Eurasia Press & News
Virtually alone within Iran’s Axis of Resistance, the Houthi movement (Ansarallah) in Yemen is threatening to resume its attacks on Israel and in the Red Sea if the Gaza ceasefire collapses, as well as if Israel continues to block aid from entering Gaza.
Trump officials have publicly warned that, should sanctions fail to achieve their objectives, they will take military action to try to stop the Houthis from attacking commercial ships in the Red Sea.
Trump officials are relying on economic sanctions, imposed on both the Houthis as well as on Iran, to deter further Houthi assaults and to restrict the group’s weapons supplies.
New U.S. sanctions target Houthi attempts to diversify their arms supplies by acquiring weaponry from Russia.
The Houthi movement, which controls Sanaa and much of northern and central Yemen, has largely stood down from attacking Israel and commercial and naval warships in the Red Sea since the late January Israel-Hamas ceasefire in Gaza. The group has been perhaps the most steadfast and undaunted of Iran’s Axis of Resistance partners, conducting repeated attacks in support of Hamas and the Palestinians in Gaza since the October 7, 2023, Hamas incursion into Israel, despite repeated rounds of retaliation by U.S.-led forces and Israel. The Houthi missile and armed drone strikes on shipping sharply reduced commercial traffic through the Red Sea. Throughout 2024, U.S.-led forces targeted Houthi missile and drone storage and launch facilities and related military targets, damaging Houthi capabilities but failing to deter the group. Israel retaliated against Houthi-controlled civilian infrastructure as well as military targets, causing significant losses. However, Yemen’s distance from Israel rendered the group less vulnerable to the intense and precise Israeli retaliatory strikes, as well as the ground combat, that Israel had employed to significant effect against Lebanese Hezbollah.
Unlike Hezbollah, which agreed to a comprehensive ceasefire with Israel in November, the Houthis have refused to end their attacks permanently unless a final end to the Gaza conflict is achieved. Phase one of the Gaza ceasefire ended on March 1, and Israel, with Trump’s backing, has threatened to resume fighting Hamas in Gaza if its leaders do not agree to extend the ceasefire and release all remaining Israeli hostages. Anticipating the Gaza ceasefire would unravel, on March 3, Hazem al-Asad, a member of Ansarallah’s political bureau, asserted that the movement was “prepared to engage in a comprehensive war targeting U.S. interests in the region” if the Israeli offensive against Hamas resumed. Another high-ranking Houthi regime official, Nasr al-Din Amir, stated: “Eyes are watching Gaza, and fingers are on the trigger.” He emphasized that the Houthis’ arsenal of missiles and armed drones was “in full readiness,” asserting, “We have proven ourselves in previous tests.”
Most recently, Houthi officials have stated the group would re-engage in its naval operations against Israel if it continues to block aid from entering Gaza. On Friday, the paramount Houthi leader, Abdel-Malik al-Houthi, issued an ultimatum, stating in a video message: “We give the entire world notice: We are granting a four-day deadline (until March 11). This deadline is to allow for mediators to continue their efforts. If, after these four days, the Israeli enemy persists in preventing the entry of aid into Gaza, maintains the complete closure of crossings, and continues to block the entry of food and medicine into Gaza, we will resume our naval operations against the Israeli enemy [interpreted as attacks on Israel-linked commercial shipping in the Red Sea].”
In an attempt to deter the Houthis from resuming their attacks, Trump officials issued warnings and imposed additional sanctions on the group. On Friday, Ambassador Dorothy Shea, chargé d’affaires ad interim to the United Nations, warned the UN Security Council: “The U.S. will take action against the Houthis should they resume their reckless attacks in the Red Sea and surrounding waterways and on Israel.” The threat implied Trump would authorize U.S. military action against the group, perhaps on a larger scale than the strikes on Houthi military installations conducted during the Biden administration. Earlier in the week, Secretary of State Marco Rubio messaged the Houthis through a key U.S. ally, the Sultanate of Oman, which hosts a Houthi representative office and has long counseled the Houthis against their Red Sea attacks. According to a readout of Secretary Rubio’s conversation with Omani Foreign Minister Sayyid Badr Albusaidi, “The Secretary also discussed [with Albusaidi] the importance of permanently ending unlawful Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and surrounding waterways.”
The Trump administration also linked their measures against the Houthis to the broader Trump effort to reimpose the sanctions-centric “maximum pressure” policy on Iran, the main backer of the Houthis, that he implemented during his first term. Shea added in her statement to the Security Council: “We will also take steps to stop Iran’s support for Houthi terrorism, in accordance with President Trump’s National Security Presidential Memorandum re-imposing maximum pressure on Iran.” Shea urged the Security Council to “respond to Iran’s flagrant violations of our resolutions through its continued arming of the Houthis” by adding staff, funding, and critical infrastructure for the UN Verification and Inspection Mechanism (UNVIM). That mission approves and then inspects cargo entering Houthi-controlled ports, particularly Hodeidah and Saleef, to prevent the Houthis from receiving prohibited arms and arms components – most of which come from Iran. Shea called for UNVIM’s capacity to be increased to the point where it could inspect “100 percent of covered containers.”
In addition to its diplomatic efforts and public warnings, Trump’s team is employing economic sanctions against the Houthis. The Trump administration insists sanctions have broad, worldwide applications, even though the measures have often proved only marginally effective, if at all. On March 4, Trump’s January 22 Executive Order (14175) setting out a 45-day process to restore the Houthis to the list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) took full effect. Announcing the formal FTO designation, Secretary Rubio wrote: “The State Department is fulfilling one of President Trump’s first promises upon taking office, and I’m pleased to announce the Department’s designation of Ansarallah, commonly referred to as the Houthis, as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.” The Rubio statement stipulated the practical consequences of the designation – shutting the Houthis off from global commerce and the international financial system – stating: “Separately, the United States will not tolerate any country engaging with terrorist organizations like the Houthis in the name of practicing legitimate international business.” The FTO designation represents a higher-profile and more sweeping label than the “Specially-Designated Global Terrorist Organization” (SDGT) designation the Biden administration imposed on the group in early 2024. At that time, the Biden team stopped short of redesignating the Houthis as an FTO, arguing the label would hinder diplomatic engagement with the Houthis on a Yemen civil war settlement and might deter global humanitarian aid agencies from providing assistance to Yemenis in areas under Houthi control.
Trump officials are also expanding their sanctions-based approach beyond the Houthis and their main patrons in Tehran, in particular seeking to head off what appears to be attempts by the Houthis to cultivate a new and potentially significant arms supply relationship with Moscow. Last week, in concert with the return of the Houthis to the FTO list, the Treasury Department sanctioned seven high-ranking Houthi officials who, according to the statement, had allegedly “smuggled military-grade items and weapon systems into Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen and also negotiated Houthi weapons procurements from Russia.” Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent’s statement explaining the sanctions designations said: “By seeking weapons from a growing array of international suppliers, Houthi leaders have shown their intent to continue their reckless and destabilizing actions in the Red Sea region…The United States will use all available tools to disrupt the Houthis’ terrorist activities and degrade their ability to threaten U.S. personnel, our regional partners, and global maritime trade.”
The Treasury Department sanctions announcement provided some specifics in its designations, implicitly messaging Russia and other governments, as well as global businesses, to refrain from engaging with Houthi officials and operatives. Those named included Mohammad Abdulsalam, the Houthis’ Oman-based spokesman, sanctioned for “facilitat[ing] the Houthis’ efforts to secure weapons and other support from Russia.” He reportedly has traveled to Moscow to meet with Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs personnel and coordinated with Russian military personnel to arrange Houthi delegations to Russia. Abdulwali Abdoh Hasan Al-Jabri (Al-Jabri), a Houthi militia commander, was sanctioned for using his company, Al-Jabri General Trading and Investment Co (Al-Jabri Co), to “facilitate the transfer of Yemeni civilians to Russian military units fighting in Ukraine in exchange for cash, generating a new source of revenue on behalf of Houthi leaders.” The Treasury Department accused the Houthis of recruiting members of Yemen’s most vulnerable populations to fight in Ukraine, “often under false and misleading pretenses,” in what amounted to a “lucrative human smuggling operation.” Trump officials reportedly hope to use their engagement with Russia on the Ukraine issue to halt any Russian weapons flow to the Houthis if such weapons are being provided, although Russian officials are likely to demand some sanctions relief as a precondition.
