Eurasia Press & News
The collapse of the 54-year rule of the Assad family in Syria constitutes a significant setback to Iran’s decades-long strategy to forge an “Axis of Resistance” to confront Israel and deter U.S. military action against Iranian territory and signals a seismic shift in the Middle East’s political landscape.
U.S., regional, and global officials seek to stabilize Syria and work to ensure that a successor government will not facilitate the continued operations in Syria of radical jihadist organizations such as the Islamic State.
Unable to help the regime of President Bashar al-Assad stave off the Islamist-led rebel offensive, Russia is likely to lose access to airbases in Syria and a naval base on the Mediterranean, reducing Moscow’s ability to project power in the region.
Assad’s fall will enhance the regional influence of Türkiye, which has ties to several of the prevailing Syrian rebel organizations, and perhaps permit many Syrian refugees still in Türkiye to return home.
Early Sunday morning in Syria, as rebel factions closed in on Damascus, President Bashar al-Assad fled the country for Russia, signaling a seismic shift in the Middle East’s political landscape. Rebel fighters declared an end to Bashar al-Assad’s 24-year rule, which followed a 30-year reign of his father, Hafez al-Assad. Abu Mohammed al-Julani, the head of the dominant rebel group, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), issued a statement delegating Assad’s Prime Minister, Mohammad Ghazi al-Jalali, to remain in charge of the government until a political transition is complete. It is unclear whether the political transition will involve free and fair elections, authoritarian rule, or other constructs, but most experts assess a successor regime will be dominated by Islamist-oriented rebels that led the fighting to oust Assad. HTS leaders have, in the past, been allied with al-Qaeda, but distanced themselves from that group officially cutting ties in 2017. HTS now professes moderation and tolerance and indicates it is focused on Syria rather than on undertaking ideological and political struggles in the broader region.
Still, some experts and global officials express concerns that an Islamist or HTS-dominated successor government in Syria might adopt a permissive – if not supportive – position toward violent extremist organizations still operating in parts of Syria. Addressing that possibility, U.S. Defense Department spokesman Patrick Ryder said on Sunday that the “…mission of [the 900 U.S. forces in eastern Syria] remains unchanged and focused on the ‘Defeat-ISIS’ mission.” Left unclear was whether president-elect Trump, who called for the U.S. to abstain from involvement in Syria’s internal affairs, would see the Assad regime’s demise as an opportunity to withdraw U.S. forces – an option he reportedly considered during his first administration.
Israel’s Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu issued a video statement Sunday taking credit for precipitating the events that led to Assad’s collapse while also indicating that Israel would defend Israel and its borders, should a hostile successor government emerge. Israel ordered its forces to occupy positions on the disputed Golan Heights that were abandoned by the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) as Assad’s rule collapsed, asserting that doing so was necessary to preserve the key provisions of the 1974 Israel-Syria Separation of Forces Agreement.
Addressing broader concerns about Syria’s stability, following meetings in Doha, the foreign ministers of Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Türkiye, and Russia issued a statement calling on “all parties to seek a political solution to the Syrian crisis that leads to end of military operations, and protection of civilians from the repercussions of this crisis. They also agreed on the importance of strengthening joint international efforts to increase humanitarian aid to the Syrian people and ensuring its sustainable and unhindered access to all affected areas.”
The recent developments in Syria reflect Türkiye’s deliberate strategy to exploit shifting regional dynamics, particularly in the aftermath of October 7. These shifts include the waning influence of Iran and its proxies in Lebanon, which Türkiye appears to view as an opportunity to expand its influence in Syria. This strategy likely stems from Ankara’s stalled reconciliation efforts with Assad and its ambition to secure a stronger strategic foothold ahead of a potential change in the U.S. administration. Türkiye’s growing influence, particularly through its support of Islamists and Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated factions, may provoke concern among Arab states such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, and Jordan. These countries, which have historically opposed Islamist movements within its borders, might seek an alternative to Turkish dominance. The various loyalties and fragmentations of rebel groups can give these countries ample chance to hinder what they see as Türkiye’s proxies.
The Islamist rebel victory, mostly supported by Türkiye, also significantly undermines the influence of Assad’s key allies, Russia and Iran, who had played pivotal roles in sustaining his regime during critical phases of the conflict by intervening during 2013-2015 to help Assad beat back the challenge from the armed rebellion that erupted in 2011. No matter how the political transition in Syria unfolds, in the context of the regional conflict raging since the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel, Assad’s collapse has upended the strategic calculations of several major regional and global powers. Although they retained considerable assets in Syria, both Russia and Iran were weakened and distracted by other conflicts, rendering them unable to counter the HTS-led armed offensive that began in late November. The rebel campaign quickly seized the major city of Aleppo and advanced to Damascus against limited opposition from the SAA, while Türkiye-backed and Kurdish factions seized most of the north and east of Syria.
The collapse of the Assad regime deals the latest, and perhaps most severe, setback to the national security strategy and ideology-driven foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Assad regime was, in many ways, the cornerstone of Iran’s strategy to project power throughout the region by arming, training, and advising a network of non-state organizations constituting an “Axis of Resistance” on or within reach of Israel’s borders. Allied with Iran, the Assad regime hosted Iranian facilities and transshipment points through which Tehran built Lebanese Hezbollah’s large arsenal of rockets, armed drones, and ballistic missiles capable of reaching cities and facilities throughout Israel. Iran helped Hezbollah deploy to Syria in 2013 to assist the SAA against armed rebel factions, but the post-October 7 combat with Israel rendered Hezbollah significantly weakened, constrained, and of little help against the new HTS-offensive.
During its offensive, HTS and other fighters killed a number of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps – Quds Force (IRGC-QF) advisers and stormed Iran’s embassy in Damascus. Iran has reportedly withdrawn its remaining advisers and commanders from the country. Other Iranian allies, including pro-Iranian Shia militias and Afghan and Pakistani Shia fighters have also left Syria. The political forces likely to dominate post-Assad Syria are mostly Sunni Muslims who blame Iran, Hezbollah, and other Axis members for sustaining Assad’s rule, leaving Iran without a safe route through which to rearm Hezbollah in Lebanon. Although Hezbollah has increasingly produced much of its own weaponry in its strongholds in Lebanon, a cutoff of weapons and technology supplies is certain to delay or derail Hezbollah’s ability to rebuild its arsenal to its pre-October 7 strength.
Moreover, the takeover of eastern Syria by pro-Türkiye as well as U.S.-backed Kurdish forces will deprive pro-Iranian Iraqi militias, including Kata’ib Hezbollah and Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, of freedom of movement into Syria. These groups have operated across the Iraq-Syria border since the 2011 rebellion, in part helping sustain the Assad regime. Some reports indicated Iran had hoped to use its Iraqi allies to retaliate for Israel’s October airstrike on Iranian air defense and missile facilities, using the ability of these groups to launch Iran-supplied ballistic missiles in close proximity – and short flight time – to Israel. Iraq fears that Syria’s disintegration could spill over into its territory, threatening its stability. The memory of Mosul’s fall and the subsequent rise of ISIS remains vivid, intensifying concerns about similar scenarios. Iran, facing constraints due to Hezbollah’s overstretched resources, may redirect its focus toward leveraging its proxies in Iraq to safeguard its regional interests.
Most experts assess that Türkiye benefits significantly from Assad’s collapse. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan applauded the rebel offensive and expressed support it would overthrow Assad, but Turkish officials denied – and no evidence has emerged – that Ankara had instigated or materially supported the HTS-led breakout. But the involvement of Turkish-backed factions in the offensive that toppled Assad not only elevates Türkiye’s regional influence relative to Iran, Saudi Arabia, and other powers, but will also help Türkiye secure its border regions from Kurdish groups Ankara considers to be terrorist organizations. At the same time, Türkiye hopes for stability and moderation in Syria that would encourage many of the several million Syrian refugees hosted in Türkiye to return home. Türkiye’s enhanced regional influence might also elevate the country’s role in helping broker a settlement to the conflict in Gaza.
Türkiye’s initial objective was to consolidate its influence over areas it perceives as part of its historical sphere of influence while gaining leverage in future regional negotiations. A core element of this approach involves neutralizing the Kurdish presence along its borders. However, the rapid deterioration of Syrian regime forces has forced Türkiye into decisive action, aiming to prevent a power vacuum that could lead to prolonged instability or further fracturing of the country. This includes efforts to direct the rebel forces towards Damascus and ending the Assad regime, thereby reshaping the political and territorial dynamics in Syria to align with Turkish strategic interests.
Outside the region, Russia is eyeing developments in Syria with significant concern. In all likelihood, a successor government will no longer host Russian air and naval forces in Syria, including at the key port city of Tartus, that gives Moscow easy access to the Mediterranean. Bases in Syria play a role in Russia’s efforts to project power not only inside Syria but in the broader region, including in Libya, Sudan, and other parts of Africa. Moscow’s inability to keep Assad in power suggests that its consumption with the Ukraine war is seriously taxing Russia’s resources and capabilities, raising questions about the sustainability of its ongoing offensive in Ukraine. Assad’s collapse potentially weakens the hand of President Vladimir Putin in the talks that president-elect Trump says his administration will engage in to try to end the Ukraine conflict.
Türkiye views the victory of the rebels in Syria as both an opportunity and a challenge. The collapse of the Assad regime could enable Ankara to install a Syrian government aligned with its interests. However, a clash between the different rebel forces that have little in common other than animosity toward the regime might create a protracted conflict that risks exacerbating Syria’s fragmentation, with far-reaching consequences for regional stability and Türkiye’s internal security. This volatile situation underscores the urgent need for a comprehensive political and inclusive transition. Without one, Syria’s divisions—rooted in ethnic, sectarian, and ideological loyalties—pose significant risks not only for Syria but also for the broader region, threatening to amplify instability and jeopardize neighboring countries’ security.
