A Year Since October 7: Where Did the Region Reach?

This paper provides a comprehensive assessment of the attacks carried out by Hamas against Israeli settlements and military bases in the Gaza envelope on October 7, 2023. The ideological framework of these attacks was based on a set of political and military foundations that shape Hamas’s vision of the conflict with Israel, as well as the tools and strategies for managing it, considering past experiences and new developments. The paper also addresses the Palestinian landscape and the trajectory of the movement before and after October 7, along with the considerations for the second year of the war.

The war in the Gaza Strip has entered its second year since Hamas launched its unprecedented attacks against Israeli settlements and military bases in the Gaza envelope. The series of events and repercussions that followed the attacks led to a humanitarian crisis in Gaza and significant regional turmoil. The impact of the war has extended beyond its main battlefield in Gaza to other geographic arenas involved in the conflict between Israel and what is referred to as the Resistance Axis, affecting both regional and international landscapes.

Given this reality, there is a pressing need to provide a comprehensive and integrated analysis of the attacks, focusing on the theoretical framework of the ideological system, military calculations, and priorities of the leadership structure that planned and executed them. This analysis will also cover the dynamics of the war and the Israeli strategies that have shaped its course, culminating in the first study the attacks, their background, assessment, and the consequences that have followed.
The Palestinian Scene Before October 7

The October attacks occurred within the context of ongoing confrontations between Israelis and Palestinians since the last major conflict in 2021, signaling a potential “escalation peak.” Following its formation in late 2022, the Israeli government, widely described as the most extremist since the nation was founded in 1949, implemented draconian measures against Palestinians that included increased settlement expansion, ignoring and even condoning a sharp rise in settler violence against Palestinians, repeated violations at the Al-Aqsa Mosque, and intensified restrictions on Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails. Meanwhile, the Israeli blockade on the Gaza Strip continued, exacerbating the already dire humanitarian crisis created by the Israeli war.

Gaza is one of the most densely populated areas in the world. Approximately 2.3 million people live in an area of just 365 square kilometers (141 square miles). According to data from the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics and multiple UN reports, more than 6,000 people live per square kilometer (0.3 square miles), equating to around 500 people per 100 square kilometers (3.8 square miles).

Unemployment rates in the Gaza Strip exceeded 46% in the third quarter of 2023, while poverty levels reached around 64% by mid-year. Additionally, 65% of the population suffers from food insecurity. It is little wonder that several media sources (there is no official data) reveal a significant increase in the number of people fleeing Gaza. Approximately 860,000 Palestinians have emigrated from the Strip without returning during the 16-year blockade, 2007–2023.

The political and humanitarian landscape in the West Bank and Gaza Strip complex, with little progress made regarding social, economic, and human rights-related struggles. Moreover, regional and international priorities have pushed the Palestinian cause far down from the top of the list of concerns. Or worse, governments have used it as a bargaining chip to protect their own priorities. An example is when then President Donald Trump tried to resolve the conflict at the sole expense of Palestinian rights through what he called “the deal of the century” in 2020, as well as when certain Arab countries normalized their relations with Israel without any provisions that would improve the Palestinian situation.

With the rise in 2017 of Yahya Sinwar as the leader of Hamas in Gaza and Saleh al-Arouri as the deputy head of its political bureau and leader in the West Bank, Hamas intensified its efforts to develop a military infrastructure in Gaza. Their leadership solidified the movement’s relationships with Iran and various factions within the so-called “Resistance Axis.”

One of the key aspects of their leadership has been a focus on issues related to lifting the blockade and re-establishing a Hamas presence in the West Bank, which had been diminished since Israel’s “Operation Defensive Shield” in 2002 undermined their operations in the West Bank and crippled the armed capabilities of factions supporting the movement. Over time, Hamas has increasingly launched armed operations against Israeli targets, while also maintaining a strong commitment to the issue of prisoner liberation, emphasizing it on various occasions.

From 2021 to 2023, the pressure on Hamas in the West Bank grew, coinciding with a rise in military operations by armed field groups. Other armed factions, such as the Islamic Jihad Movement, have also initiated confrontations against Israel and increased their roles in both Gaza and the West Bank.

On the popular level, residents of the Gaza Strip held numerous protests between August 2021 and September 2023 near the border fence controlled and patrolled by Israeli forces in condemnation of the repeated Israeli assaults on Al-Aqsa Mosque and incursions into the West Bank, as well as the ongoing blockade of the Gaza Strip since 2007. This situation has driven many Gaza residents to attempt dangerous sea migrations despite the high risks involved. More than 360 Palestinians lost their lives or went missing at sea in 2022 while trying to migrate illegally to Europe.

In reality, many of these issues and files fell under the responsibilities of Sinwar, the Hamas leader in Gaza at the time. They exerted pressure not only on the public’s perception of his leadership but also on the overall priorities and directions of Hamas. This may have contributed to the movement’s escalation of “armed actions,” particularly concerning the issue of prisoners.

Statements made by Hamas leaders, especially Sinwar and al-Arouri, during an event held in December 2022 to commemorate the 35th anniversary of the movement’s founding, highlighted their strong interest in the issue of prisoners. This focus was sharpened by the prevailing sense of frustration over the possibility of their liberation, both among the prisoners themselves and within the Palestinian people, due to the continued stasis surrounding the issue.

Both leaders made it clear that the movement’s primary option for their liberation would be through a prisoner exchange deal, and they implicitly threatened to capture Israeli soldiers and settlers in order to expedite the process of a prisoner exchange and increase their strength in negotiations.

The Movement’s Trajectory Before the Attacks

Prior to the October attacks, Hamas believed that along with its military engagement against Israel it should also enhance the movement’s diplomatic standing both internationally and regionally, as well as strengthen its governance of the Gaza Strip. These principles set the parameters for Hamas’s engagement with Israel in two main areas: preventing Israel from achieving gains without costs and avoiding being drawn into a war that exceeded the intensity of already ongoing escalations with Israel.

In 2017, a Hamas political document reflected its new strategic orientations compared to its 1988 charter. Notably, the new document did not mention Hamas’s affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood. And while it maintained the principle of “armed resistance,” it allowed the movement greater flexibility in political and diplomatic fields. Under this framework, Hamas accepted the idea of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders and redefined the conflict as one against “colonial Zionism.”

Subsequently, there was an active effort by Hamas in political and diplomatic arenas. The movement resumed its relations with Damascus in October 2022 and its leaders accepted an official invitation in April 2023 to visit Saudi Arabia for Umrah, an Islamic pilgrimage to Mecca, the holiest city for Muslims, located in the Hejazi region of Saudi Arabia. Hamas leaders also visited several other countries, including Russia, China, and various Southeast Asian nations.

Hamas’s focus on regional and international politics and diplomacy brought quick and positive results for the movement, particularly in the Gaza Strip. The Egyptian and Qatari mediations succeeded in allowing Gazan residents to work in Israel, with the number reaching about 18,000 daily. However, the October attacks reversed this course and brought about a sudden shift in the movement’s strategic outlook. This shift led many foreign officials and observers to consider the previous political path as part of a broader disinformation campaign by the movement conducted solely to protect the element of surprise in the October attacks.

The accuracy of these assessments requires studying the role of Hamas’s structures in making the decision to launch these attacks. According to the internal system of the movement, it is assumed that the Shura Council, the Executive Council (which includes the political bureau), and the Ezzedin al-Qassam Brigades were all aware of the attack plans and had to approve their implementation. However, given the extreme secrecy surrounding the attacks, it is likely that the planning and decision-making were confined to a narrow circle of Hamas leaders based in the Gaza Strip that included Sinwar (who became the head of the political bureau on August 6, 2024 and was killed on October 16 in a clash with the Israeli military in Rafah) and Mohammed Deif, the commander of Hamas’s military wing, the Al-Qassam Brigades, who Israel announced was killed in early August 2024. These pinpointed assassinations suggests that members of the Shura Council and the Executive Bureau did not review the attack plan or contribute to the decision to execute it.

Hamas’s political leader abroad, Khaled Meshaal, said he learned about the attacks through the media. However, it remains unclear who had full prior knowledge of the attacks, particularly its timing and methods of execution, who had partial knowledge, and who were completely uninformed.

In fact, the October attacks revealed shifts in the decision-making authority within Hamas. Since 2009, the movement’s leadership has been structured in a four-part model that shared representation and decision-making authority: Gaza, the West Bank, aboard, and the prisons. This structure was designed to represent the three main geographical areas of Hamas’s presence. However, the priorities of these three arenas differed on key issues, such as the nature of alliances, the movement’s strategy, and its overall direction.

When Sinwar was elected leader of Hamas in Gaza in 2017, his close ties with the Al-Qassam Brigades and the leadership in the prisons shifted the balance of power within the movement toward Gaza. This change led Hamas to prioritize issues related to prisoners and lifting the siege on Gaza, with a growing emphasis on armed resistance, as we have outlined earlier. The October attacks, however, fell outside the framework of the delicate balances between the four decision-making centers.

The Military Calculations Behind the October Attacks

The theoretical framework behind the ideological system of Hamas that led to the October attacks is based on a combination of political and military principles that shaped the movement’s vision for the conflict with Israel. These principles also inform its current tools and strategies for managing the conflict, drawing from both past experiences and new developments. This can be understood through two main perspectives that influenced the execution of the October attacks.
First, Palestinian factions have interacted with Israel based on a balance of deterrence, particularly in assessing their own strength relative to Israeli power. The Israeli force was not viewed in its absolute maximum capacity, but rather in terms of how it had been used against the Palestinians since 2008. Hamas believed that the deterrence equation was increasingly in its favor, especially with its possession of Israeli detainees. This gave Hamas leverage, allowing them to repeatedly engage in clashes while employing the “Unity of Arenas” model.

Second, irregular military forces have historically outperformed conventional military power, and the infrastructure of Hamas—such as tunnels and local military manufacturing—allows it to sustain a prolonged conflict, which, in Hamas’s view, will gradually wear down Israel and push it toward the option of negotiations, which Hamas believes will favor the movement.

These conclusions have been drawn from previous experiences in various escalations with Israel that have led Hamas to conclude that attacks involving capture operations often compel Israel to return to the negotiation table. The returns from this path are highly favorable for armed organizations and factions relative to what Israel gains. For example, the release of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit occurred under a 1,000-for-1 equation in which Israel freed nearly 1,000 Palestinian prisoners in exchange for Shalit. Similarly, Hezbollah achieved its objectives by securing the release of Lebanese militant Samir Kantar when it captured Israeli soldiers in 2006, in addition to the release of three other prisoners and the dead remains of 200 Lebanese and Palestinian prisoners.

In reality, the October attacks were primarily designed to push Israel into negotiations with Hamas and to secure the release of Palestinian prisoners from Israeli prisons in exchange for Israeli detainees whom Hamas anticipated capturing, whether they were soldiers or settlers. Given the scale of the attack, Hamas believed that the number of Israeli detainees would be sufficient to clear the prisons through disproportionate prisoner exchanges, based on its publicly declared equation: “All for all.”

Nevertheless, Hamas was prepared for the reality that such an attack would rise to the level of war and would provoke a thunderous response from Israel. This was reflected in the speech Deif delivered when the attacks were announced. His speech served as a mobilizing call, both domestically and internationally, urging people to join the confrontation. His call, however, stopped short of delivering an explicit declaration of war.

It is unlikely that Hamas anticipated the subsequent chain of events or that the reaction would be disproportionate enough to trigger a high-intensity war in the Gaza Strip that would later expand to Lebanon and potentially involve other parties in what is called the “Axis of Resistance.” The current war is an exception in the historical context of conflicts between the two sides.

• Over the past 15 years, the total duration of clashes between the two sides amounted to only 93 days, including the attacks in 2008, 2012, 2014, and 2021.
• The use of ground forces was limited to escalation rounds in 2008, 2012, and 2014. In the most intense case, in 2014, the depth of the ground incursions was limited and brief. Ground operations began July 17 and ended on August 5.

Hamas relied on a number of factors to mitigate the intensity of Israel’s response. First, as made clear in Deif’s statement and later in an October 12 speech by the spokesman for the al-Qassam Brigades, Hamas anticipated a repetition of the rules of engagement based on Israel’s “Operation Sword of Jerusalem” in 2021. This operation involved multiple fronts, with the participation of various units across the regions, including the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and inside Israel, as well as in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. In that conflict, Hamas succeeded in deterring the Israeli government from its attempt to expel the residents of the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood in East Jerusalem. The name given to the October 2023 attacks, “Toofan Al-Aqsa” (Al-Aqsa Flood), reflects Hamas’s intent to place Israel in a multi-party equation, which could complicate its response to the assault.

In addition to the prisoner card, the strategic objective of the attacks was to target Israeli military camps in the vicinity of the Gaza envelope, specifically the “Gaza Division” stationed at the Re’im Base of the Southern Military Region, which is responsible for guarding the border between Israel and the Gaza Strip. The aim was to capture as many officers and soldiers as possible and detain them in the Gaza Strip. This was seen as a guarantee in the planners’ calculations that Israel would not carry out a ground invasion of the Gaza Strip in the near future.

The Implementation of the Attack

The previous discussion focused on the reasoning behind the October attacks and does not necessarily reflect what occurred that morning and subsequently. The difference between the planned offensive strategies and the practical aspects of their execution created a gap significant enough to become a defining factor in the attacks and make them a historical first in the context of the yearslong conflict.

The execution of the attacks was accompanied by several deviations in the field by elite elements that entered the Gaza envelope areas, which Hamas later acknowledged in a subsequent statement, attributing these to the “complete and rapid collapse of the Israeli security and military system.” However, these deviations also revealed problems and gaps surrounding the planning process, decision-making mechanisms, training and preparation of the operatives, and ultimately the execution itself. Below are some of the more important issues.

• Decentralized Execution

Despite detailed planning and the assignment of specific tasks to fighters, the executing units made a decentralized decision to expand their operations after crossing the security fence in response to the field conditions they encountered. Hamas’s document, issued in January 2024, acknowledged these mistakes, clarifying that the initial attack plans were limited to military bases and outposts in the settlements surrounding the Gaza Strip, particularly the Gaza Division stationed about 7 kilometers (4.3 miles) from the security fence. This clarification suggests that the movement’s fighters reaching as deep as 20 kilometers (12.4 miles) into Israeli territory was an unplanned deviation from the designated targets to targeting civilian facilities within the settlements.

• Weak Leadership Hierarchy

The deviation of fighters from their assigned tasks reveals a flaw in coordination within the central and field leadership structure, particularly among the field commanders and unit leaders responsible for managing their fighters and ensuring adherence to the tasks as outlined in the plans. This issue, along with the decentralized approach to execution, allowed fighters in the field greater freedom of action.

This lack of discipline and control resulted in actions that negatively impacted Hamas—and, of course, Israel—particularly the detention of Israeli civilians, including women and children, from non-military areas. This became a problematic issue for Hamas, which later attempted to mitigate it by issuing a statement expressing its readiness to release the civilians unconditionally.

• Weak Psychological Discipline

The units executing the attack were not fully aware of their specific tasks until just a few hours before the operation. They relied on prior training, particularly the Al-Rukn Al-Shadid (Hard Corner) exercises that were conducted four times, the first in December 2020 and the last in September 2023. These drills included simulations of potential methods of attacks for the October operations, such as enhancing the effectiveness of the joint operations room between factions; training personnel on mock-ups resembling Gaza Envelope settlements, military bases, and tanks; and practicing tactics like abduction and infiltration, among others for complex combat environments.

These drills reflected a high level of combat readiness during the execution of the attack, especially against Israeli military sites. However, they overlooked crucial aspects that are just as important as physical and combat training—specifically, the psychological preparedness of the fighters, especially at the moment of crossing the security fence for the first time since 1948. After decades of siege, targeted assassinations, and rounds of escalation, the fighters had mentally merged together as threats Israeli civilians and settlements with military personnel and encampments.

• Lack of Border Security

The secrecy surrounding the attacks limited Hamas’s ability to mobilize larger numbers of fighters for guarding and securing the border to prevent security gaps that could undermine the effectiveness of the operation’s plan of execution. While secrecy was crucial for Hamas to prevent leaks to Israel and to avoid exposing their movements from surveillance areas, the absence of fighters securing the surrounding areas of the security fence allowed Gaza residents to cross and move freely within the operational locations.

Meanwhile, the Israeli response in the first few hours of the attack was uncoordinated, which further exacerbated the crisis, complicating the situation and increasing the chaos within the Gaza envelope. Journalistic and official investigations later revealed that some Israelis were killed by their own military forces. This was particularly noted in an Israeli police investigation regarding responsibility for the deaths of people attending a music concert near the Re’im settlement in southern Israel.
The Day After the Attacks

The October attacks caused a massive shockwave in Israel and unexpected surprises for the planners in Hamas, which significantly altered their calculations and assessments regarding the Israeli response. On the following day, October 8, Israel declared a state of war, placed all its cities under emergency law, and announced the mobilization of 300,000 reservists. On October 9, Israel imposed a full siege on Gaza, preventing the entry of fuel, water, food, and medicine. The country also gained an air bridge from its supporting allies to receive military aid from the United States and Europe. Israel then launched a massive airstrike campaign and intense artillery bombardments targeting various areas of the Gaza Strip, followed by a heavy ground invasion. This response was widely described as disproportionate.

In reality, the reasons behind Israel’s response, both in Gaza and in Lebanon, can be understood from the following perspectives.

• The October attacks represented an unprecedented event in the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and in the wars between Hamas and Israel. They contradicted Israel’s belief that Hamas was incapable of carrying out such large-scale and powerful attacks, and that it fell outside the typical patterns of Hamas’s historical tactics. Until then, Israeli intelligence had viewed Hamas’s operations as primarily limited to launching rockets, defending its territory, and carrying out bombings and armed operations targeting bus stops, cafes, and public gatherings.
• This shift in executing an effective, coordinated, and organized attack resulted from Hamas’s long-term organizational and structural mobilization. This began with the establishment of its leadership, ideology, human resources, media, advertisement, recruitment, and public relations since its founding in 1988. It extended to securing operational spaces that enabled Hamas to train its fighters, build military manufacturing infrastructure, and establish safe havens with supportive social segments. After Hamas took control of the Gaza Strip in 2007, it developed a military, intelligence, and weapons system that transformed the movement into a comprehensive organization that carries out state-like functions for the Palestinian population in Gaza.
• The attacks revealed Hamas’s use of accumulated military, material, and human assets, including its capabilities and resources, to work in an integrated manner against Israel. This represented the peak of the strength of the al-Qassam Brigades, with the maximum utilization of the personnel, skills, funds, and equipment it possesses.
• The scale of the attacks involved the entry of more than 2,000 of its most highly trained and qualified fighters via land, sea, and air (using paragliders). Approximately 3,000 rockets were launched towards Israel, along with drone attacks and aspects of cyber warfare. It succeeded in creating 25 breaches in the separation barrier that Israeli officials had described as “the most complex project,” costing about $1 billion and including a 20-foot-high fence, along with numerous surveillance towers and remote-controlled gun towers spread every 500 feet along the 60-kilometer (37-mile) border. Then, Israel managed to seize an area of up to 5 kilometers (3 miles) in the Gaza Envelope and advanced to a depth of 25 kilometers (15.5 miles) inside Israel, killing 1,189 people—more than the number of Israelis the movement had killed since its founding until 2020, which, according to specialized databases, was 857, surpassing the number of deaths from Palestinian operations against Israeli targets since 1949. This period of detention of Israelis by Palestinian factions became the longest in history, second only to the 444 days that American hostages spent in detention in Iran in 1979.

Therefore, Israel did not view the attack as originating from an armed organization, but rather from a state that possesses an integrated military and social system. Weakening it requires targeting its various organizational structures and operational and armament resources, as well as depriving it of the safe haven that allowed it to accumulate strength, primarily its political and military infrastructure related to the movement.

From this perspective, declaring war became a necessity for Israel both domestically and internationally. Pursuing the threats became imperative, and the attacks fundamentally altered the Israeli security doctrine, shifting it towards readiness for an expanded war against anyone who possesses the power and the intention to use it against them. As a result, Israeli officials repeatedly declared that they were facing “seven fronts.”

Hamas’s Calculations After the Attacks

Hamas found itself facing an international landscape that supported an Israeli war against it. On one hand, Israel, with its citizens and institutions, considered the attack an existential threat. This coincided with the presence of what was described as the most extreme government in Israel’s history, as U.S. President Joe Biden described it in July 2022. From the very first day, members of the Israeli government revealed their intention to resolve the conflict with the Palestinians rather than merely manage it. The attacks also occurred at a time when Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was facing a trial that threatened both his political future and personal freedom.

These events intersected with the perspectives of these three levels within Israel, alongside the international and regional context, which involved a weak U.S. administration and a “Resistance Axis” whose priorities had shifted from external to internal concerns.

A major aspect of the miscalculation by the planners of the attacks was their exclusion of the political bureau abroad from the decision-making process. This oversight didn’t allow the planners to have a crucial understanding of the international context, regional circumstances, diplomatic relations of the movement, and the potential repercussions on neighboring countries. This also complicated Hamas’s calculations both domestically and internationally, as well as in front of its allies.

In reality, Hamas’s assessments and objectives regarding its attacks changed from the very first day. It quickly realized that it was facing a different kind of Israeli response compared to previous attacks and confrontations. This led the spokesperson for the al-Qassam Brigades, in his October 19 speech to state, “The movement is preparing for a long war.”

The ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas on November 22, 2023, marked a turning point in the perceived outcomes of the October attacks for their planners. New issues, more urgent due to the war, entered the negotiations, including those related to humanitarian aid, ceasefires, and the opening of humanitarian routes. It is presumed that at this point, Hamas realized what Israel had been doing to weaken its leverage regarding the detainees held by Hamas.

This prompted the movement to change its stance from the “all for all” exchange equation to a “3 for 1” equation. Hamas also recognized the priority Israel placed on continuing the war. This round of conflict, Hamas realized, was different from what it had been accustomed to and from what it had expected in terms of the aftermath of its attacks—whether that meant returning to negotiations or not.

This realization deepened throughout the course of the war, as other issues took precedence over the file of detainees. From November 2023 to May 2024, halting the war became the core objective for Hamas to preserve its control over the city of Rafah, the last remaining stronghold for its military battalions and its leadership. This position allowed Hamas to gradually return to managing the Gaza Strip, particularly as it also controlled the Rafah crossing and the Philadelphi Corridor. From this standpoint, Hamas agreed to Biden’s proposal on May 31, 2024.

However, Hamas’s priorities underwent a shift in June 2024 following geographic changes in the Gaza Strip that included the Israeli military’s control over the Rafah crossing and the Philadelphi Corridor as well as Israel’s doubling the width of the buffer zone it calls the Netzarim Corridor that splits the Gaza Strip in half. As a result, Hamas’s demand for the complete withdrawal of the Israeli military from the Gaza Strip became its top priority, surpassing other demands.

This shift was evident in the movement’s retreat from its stated goal of freeing all prisoners to accepting a limited number of detainees. The new equation focused on securing the release of as many prisoners as possible in exchange for the Israeli detainees, currently estimated to be around 97. There was a particular emphasis on key groups for the exchange, including women, children, the sick, and some of the prominent leaders held in Israeli prisons, such as Abdullah al-Barghouti from Hamas, Marwan Barghouti from Fatah, and Ahmad Sa’adat from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Notably, the number of Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails had risen from approximately 6,000 before the attacks to more than 10,000 in the West Bank alone, with an unknown number imprisoned in Gaza.

Nevertheless, Hamas’s demand for the complete withdrawal of the Israeli military from the Gaza Strip faces Israeli opposition. As a result, discussions about a final or long-term ceasefire have become a complex and nearly impossible matter. This is evident in Egypt’s failed attempt to broker a limited and temporary deal in late October 2024 for the release of four detainees held by each side within two days of a ceasefire, followed by 10 days of negotiations to reach a permanent ceasefire. This would coincide with a new round of talks in the Qatari capital of Doha. The Egyptian proposal appears to be a test of the Israeli government’s seriousness regarding a ceasefire, as well as a way to gauge changes in Hamas’s position following Sinwar’s assassination.
Calculations for the Second Year of the War

A year after the war broke out, both sides redefined it. On October 12, Israel declared that the war in the Gaza Strip had become a “secondary battlefield,” while Hamas aimed to reorganize its ranks toward a “long war of attrition.” In a video message on the first anniversary of the October attacks, the spokesman for the al-Qassam Brigades promised that Israel’s continued waging of the war would prove to be “painful and costly for the enemy.”

Both announcements came after the Israeli military gained operational control over roughly 90% of the Gaza Strip’s territory, the failure of any ceasefire deal, and the movement’s unsuccessful attempts to open a second front in the West Bank or from within Israel.

However, both sides face strategic challenges in the upcoming phases of the confrontation. On one hand, Hamas may be able to endure militarily in a war of attrition, supported by local capabilities to recruit new fighters, produce weapons, and reuse an estimated 6,000 to 9,000 unexploded shells. However, the success of this strategy depends on the ability of the Gazan people to withstand a war that could last for years. Moreover, reviving Gaza to make it a viable place to live will require a comprehensive rebuilding of the region’s entire infrastructure.

According to data collected in early September by the United Nations Satellite Center, the total number of buildings damaged in Gaza reached approximately 163,000, including about 52,000 completely destroyed, 18,000 severely damaged, 35,000 possibly damaged, and 56,000 moderately damaged—representing 66% of the total buildings in the sector. The same agency reported in March that more than 76% of the schools in Gaza need to be entirely rebuilt or extensively rehabilitated. According to a report released by the World Health Organization in June, 17 of Gaza’s 36 hospitals (46%) are only partially functional, and 14 of those 17 hospitals are only partially accessible due to security threats and physical barriers such as destruction of surrounding roads and damaged entrances for patients and ambulances. (Rafah has no functioning hospitals for the 90,000 Gazan refugees living there.)

According to the United Nations, Israeli airstrikes have left more than 42 million tons of rubble throughout Gaza, which may take years to remove at a cost of up to $700 million. The task is further complicated by unexploded bombs, hazardous debris, and long-dead corpses under the rubble.

The complexity of this situation increases if Israel exploits it against Hamas, especially by leveraging the issue of humanitarian aid, which could become the primary topic of negotiations after the war. This is particularly true if humanitarian aid is used as a bargaining chip to secure concessions from Hamas, whether in terms of disarming the group or handing over its wanted leaders. Key issues that might come into play include reconstruction, early recovery efforts for the community, and the distribution and expansion of humanitarian aid.

This pattern can be observed in Israel’s control over polio vaccination campaigns. Israel provided the vaccines in determined sites and set the times for vaccination. Furthermore, Israel had offered Sinwar a deal called “Safe Exit” that was intended to secure the release of Israeli detainees in exchange for allowing Sinwar and other Hamas leaders to safely leave the Gaza Strip. The proposal, formulated in September 2024, aimed to link the fate of Hamas leaders to that of their society and push for their accountability. After Sinwar’s assassination on October 17, Netanyahu reaffirmed this offer, directing it to those who knew the locations of the Israeli detainees, demanding their release in exchange for the safe exit of Hamas leaders from Gaza.

On the Israeli side, entering into a state of attrition while awaiting the political outcomes of post-war issues could once again push Israel to withdraw from the Gaza Strip without achieving its objectives, similar to the disengagement process in 2005. Additionally, there is concern within the Israeli security and military establishment that this attrition might expand to other places, particularly the Lebanese front. Despite the elimination of Hamas’s leadership structure and the destruction of several weapon depots and stockpiles, these actions may not be a true indicator of success in the Israeli ground campaign.

Therefore, Israel follows this strategy in its confrontation across various fronts.

1. Disproportionate Escalation

This involves delivering strikes with significant impact to avoid being stuck in a deterrence equation or maintaining proportionality in its strikes, which could lead to a war of attrition war on all fronts. This strategy has been particularly evident in Israel’s actions on the Lebanese front, where it sequentially targeted command and control centers, field commanders, unit leaders, communication and coordination facilities, weapon and equipment storage sites, and financial storage locations. This approach was taken despite Hezbollah’s assertions that it did not seek to enter into a full-scale war and was limiting its role to providing support for Hamas.

The Israeli escalation not only targeted Hezbollah but also included other members of the Axis of Resistance, particularly Iran, which leads the axis. In early April, Israel targeted the Iranian consulate in Damascus. On July 31, it assassinated Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh on Iranian soil. On September 28, Israel issued a warning to the Houthis, threatening to also target them. This suggests that Israel aims to put Iran and its allies in a difficult position, either forcing them into a proportional retaliation or pressuring them to respond in a way that could potentially draw them into direct conflict.

2. Undermining the Unity of Arenas

This strategy aims to sever the supply and support routes between Iran and its proxies, particularly Hezbollah, by targeting Iranian military leaders involved in managing the network of proxies. The October 26 Israeli strike on Iran served this goal by not targeting Iran as a political entity, but as an expansionist project. The attack focused on specific facilities for manufacturing missiles and drones, which are crucial to Iran’s operations in supplying its allied forces with such weapons.

The objective of this approach is to weaken the other fronts in Lebanon, Yemen, and Iraq, further complicating Iran’s calculations on how to respond. Iran’s choices between retaliation or continuing escalation are fraught with the risk of direct war, especially as the threat to Iranian territory becomes more imminent than ever.

In line with this strategy, the Israeli military began operations this year in Syria’s Golan Heights on October 9 by establishing a military path along the border fence. This move appears to be part of a broader Israeli objective to create a “security belt” along the border, referred to as “Sofa 53,” likely laying the groundwork for expanding its strikes against an Iranian presence and Iranian proxies in Syria. This also aligns with the increasing frequency of Israeli airstrikes on various locations and targets across Syria, including airports in Damascus and Aleppo, each of which was attacked three times between October 14 and 22.

3. Complicating the Calculations of Axis Parties

It is evident that the Israeli strategy not only focuses on decisively winning the front against one of the parties in the Unity of Arenas, but it also seeks to complicate the calculations of those arenas from Gaza to Lebanon, and possibly extending to other areas. A notable example of this is Israel’s attempt to link a ceasefire in Lebanon to the completion of a prisoner exchange deal in Gaza.

By maintaining the intensity and style of its actions, Israel aims to shift the balance of power that has been in place since 2003, which allowed Iran to establish a foothold in Iraq, expand into Syria in 2012, and further into Yemen by 2014. This progression helped solidify Iran’s supply lines to Hezbollah in Lebanon, extending all the way to the Mediterranean Sea, and forming a strategic encirclement of Israel by both land and sea, especially with the Houthi activity in the Red Sea.

The shift in this balance of power signals the setbacks faced by the Axis of Resistance in achieving its objectives. On one hand, Hamas has failed to alter the equation of confrontation with Israel in its favor or to impose a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Hezbollah has also suffered significant losses due to its involvement in the war, including damage to its leadership structure and weapons storage sites—despite its continued insistence on only playing a support role and its repeated avowals of not wanting to be drawn into a broader war.

Finally, and most importantly, the axis has failed to achieve its main goal: to end the war in Gaza. Meanwhile, Iran finds itself in a complex equation that could drag it into a direct war involving the United States. For the first time, U.S. soldiers are participating in operating air defense systems within Israel, and the aircraft carrier USS Harry S. Truman is now deployed in the Eastern Mediterranean, which is considered part of the Middle East region. These developments indicate the potential failure of the “forward defense” strategy Iran has been developing since the 1980s to protect its territory from direct targeting.

4. Resolving the Conflict Rather Than Managing It

The idea of resolving the conflict rather than merely managing it has been alive within Israel’s right-wing government since its formation. Practically speaking, the October attacks provided an opportunity for the government to advance its agenda on the ground, both in Gaza and the West Bank, while also expanding its actions on the Lebanese front.

Until then, the United States had largely focused on managing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict without aiming for a final resolution. The October attacks seemed to push for international involvement, including Washington, to achieve a two-state solution and reassert global attention on the Palestinian issue. While some progress in international attention was achieved, Israeli actions since the beginning of the war indicate a shift towards weakening Palestinian political and military structures.

Israel has consistently rejected any future role for the Palestinian Authority (PA) in Gaza while simultaneously undermining the PA’s authority in the West Bank. Israel has worked to obstruct attempts to reform the PA to enable it to govern and administer Gaza. This includes holding approximately $2 billion of Palestinian Authority tax revenues, according to Palestinian Ministry of Finance data in September 2024.

Moreover, Israel has actively undermined international and UN calls for a two-state solution. For example, on February 21, 99 of the 120 members of the Israeli Knesset approved the government resolution to reject unilateral recognition of a Palestinian state. And on July 18, the Knesset voted, 68–9, against the establishment of a Palestinian state, even as part of a negotiated settlement with Israel.

Israel’s unilateral actions in the West Bank have included land confiscations and the construction of new settlement units in strategically important areas. In addition, Israel has targeted the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). In July, the Knesset designated UNRWA, the largest provider of humanitarian assistance to Palestinians, a terrorist organization and banned it from conducting “any activity” inside Israel, annexed East Jerusalem, Gaza, and the West Bank.

Finally, the October attacks served as a strategic event aimed to change the nature and boundaries of Hamas’s confrontations with Israel. However, errors in calculations and execution gave Israel an opportunity to achieve a decisive outcome, altering Hamas’s goals and priorities in executing the attacks. As a result, Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Axis of Resistance found themselves under existential threat from both military force and political means. The Israeli threat has now extended to all parties within the axis, including Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Iran.

This shift indicates that the second year of the war holds consequences that are no less significant than those of its first year. In fact, the situation now points to even more intense and expanded confrontations, leading to transformational changes that could have pivotal consequences for the region and the balance of power within it.