Eurasia Press & News
Of Sweet Potatoes and Newsreels
(FPRI) — During the American Revolution, a British officer was sent from Charleston under flag of truce to negotiate a prisoner exchange with “Swamp Fox” Francis Marion. The officer was blindfolded but treated courteously as he journeyed under escort to Marion’s hidden camp. The Swamp Fox warmly greeted the British officer upon his arrival and invited him to dine. The British officer noted that although the camp was austere, morale was high, and the cook provided baked sweet potatoes for breakfast. Francis Marion indicated that the only food he and his guerrillas had to eat was sweet potatoes, but the visitor was told that he might eat as many as he pleased. The visiting officer was awed by Marion and his men—in good spirits despite obvious privation. Upon his return to Charleston, he declared that the Americans could never be beaten and that the Royalist effort in the South would ultimately fail. His testimony had an impact as British morale began to fall despite their military victories in the Carolinas. Canny and resourceful, the Swamp Fox conducted a successful influence operation. Francis Marion won a small but important psychological victory using only courage, courtesy, and sweet potatoes.
In another war on American soil, four months had passed since the battle ended. It was late November and turning cold. After a great orator spoke for two hours, a gaunt-looking man in a dark suit and wearing a tall hat rose to speak. He did not have much to say because he thought himself a poor public speaker. But he hoped to encourage a nation grown weary of war: “that from these honored dead we take increased devotion to that cause for which they gave the last full measure of devotion—that we here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain—that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom—and that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth.”
When Abraham Lincoln sat down, he thought few persons “would little note, nor long remember” what had been said at the dedication of a military cemetery at Gettysburg. But his unadorned address captured the agony and hope of a nation and inspired Americans to carry on the struggle.
Eighty years later, the chief of staff called a filmmaker to his office and outlined a project he believed was of vital importance in mobilizing American public opinion at a critical time. Japanese bombs had drawn the United States into a world war that most Americans had been anxious to avoid. General George C. Marshall asked legendary producer-director Frank Capra to make a series of films for Americans explaining to every citizen why the nation, however reluctantly, had to defeat global fascism. With Marshall’s full support, Capra produced the “Why We Fight” series. Using newsreels—including German and Japanese footage—Capra’s work achieved Marshall’s goal. Artistic talent helped to explain America’s war aims and succeeded in molding public opinion.
These vignettes, chosen from three different wars in U.S. history, make several points. Each event took place during a desperately fought armed conflict. Each activity was shaped by the situation at hand and the brainpower of the men involved. We have examples of influence by deed, by speech, and visually by film. Whether using sweet potatoes or newsreels, an impact was made having tangible consequences and contributing in some way to the war effort of its time. Yet not a single shot was fired in any of the three.
Perhaps in an age of artificial intelligence and weapons of high technology, we forget that the most effective weapon system we possess is brainpower. Brainpower does not require a budget. Values, imagination, and a deep understanding of human nature are essential elements of effective influence operations.
Influencing the Willpower of Combatants
After making his central point about war being the extension of politics, Carl von Clausewitz taught that there are two aspects of war—the material side and the metaphysical side, or “will.” The material side can be counted or estimated—numbers of soldiers, weapons, resources available, and even factors such as time and distance.
But like Sun Tzu centuries before him, and Mao Zedong a century after him, Clausewitz raised the subject of will or morale as a key element in war. Perhaps taking a potshot at his Swiss contemporary, Antoine Jomini, Clausewitz expounded:
It is still more ridiculous if . . . we reflect that the same critic [ed. Jomini?], in accordance with prevalent opinion, excludes all moral forces from theory, and will not allow it to be concerned with anything but the material forces, so that all must be confined to a few mathematical relations of equilibrium and preponderance, of time and space, and a few lines and angles. If it were nothing more than this, then out of such a miserable business there would not be a scientific problem for even a schoolboy.[1]
Clausewitz believed that “where Strategy borders on political science, or rather where the two become one . . . [moral force has] more influence on the ‘how much’ and ‘how little’ is to be done than on the form of execution.”[2]
Mao echoed Clausewitz when he decreed, “The mind of the enemy and the will of his leaders is a target of far more importance than the bodies of his troops.”[3]
So, What Makes “War,” War?
Americans make a sharp distinction between what we define as “war” and what we consider “peace.” We commonly limit our understanding of war as being the violent use of arms in support of policy. Put another way, if there is shooting, we are engaged in war. If there is no shooting, we are not at war. Pentagon thinkers therefore coined the strange acronym MOOTW (military operations other than war)[4] as a catch-all for “not-war” military activities; a more recent term is MISO (military information support operations). Since “information operations” do not involve shooting and violence, they must fall outside the American definition of war.[5]
Our principal adversaries hold very different views of war and therefore of influence operations. The Leninist view of warfare is a continuum from agitation and propaganda to the use of nuclear weapons. Autocrats consider lethal arms merely one means (of many) to achieve their political ends. In his 1962 work, Military Strategy, Marshal Vasiliy Sokolovskiy noted this continuum: “In a war period, the political struggle is transferred from nonmilitary to military form.”[6] For Russian and Chinese military thinkers, there is merely a change in the means used to achieve the ends sought, but the condition of political struggle is unchanged. The object of war remains the imposition of one’s will on an adversary.
This contrasts with the American view of how to influence. The Pentagon’s official term is information operations (IO). Unfortunately, IO is a misnomer for two reasons. First, IO means different things to different people and ranges from public relations to tactical deception. Second, information per se has little to do with the business of influencing target audiences. You cannot “information” someone to do something. Certainly, information exists. But by itself, information has no power to motivate; information only informs. Moreover, playing tank engine sounds, showing newsreel images, conducting tactical ruses, corrupting databases, conducting denigration operations, producing false or misleading “orders,” or even offering sweet potatoes to an enemy officer may influence someone to do something—but none of these acts are information.
Rather than branding “not-war” activities as information operations, we should ask ourselves what it is that we hope to achieve through our deeds and images as well as spoken and written words. What really matters in politics, in commercial activities, and in warfare is the influence of groups and individuals that lead us to a specified, desired result. Put more directly, we want someone to do something that meaningfully aids our cause or, conversely, to cease doing things that hinder our cause. In an election, we hope to influence voters to vote for our candidate. In commerce, we want consumers to buy our product. In war, we want “our side” to prevail over its enemies. But note that in all cases, we want someone to DO something—not merely to KNOW something. We want something to happen, something to take place. And we have the means to achieve that end.[7]
The Soviet concept of “active measures” comes closest to describing the operations we should be conducting. This is also for two reasons. First, active measures are defined as the continuance of political relations, but using brainpower rather than firearms. Second, active measures (influence operations) can be included in war plans and tasked with specific goals or objectives. Information per se cannot.
The Chinese View of Influence in Warfare
In 1999, two well-informed colonels of the People’s Liberation Army published a theoretical work titled Unrestricted Warfare. In this work, the colonels defined a “battlefield beyond the battlefield” as the ultimate target in future conflict. Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui went so far as to proclaim that “warfare is now escaping from the boundaries of bloody massacre, and exhibiting a trend towards low casualties, or even none at all, and yet high intensity.” They go on to note that warfare may take many forms; in their view, there is “almost no domain which does not have warfare’s offensive pattern.”[8]
In effect, the Chinese officers stated that due to advances in technology and the blurring distinction between “civilian” and “military” operations, warfare was changing. Warfare would continue as an extension of politics, not merely with armaments, but with “weapons that are not weapons,” that reach into the barracks, classrooms, boardrooms, and even living rooms of the enemy.
Political power, in short, no longer comes just from the barrel of a gun, but also from computer chips and algorithms enabling one side to place an adversary in a disadvantageous position with no shots fired. Attacks launched on the battlefield beyond the battlefield would target an enemy’s databases, computer systems, infrastructure, communication networks, and ultimately public opinion. This capability is aimed both verbally—and non-verbally—at hobbling an enemy. The target of the battlefield beyond the battlefield is nothing less than the “mind of the enemy and the will of his leaders.” The operational question posed becomes how best to influence the enemy’s mind and erode his will to resist.
In addressing the issue of influence, Qiao and Wang humorously described the ideal valorous soldier of the People’s Liberation Army of the future: “The era of ‘strong and brave soldiers who are heroic defenders of the nation’ has already passed. In a world where even ‘nuclear warfare’ will perhaps become obsolete military jargon, it is likely that a pasty-faced scholar wearing thick eyeglasses is better suited to be a modern soldier than is a strong young lowbrow with bulging biceps.”[9]
The point made by the jolly colonels is that the nature of warfare has fundamentally changed, and that brainpower armed with 21st-century technology has moved to center stage. Leaflets and loudspeakers remain but have been joined by the Internet and computer trolls. We might note some dark humor of our own: “No danger is greater than a high IQ with evil intentions.” Neither the Chinese nor the Russians will leave untouched any opportunity to damage American economic or military assets or set Americans at each other’s throats.
China has one unique aspect to its doctrine. This is the ancient admonition of Sun Tzu that enemy states should be taken intact, not ruined, by conquering without fighting.[10] The Chinese preference is to heed Master Sun’s advice and use psychological and political pressures rather than arms to bring down an enemy. Does this change our definition of war?
The Limits of the American View
The United States suffers from three misperceptions that render us vulnerable to defeat on any battlefield beyond the battlefield: failure to comprehend the continuum of conflict, our Jominian approach to military analysis and weapons procurement, and our apparent blindness regarding culture and psychology in conflict.
The Soviet Union is gone, but with Vladimir Putin, a former KGB officer, the Leninist view of war remains. In the People’s Republic of China, this view is augmented by collective memory of a century of humiliation at the hands of Western imperialists. Warfare may vary in its form depending upon circumstances, but struggle is permanent.
In military operations of any type, it is not a question of whether to employ techniques to influence the attitudes and actions of a given group, but rather of when, how, and to what degree. In many of America’s past operations, such as the Afghan war, both Gulf wars, and Vietnam, the United States did not make effective use of influence operations. In the case of the twenty-year war in Afghanistan, American influence operations (such as they were) had almost no bearing on the outcome. Indeed, as U.S. forces were withdrawn and the collapse of the Afghan republic appeared imminent in early 2021, attempts at mobilizing support for the government virtually ceased.
Retired Army Colonel Robert Curris, a former commander of the U.S. Army’s Fourth Psychological Operations Group, had this observation: “A crucial yet underutilized tool in the U.S. strategic arsenal can help counter the multifaceted threats sophisticated adversaries pose: military information support operations, or MISO, carried out by psychological operations forces. In layman’s terms, MISO is designed to develop and convey messages and devise actions to influence select foreign groups and promote themes to change those groups’ attitudes and behaviors.”[11]
During the 1970s and 1980s, the Defense Department expanded the role of psychological operations primarily with the former Soviet Union in mind. As Colonel Curris notes, “This strategy included establishing specialized units, developing cutting-edge technologies, and creating sophisticated methodologies for influencing target audiences.”[12] Psychological operations (PSYOP) units in the Cold War had language and area expertise—a rarity even in many military intelligence units. All PSYOP units were expected to conduct research on their specific country or area of interest. Many units—the majority trained for use in the European theater—had organic broadcasting and printing teams capable in some cases of acting within minutes of an “actionable” incident taking place.
The policy winds evidently shifted during the 1990s, and both PSYOP and civil affairs units faced reductions in numbers and capabilities. Despite Congressional interest in PSYOP, Defense Department strategists placed a greater premium on firepower than on brainpower.
Colonel Curris warns of the error of deemphasizing brainpower at a time when military-political problems are increasing around the globe:
A decline in psychological operations capabilities is a strategic error that will have severe implications for U.S. national security. The time for half-measures is over; the United States Congress and defense senior leadership must act decisively to restore psychological operations and the military information support operations mission to its rightful place in the pantheon of national security tools. Failure to act now will have long-term implications for the United States’ ability to protect its interests and counter the growing threats posed by adversaries who are increasingly leveraging information warfare as a tool for achieving their strategic objectives.[13]
In the American defense establishment, greater emphasis has always been given to weapons procurement than influence operations. Perhaps this focus reflects the American fascination with mechanical things. Clausewitz would probably shake his head at the American penchant for counting numbers of weapon systems and calculating trajectories as advocated by Jomini, while devaluing the human element in war.
Clausewitz viewed war as messy and chaotic, with the outcome shaped by courage, persistence, and luck. In contrast to Jomini, who considered war almost a thing of mathematical beauty, Clausewitz came to think of warfare as a game of chance with victory or defeat determined by human factors such as persistence and guts. In a game of poker, each player holds different cards. Some hands may be stronger than others. As the game progresses, cards are played, and opponents try to “read” each other and anticipate the next move. There is bluffing and deception and astute guessing of what cards each player holds. Even a weak hand, if shrewdly played, could win. American humorist Josh Billings said it best: “Life consists not in holding good cards but in playing those you hold well.” Clausewitz would agree.
An American Blind Spot
If influence means getting people to do things for us, it follows that we must first understand those we hope to motivate—their needs, beliefs, goals, myths. Everything. There is absolutely no substitute for constant study of your audience and adjustment of the means of influence as revealed by continual analysis: “You must know your target audience better than it knows itself.”[14]
Cultural and psychological aspects of a target audience are central to an influence campaign. These aspects can only be understood by experience and close study of the people we hope to influence. An argument can be made that in World War II, our influence operations generally were more effective with European adversaries, Italians and Germans, rather than with the Japanese. Americans of Japanese heritage were not used extensively in the Pacific theater where their knowledge of the Japanese language and culture could have played a positive role in overcoming enemy resistance.[15]
American-supported influence operations in Central America in the 1980s were generally successful. American advisors in El Salvador worked closely with their Salvadoran counterparts following the May 1984 election that brought a reformist administration to office. The Salvadoran army changed its character from a plutocratic institution preying on the campesinos to a force committed to help and protect the people. Emphasis was placed on civic action and sophisticated psychological operations.[16] The army distributed school items, provided medicines, and became a credit to communities. In 1991, the army succeeded in bringing an estimated 200,000 people to the capital for a “peace demonstration”—well covered by radio and television. Politically, the Salvadoran guerrilla group, the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN), was outmaneuvered.
American advisors taught Salvadorans, provided intelligence and technical advice, and obviously financed the operations. But the influence operations themselves—which included sponsoring a Salvadoran girl with a “peace song” that became a national hit—were Salvadoran, not “made in the USA.”[17]
Another relatively successful influence campaign was that in the Philippines against the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s Army (CPP/NPA). This program was successful after an honest election brought Cory Aquino to the presidency. Improved rural administration lessened citizen grievances, thus removing many issues that fueled the NPA’s agitation in Luzon and the Bicol Peninsula.
American influence operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan fell short due to cultural obstacles that could not be overcome. An obvious problem was the inability to influence groups holding strict Islamic values and having cultures alien to our own. Few Americans were familiar with either Iraq or Afghanistan, and even fewer spoke Pashto or Dari. Our troops and leaders were dependent upon interpreters. There was also considerable ignorance of Islamic beliefs and practices.
In contrast to El Salvador or the Philippines, soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan found themselves in culturally alien environments in which even routine actions of American GIs, such as drinking beer, eating bacon, or even shaving were viewed by strict Muslims as haram.[18] News reports of disrespect of the Prophet Mohammed or Islam merely added to negative impressions of Americans created by our cultural differences.[19] In Iraq, revelation of the gross misconduct at Abu Ghraib fatally undermined our credibility.[20]
In Afghanistan, in addition to Islam, the Pashtuns have a code of conduct known as Pashtunwali, which stresses hospitality and protection of strangers—even enemies—in one’s home. And yet, U.S. units routinely conducted midnight raids to capture Taliban suspects, invading homes and forcibly taking captives in violation of Pashtunwali. Many breaches of Pashtunwali were done in sheer ignorance.
The Afghans saw our posters and listened when U.S. colonels spoke about the importance of elections to the Afghan republic’s parliament. Most tribesmen were respectful during meetings or infrequent cultural gatherings, but it is doubtful whether any were persuaded or much was achieved.
Professor Shibley Telhami of the University of Utah notes that “there is a complete gap between what we say and how our words are received in the region. Why? Lack of trust. When we say we’re going to bring democracy, people don’t believe us. They don’t believe that’s an objective. If you don’t trust the messenger, you don’t trust the message.”[21]
This having been said, all successful influence operations—even against so-called hard targets—are based on thorough, insightful, and continuous target audience analyses. To motivate any audience, even those holding rigid ideologies (or religious beliefs), propagandists require a comprehensive understanding of the culture, psychology, and physical needs of the target group.[22] It is also necessary to understand how a target audience views itself and other groups. Unfortunately, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, PSYOP research and analysis capabilities were curtailed sharply, perhaps due to funding cuts from the so-called peace dividend. Moreover, by 2001, many experienced officers had retired or left the PSYOP–civil affairs community.
The lack of in-depth analyses of significant target groups in Afghanistan or Iraq was a major shortcoming that undermined American influence operations. In-depth studies might have made our influence operations more effective. Instead, during both conflicts there was a rush to “do something”—a typical American trait—which upon occasion earned us a black eye with those whom we hoped to motivate. Lacking a fully integrated countrywide political-military strategy in either country created a yawning gap between tactical operations and influence operations. Influence operations often were piecemeal. Upon occasion, tactical operations and firepower “undid” in minutes what PSYOP and civil affairs units had accomplished over weeks and months of patient effort.
Special operations troops were used to kick down doors and make midnight arrests—while by radio we professed support for “democracy” and the rule of law. (Of course, Western concepts of law are poles apart from Islamic law deriving from the Word of God.[23]) Some units air-dropped leaflets using excerpts from the Qur’an. As the leaflets fell to the ground, the Islamic opposition pointed to the airdrop as prima facie evidence of the Unbelievers’ sacrilege.[24] Civic action projects—a tangible form of influence—aided civil governments (often viewed as corrupt.)[25] “Leader engagements” (a direct means of influence) lacked credibility as U.S. commanders focused on the number of such engagements but not their effectiveness. “Mullahpaloozas” became Kiplingesque photo opportunities mentioned in reports sent to Bagram, but rarely achieved permanent political gains; American commanders and mullahs met, but talked right past each other.
Where To From Here?
On the eve of the American Revolution in 1775, British politician and philosopher Edmund Burke warned that “the use of force alone is but temporary. It may subdue for a moment, but it does not remove the necessity of subduing again, and a nation is not governed, which is perpetually to be conquered.”[26]
In our expeditions abroad, especially in parts of the globe having markedly different cultures from that of the United States, our military forces have a checkered record of successes and failures. Contributing to its failures abroad is the American misconception that force alone may substitute for political influence. Clausewitz noted: “War can never be separated from political intercourse, and if . . . this is done in any way, all the threads of the different relations are, to a certain extent, broken, and we have before us a senseless thing without an object.”[27] Influence operations of various kinds might have helped stabilize the Afghan republic but were never integrated with combat operations. Much was done, but, lacking an overall plan, influence operations failed.
As mentioned, our adversaries do not make the mistake of separating combat operations from influence operations. The North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and Vietcong (VC) skillfully blended politically relevant actions such as propaganda and agitation with tactical operations. The NVA/VC used deeds and speeches in an integrated way with tactical operations intended to secure villages and districts politically. We did not do this.
American influence operations have atrophied in the last thirty years and, as Colonel Curris points out, PSYOP units need new staffing and funding. But of greater importance, the Defense Department needs to reassess the role of influence and fully integrate it into American war planning. PSYOP and civil affairs units should be organized into their own command with units placed in direct support of all engaged frontline units. If this is done, regular infantry units could call upon “their Influencers” to outwit an enemy or consolidate the area of operations where the infantry units must operate.
Of highest importance, however, is rebuilding the research and analysis capability of the PSYOP–civil affairs community, and staffing units with personnel having native fluency in foreign languages and in-depth knowledge of the culture and psychology of the people living in areas of operational interest.
The Last Word
It has been said that “politics is how who gets what when.”[28] Politics is competition for scarce resources; it is the contest for power and position; it is the struggle between rivals for dominance and supremacy. And for some, it is a battle for mere survival. Whatever the specific aims or purposes of politics at any level, it is ongoing from the smallest precinct to the global stage. As we know, warfare is the continuation of politics with “additional means” intended to influence the outcome.
Influence is power to make something happen (or prevent something from happening.) Influence takes many forms. Its purpose is to build support for one’s own side, strengthening resolve and willpower. At the same time, it can break the will of an adversary and weaken resistance. Influence does this by projecting hope and positive expectations to encourage friends—or just as easily, conveying visions of doom and failure that discourage enemies.
Regardless of influence’s specific mission in any particular case, it is a truism that influence operations are tools—indeed, weapons—in the hands of a skilled practitioner. Influence is an element of strategy that can be used to achieve victory and that, if omitted, can lead to defeat. It is therefore of great importance that leaders at all levels take seriously the inclusion of thoughtful influence operations in their campaigns and battles. Clausewitz would expect nothing less.
[1] Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Peter Paret and Michael Howard (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), book three, chap. 1, 242. [2] Clausewitz, 243. [3] Mao Zedong, On Guerrilla Warfare (1937), 23. B.H. Liddell Hart in Strategy made a similar observation: “The profoundest truth in war is that the issue of battle is usually decided in the minds of the opposing commanders; not the bodies of their men.” [4] Military operations not involving arms (MOOTW) include peacekeeping, disaster response, humanitarian aid, military engineering, law enforcement, arms control, deterrence, and multilateralism. MISO is the latest Pentagon jargon; the term misrepresents influence operations, which are in fact means of warfare without weapons. [5] The author holds that the catch-all term “information operations” is an unfortunate label that misrepresents what in fact are political-military means used to influence the outcome of conflict. The author believes the phrase “influence operations” to be more appropriate. [6] Vasiliy Sokolovskiy, Military Strategy (1962), quoted in Graham D. Vernon, ed., Soviet Perceptions of War and Peace (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1981), 19. [7] G.L. Lamborn, Jihad of the Pen: A Practitioner’s Guide to Conducting Effective Influence Operations in an Insurgency (Defense Intelligence Agency, Afghanistan-Pakistan Training Group, 2010), 15. [8] Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare: China’s Master Plan to Destroy America (Beijing: People’sLiberation Army Publishing House, 1999), 189. [9] Qiao and Wang, 44. [10] Sun Tzu Bing-fa, “To conquer without fighting is the acme of skill.” [11] Robert Curris, “The Army Needs to Invest in Psychological Operations, Not Cut Them,” Military Times, November 1, 2023. [12] Curris. [13] Curris. [14] Lamborn, Jihad of the Pen, 129. [15] Known as the “Ghost Army,” the 23rd Headquarters Special Troops consisted of only 1,300 officers and men, but with brilliant artistry, they deceived the Germans into believing that they faced two fresh American divisions, thereby diverting German attention and saving Allied lives. The highly decorated 442ndRegimental Combat Team, all Japanese-American, distinguished itself in Europe, but there was no unit in the Pacific comparable to the 23rd. [16] El Salvador made extensive use of television and employed former FMLN members in “attraction programs” used to induce fighters to take amnesty and drop out of the fighting. [17] Author has direct knowledge of the Salvadoran influence operations, having served there. It helped that most advisors spoke some Spanish and had available extensive research on the country and the FMLN. [18] Islam divides human actions into halal, which are recommended or indeed mandatory, and haram, which are actions forbidden or highly disapproved. [19] The Qur’an burning in Florida and the Danish cartoons lampooning the Prophet triggered terrible riots in Jalalabad and other cities, undoing months of U.S. efforts to engage with the people. It took many weeks to rebuild decent relations in Jalalabad. [20] Abu Ghraib destroyed American credibility and handed a propaganda victory to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and our al-Qaeda enemies. Zarqawi posted a video in 2005 making American misconduct plain to all. [21] See Shibley Telhami, “Does Arab and Muslim Public Opinion Count?” Middle East Center University of Utah, January 24, 2005. [22] These are called “Basic PSYOP Studies” (BPS) and present detailed analyses of the country and target audiences of PSYOP interest. A BPS will note operationally relevant cultural and political aspects of various target audiences for possible campaigns. Lacking target studies, much American propaganda was “Made in USA” and lacked credibility. By contrast, the Taliban capitalized on our lack of cultural sensitivity and actions. [23] Ordinary Afghans noted the corruption of the Afghan republic’s courts of law, which contrasted sharply with the Taliban’s Islamic courts where justice was delivered swiftly and honestly. [24] Complicating matters for those of us in the field, almost no pre-testing or sampling with focus groups was done. American influence therefore often had little relevance to the local people. [25] Civic action teams, known as Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), did excellent work that benefitted Afghan communities, but their accomplishments were often undercut by the corruption of district and provincial governors. On occasion, even U.S. tactical units “undid” projects by the PRTs. [26] Edmund Burke, “Speech on Conciliation with America,” March 22, 1775, https://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch1s2.html. [27] Clausewitz, On War, book five, chap. 6, 402. [28] Attributed to Professor Harold D. Lasswell (1902–78), political scientist and communications theorist, credited as the founder of the field of political psychology.
