Eurasia Press & News
Success in the Serbia-Kosovo dialogue would demonstrate the EU’s relevance as a strategic actor, just as it is being questioned elsewhere.
At a critical geopolitical juncture, the European Union finds itself navigating crises on multiple fronts.
In Ukraine, its influence remains secondary to that of the US and Russia; tensions with China have escalated into a full-blown trade war; and renewed instability in the Middle East continues to sideline the EU as a serious political actor.
As global power dynamics shift, the pressure is mounting on Brussels to define its geopolitical role – particularly in its immediate neighbourhood, where its enlargement agenda is being tested.
Amid these overlapping crises, one process often treated as peripheral still offers the EU a rare chance to lead: the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia. It remains one of the few diplomatic arenas where Brussels retains a primary role and influence. Its success or failure will demonstrate the EU’s relevance – or lack of – as a strategic actor in Europe.
To comprehend the stakes involved, one must view the dialogue as part of the broader enlargement policy, a central pillar of the EU’s foreign and security strategy, particularly in the context of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
While Ukraine and Moldova’s EU paths have accelerated under Ursula von der Leyen’s leadership of the European Commission, the Western Balkans have struggled to retain strategic significance.
As High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Kaja Kallas’s political engagement in the Western Balkans could mark a turning point.
Her trip to both Serbia and Kosovo this week is an opportunity to revive a process largely stalled since 2020, with only sporadic progress punctuated by rising tensions and repeated crises.
But unless there is a serious shift in how Brussels and EU member states approach the process, the visit risks becoming another symbolic gesture. The EU must stop hiding behind the role of passive facilitator. This is the moment to assert political leadership with purpose and resolve.
Anything less will only deepen the cycle of stagnation that has come to define the dialogue. Brussels should know better by now. It has had enough time to learn from its own process.
Time to take the dialogue seriously
Kallas’s visit this week follows two rounds of shuttle diplomacy by EU Special Representative Peter Sorensen, who has been sounding out a fragile and volatile terrain.
Trust between Pristina and Belgrade is at a historic low. The political environment remains fraught, clearly showing a lack of political environment in both countries to engage in the process.
But the fragility of the process only makes it more urgent. Suppose Brussels fails to re-energise the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue. In that case, it will not only undermine its credibility as a diplomatic actor but also cast doubt on its legitimacy as a serious broker and partner.
On the surface, the dialogue might seem too peripheral to serve as a strategic test in today’s geopolitical context. However, in an era of internal fragmentation and external threats, success would be a significant political win that Brussels can claim.
This is not just a bilateral dispute; it is a litmus test of the EU’s capacity to act strategically and lead diplomatically.
The stakes for Kallas are high. She steps into a fractured landscape where EU foreign policy often falls victim to intra member-state rivalries and shallow institutional mandates. Yet her political experience and credibility offer a rare opportunity to reset the EU’s approach, if she chooses to seize it and step out from the shadow of Von Der Leyen in foreign policy.
With Sorensen providing technical grounding and Kallas delivering political clout, the EU has a workable division of labour to re-energise the process. But the window of opportunity is narrow. Another flare-up in northern Kosovo would only increase reliance on NATO and further securitise the dialogue. The EU must act before the crisis spirals.
Ground-level lessons matter. Local voices in both Kosovo and Serbia have long echoed in Brussels, calling for a shift away from elite-driven politics and toward inclusive processes that engage civil society and credible local actors. But even the best local partnerships are no substitute for strong political leadership from Brussels and the capitals.
This can no longer be a box-ticking, technocratic exercise. It demands political resolve and long-term investment, and there are several steps that have been suggested in the past but that did not materialise, which can help Kallas navigate this endeavour.
Step up, act, and don’t trust autocrats
Kallas’s first move should be to transform the EU’s posture from a neutral facilitator to an engaged strategic actor. That means putting real political capital on the line, setting concrete, time-bound goals, and moving beyond the vague incrementalism that has led nowhere. This dialogue must become a top-tier political priority and be owned as such by the EU.
The bloc has more leverage than it often acknowledges. And now, it faces a more favourable landscape: the Western Balkans have slid down the geopolitical priority list as attention shifts to the Black Sea, where China, the US, Russia and even Turkey are engaged in a more intense power contest. This decline in regional salience creates an opportunity for the EU to lead more decisively in its backyard, if it dares to act.
The region’s fading geopolitical relevance has also weakened a key card local leaders have long played, using instability to extract political concessions from Brussels or turn the dialogue into nationalist theatre. Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic’s bet that the Trump administration and Russia would prioritise the Western Balkans fell flat. With global attention elsewhere, Brussels now has the opportunity to step in and take the lead.
But to do so, it must abandon the approach of “stabilitocracy,” where merely avoiding conflict is equated with success.
The EU must stop managing tensions and start owning the process politically, not just procedurally.
The Kosovo–Serbia dialogue, although complex, remains manageable, especially when compared to the far more volatile security challenges in Ukraine or the Black Sea.
With clarity, coordination, and political will, the EU can score a significant diplomatic win. But that requires shedding the low-impact playbook of the past and embracing strategic risk.
Use enlargement levers, show leadership
Enlargement remains the EU’s strongest lever. The time is ripe to tightly anchor the dialogue to the enlargement agenda and work more strategically with EU capitals. This could turn the dialogue from a stagnant process into a genuine driver of reform and alignment.
But that requires addressing some uncomfortable truths, starting with the EU’s asymmetrical treatment of Kosovo, which has severely eroded credibility.
One of Kallas’s clearest messages during her visit must be that keeping Kosovo under punitive measures undermines the very approach the EU claims to champion. A roadmap for lifting these measures, backed by coordination with member states, is crucial to advancing the process.
To restore traction, Kallas should push for the EU to adopt a more integrated scorecard where dialogue progress impacts accession reports, funding allocations, and integration benchmarks. The goal is not just dialogue for its own sake, but concrete Europeanisation tied to visible rewards.
Kallas will face headwinds. Some member states still don’t recognise Kosovo and are wary of actions that might be perceived as legitimising it. However, the goal is not recognition – it is about unlocking consensus on making this process work. Without that, the EU remains hostage to paralysis.
The real failure here hasn’t been just the nationalist games of local elites; it has been the EU’s own weak political engagement since it took the dialogue on its shoulders in 2011. Now, Kallas must use her standing with member states to inject a stronger, more united political will into the process.
The regional picture is also complicated. Elections, volatility, and nationalism could all stymie progress. However, by expanding engagement to civil society, opposition groups, and regional actors and offering phased, tangible benefits, the EU can rebuild its credibility and regain momentum.
The Kosovo-Serbia dialogue is more than a technical process. It tests whether the EU still has the capacity and courage to shape its neighbourhood. If it cannot deliver here, what hope is there for tackling more complex geopolitical crises?
For Kallas, this is a moment of rare opportunity. By aligning diplomacy with enlargement, investing political capital, and re-engaging with EU capitals and regional stakeholders, she can shift the EU’s posture from passive facilitator to strategic leader.
In an era where Brussels risks slipping into geopolitical irrelevance, a breakthrough in the Western Balkans could demonstrate both to the world and itself that the EU still has what it takes to lead.
