Eurasia Press & News
With its foreign policy maneuvering space increasingly constrained, Turkey’s hedging between its NATO allies and Russia will be harder to maintain.
A decade into adopting a more assertive foreign policy that enabled Turkey to successfully project power and shape the Syrian, Libyan, and Nagorno-Karabakh conflicts, Ankara’s maneuvering space appears to be increasingly constrained.
Domestic economic and political challenges, an international context in flux, and the choice to position itself at equal distance from East and West are limiting Turkey’s global clout while raising its dependence on Russia.
While Ankara had so far managed to contain the negative impact of its deteriorating relations with NATO allies and to benefit from its ambiguous positioning toward Russia, it may now find it has become more dependent on Moscow. This is especially true in the energy and missile defense sectors. Russia has been pushing Turkey to become a major gas supplier to southeastern Europe and has achieved a dominant and autonomous position for nuclear-generated electricity generation in Turkey. And by purchasing Russian S-400 missile systems, Ankara has deprived itself of superior systems of NATO origin and of the U.S.-made F-35 stealth fighter.
Up until now, it has effectively leveraged its geographical position, a large economy, new capacities in the defense industry, and enhanced force projection capabilities, to pursue an ambitious and assertive foreign policy. In the past few years, it was active in Iraq, Libya, Palestine, Syria, Ukraine, and the Eastern Mediterranean. Further afield, in the Western Balkans and Sub-Saharan Africa, Turkey has increased trade and investment, vastly expanded the Turkish Airlines network, developed its diplomatic and cultural engagement, and introduced military cooperation.
However, Russia’s unprovoked aggression against Ukraine since February 2022 has muddled Turkey’s ambitions. Initially, Ankara’s involvement alongside the UN helped secure a grain deal between Russia and Ukraine, but the accord didn’t last. Prisoner swaps have been more successful, especially the exchange of twenty-six prisoners between Russia, Belarus, and multiple Western states at Ankara’s airport in August, presented as Turkey’s “contribution to ensure international peace and stability.”
Ankara’s entanglement with Moscow in the energy and defense domains resulted in more constraints than opportunities for Turkey. Its so-called balanced policy between Russia and Ukraine—or rather between NATO and Russia—didn’t open a new field of diplomatic action, as the return of war to the European continent forced the transatlantic alliance to adopt strong policies against Russia, which Ankara considered incompatible with its national interests. Moving forward, Moscow could could push Turkey into lasting political and military antagonism with the rest of NATO. In this context, the Black Sea, Syria, and energy supplies are the main flashpoints.
In conceptual terms, Ankara emphasized that it didn’t want to limit its foreign relations to its traditional Western allies—the United States, the EU, and NATO—but rather sought to diversify them in line with its interests. Its move to join the BRICS group of states, immediately praised by the Kremlin, is the latest example of this strategy. The ongoing reconciliation with Egypt and the participation of Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan at a recent informal EU ministerial meeting are also part of this multipronged approach.
Recently, however, some of Ankara’s stances have induced considerable malaise among its Western allies. Turkey’s leadership has been taking increasingly strong positions in the Hamas-Israel conflict, declaring the former “not a terrorist organization but a liberation group” and joining the International Court of Justice genocide case against the latter. In late July, President Erdoğan even alluded to sending troops to defend Gaza against Israel. Whatever their domestic rationale, the positions upended Ankara’s stated ambition to act as a go-between in negotiations about hostages and a potential ceasefire, leaving Egypt, Qatar, and the United States in the lead roles.
More generally, Ankara’s recurrent ambivalence and unpredictability in a number of major foreign policy issues has limited the regional role Turkey was expected to play, for example in Libya, in Syria, or between Russia and Ukraine.
Despite a third-term victory in May 2023 and the enlarged coalition between his Justice and Development Party (AKP), the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), and other smaller parties, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan faced a crushing setback in the May 2024 municipal elections. Although his camp hurried to state that the president was legally unaffected, no political conclusion has yet been drawn from this unforeseen situation. More importantly, a degree of dissent has appeared within the AKP, in power since November 2002, with some of its members demanding progress on the rule-of-law front, in particular in the case of imprisoned philanthropist Osman Kavala.
Indeed, local elections have no legal influence on the presidential mandate or on the Turkish Grand National Assembly. Yet, their outcome cast a doubt on the direction Turkey’s leadership took over the past few years in key domains of public life: religious affairs, return to liberal economic principles, freedom of expression, and the rule of law. The future will tell how the local elections’ political shock may influence presidential and legislative elections due in 2028—a very distant horizon in Turkish politics.
While domestic factors remain critical, the impact of the international context Ankara is operating in should not be overlooked. At the time of writing, many of Turkey’s Western counterparts are on the cusp of major changes.
A new European Parliament has been elected and new interlocutors for Turkey will emerge soon. Ursula von der Leyen has been reappointed as president of the European Commission but her team of commissioners is under formation and needs the parliament’s approval. The new president of the European Council, António Costa, and the new EU foreign policy chief, Kaja Kallas, have yet to take up their functions and choose their advisers. Hopes of reviving the EU-Turkey relationship will be contingent upon progress on the rule of law in Turkey and on the Cyprus settlement.
Mark Rutte will become NATO’s new secretary general in October and will have to seek clarity on Turkey’s real involvement in the alliance’s reassurance operations on its Eastern flank. One additional issue is Russia’s growing involvement in Turkey’s civilian nuclear sector, with the Akkuyu power plant built, owned, and operated by Russian state corporation Rosatom, and a forthcoming bidding for a second plant.
Similarly, the U.S. presidential election taking place on November 5, with effect in January 2025, will inevitably impact the relationship with Ankara.
Taken together, these institutional changes and the lasting conflicts in the Middle East and Ukraine form a web of uncertainties for Ankara’s diplomacy. In this context, it is likely that Turkey’s leadership will maintain its current foreign policy trajectory as long as it can remain at equal distance from Western powers and Russia without suffering dire economic or security consequences.
