Eurasia Press & News
Work is underway on a reconstruction plan for the Gaza Strip in coordination between Egypt and various Arab countries, and its details are supposed to be presented at the Arab Summit in Cairo, where the Arab countries moved to respond quickly to US President Donald Trump’s proposals regarding the displacement of Palestinians, by presenting a more logical and realistic alternative proposal.
Egypt announced in a statement by its Ministry of Foreign Affairs on February 12 that it, along with other Arab countries, is preparing a plan that includes the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip, as part of Arab efforts to present an alternative plan to the one presented by US President Donald Trump, which is to displace the residents of the Gaza Strip, considering it unviable. The Arab plan was mentioned for the first time in a statement by His Majesty King Abdullah II bin Al Hussein during his meeting with Trump at the White House on February 11, 2025. This plan will be the focus of discussion at the Arab summit scheduled to be held in Cairo on March 4, 2025, and is likely to achieve full Arab consensus. It was preceded by a mini-Arab meeting between the leaders of the Gulf states, Jordan and Egypt, held on February 21, 2025 in Riyadh, to discuss the Arab plan before presenting it at the Cairo summit.
In fact, the Arab countries are launching their plan based on precise political and security calculations and historical sensitivities since the first displacement of the Palestinian people in 1948, which is still an issue that has an impact on the countries hosting them at that time. However, reconstruction plans in conflict zones in general, and in the Gaza Strip in particular, face complex difficulties and challenges, especially when looking at previous reconstruction operations in the Strip since 2007, many of whose projects and programs are still suspended, taking into account the extent of the destruction in the Strip after the current war, in a way that doubles the challenges and complexities.
Arab Reconstruction Plan: General Frameworks
Work on the reconstruction plan has been underway since it was announced, in coordination between Egypt and various Arab countries, as its details are supposed to be presented at the Arab Summit in Cairo. Up until this moment, only general frameworks have been known about those details, which came in the context of statements by Arab officials, which referred to the governing frameworks for it, in the issues of post-war management, means of protecting borders, reconstruction operations, aid, the duration of the plan’s implementation and its stages, donor partners, and funding sources. These points can be detailed as follows:
First: Duration, stages of implementation and financing methods
The reconstruction process will take between 3 and 5 years, during which time Arab countries will work in cooperation with UN agencies and private companies to remove as much rubble and debris as possible, and benefit from it by reusing it to rehabilitate basic medical and educational services, vital facilities, and infrastructure such as water and electricity networks, in addition to establishing 20 temporary residential areas during the reconstruction period.
According to Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdel Aati, the reconstruction process is divided into three phases: the first is the early recovery phase, which lasts for six months, during which rubble removal and temporary housing will take place; the second is the main phase of reconstruction, during which the necessary financial resources will be raised to provide an estimated $20 billion to implement basic infrastructure projects; and the third includes a political track to pave the way for broader negotiations to achieve a two-state solution.
On the other hand, it is expected that financial contributions from the countries of the region for reconstruction will play a major role in financing, and it is expected, considering the reconstruction operations in general, that we will witness the establishment of a special fund for reconstruction in the Gaza Strip, as well as the holding of an international conference dedicated to providing the necessary funding by broad international parties, especially from the countries of the European Union, Islamic countries, and East Asian countries such as China and Japan.
Second: Implementation features and security protection frameworks
Successive statements about the plan indicate that Arab and international private companies will undertake the implementation of reconstruction projects for residential areas, infrastructure and vital facilities, in addition to an enhanced role by the Egyptian Engineers Syndicate, its Palestinian counterpart and the Gaza Contractors Union, who are working on studies on reconstruction mechanisms. Meanwhile, a committee affiliated with the Palestinian National Authority will be responsible for managing the reconstruction without any mention in the statements and open sources of the participation of Hamas or other armed factions in the Strip within this committee. It is likely that an Arab or international security force will secure the implementation projects and ensure the safety of the process. The plan also includes the establishment of a buffer zone and an actual physical barrier on the border between the Gaza Strip and Egypt to confront attempts to dig tunnels used by armed factions, according to what Reuters reported from Egyptian officials.
The Arab Option: Motives and Strategies
The Arab countries’ move to respond quickly to US President Donald Trump’s proposals came by presenting a more logical and realistic alternative proposal, which Egypt is working to crystallize from a set of agreed-upon frameworks into a detailed and clearly defined action plan. This move, which can be considered “urgent” and urgent, comes within the framework of confronting the risks involved in the US President’s continued speech calling for the displacement of the people of the Gaza Strip, and fears that Israel will exploit these calls and preemptively push them into an action plan that it may work to implement with US support.
Thus, the Arab countries responded by working to rebuild the Gaza Strip, instead of dealing later with the repercussions and risks associated with displacement at various levels, starting with the neighboring countries, specifically Jordan and Egypt, which are primarily targeted by Trump’s speech, and by current and historical Israeli plans, as each of them receiving new waves of Palestinian refugees means a danger that threatens their economies and social systems, in a way that may expand to destabilize the entire Middle East, at a time when the region is facing pressing and urgent issues and files, including the transformation in Syria after the fall of the Baath regime.
On the other hand, the Arab countries seem to be aware of the attempts of Israel and the United States to reshape the balance of power in the region, and to impose Israel as the new architect of the emerging regional order. Accepting displacement or being lax in deterring it would reinforce that assumption and place the Arab countries, especially the central ones, in the face of Israeli ambitions and plans that do not seem to stop at the borders of the Palestinian territories. They have expanded into areas of southern Lebanon, then into southern Syria, and are trying to impose a new reality on Arab geography, which would have repercussions on various Arab countries.
In addition, the American and Israeli displacement discourse comes at a time when Arab and European files intersect, as US President Donald Trump threatens to extend US authority over the Danish island of Greenland, and to annex Canada to the United States without taking into account the special status of the Canadian state as part of the Commonwealth countries, which threatens not only Canada, but also the United Kingdom. Europe’s laxity towards the displacement discourse in the Gaza Strip will reinforce the approach of the fait accompli and the imposition of authority by force, in a way that will have repercussions on European countries. It also comes at a time when Arab and European interests intersect in one of the most sensitive files for Arab countries, which is Saudi Arabia hosting Russian-American talks on the war in Ukraine, which makes Saudi Arabia the most reliable partner for Europe in this file.
Reconstruction: Challenges and Complexities
Arab efforts to rebuild the Gaza Strip face multiple and complex challenges and complications related to technical, logistical, security, political and economic aspects. These challenges become more complex in light of the extent of the destruction in the Strip as a result of the war, which affected various aspects of residential life, infrastructure and vital facilities, in a way that placed its residents in the midst of an unprecedented humanitarian crisis. The most important of these challenges are:
First: Technical and logistical challenges
The field situation in the Gaza Strip is the most prominent challenge facing the reconstruction process, as the level of destruction and rubble is unprecedented compared to previous wars witnessed by the Strip. According to a United Nations report issued on February 12, 2025, about 60% of the homes in the Strip are destroyed. This has repercussions and effects on the environment and people. UN reports indicate that the rubble spread in the Strip, estimated at about 50 million tons, contains hundreds of thousands of tons of asbestos, a group of mineral fibers that the World Health Organization classifies as a hazardous material that exposure to it may cause illness and death. The spread of this material not only threatens the people of the Gaza Strip, but also the construction teams that will work within the reconstruction process, in addition to the pollution of the beaches, soil and water as a result of the disruption of the sewage systems in the Strip, according to UNRWA’s assessment.
In addition to the challenge of unexploded ordnance, which was estimated by December 2024 at about (6-9) thousand unexploded pieces, according to the Washington Institute, and this estimate does not include artillery shells, rockets or mortar shells. These munitions are considered a threat to the lives of civilians in the Strip in the long term, and pose a challenge to reconstruction teams that hinders implementation, and require initial studies to assess their size, locations and quality. Also, detecting them among tons of rubble requires advanced scanning techniques and tools that operate from the air and on the ground. The Israeli army must assume its responsibility to disclose the data record of its air and ground strikes in the Gaza Strip, and the weapons used, to facilitate the work of the specialized teams.
On the other hand, the reconstruction operations face the obstacle of Hamas’s military infrastructure, especially the tunnel network, which the movement considers a strategic structure that must not be touched, and may play a negative role in facilitating the reconstruction operations by questioning the security motives of the field teams, projects or companies involved in the operation. This may also lead some groups in the Gaza Strip to view the workers negatively, which places them in the midst of security risks and a complex operational environment.
Second: Palestinian-Israeli political challenges
Gaza reconstruction plans face fundamental political challenges related to the relationship between the Palestinian factions in the Gaza Strip and the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank on the one hand, and the Palestinian-Israeli relationship on the other. Talk of reconstruction is preceded by issues of no less importance, including the post-war system of government in the Strip, as Israel rejects any role for the Palestinian Authority in governing and managing the Gaza Strip, and may oppose the Palestinian Authority’s intervention in reconstruction projects, which creates a gap between the plan’s requirements and the reality of the political situation on the ground, especially with the absence of a ready, qualified, and internationally agreed-upon Palestinian alternative. The Trump administration may also support Israel in this condition, unlike the Biden administration, which proposed that the Palestinian Authority take over after reforms are carried out, as evidenced by Trump’s decision on February 19 to stop funding the PA’s security services. This dilemma will be evident for Arab countries, as moving toward reconstruction without a major role for the Palestinian Authority will entrench the geographical separation between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and exacerbate the challenges facing the “two-state solution.” In general, this is related to more complex issues, in light of the need of the Palestinian territories and the Gaza Strip in particular for a legitimate authority that not only supervises reconstruction, but also manages various aspects of daily life, foremost among which is law enforcement and maintaining security. Without this, reconstruction projects will face a fragile and difficult security environment, and donor countries and organizations will hesitate for fear of exploiting these projects or making them hostage to a decision by armed Palestinian factions.
Third: Security and military challenges
The reconstruction process depends on the implementation of a comprehensive and sustainable cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of the Israeli army from various areas of the Strip. However, this condition faces a challenge that has begun to appear with the transition to negotiations for the second phase of the agreement, and the difficulties that faced the first phase of its implementation, as the Israeli discourse of resuming the war has escalated again, as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu confirmed on February 18 that the Israeli army will continue field military operations “as long as necessary.”
However, the resumption of war is not the only security challenge facing reconstruction. Arab and European countries have previously experienced different cycles of reconstruction operations in the Gaza Strip, and while this time is the largest and most in need of funding, different countries will look for how to achieve it in a more sustainable manner and to ensure that their reconstruction investments will not fail due to any expected future military or security escalation, especially given the repeated and close waves of escalation since the 2008 war until 2021, which amounted to four wars, and the reconstruction operations required an estimated $10 billion. The current war has destroyed the economic, vital and housing projects that were implemented during previous reconstruction projects. Therefore, ensuring that reconstruction is not sustainable is a vital factor in its implementation, financing and project identification.
However, in light of Israel’s failure to provide guarantees that the war will not resume or start a new war after years, and in light of the weapons spread in the hands of the Palestinian factions in the Gaza Strip, and the possibility of their use in a new confrontation with Israel, or within the Strip between the factions themselves, or in confronting any security and political force that may manage the Strip in the future (as happened in 2006), countries and donors will refrain from supporting the reconstruction process except for early recovery support.
Fourth: Post-recovery challenges
The Arab plan works on a limited scale of reconstruction, supporting the sector to remain viable and preventing displacement ideas and plans that take the field situation of the sector as a pretext. Thus, the funding allocated to the plan, estimated at about $20 billion, represents only a part of the total funding required to make the Gaza Strip a safe and healthy environment for its residents and support their livelihoods, estimated according to the United Nations at more than $53 billion.
In addition, the plan does not clarify basic matters that play a pivotal role in determining the future of the sector, such as urban planning before the war, which did not support the transformation of the Gaza Strip into a developed urban environment, as well as the structure of the economy, which was previously dependent on aid, and the possibilities of supporting reconstruction operations for an economic structure close to the market that transforms the plan from a short-term recovery to a long-term economic development.
On the other hand, the Gaza Strip remaining as it was before October 7 after the war and reconstruction will only achieve few results at the level of society, economy and governance, and will remain susceptible to supporting the factions’ control over power in the future. This in itself undermines the reconstruction process and prevents the sector from employing the available capabilities and potential in the sector, whether in sectors such as tourism or energy, or establishing advanced and strategic infrastructure such as ports and airports. To solve this dilemma, the reconstruction process must be accompanied by serious negotiations that guarantee the lifting of the siege and reaching a solution that guarantees the Palestinians’ fulfillment of their destiny. Such future strategic projects can be presented to the future administration in the form of grants or loans in order to integrate the Gazan economy into the global financial economy, as guarantees for the next administration to preserve the gains of reconstruction.
Finally , it is clear that the Arab countries are serious about agreeing on a plan to rebuild the Gaza Strip, the main goal of which is to achieve recovery for the people of the Strip, refute President Donald Trump’s pretexts for displacing his citizens, and thwart Israeli plans in this regard. However, it seems that this agreement on the plan is the easiest part of it in light of the security, political, economic, and procedural challenges that will face its implementation.
