Eurasia Press & News
Mykhailo Podolyak was cautiously optimistic about Donald Trump’s return to the White House. In an interview with Meduza in the days after the new U.S. president’s inauguration, the top advisor to Volodymyr Zelensky said he saw a change in Trump’s rhetoric towards Russia that gave him “some hope.” But in the weeks since, Trump has abandoned talk of putting pressure on Moscow and adopted a harsher attitude towards Ukraine: calling Zelensky a “dictator without elections,” demanding that Kyiv sign an unfavorable deal to exchange Ukrainian natural resources for military aid, and sending a delegation to conduct bilateral peace talks with Russia. To find out how officials in Kyiv view this change, Meduza called Podolyak for another wide-ranging interview. The following translation has been edited and abridged for length and clarity.
— Kyiv has repeatedly warned the world that Putin can’t be trusted. Can Trump be trusted?
— Of course. At this stage, he can be trusted. You just have to take into account Trump’s style: it’s characterized by information aggression and a desire to achieve goals in a short period of time. You need to take into account Trump’s extremely pragmatic approach. He wants to obtain the most advantageous economic positions for the United States. He adheres to this style regardless of whether he’s communicating with partners or opponents. You either take this into account and negotiate with him effectively, or you give him everything [he wants]. Some people are tougher in negotiations, others less so. Trump acts as tough as possible.
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— In recent days, Trump has repeatedly parroted Russian propaganda narratives and blackmailed Kyiv. Why do you think Trump is doing this? And if he acts this way with everyone, then why would he call Zelensky a “dictator” and not Putin?
— What we saw [during the U.S.-Russia talks] in Riyadh was an attempt to bring Russia out of isolation, but on [Trump’s] own terms. Trump is trying to tone down the anti-Russian rhetoric in the American establishment, which has reached a peak in the last three years — although it was absolutely justified. He’s already directly stated that he’s interested in receiving economic benefits from Russia. This is how he’s driving Putin into a trap, in order to get the maximum profit from Russia. He’s clearly demonstrating that he’s only interested in the [economic] position of the U.S. — financial profitability, the opportunity to enter certain markets, or obtain cheap resources from them. Whether this strategy will be successful overall, I’m not ready to say. But so far, Trump is succeeding in exerting this pressure.
— So you think that Trump’s statements are based on cold judgement?
— Absolutely. There’s zero emotion, that’s for sure.
— Representatives of Trump’s team have said repeatedly that Ukraine joining NATO is not on the table; Washington is meeting with Moscow without Kyiv’s participation. Does the Ukrainian president’s office see any point in such a negotiation process if it fundamentally contradicts Zelensky’s stated peace plan?
— Regarding the various statements [from Trump’s team] about NATO, peacekeeping contingents, weapons supplies — the very fact that these statements are being made means this is being discussed. You can say that there’s nothing on the negotiating table, but in fact, it’s all there. [Including] NATO membership and a peacekeeping contingent as a component of security guarantees.
The negotiation process between Moscow and Washington that we saw in Riyadh is probably important for bilateral relations between the U.S. and Russia, because a lot of contradictions have built up there. They have the right to hold such talks, to look for common ground. But a negotiation process in which the end of the war is discussed without Ukraine is unacceptable, and President Zelensky spoke about this. We won’t recognize the results of such a negotiation process.
President [Zelensky] says there’s a formula for the negotiation process where Ukraine, the European Union, the U.S., and Russia participate. Any other formula will not be accepted. Ukraine did not accept any ultimatums at the start of the war and will not accept any ultimatums today.
— Meaning Ukraine will reject negotiations imposed by Washington that don’t take into account Kyiv’s interests?
— Let me clarify a bit. Nothing can be imposed on Ukraine today. Bilateral talks in any format are possible, this is the sovereign right of two countries, but they definitely will not lead to the end of the war. We understand that such statements [about the impossibility of Ukraine joining NATO] are an element of Trump’s style. He’s trying to define the rules of the game, the rules of the negotiation process. But the rules have already been defined.
— It just seems like Trump has more leverage over Ukraine than Ukraine has over the United States. The Economist wrote that with the agreement on natural resources, Washington made Kyiv “an offer it can’t refuse,” and a Ukrainian source told the AP, “it’s a colonial agreement.” Can Kyiv forgo signing this document if it doesn’t include fundamental points for Ukraine, such as security guarantees?
— Let’s start with the levers of influence. Of course, we are to some extent dependent on military and financial aid from our partners. But at the start of the war there was no such assistance, and Ukraine still survived. Now, [Ukraine] is a re-equipped country that has relaunched military production. And Europe today takes much more initiative [when it comes to military aid for Ukraine.] So, I would say there’s equal leverage here. Informationally, yes, it looks as though the United States is dominating. But again, these are elements of Trump’s style.
About the agreement on rare earth metals: Let me remind you that the initiative came from Ukraine. Because short wars are one thing, when the costs are insignificant, and it’s another when you’ve been fighting for three years already and the costs are high, including for the United States. We’re looking for compensation mechanisms — but fair ones. That is, you can get [compensation], but only if specific conditions are met for Ukraine.
What is Ukraine trying to include in the agreement? Firstly, a clear understanding of what investments will come from the United States. Because military support is important for us. We want to understand that within the framework of this agreement, we will continue to receive such-and-such volumes of weapons for such-and-such amounts. Secondly, we want to see a distribution of cost-sharing and profitability from this agreement. This is mineral development, after all. And thirdly, security guarantees for Ukraine against repeated Russian aggression. In any case, Ukraine is insisting on the need to include these positions within the framework of the negotiations. I think this will be done.
Update: After Meduza published the Russian version of this interview on Tuesday, the Financial Times reported that Ukrainian negotiators had reached an agreement with the Trump administration on the terms of a natural resources deal. This was later confirmed by President Trump, who said President Zelensky is expected to visit Washington on February 28 to sign the agreement. Although it was initially reported that the document doesn’t mention security guarantees for Ukraine, Zelensky said on Wednesday that it does. “Not all the security guarantees Ukraine wanted are there, but I wanted at least some mention of guarantees — and there is one, in what I believe is Article 10 of the framework agreement,” he said. You can read a summary of the agreement here.— Zelensky recently said he’s prepared to step down as president for the sake of a peace agreement or in exchange for NATO membership for Ukraine. Does that mean elections in Ukraine are possible before the end of 2025?
— The president said that if this is the price for Ukraine to receive a fair peace and NATO membership, then, of course, he’s ready for such an exchange. The problem is that it’s unlikely that such an exchange will be offered.
Now, as for elections. This is a strange discussion. There isn’t a single example of elections taking place in a country during the active phase of a war. I can’t understand this logic. How do elections influence the very fact of aggression? Ukraine is not the aggressor. The aggression against Ukraine is the decision of a dictator, Putin.
Of course, as soon as martial law is lifted, presidential and parliamentary elections must be held in the country within six months. Right now, there’s a public consensus that it’s impossible to hold elections. It’s impossible to ensure safety at polling stations. People who are fighting and are in the combat zone won’t be able to run or be elected. Plus, there are more than six million people who have left Ukraine. It also won’t be possible to organize a full-fledged electoral process for them and ensure the proper integrity of the electoral procedure. Everyone understands perfectly well that elections are nonsense until the end of the war.
At the same time, I understand Russia’s logic. Putin believes he can [install] a pro-Russian government here, although this is absolute ignorance of Ukraine. This undoubtedly will not happen, but nevertheless he wants to do it.
Russia believes that for a small investment, it can easily achieve a sharp increase in internal tension [in Ukraine] — especially against the backdrop of a partially frozen but essentially ongoing war — and simultaneously increase the pressure along the front line, and declare that if a pro-Russian candidate gets through, we’ll come to an agreement. So presidential and parliamentary elections in Ukraine are exclusively a technological interest for Putin, nothing more.
