Eurasia Press & News
In-depth: As the path to a new Syria evolves, the Druze find themselves navigating different pressures amid local and regional power struggles.
More than a week after a member of the interim government’s security forces was killed during clashes with Druze armed factions in Jaramana, tensions remain high.
The incident had escalated quickly, with armed Druze groups from across the Suweida province deploying in the city and government forces sent in as reinforcements.
Taking advantage of the situation, Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu instructed the army to “prepare to defend the Druze community in Jaramana,” employing a narrative characteristic of psychological warfare.
The response was swift. Protests broke out and many Druze representatives strongly rejected these statements, reaffirming their commitment to Syrian unity.
While the Jaramana crisis was eventually resolved diplomatically, recent fighting on the coast and reported civilian massacres highlight the fragility of post-Assad Syria.
If the security environment deteriorates further, the influence of pro-decentralisation Druze factions could increase.
A failed attempt at instrumentalisation
On 25 February in Suweida’s Dignity Square – where all anti-Assad protests have taken place since 2023 – demonstrators gathered once again. This time, they were protesting against both the Turkish and Israeli occupations, as well as accusations of Druze separatism.
Many Druze remain deeply committed to Syrian nationalism and the country’s unity. For these protesters, maintaining such unity requires engagement with Damascus and strengthening institutions within the transitional government.
Jibran Hamzeh, a member of the Youth Political Movement who participated in the 25 February National Dialogue Conference – aimed at shaping Syria’s future – stressed the need to consolidate the state before any political reform.
“We must first build a strong state and a solid central government. Once that step is taken, we can discuss the structure of the regime,” he told The New Arab.
The situation in Suweida remains highly complex, with nearly 160 armed groups operating in the region. Alongside Daraa – home to the Southern Operations Room – and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in the northeast, Suweida is among the last areas where local forces retain military autonomy.
However, unlike these other factions, Suweida’s militias maintain ties with Damascus. This connection was reaffirmed on 24 February when a delegation of Druze figures including major militia leaders Laith al-Balous and Sulaiman Abdelbaqi visited Ahmed al-Sharaa to reaffirm their commitment to strengthening ties.
After recent tensions in Jaramana, the situation was restored partly due to the intervention of leaders Balous and Abdelbaqi, in coordination with the interim government.
Instead of creating division, the event accelerated rapprochements. In response to Israeli pretensions to defend the Druze community, Walid Jumblatt, considered as leader of the Lebanese Druze community, called for an urgent general assembly of the religious council to condemn Israeli actions, and proposed a new meeting with Ahmed al-Sharaa.
On 6 March, several influential armed factions, including the Men of Dignity, the Dignity Guest House, and the Ahrar Jabal al-Arab Gathering, announced, in coordination with the Ministry of Interior, the reactivation of the General Security Forces in the Suweida region.
These forces aim to restore order, tackle crime, and curb drug trafficking but are managed by local leaders, marking a gradual reintegration of state institutions under regional control.
However, this initiative is far from unanimous. On the same day, protests erupted in Suweida to denounce the return of state authority, particularly the transitional government dominated by former HTS figures. Supporters of autonomy, and even separatism, took to the streets to assert their stance.
Druze Sheikhs with differing visions
Historically, the Druze community was led by tribal chiefs, among whom the al-Atrash family, known for its fight against French colonisation, remains the most prominent. However, since the onset of the Syrian civil war, political dynamics within the community have evolved.
The Sheikhs al-Aql (‘Leaders of Wisdom’) previously confined to the spiritual realm, have gained influence in temporal matters, with the population increasingly turning to them for guidance in both life and politics. This shift was notably exemplified by Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri, who supported the anti-Assad protests in Suweida as early as 2023.
In this context, significant divisions have emerged among Druze religious leaders regarding the community’s future and strategic positioning, each influencing their respective spheres.
While al-Hijri has called for greater decentralisation and federalism in some of his statements, the two other leading Sheikhs al-Aql from Suweida, Sheikh Hammoud al-Hinnawi and Sheikh Yousef al-Jarbou’, advocate for a centralised Syria and vehemently oppose secessionist rhetoric.
Sheikh Mowafaq Tarif, a Druze leader in Israel with close ties to Tel Aviv, has raised significant concerns. As reported in January, Tarif had organised a series of meetings with prominent figures, ranging from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to Washington, to promote a pro-Israeli vision for the Druze community in the region.
According to the Al-Jumhuriya newspaper, Sheikh al-Hijri may be also seeking to become more actively involved in this regional game.
Khaldun al-Hijri, a close associate of Sheikh al-Hijri, allegedly met with political representatives in Washington to discuss an armed revolt in cooperation with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and certain Alawite groups from the Syrian coast. This plan, however, did not receive approval from the United States, the newspaper reported.
These developments come at a time when Israel is concerned about the growing influence of Turkey in Syria. Recently, Tel Aviv outlined a series of measures in Washington to prevent this, including lobbying to keep the country weak and decentralised and voicing support for Russia’s military presence.
In this context, Israel could be prompted to fuel ethnic and sectarian tensions in the region, using the Druze minority as a border guard to further its political agenda. This strategy is particularly relevant to the highly publicised and strategic “David Corridor” leading to northeastern Syria, bringing Israel one step closer to the vision of Greater Israel.
Different pathways under intense pressure
Several Druze factions advocating for federalism, bordering on secessionism, have emerged on the ground. The main points of contention between these groups and those favouring ties with the central government are the military’s structure and the concentration of key positions in the hands of former HTS members, as well as their Salafi-jihadi past.
Among these factions, the Suweida Military Council (SMC) plays a central role as the leading pro-decentralisation group. The leader, Tariq al-Shoufi, a former officer of the Syrian regime who defected in 2015, told The New Arab: “HTS did not trust local skills and expertise […] that’s why I reactivated my fighters.”
The same criticism is shared by Najib Abu Fakhr, head of the political office of the Military Council of Southern Syria. “The appointment of foreign mujahideen to sovereign positions, and ultimately the monopolisation of national decisions, especially sovereign ones, was shocking, though expected,” he told TNA.
Controversy arose when some fighters among the SMC expressed pro-Israeli views. Despite this, new local armed groups continue to join the council. Numerous rallying videos, mostly featuring village-based militias, attest to this growing support.
Abu Fakhr told TNA that these two councils should merge into one and form an alliance with the military councils of the Syrian coast and the northeast, creating a unified structure advocating for a “federal” and “decentralised Syria”.
There are also other groups like Hezb al-Liwa, close to Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri. Led by Malik Abu al-Khair, a journalist currently living in France, the party seeks peace with Israel. Regarding relations with Israel, Najib Abu Fakhr states: “In the event of a confrontation with jihadists, we do not rule out an alliance with any regional power to achieve victory.”
The struggle for Druze autonomy and the accusations of ties with Israel are also reflected in a war of propaganda and misinformation that is fuelling community tensions in Suweida, especially between Bedouin tribes and Druze, amid growing insecurity and lingering memories of past conflicts.
Psychological operations are also at play, such as the raising of an Israeli flag, pro-Israeli leaflets scattered on the ground, and messages encouraging Druze to work in Israel. At the same time, efforts to sow chaos within the Druze community itself are underway, exemplified by the attempted assassination of Suleiman Abdelbaqi, a major leader close to the government, on 8 March.
In the face of this increasingly tense situation, the violence that has affected the Alawite civilian population along the coast in recent days may lead to an increase in support for those advocating for autonomy, or even secession, attracting more sympathisers and armed militants than there were even just a week ago.
