Eurasia Press & News
Bosnia and Serbia are back in the news. Bosnia’s dysfunctional political system that was forced upon it through the 1995 Dayton Accords, which bifurcated the country into Serb- and jointly Croat- & Muslim-run halves with a rotating presidency between all three under international supervision, is finally breaking down. Meanwhile in Serbia, anti-corruption protests with regime change intentions have been taking place for months, with last weekend’s being the largest by far.
Beginning with Bosnia, the latest tensions were sparked by the central authorities issuing arrest warrants for President of Republika Srprska (RS) Milorad Dodik, his Prime Minister, and Parliamentary Speaker on the grounds that they defied the will of “High Representative” Christian Schmidt. In brief, as Dodik concisely explained in his interview with The American Conservative that’s worth reading in full, Schmidt was scandalously installed by the Biden Administration in 2021 without UNSC confirmation.
Neither Dodik nor Russia therefore recognizes Schmidt’s authority, ergo why the first has refused to abide by his demands that would essentially amount to neutralizing RS’ autonomy in pursuit of a unitary state to the Muslims’ political advantage and the second has supported him every step of the way. The aforesaid goal that Schmidt is working towards would remove RS’ veto over Bosnia’s NATO membership, thus revealing what’s really behind this lawfare-driven coup plot to replace that polity’s leadership.
Given Trump’s efforts to purge his country’s permanent military, intelligence, and diplomatic bureaucracies (“deep state”) of subversive liberal-globalists and how different his worldview is from Biden’s, one would think that his administration opposes this plot, but they’d be wrong. Secretary of State Marco Rubio accused Dodik of “undermining Bosnia and Herzegovina’s institutions and threatening its security and stability”. He also said that he doesn’t want to see Bosnia breaking apart either.
In parallel, US Chargé d’affaíres to the UN Dorothy Shea expressed support for EUFOR (European Union Force Bosnia and Herzegovina) amidst what she described as “persistent threats to Bosnia and Herzegovina’s territorial integrity”, which hints at greenlighting the possible kidnapping (“arrest”) of RS’ leadership. Dodik reacted to Rubio’s position in his earlier cited interview by denying the allegations and “inviting him to engage in dialogue” in order to learn the Serb perspective on everything in Bosnia.
As an incentive to initiative this dialogue, Dodik declared in his interview that he’d be interested in giving American companies exclusive mining rights to his polity’s $100 billion worth of rare earth minerals, which might attract Trump’s attention. Another important point was him sharing his view that the US’ policy towards Bosnia is still influenced by the same “deep state” elements, in this case the embassy’s 90% local Muslim staff, that have always tried to undermine Trump instead of blaming his administration.
Although not touched upon in Dodik’s interview, it can’t be ruled out that the British have a hand in the latest Bosnian tensions after what Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) reported last week about how they’re actively trying to undermine Trump’s policy of repairing relations with Russia. A few days later, Putin’s senior aide Nikolai Patrushev accused the Brits of aggravating the situation in the Baltic, so it wouldn’t be far-fetched to suspect them of doing the same in the Balkans via Bosnia.
In that scenario, they might be leveraging their liberal-globalist “agents of influence” in the EU, NATO, and the US’ “deep state” to provoke another conflict in Bosnia for the purpose of flexing the West’s strength amidst their impending defeat in Ukraine. Even if Trump doesn’t let his country get directly involved in the hostilities that might follow, a “coalition of the willing” could be assembled in Europe under British leadership to demonstrate that they can “defend” the continent without US support.
In connection with that, the goal might even be as trivial as wanting to present Bosnia as a so-called “consolation prize” for Europe (including the UK in this context) and/or NATO after the West’s impending defeat in Ukraine, yet it could also backfire if there’s a prolonged conflict, lots of refugees, etc. For that reason, Trump would do well to take Dodik up on his rare earth mineral proposal, initiate talks between the US and RS without delay, and make clear that he disapproves of further meddling for now at least.
Best-case scenarios aren’t always the most likely ones, however, and it might also be that the US’ calculations towards Bosnia are connected in some way to what’s happening in Serbia. This segues the analysis into its second half focusing on that country’s latest tensions in light of what some have claimed to be the country’s largest-ever protests that just took place last weekend. The pretext was a deadly accident at the Novi Sad railway station last November that some people attributed to state corruption.
They predictably “demanded accountability”, which could in practice set into motion a rolling regime change inside the country, and then took to the street to pressure the authorities into complying. Prior to last November’s incident, similar large-scale protests were organized after a school shooting, thus showing that the organizers and some members of the public have long had such intentions. That said, they’re a disparate bunch, imperfectly divided into liberal-globalists and genuine patriots.
Some of the first openly collude with the West while none of the latter organize their protest activities with foreign entities. The liberal-globalists believe that President Aleksandar Vucic is too pro-Russian since he won’t sanction Russia, while the patriots believe that he’s too pro-Western since Serbia voted against Russia at the UN under his leadership, went along with Western moves to de facto acknowledge Kosovo’s separation from Serbia, and was accused of arming Ukraine, which Vucic denied.
For his part, Vucic always depicts all protests against him (regardless of size and intent) as part of a Western-backed Color Revolution that aims to topple him for allegedly putting Serbia’s national interests first, with allied media even reporting last August that the West was plotting to assassinate him. He himself had also claimed on several occasions that his foreign opponents want him dead. Russia has publicly lent credence to his claims and even reportedly informed him about a coup plot last August.
A few facts complicate the abovementioned narrative. First, Vucic agreed to an “Individual Partnership Action Plan” with NATO in 2015, which “represents the highest form of cooperation with NATO through the Partnership for Peace, without implying any aspirations for membership in the Alliance”, according to Serbia’s Mission to NATO in Brussels. In practical terms, this allows NATO to transit through Serbia, thus improving the bloc’s Balkan logistics. Vucic also suggested resuming joint exercises in late 2023.
Second, Vucic announced a surprise $3 billion French warplane deal in late August at the height of the last supposed Color Revolution plot, which challenged his claims that the West sought to depose him since he wouldn’t have otherwise rationally been in talks with France about this if he truly believed it. Moreover, Serbia’s Chief of General Staff confirmed at the start of the year that some Russian arms deals were terminated or postponed due to the sanctions, which shows compliance with Western pressure.
And finally, Trump’s Envoy for Special Missions Ric Grenell (who served as Envoy for Serbia and Kosovo Peace Negotiations during his first term) has been very critical of Kosovo while Trump Jr. just interviewed Vucic in Belgrade for his podcast, both of which show that this administration at least isn’t too hostile. To be sure, it certainly isn’t too friendly either, but it also doesn’t appear to be anywhere near as obsessed with seeking Vucic’s ouster like the Biden Administration allegedly was according to how he portrayed it.
Putting everything together, three scenarios appear to be the most likely for explaining the latest tensions in Serbia, and they’re not mutually exclusive since it’s probable that there’s some interplay: 1) the large-scale protests are largely indigenous but are being guided to a degree by the West; 2) the British and their American “deep state” allies have a hand in this unrest; and/or 3) Trump 2.0 wants to pressure Vucic within certain limits in order to obtain some more concessions (ex: recognize Kosovo).
It’s on this note that the analysis will circle back to the beginning by explaining how the tensions in neighboring Bosnia might be connected to those in Serbia. Unlike in Serbia, what’s happening in Bosnia doesn’t have a semi-plausible legitimate basis since it’s entirely an attempted sub-state coup against RS by foreign-backed forces, all with the intent of railroading that country into NATO. The Trump Administration’s explicit support for these efforts, thus far at least, is also extremely concerning.
Unless Trump is informed about Dodik’s rare earth mineral proposal and takes him up on it without delay, during which time he’d also have to order Rubio to halt US pressure on RS, then the situation might continue deteriorating at the risk of another regional war. It could also be that Trump is convinced or has been misled to believe that the US can get an even better deal on RS’ rare earth minerals following the erasure of its autonomy, but that’s just speculation for the sake of argument.
As it presently stands, the Trump Administration officially considers Dodik to be a threat to Bosnia’s security, stability, and territorial integrity and has also expressed support for EUFOR, all of which are very strong statements which imply that it wants him out of the picture one way or another. It’ll be very difficult for the US to walk back these policies even if they were predicated on misguided assessments and/or influenced by (possibly British-backed) “deep state” elements who want to undermine Trump.
By contrast, judging by Grenell’s recent criticism of Kosovo and Trump Jr’s in-person interview with Vucic, it appears as though the administration is more open to compromising with the Serbian leader. If so, then this could take the form of relieving pressure upon him in exchange for some unknown concessions, which he could be incentivized to do by promises of the US guaranteeing Serb autonomy in Northern Kosovo or allowing Belgrade to formally reassert its legitimate writ over that part of this polity.
The best-case scenario for regional Serbs of the US agreeing to let RS merge with Serbia is very unlikely, however, since the US remains dedicated to preserving Bosnia’s dysfunctional system. No interest exists in reforming the country or peacefully dissolving it like Dodik proposed. This policy contradicts Trump 2.0’s friendliness towards Serbia and shows that hegemonic divide-and-rule geopolitical interests still shape the US’ Balkan policy even though there might be some recalibrations towards Belgrade.
Correspondingly, it can be concluded that Trump 2.0 still retains many Biden-era Balkan strategists, hence the policy continuity between administrations as regards Bosnia. The incipient changes towards Serbia can be ascribed either to the personal initiative of some within Trump 2.0 (Grenell and/or more likely Trump Jr.) and/or the similarly incipient thaw in ties with Russia. In this understanding, Serbia occupies a much higher priority for US interests than Bosnia, hence the more hands-on approach.
The problem though is that what happens in Bosnia directly affects Serbia so it’s not possible to compartmentalize them as separate issues if Trump 2.0 wants to practice a coherent regional policy with tangible results (conceptualized as preserving stability so as to make them better US economic partners). Dodik’s interview with The American Conservative was only published on Saturday, however, so there’s a chance that it might get to Trump by later this week and possibly lead to an emergency shift in policy.
That scenario therefore can’t be discounted, but it would also be foolish for Serbs to get their hopes up about that happening, so it should be assumed that no dramatic change in policy towards Bosnia will happen anytime soon, if at all. The most realistic best-case scenario might thus be that the US becomes more aware of how high the risk of conflict has become, realizes that this could imperil its policy towards Serbia, and calls on (jointly British- and EU-backed) Sarajevo to abstain from any radical action for now.
Seeing as how the US is the most influential of Bosnia’s foreign patrons, a public statement to this effect by Rubio for example could go a very long way towards deterring the local Muslims in charge there from crossing the Rubicon by attempting to kidnap (“arrest”) RS’ leadership. Knowing for a fact that the US wouldn’t have their support, which is more important than the UK’s or EU’s, they might not do this. That could then buy enough time for RS/Dodik and Serbia/Vucic to propose a package deal to Trump.
The purpose would be to avert another Bosnian War, but this might entail concessions on Kosovo, such as Belgrade recognizing the “independence” of its autonomous region in exchange for Washington allowing RS to merge with Serbia and then giving the US privileged rare earth mineral access in RS. To be clear, this isn’t being suggested nor supported, only speculated. The point is to generate a discussion of what RS and Serbia could offer the US to get it to restrain Sarajevo and its foreign warmongering patrons.
All in all, Serbs are once again under Western pressure, but the nature thereof differs between Bosnia and Serbia as was explained. Although part of the same civilization, they’re being pressured differently due to them formally being separate polities, which facilitates efforts to coerce concessions from one or both of them. Whatever form this takes, it won’t be to their objective benefit, which is why they must closely coordinate their policies – ideally with Russian input if requested – to get the best deal possible.
