Eurasia Press & News
On the morning of Wednesday, March 19, Istanbul police arrested Ekrem İmamoğlu, the city’s mayor and a member of the opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP).
According to the prosecutor’s statement, İmamoğlu and 106 others were charged with leading and participating in a criminal organization, extortion, bribery, aggravated fraud, unlawful acquisition of personal data, tender manipulation, and aiding a terrorist organization. The arrest sparked widespread and ongoing demonstrations in many Turkish cities, particularly in Istanbul, with protesters describing the move as a politically motivated decision in favor of President Erdoğan.
Notably, just one day earlier, on March 18, İmamoğlu’s bachelor’s degree was revoked by Istanbul University following allegations of a fraudulent transfer from a university in Cyprus decades ago—a development with significant political implications, as a college degree is required to qualify for the presidential race. Shortly before these events, the CHP had announced İmamoğlu as its presidential candidate for the 2028 elections, with the official announcement scheduled for March 23.
There is near-unanimity among observers and political insiders—with the exception of Erdoğan’s supporters—that the court’s decision against İmamoğlu is purely political. Even Abdullah Gül, former Turkish president and a founding member of Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP), who left the party following a dispute with Erdoğan, questioned the legality of the move and hinted that it was unfair to İmamoğlu. Former Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu and former Economy Minister Ali Babacan—once two of Erdoğan’s closest allies within the AKP before parting ways with him—also condemned the actions against İmamoğlu, describing them as a threat to the rule of law and democracy in the country. Even Alparslan Kuytul, the leader of the Salafist Islamic movement in Turkey, condemned the decision. This raises an important question: what are the real political motivations behind this event?
The timing of the event is significant because it helps explain some of the reasons behind what happened in Turkey. On March 16, President Erdoğan had a phone call with President Donald Trump. Although the content of the conversation was not disclosed to the media, a source close to the Turkish presidency described it as important and constructive, with several key issues reportedly agreed upon. This call was described by Steve Witkoff, the president’s foreign envoy, during a March 21 interview with Tucker Carlson: “The Erdoğan–Trump conversation has been underreported; the call was transformational, and a lot of good will come out of it in the near future—everyone will see it.” According to informed Turkish sources, Trump expressed strong support for Erdoğan’s policies during the call.
Peace talks between the Turkish government and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) have also recently begun, with the PKK declaring a ceasefire in early March. Additionally, ongoing geopolitical changes in the region—such as the recent fall of Bashar al-Assad and the rise of Turkey’s influence—are seen as significant achievements for President Erdoğan. Moreover, Turkey’s growing strategic importance to Europe, especially in light of Trump’s stance on the Russian-Ukrainian war, has raised the possibility that Europe may seek closer ties with Turkey to counterbalance Russia.
Furthermore, there appears to be significant deep state support in Turkey for Erdoğan’s current policies. The Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), led by Devlet Bahçeli—a prominent figure often associated with the deep state—has been a key ally of Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) since 2017. The MHP has consistently backed Erdoğan’s policies, including the controversial decision to arrest İmamoğlu.
This coincides with the CHP’s announcement of İmamoğlu’s candidacy for the 2028 presidential elections—an event Erdoğan views as pivotal both for Turkey’s future and for his own political legacy. As a result, strong external backing, internal support from the deep state, and the aforementioned circumstances have likely led Erdoğan to believe that the time has come to sideline his strongest rival—someone widely expected to defeat him in the upcoming elections and potentially bring an end to the Erdoğan era in Turkey.
There are also direct reasons related to İmamoğlu himself and his party, the CHP. For years, the electoral support for Erdoğan’s AKP has been in decline, while support for the CHP—of which İmamoğlu is the most prominent and popular figure—has been steadily increasing. For instance, in the 2019 local elections, İmamoğlu and the CHP won control of Istanbul. This was a major shock to Erdoğan and his party, as Erdoğan has often said that “whoever wins Istanbul, wins Turkey.” In response, the AKP challenged the results and called for a rerun of the election. However, in the rerun, İmamoğlu and the CHP won again—effectively defeating Erdoğan’s party twice in the same year in Istanbul.
In the 2023 presidential elections, although Erdoğan secured victory, his share of the vote declined, while the CHP gained ground. The party had not nominated İmamoğlu as its presidential candidate, but had it done so, many believe his victory would have been likely. In the 2024 local elections, the CHP achieved a nationwide win, with İmamoğlu being re-elected as mayor of Istanbul. This marked the first loss for Erdoğan’s party since 2002 and represented the CHP’s strongest performance since 1997.
This outcome, combined with the announcement of İmamoğlu’s candidacy for the 2028 presidential elections—and particularly in light of polling data indicating that İmamoğlu would likely defeat Erdoğan—has led Erdoğan to conclude that retaining power through democratic means may no longer be feasible. Even if he were to call early elections or amend the constitution to allow himself to run again (as he is currently ineligible under existing rules), overcoming İmamoğlu’s popularity would still be a significant challenge. As a result, Erdoğan appears to have turned to judicial means to eliminate his strongest political rival, leveraging the courts—which are widely viewed as being under his influence—to remove İmamoğlu from the political scene once and for all.
It is worth noting that Erdoğan has repeatedly sought to sideline İmamoğlu through legal accusations and court proceedings since 2015. However, İmamoğlu had successfully navigated and resisted these efforts—until March 18 and 19, when his bachelor’s degree was withdrawn and he was subsequently arrested.
The ideological conflict is a significant factor in Turkey’s current political landscape. The CHP is a Kemalist party founded by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and represents the Kemalist ideology, which remains the official state ideology according to the Turkish constitution. In contrast, the AKP has an Islamist orientation. Since coming to power in 2002, the AKP has fueled an intensifying ideological rivalry between secular Kemalism and Erdoğan’s brand of political Islam. As Erdoğan’s Islamist orientation gained influence over the years, the prominence of secular Kemalism declined. This ideological divide deepened further after Erdoğan began consolidating his control over the AKP from 2010 onward, sidelining internal rivals and bringing the party fully under his leadership. However, in recent years, Kemalist influence has experienced a resurgence, while Erdoğan’s Islamist influence has shown signs of decline—particularly amid the country’s worsening economic crises. In this context, it became increasingly difficult for Erdoğan to counter the rise of Kemalism and recover his political support through democratic means or economic success. As a result, he is widely seen as having turned to the judiciary—over which he holds substantial influence—to suppress the Kemalist resurgence by targeting and removing its most powerful political representative, Ekrem İmamoğlu, from the political stage.
The outcome of this struggle will determine the future of Turkey—whether it fully embraces Erdoğanism or returns to Kemalism.
Possible Scenarios
No one can accurately predict the future of the current situation in Turkey or the widespread protests unfolding across the country. While a range of outcomes is possible, the situation can broadly be summarized into two general scenarios:
- Erdoğan’s Success
According to many observers, this is the more likely scenario. It involves the suppression of protests and the effective removal of Ekrem İmamoğlu from the political arena—either through imprisonment or by rendering him politically inactive. This outcome hinges on several key factors: Erdoğan’s firm control over the military, judiciary, and key state institutions; continued support from the influential deep state; and backing from international actors, particularly the United States. Under this scenario, demonstrations could be swiftly contained or fully suppressed. Erdoğan’s supporters might also mobilize, potentially leading to clashes with opposition groups. Should the unrest escalate, the military could intervene to restore order—likely in Erdoğan’s favor. This would pave the way for him to either call early elections or amend the constitution to remain in power, particularly if the peace process with the Kurds advances successfully.
- Erdoğan’s Failure
Though considered less probable, this scenario envisions the protests escalating and spreading nationwide, resulting in mass demonstrations across major cities that overwhelm the government’s capacity to respond. This could either lead to the fall of the government or force Erdoğan to release İmamoğlu and allow his return to politics. Such a move would likely reinvigorate İmamoğlu’s popularity and significantly enhance his chances in the 2028 presidential election. However, from Erdoğan’s perspective, releasing and politically rehabilitating İmamoğlu would constitute a serious political defeat—potentially amounting to political suicide.
