Eurasia Press & News
- Governments in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon are trying to strengthen the power of the state by reining in non-state actors backed by outside powers.
- Leaders of the three countries want to prevent non-state militia forces from further embroiling their countries in unwanted conflict with neighboring and other outside powers.
- Non-state actors in the three countries have deep roots in segments of society who see the militias as protectors, complicating state efforts to disarm and marginalize them.
- The outside backers of the region’s non-state actors oppose disarmament of the militias they sponsor because the armed groups are advancing their strategic agendas.
The regional warfare that erupted following the Hamas incursion into Israel on October 7, 2023 laid bare the challenges to the region posed by non-state actors willing and able to defy state authority to pursue their separate ideologies and further the objectives of their outside backers. In three cases – Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, all of which have been involved in post-October 7 conflagration – governments are expressing their intent to rein in the non-state actors whose actions have provoked Israel, U.S., Turkish, and other retaliatory attacks. The retaliation has caused significant destruction and brought humanitarian hardship to broad swaths of their populations. However, the social bases of non-state factions and militia forces, coupled with their backing by outside powers seeking to advance strategic agendas, in each case complicates governmental efforts to exercise a monopoly of armed force within their territories.
In post- Assad Syria, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) leader Ahmad al-Sharaa, named last week as transitional president, has stated clearly his intent to rein in the militias that have operated in Syria since civil war broke out in 2011. The Iran-backed militias supporting the Assad government there, including Lebanese Hezbollah, have either dissolved, retreated back to Lebanon and other home locations, or fled to Iraq. Al-Sharaa recently flew to Saudi Arabia to meet with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS).
Other non-state actors, including a U.S.-supported Kurdish-dominated militia, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), remain. The SDF acts in concert with U.S. forces in Syria to prevent the reemergence of the Islamic State organization (IS). The SDF has not conducted any attack against Turkiye or other Syria neighbors, but Türkiye considers the SDF, which is dominated by ethnic Kurds, as affiliated with militant Turkish Kurdish groups, particularly the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Acting on that perception, Turkiye has intervened militarily in Syria – both before and since the fall of Assad – to establish and widen a buffer zone along the Syria-Türkiye border. Ankara’s policy has caused tensions with Washington, which regards the SDF as unaffiliated with any militant organizations and a vital component of its anti-IS strategy. Syria’s Kurds view the SDF as a key protector of Kurdish rights in Syria, amid uncertainty about how the HTS-led government will treat Syria’s minorities.
Insisting that dissolving all militias in the country is vital to stabilizing post-Assad Syria after more than a decade of civil war, on December 17, al-Sharaa announced Syria’s rebel “factions will be dissolved, and the fighters will be integrated into the Ministry of Defense.” He explained the basis of the decision to journalists, telling The Times of London: “We seek no conflict, whether with Israel or anyone else, and we will not allow Syria to be used as a base for such hostilities.” His aides indicated his directive applies to all militias in the country, including the allied rebel group that ran a Daraa-based Southern Operations Room and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA), which has been battling the SDF in eastern Syria on behalf of Ankara. His fledgling government has ordered armed Palestinian factions in Syria, which have occasionally launched attacks on Israel-controlled portions of the disputed Golan Heights, to immediately disarm, shut down their training camps, and dissolve their military formations. To implement the order, HTS forces have also been confiscating weapons from former members of the Syrian Arab Army and Syria-based Iran-backed militias in exchange for an amnesty for those who served the Assad regime.
Iraq’s government is moving in a similar direction, recognizing that attacks on Israel and U.S. forces in Iraq by pro-Iranian militias there have brought retaliatory attacks that undermine Iraq’s sovereignty and stability and interfere with efforts to work with U.S. officials to prevent the resurgence of IS. Explaining Baghdad’s policy, Iraq’s Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein stated in a January interview: “Two or three years ago, it was impossible to discuss this topic (disarming the Iran-aligned militias) in our society…But now, having armed groups functioning outside the state is not acceptable.” Iraqi officials have sought to obtain the concurrence of the pro-Tehran militias and their leaders – who are nominally part of the Shia Muslim-dominated Coordination Framework governing coalition – by citing U.S. pressure and implicit U.S. threats to unilaterally act militarily against Iran-aligned Iraqi militias. Iraqi leaders note that, in the waning weeks of President Biden’s term and immediately following Assad’s collapse in early December, then-Secretary of State Antony Blinken visited Baghdad to urge Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al-Sudani to adopt hardline measures against pro-Iranian militias. This push to dismantle the militias is part of a longstanding U.S. effort, also backed by the new Trump Administration, to weaken Iran strategically.
Perhaps predictably, the leadership of the Iran-aligned militias have expressed opposition to placing their fighters firmly under the national chain of command, let alone disarming outright. Iranian leaders, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, have insisted Iran will rebuild its weakened Axis of Resistance. During a January visit by Sudani to Tehran, Khamenei in fact called for strengthening pro-Iranian militia forces – not constraining them. Some militia leaders have insisted that dismantling the militias would require a religious pronouncement (fatwa) from Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, Iraq’s most senior Shia cleric and a revered figure throughout the Shia community worldwide. Yet, recognizing that many Shia Iraqis see the Iran-aligned groups as protectors and as legitimate opponents of Israel, Sistani is unlikely to take a public position on the militias.
Even if the militias do not agree to disarm, Baghdad still stands to accomplish at least some of its objectives. Some of the Iran-aligned militias have signaled their intent to distance themselves from Iran – perhaps as a means of alleviating pressure on them to disarm outright. Militia leaders have committed their movements to Iraq’s official policy of non-intervention in Syria. In addition, the pro-Iranian Iraqi militias have refrained from launching drones toward Israel in recent weeks. And, fearful that the fall of Assad might pave the way for a resurgence of IS inside Iraq, leaders of the Coordination Framework have shifted toward supporting the Sudani government position to keep U.S. forces in Iraq beyond 2026. According to one Framework official: “[Framework leaders] are afraid of IS exploiting the vacuum if the Americans leave Iraq and the situation in Iraq collapses.”
Perhaps more difficult than expanding state authority in Iraq or Syria will be efforts by Lebanon’s government to curb the autonomy, influence, and military power of Iran’s main regional ally, Lebanese Hezbollah. In January, Lebanon’s parliament broke a two-year deadlock to select Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) commander Joseph Aoun as the country’s president. The impasse was caused in large part by Hezbollah’s opposition to any candidate who sought to curb Hezbollah’s influence within Lebanon. A sharp critic of Hezbollah, Aoun has stated the Lebanon government should have a monopoly of armed force throughout the country. His statement implies that Aoun and his allies among the Maronite Christian and Sunni Muslim community want to build on Hezbollah’s military setbacks against Israel to try to disarm the group outright. The political trend against Hezbollah continued later in January with Aoun’s nomination of Nawaf Salam to be Lebanon’s Prime Minister – a selection that countermanded Aoun’s reported pledge to Hezbollah to reappoint caretaker Najib Mikati as premier. Salam is a former Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) militant turned Lebanese diplomat who also served as president of the International Court of Justice.
However, Aoun and Salam, if he and his cabinet are confirmed, face huge hurdles in any effort to reduce the political and military influence of Hezbollah and strengthen the authority of the Lebanese state. Hezbollah retains the allegiance of a large majority of Lebanon’s Shias – the largest single community in the country. In spite of the losses suffered from Israel’s air and ground campaign since September, Hezbollah’s militia remains, by all accounts, the strongest military force in the country. The LAF, despite U.S. and other outside assistance, remains too small, underfunded, and poorly armed to challenge Hezbollah internally. And, Iran apparently remains committed to rebuilding the group, even though its secure land route for resupplying Hezbollah has been severed by the fall of the Assad regime. Israel claims Iranian diplomats, as part of Tehran’s efforts to circumvent the Syria route, have been smuggling tens of millions of dollars to Hezbollah by flying into Beirut carrying suitcases full of U.S. dollars. By all accounts, Iran is also actively seeking new routes through which to supply advanced weaponry to Hezbollah, but it is unclear whether any such Iranian efforts have succeeded to date.
