confirmed that Gulf officials had been in touch with their U.S. counterparts to express concern about the potential scope of Israel’s expected retaliation. President Joe Biden and Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu spoke on October 9 about the potential Israeli retaliation, although, by all accounts, Israel did not commit to avoid targeting any Iranian energy installations in a retaliatory strike. U.S. leaders agree with the GCC leaders that Israel should avoid energy targets in Iran, in part because doing so is certain to spike crude oil prices and, depending on the extent of Iran’s military action, potentially create worldwide oil shortages, at least temporarily.
Underlying the diplomatic conversations are U.S. official concerns that any Iranian retaliation against Gulf energy installations would necessitate a U.S. military response against Iran. Last month, Washington designated the UAE, which hosts large numbers of U.S. aircraft at its Al Dhafra Air Base, a “Major Defense Partner.” In September 2023, the U.S. and Bahrain signed a Comprehensive Security Integration and Prosperity Agreement that goes a long way toward binding the U.S. to come to Bahrain’s defense in case of attack. U.S. defense pacts with the other four Gulf states also imply a U.S. security guarantee in the event of Iranian or other aggression. In 2019, Saudi and Emirati officials began to question the U.S. commitment to Gulf security when the U.S. did not retaliate for an Iranian missile and drone strike that temporarily knocked out half of Saudi Arabia’s oil output. U.S. officials have since stressed to Gulf rulers the durability of the U.S. commitment to Gulf security.
The calculations of Washington and Israel might become even more complicated if Tehran were to delegate to its regional allies the task of retaliating against the Gulf states for any cooperation they give to Israel against Iran. Attacks on the Gulf states by Iran’s allies would provide Tehran with a measure of deniability, enabling Iranian leaders to remain engaged with Gulf rulers while still pressuring them to avoid cooperation with Israeli and U.S. military operations against Iran.
Attacks by any pro-Iranian group on the Gulf states would further expand regional warfare, unravel a tenuous ceasefire in the Yemen conflict, and upset the delicate balance Baghdad is attempting to strike in its relations with both Tehran and Washington. The Houthi movement in Yemen has warned of resuming attacks on Saudi Arabia and the UAE because of their strategic alignment with Washington and their roles in helping thwart Iran’s missile attacks on Israel. “Houthi threats against Saudi Arabia should be taken seriously, rather than dismissed as empty rhetoric,” said U.S.-based Yemen analyst Mohammed al-Basha. Any attack by the Houthis on the Kingdom or the Emirates could reignite the Yemen war between the Houthis and the Republic of Yemen Government. In September, the leader of Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada, one of Iraq’s pro-Iran factions, threatened the UAE with direct attacks in the event of a regional war. In a statement on social media platform X, the group’s Secretary-General, Abu Ala al-Walai accused the UAE of being a “Zionist” proxy in the Gulf and said it would be “the first target… in the event of an all-out war.”
On the other hand, the Gulf states have also benefitted, to some extent, from the expansion of the regional war. Saudi Arabia, in particular, has sought for more than a decade to weaken the political influence of Lebanese Hezbollah within Lebanon. The Kingdom and the Emirates also sought to counter Hezbollah’s help to the Assad regime in Syria in its battle against a broad national rebellion that erupted in 2011. The two Gulf powers assess Hezbollah also has been helping the Houthis, as well as the pro-Iranian Iraqi militias, strategically. But, the Gulf leaders prefer to see Israel and the United States bear the brunt of weakening Iran and its Axis rather than become embroiled in warfare themselves and risk unending hostility from Tehran.
