Eurasia Press & News
On February 27, Abdullah Öcalan, founding member of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), called for the PKK to disarm and dissolve. This announcement, supported by various Kurdish leaders in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), has instilled a sense of hope for peace amid a long-standing conflict that has claimed countless lives and caused enduring regional instability. Yet, while the streets of Sulaymaniyah, Qamishlo, Diyarbakir, and Van have erupted in celebration, the path forward is fraught with obstacles that could derail this new opportunity.
Öcalan’s call to disband the PKK came after two months of negotiations involving key players from Turkey, northeast Syria (NES), and the KRI. This has marked a watershed moment, signaling a willingness for dialogue not only within Kurdish ranks but also with Ankara. The political elite in the KRI has rallied behind Öcalan’s message, with prominent figures like Masoud Barzani, President of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), expressing optimism that this could catalyze a genuine peace process.
Among the immediate challenges is the Turkish government’s ongoing military operations against the PKK in the KRI and NES. While the PKK has declared a unilateral ceasefire, the situation remains precarious. The PKK insists that meaningful progress hinges on a face-to-face meeting with Öcalan, jeopardizing the ceasefire framework. This ambiguity reflects historical precedents of failed ceasefires that have left both the PKK, recognized by Turkey and some other countries as a terrorist organization, and Turkish forces skeptical of one another’s intentions. What will happen to Turkey’s expanded network of military bases?
Moreover, as political leaders in the KRI express their hope for a unified Kurdish front and the end of hostilities, the fate of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) remains a critical factor, despite the new developments. On March 10, Mazloum Abdi and Interim President Ahmed Al Sharaa signed an agreement stipulating the integration of civil and military institutions in Northeast Syria within the institutions of the Syrian state, to be implemented by the end of 2025. The deal recognizes Kurds, who make up about 10 percent of the population, as an indigenous community of the Syrian state and guarantees them political and constitutional rights. The deal gives away around 30 percent of Kurdish-controlled areas at the borders with Iraq and Turkey under the control of the central government. The deal has given the power to the central government to gain its territorial control, political influence, and financial recovery, while granting Damascus access to the oil and gas revenues in NES.
While the agreement was welcomed by some of the international community and Syrians, still some Kurds, Assyrians, and Druze of Syria unwelcomed the development, fearing for their rights to be dismissed, the Kurdish disunity contradicts the ongoing meetings in Erbil to encourage a one-voice approach to dealing with the central government. The question now is to what extent this deal will help with stopping Turkish attacks in NES and foster the ceasefire deal between the PKK and Turkey regionally. Despite Öcalan’s plea, SDF commanders clearly distinguish their operations from those of the PKK, indicating that disarmament for them is contingent upon Turkey’s cessation of attacks against Kurdish positions in Syria. The intricate relationship between the PKK and SDF adds another layer of complexity to peace negotiations, particularly as the Turkish government often lumps both groups together in its security rhetoric.
The PKK’s future will depend on the results of key questions about disarmament logistics. How will fighters safely lay down their arms despite enduring volatility, particularly in places like the Qandil Mountains – PKK’s headquarters in the KRI? More crucially, what legal protections will be established to ensure that PKK fighters are not pursued or punished after they disarm? While the KRG expresses its desire for a peaceful transition, the absence of a comprehensive legal framework could serve as a formidable barrier to successfully executing peace agreements.
Simultaneously, the ongoing conflict in Sinjar presents further complications. The 2020 Sinjar Agreement aimed to restore stability and allow for the return of displaced residents, yet the presence of PKK fighters has triggered repeated military strikes by Turkey, complicating the implementation of this agreement. The assumption that a reduction in hostilities could allow for the PKK withdrawal from Sinjar to their bases in the Qandil Mountains illustrates the interconnectedness of local conflicts and broader peace processes—a delicate dance undermined by mistrust and geopolitical rivalries.
In conclusion, Abdullah Öcalan’s call for disarmament heralds an encouraging shift toward peace among Kurdish factions. Yet, the complexities of reintegrating PKK fighters, navigating the nuanced dynamics of the Syrian conflict, and addressing Turkish military activity pose significant hurdles. A successful transition to peace hinges on ongoing dialogue, the establishment of protective legal frameworks, and cooperative agreements that resonate with all parties, particularly Turkey, Iraq’s federal government, the KRG, and Syrian Kurdish groups. As the KRI rallies around a vision of stability, the success of this appeal will ultimately depend on the commitment of all involved to transcend historical grievances and forge a shared path towards peace.
Moreover, as political leaders in the KRI express their hope for a unified Kurdish front and the end of hostilities, the fate of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) remains a critical factor, despite the new developments. On March 10, Mazloum Abdi and Interim President Ahmed Al Sharaa signed an agreement stipulating the integration of civil and military institutions in Northeast Syria within the institutions of the Syrian state, to be implemented by the end of 2025. The deal recognizes Kurds, who make up about 10 percent of the population, as an indigenous community of the Syrian state and guarantees them political and constitutional rights. The deal gives away around 30 percent of Kurdish-controlled areas at the borders with Iraq and Turkey under the control of the central government. The deal has given the power to the central government to gain its territorial control, political influence, and financial recovery, while granting Damascus access to the oil and gas revenues in NES.
While the agreement was welcomed by some of the international community and Syrians, still some Kurds, Assyrians, and Druze of Syria unwelcomed the development, fearing for their rights to be dismissed, the Kurdish disunity contradicts the ongoing meetings in Erbil to encourage a one-voice approach to dealing with the central government. The question now is to what extent this deal will help with stopping Turkish attacks in NES and foster the ceasefire deal between the PKK and Turkey regionally. Despite Öcalan’s plea, SDF commanders clearly distinguish their operations from those of the PKK, indicating that disarmament for them is contingent upon Turkey’s cessation of attacks against Kurdish positions in Syria. The intricate relationship between the PKK and SDF adds another layer of complexity to peace negotiations, particularly as the Turkish government often lumps both groups together in its security rhetoric.
The PKK’s future will depend on the results of key questions about disarmament logistics. How will fighters safely lay down their arms despite enduring volatility, particularly in places like the Qandil Mountains – PKK’s headquarters in the KRI? More crucially, what legal protections will be established to ensure that PKK fighters are not pursued or punished after they disarm? While the KRG expresses its desire for a peaceful transition, the absence of a comprehensive legal framework could serve as a formidable barrier to successfully executing peace agreements.
Simultaneously, the ongoing conflict in Sinjar presents further complications. The 2020 Sinjar Agreement aimed to restore stability and allow for the return of displaced residents, yet the presence of PKK fighters has triggered repeated military strikes by Turkey, complicating the implementation of this agreement. The assumption that a reduction in hostilities could allow for the PKK withdrawal from Sinjar to their bases in the Qandil Mountains illustrates the interconnectedness of local conflicts and broader peace processes—a delicate dance undermined by mistrust and geopolitical rivalries.
In conclusion, Abdullah Öcalan’s call for disarmament heralds an encouraging shift toward peace among Kurdish factions. Yet, the complexities of reintegrating PKK fighters, navigating the nuanced dynamics of the Syrian conflict, and addressing Turkish military activity pose significant hurdles. A successful transition to peace hinges on ongoing dialogue, the establishment of protective legal frameworks, and cooperative agreements that resonate with all parties, particularly Turkey, Iraq’s federal government, the KRG, and Syrian Kurdish groups. As the KRI rallies around a vision of stability, the success of this appeal will ultimately depend on the commitment of all involved to transcend historical grievances and forge a shared path towards peace.
