Eurasia Press & News
The issue of foreign fighters in Syria has resurfaced prominently following a recent meeting in Riyadh between U.S. President Donald Trump and Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa, brokered by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. During the meeting, Trump reportedly presented President Sharaa with five key conditions, notably demanding the repatriation of foreign fighters and the removal of individuals he described as “Palestinian terrorists”—a clear reference to groups like Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hamas, and other Palestinian armed organisations—from Syria. Additionally, Trump’s conditions included a demand for Syrian cooperation in preventing the resurgence of the Islamic State (ISIS) and the transfer of administration of ISIS detention centres in northeastern Syria to Damascus authorities.
This matter gained further significance following threats directed at President Sharaa by ISIS’s media arm. An editorial in their mouthpiece, Al-Naba newspaper, accused him of abandoning the “religion of Abraham” in favour of the “Abraham Accords,” alluding to Trump’s proposal to include Syria in these normalisation agreements with Israel.
In its Thursday edition, published a day after the presidential meeting, the newspaper alleged that Sharaa was seeking to “get rid of foreign fighters according to American dictates.” It further claimed that he had “finally managed to dismantle their groups—independent and non-independent—and end their project, which he had long tailored to serve his interests.” The newspaper reminded the foreign fighters that they had disregarded the advice of ISIS leaders and were now “paying the price.”
However, ISIS’s appeal is unlikely to resonate with most foreign fighters. Some have previously fought against the group alongside Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), while others avoided such conflict and declined to join ISIS even at its peak of territorial control in Syria and Iraq. Moreover, a significant number of foreign fighters remaining in Syria have established lives in rural areas and built extensive networks of interests in the north, making them unwilling to abandon their current circumstances and return to a life of hiding.
Conversely, the issue of foreign fighters presents a complex and burdensome challenge for the new Syrian administration. Despite HTS’s significant transformations leading to its rise to power—evolving from a jihadist organisation aligned with al-Qaeda to a military alliance encompassing a broad spectrum of armed opposition—it heavily relied on foreign fighters (Muhajireen) to consolidate its authority in northern Syria during clashes with other factions and ultimately to enter Damascus after the fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime.
Warnings and Arrests
In recent days, the Syrian administration has reportedly issued warnings to several foreign fighters active on social media, demanding they refrain from appearing in military attire. Al-Quds Al-Arabi learned from a well-informed military source that the new Syrian leadership “asked some fighters to refrain from appearing in military uniform and speaking as fighters in the Syrian army.” The source added that the leadership “gave them a choice between adhering to the instructions and regulations of the military institution or leaving and appearing in a civilian, advocacy role,” attributing the warning to the need to avoid “inciting sectarian strife” among the Syrian population. The leadership also reportedly instructed a number of foreign fighters, including Abu Dujana al-Turkistani, to cease publishing photos or videos of themselves in military uniform. Al-Turkistani is a member of the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) who has previously posted images on social media threatening Syrian minorities.
Concurrently, a Syrian security source confirmed the arrest of Shamil al-Ghazi Abu Khattab, a leader within HTS, several days ago on charges of “inciting against Syrian minorities on social media.” The source denied any connection between his arrest and the “foreign fighters” issue, stating that al-Ghazi had been “previously warned to stop his activities and adhere to military instructions, but he persisted.”
Conversely, Nour al-Din al-Baba, the official spokesperson for the Syrian Ministry of Interior, refuted circulating news about the Syrian authorities initiating arrests of foreign fighters in Syria, describing such reports as “misleading.” In an official statement, he affirmed that the Ministry of Interior and its security institutions had not carried out such a campaign, dismissing information about crackdowns and arrests of foreign fighters in Idlib and Hama. He also denied any connection between these alleged actions and events in the coastal region.
While the exact approach of Sharaa’s government to this sensitive issue remains unclear, the past five years have undoubtedly been a significant test for him and his group in international engagement, particularly on security matters. He has reportedly learned swiftly from experience, eliminating many jihadist organisations that attempted to form alliances threatening his entity and authority in Idlib. He dismantled these groups through a combination of incentives, intimidation, and warfare until they ultimately surrendered and accepted his rule.
Therefore, it is likely that the issue of foreign fighters will be resolved through a “peaceful solution,” and a major conflict with them is unlikely for several reasons. Firstly, most foreign fighting groups are very small, with the exception of the TIP fighters (Uyghurs), who constitute the most prominent force among the jihadist groups aligned with Sharaa remaining in Syria. While information regarding the number of TIP fighters varies—Foreign Policy magazine estimated around five thousand fighters and a total of 15,000 including their families—Al-Quds Al-Arabi’s information suggests their numbers do not exceed 1,500 at best.
Abu Muhammad al-Turkistani appeared during the events in the Syrian coast in March alongside dozens of Uyghur and Syrian fighters on the Latakia-Tartus road. In April, the Syrian Ministry of Defence reportedly moved the Turkistani faction away from the Syrian coast to prevent its fighters from committing any violations against Alawites there and redeployed them on the Homs-Tartus road to control the borders and prevent the smuggling of weapons and Captagon to and from Lebanon.
Notably, Sharaa granted al-Turkistani, whose name is Abdul Aziz Dawood Khodaberdi al-Turkistani, the rank of Brigadier General in December 2024, and he commands the 133rd Division in the new Syrian army, as part of a series of military promotions carried out by Sharaa.
Currently, the Syrian Ministry of Defence is avoiding the integration of foreign fighters, particularly Arab fighters, into the structure of its divisions and brigades. This clearly indicates that the new administration has begun to view them as a problem that must be addressed seriously, acknowledging the guarantees provided by Prince Mohammed bin Salman and President Erdoğan regarding the implementation of Trump’s demands. Turkey is likely to play a significant role in this issue by facilitating the return of foreign fighters and participating in providing security guarantees for them in certain countries.
Departure from Syria might be a viable option for TIP fighters originating from Turkey, where they previously resided. However, for those of other foreign nationalities, a practical solution could involve relocating them away from military centres of power and attempting to provide alternative options for them to live as civilians and facilitate their residency, either through naturalisation as Syrian citizens—a move that could face strong opposition from a large segment of the Syrian population and might encourage the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to demand the naturalisation of some of their non-Syrian leaders and members—or by granting them residency permits and providing guarantees for their stay, granting them their rights to life and work, and distancing them from the military and security establishment.
Furthermore, Syrian Palestinians also desire citizenship, along with tens of thousands of Syrian women married to foreign fighters who have been demanding citizenship for their husbands and children for many years.
SDF and ISIS Prisons
In eastern Syria, Trump’s recent conditions regarding the transfer of ISIS prisons from SDF administration to Sharaa’s administration have weakened the influence of Kurdish fighters, who are the de facto local partners in the international coalition against ISIS. The prisons holding ISIS members have long been the SDF’s strongest leverage, leading Washington to resist Turkey’s persistent demands to eliminate the People’s Protection Units (YPG), considered the Syrian arm of the Turkish Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). This move will undoubtedly reduce direct U.S. spending on these prisons, and Saudi Arabia is likely to replace it in bearing the cost of their upkeep.
Additionally, Washington seeks to rely on the Syrian administration to eliminate active ISIS cells in and around the Syrian desert, implying significant security cooperation and American oversight of Syrian security agencies. This potential partnership strengthens the roles of cooperation between the two countries and opens doors for security collaboration on other issues, potentially preventing Iran’s return and limiting Hezbollah’s activities.
