Eurasia Press & News
The United States is going to abolish the post of NATO commander in Europe. Experts interpret this decision as Washington’s first step toward leaving the alliance. Potentially, this leaves European NATO countries defenseless against a nuclear threat from Russia. Europe has several ways to ensure its own nuclear security: expanding France’s deterrence system to the entire continent, jointly using nuclear weapons, or developing its own nuclear weapons. However, there are no quick fixes in this area that could immediately compensate for the loss of American involvement. Each of the possible options leads to its own set of technical, political, and military problems, says Fabian Hoffmann, a researcher in defense policy at the University of Oslo in Norway.
It is not yet clear whether Donald Trump is serious about pulling the United States out of NATO. But his administration’s stance on EU security does not inspire much confidence in the United States’ willingness to honor its commitments to the alliance if NATO’s European members are attacked.
If Washington does withdraw – formally or informally (for example, by declaring that it will not intervene in European wars no matter the circumstances) – it will have significant implications for Europe’s security posture, including at the level of nuclear deterrence.
The United States has the largest, most diverse and most powerful nuclear arsenal in NATO. Since the beginning of the Cold War, it has used these weapons not only to deter possible attacks on its territory, but also to ensure the defense of Europe and the alliance’s non-nuclear countries.
Without the United States, this broad structure collapses, creating serious gaps in deterrence. Russia, aware of its nuclear superiority in Europe at both the strategic and non-strategic levels, may see this as an opportunity to increase pressure on NATO or even take offensive action.
To prevent such a scenario, NATO must rely on its nuclear arsenal to find ways to offset the consequences of a possible US withdrawal. There are three potential solutions to this problem: expanding the French “nuclear umbrella,” sharing weapons, and new countries developing their own nuclear weapons.
The French “nuclear umbrella”
Emmanuel Macron has proposed extending France’s “nuclear umbrella” to EU member states, citing the need to protect “vital European interests.” In essence, he is proposing to fill the gap in deterrence that would potentially result from a US withdrawal with France’s arsenal, without significantly changing its characteristics and functions.
The main problem with this proposal is that, unlike the American nuclear deterrent, France’s weapons are not designed for such a role.
Compared with the U.S. nuclear force, the French arsenal is considerably smaller and far less diverse. The United States has more than 1,500 deployed nuclear warheads across a wide range of delivery systems, while France has only about 290 warheads, most of which are carried on submarine-launched M51.2 intercontinental ballistic missiles, with the remainder on ASMPA-R air-launched cruise missiles.
In addition, the U.S. deterrent force includes both high-yield warheads and low-yield tactical warheads on a variety of air- and sea-based platforms, allowing for flexible responses to aggression at the strategic and non-strategic levels.
France’s nuclear doctrine does not recognize non-strategic options, treating any use of nuclear weapons as strategic. The exact capacity of the French arsenal remains classified, but it is believed to consist exclusively of high-yield warheads.
France’s nuclear doctrine views any use of nuclear weapons as strategic
A relatively small arsenal focused on second-strike assurance rather than so-called “escalation dominance”—the ability to out-maneuver an adversary at every stage of a nuclear conflict—is well suited to the defense of a single country. But it has obvious limitations in the context of extended deterrence.
While the United States can offer its allies the ability to fight and potentially win at any level of escalation, France can only provide its own response. To some extent, this may be a credible security guarantee for Germany, Belgium, and other neighboring countries, since an existential threat to their security is likely to be an existential threat to France as well. Thus, the use of strategic nuclear weapons on their behalf would at least be justified.
While the US can offer its allies the ability to fight and potentially win at any level of escalation, France can only provide its own response.
But this logic breaks down when applied to more distant allies, such as the Baltics, Poland or Romania. Would the French president risk nuclear retaliation against his country if Estonia were attacked? Tallinn would likely question the reliability of such a security guarantee – and not without reason.
Joint use of nuclear weapons
To enhance the credibility of extended deterrence, European nuclear-armed countries – primarily France, but potentially also the UK – could deploy some of their arsenals to allied states.
This approach is similar to the U.S. nuclear sharing agreement of 1957. Under this system, NATO member countries (West Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, and Turkey) hosted U.S. nuclear warheads, but the final decision on launching them rested with the United States. However, countries hosting U.S. weapons were consulted through NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group, established in 1966.
A similar structure could be created in Europe after the US leaves. For example, France could transfer some of its ASMPA-R missiles to NATO allies, either along with French Rafale fighters or by installing them on allied aircraft, such as the Eurofighter.
Deploying such forces would be particularly effective in one or more frontline states. For example, deploying French nuclear weapons in the Baltic region could provide the ability to fire a “warning shot”—a signal to an adversary that further aggression would provoke a large-scale nuclear response. Such a deployment could also allow for the limited use of nuclear weapons to push back enemy forces if conventional defenses fail.
This arrangement faces two major challenges – one political, one military-technical. Command and control of forward-deployed nuclear weapons is likely to be a contentious issue among alliance members. Host countries may demand a say in how and when to use the weapons, especially if they shoulder all or part of the costs of deploying them. But London and Paris are unlikely to agree to a shared mandate to use their arsenals. Moreover, even if a compromise is reached, its durability is questionable, as it could be subsequently overturned by new leaderships in the countries involved. This includes France’s proposal to expand the “nuclear umbrella.”
It is also unclear whether the alliance will be able to reach a consensus on deploying such weapons to frontline states, as this could fundamentally change the dynamics of relations with Russia. However, if a multilateral agreement proves unsustainable, the weapons could still be deployed through bilateral arrangements.
From a military-technical point of view, it is unclear whether France and the UK have the necessary stockpiles of warheads to simultaneously maintain a secure “retaliatory strike” capability and deploy sufficient additional weapons to protect allies. Expanding the stockpiles of warheads is possible, but would require significant time and financial investment. The same applies to the development of new types of warheads, such as new low-yield nuclear weapons for the ASMPA-R.
It is unclear whether France and Britain have the necessary stockpiles of warheads to simultaneously defend themselves and their allies.
Moreover, the UK currently relies solely on submarine-launched intercontinental ballistic missiles, which are unsuitable for forward deployment. To contribute to a possible new deterrent, the UK would have to develop alternative delivery systems that could be deployed on allied soil, such as air-launched cruise missiles.
Development of nuclear weapons by new countries
If neither the nuclear umbrella option nor the agreement on the joint use of such weapons suits the European non-nuclear states, and the need to strengthen the deterrence system on the continent is confirmed, then the only option left will be for these states to develop their own nuclear weapons. However, such a solution will be associated with significant technical difficulties and may entail serious political and military consequences.
The technology for developing nuclear weapons is well understood, including in Europe. However, the necessary infrastructure, in particular for the production of highly enriched uranium or weapons-grade plutonium, is not necessarily available in non-nuclear European states.
States such as Norway, Poland, and Germany currently have no nuclear infrastructure or have dismantled what they had. Others, such as Sweden and Finland, maintain civilian nuclear programs, but they are deliberately designed to prevent them from being easily converted to military purposes. While it is possible to turn these programs into weapons, it will take time and may be technically difficult because certain capabilities, such as the production of weapons-grade plutonium, are not currently available and must be developed from scratch.
States such as Norway, Poland and Germany currently have no nuclear infrastructure or have dismantled what they previously had.
It is important to note that concealing the launch of a nuclear weapons program would be extremely difficult, if not impossible. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) constantly monitors the use of civilian nuclear infrastructure around the world, including in Europe, to prevent covert weapons development.
As a result, any attempt to produce new nuclear weapons would likely be detected, which could lead to powerful economic and political pressure in the form of sanctions. Moreover, Russia would likely perceive such moves as a direct threat and might take preventive military measures, such as launching missile strikes against the nuclear infrastructure of a state seeking to produce weapons before it has time to build up a powerful arsenal. This means that the short-term security threats to such countries are likely to be serious, even if acquiring nuclear weapons ultimately serves as a long-term guarantor of sovereignty and independence.
Any attempt to produce new nuclear weapons would likely be detected, which could lead to powerful economic and political pressure.
Finally, there are also likely to be global negative consequences. The development of nuclear weapons by one or more European states would almost certainly trigger the collapse of the global non-proliferation regime. It could lead to further expansion of nuclear weapons development in regions such as Asia and the Middle East, with implications for European security as well.
