Eurasia Press & News
As of the writing of this article, American efforts to end the Russo-Ukrainian War remain stalemated like the fighting itself. None of the parties involved, Russia, Ukraine, or the United States, have the power to force their will upon the other(s) to make peace. At the same time, neither of the two combatants is so exhausted as to be unable to wage war. This has been demonstrated by Russia’s indifference to American entreaties and Ukraine’s refusal to formally cede any of its territorial integrity. Based on the will and resources of both warring parties and the uncertainty at this juncture of a negotiated settlement, the Russo-Ukrainian War is likely to continue into the indefinite future.
President Trump’s administration has invested considerable time, effort, and political capital trying to end this war. However, it is possible that a “deal” that both warring parties can agree on to stop the war in Ukraine does not exist, and the conditions that Russia wants will weaken US national security. In its zeal for a deal, the administration must be careful not to strengthen America’s enemies or weaken itself. The United States will not be safer if it creates a stronger Russia and a venturous China. America has the power to bring peace to Ukraine, not by trying to balance between two implacable foes, but by making sure one wins and the other loses for the United States’ benefit.
The Russo-Ukrainian War
The war between Russia and Ukraine is not over territory but national identity. Russian President Vladimir Putin wants to destroy Ukrainian national identity—the sense that Ukrainians are distinct from Russians and consequently free to make their own way in the world separate from Moscow. Ukrainians are fighting to affirm their distinct identity. Both the Kremlin and Kyiv see the war as an existential conflict, even as a “holy war,” and are prepared to fight for years to achieve victory.
This is why negotiations are unlikely to bring an enduring peace. It would require either Putin to acknowledge Ukraine’s right to exist separate from Russia and return territory, including Crimea, or Ukraine to acknowledge Russian suzerainty. Negotiations are also unlikely to bring a ceasefire for more than a short period of time. Neither side can give up. Both sides face great military and economic challenges. The outcome of the war may depend on which side can last until those challenges collapse the other from within.
War and Peace from the Kremlin’s Perspective
Russia should be eager to accept a ceasefire that keeps its territorial gains and reduces sanctions. Why then does it keep fighting? The primary reason is that Putin likely believes stopping the war without achieving his war aims would threaten his hold on power.
Putin’s goals have been clear since the beginning of the war: the subjugation of Ukraine and formal recognition by NATO of Russia’s sphere of influence in the former Warsaw Pact states and Soviet republics. For this, Putin has sacrificed a million Russian men, killed or maimed, and has substantially weakened Russia’s civilian economy. Putin must present to the Russian people, both the general population and the elites, a victory that consecrates these losses into a tangible gain for all. To accept less would create an unstable domestic situation that could threaten his hold on power.
Putin is on a treadmill he cannot get off until he achieves his goal of turning Kyiv into a satrap. Russia’s 2014 and 2022 invasions of Ukraine have turned the two countries, formerly close in terms of history, culture, linguistics, trade, and even intermarriage, into implacable enemies. By seizing 20 percent of Ukraine, Russia has ensured that the main national sentiment uniting Ukrainians for generations will be the recovery of their territory. This happened after the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871 when the loss of Alsace-Lorraine made revanche against Germany a national goal across France’s political spectrum. Therefore, a ceasefire along a 600-mile front line will require maintaining a large Russian army there to protect its conquest.
Manning that army will not be easy. Russia’s army has only been able to fill its ranks for three years via the one-time expedient of emptying its prisons and by offering recruits from Russia’s impoverished hinterlands exorbitant bonuses and death benefits. Thus, for many poor Russians, it became a reasonable economic decision to risk likely death or dismemberment and enlist. Recently, even these measures have not provided enough manpower, forcing Moscow to hire North Korean mercenaries. Russia’s quid pro quo to Kim Jong Un for this is still unknown but likely quite costly.
With a ceasefire, Russia will not need as many recruits for its army of occupation since it will not be suffering 30,000–40,000 casualties monthly. However, can it maintain the same financial incentives to attract recruits once the shooting stops? Will it instead be forced to send conscripts to man the 600-mile front line as well as protect the other hundreds of miles of Russia’s border with Ukraine? Soldiers currently at the front will want to be demobilized after a ceasefire. While their demands are unlikely to be met immediately, how long can they be kept on active service, and where will their replacements come from? The only way for Putin to solve this dilemma is to ensure that Ukraine can never threaten Russia’s conquests, and for this, he needs to install a pliable government in Kyiv. Until then, he must recruit, support, and pay for an army of occupation, larger than any force Ukraine can field, for years or decades to come.
Russia must also ensure its army maintains at least parity in weapons and ammunition. Since during a ceasefire the Russian army would no longer be expending ammunition or losing equipment, this would seem an easy task. However, Russia’s production of armored vehicles is hamstrung by Western sanctions and the limitations of its industrial base. The war has forced Russia to use up its seemingly inexhaustible reserves of Soviet-era weapons. Those reserves are now almost gone. While Russia’s ammunition production is greater than the West’s and it has received large amounts of ammunition, drones, and ballistic missiles from North Korea and Iran, Russia will have to decide how much it can spend on bullets and on butter in the wake of a ceasefire.
A ceasefire will raise expectations among a long-suffering population that economic relief is at hand. However, Putin faces a two-sided economic trap regarding any decision to either maintain a war economy to deal with a revanchist Ukraine or reorient Russia’s economy back to a peacetime footing.
The Kremlin could justify keeping Russia’s war economy and the corresponding need for civilian sacrifices, as it always does, by exaggerating foreign threats. If defense spending continues at high levels, this could soften the chance of a recession caused by a sudden decrease in government spending. Maintaining the army at its current size would also keep unemployment from rising due to demobilized soldiers looking for work.
However, this would not address the lack of growth in the civilian economy or major macroeconomic issues such as continued inflation. The Kremlin will face rising social expectations that a ceasefire will result in an improved economy that benefits those beyond the military-industrial complex. A continued wartime economy will not return the human capital that fled Russia to avoid the war that it now needs to invigorate its economy. While the Russian people are known for their ability to suffer and sacrifice, at some point, the question as to why further sacrifices are necessary will challenge the veneer of legitimacy that Putin’s regime strives to maintain. If Russia’s economy does not improve after a ceasefire, Putin could face social discontent leading up to the September 2026 Duma elections. While the elections are certain to be fixed, a reaction to greater than usual electoral fraud and poor economic conditions could lead to unrest even greater than occurred between December 2011 and July 2013, when nationwide protests arose first over legislative election fraud and then over Putin’s return for a third term. Those protests, especially in Moscow’s Bolotnaya Square and the March of Millions in May 2012, greatly impacted Putin’s thinking regarding his regime’s security. It is not a situation he would like to face again.
Nevertheless, returning Russia’s economy to a peacetime footing will not automatically create prosperity for the average Russian due to possible continued Western sanctions (at least by Europe), limited foreign direct investment (FDI), and structural issues within Russia’s economy. Even if the United States lifts sanctions on Russia, the European Union (EU) and the United Kingdom will likely continue to impose them. Companies willing to face EU sanctions may not be willing to face Russia’s business climate, which remains corrupt and lacks a legal system to guarantee the sanctity of contracts. Additionally, the cancellation of government defense contracts would lead to laid-off defense workers joining demobilized soldiers on the unemployment rolls. Firms that retooled to handle defense contracts would be hard pressed to find the capital to retool back to civilian pursuits due to interest rates above 20 percent to combat chronic inflation. Therefore, Russia’s economy would face strong recessionary pressures whenever it transitions from a wartime economy back to a peacetime one.
Recessions are natural when economies transition from war to peace. The United States experienced recessions after World War I, World War II, and the Korean War due to demobilization and a decrease in government spending. However, while recessions in democratic societies are like a cold, they are akin to pneumonia in autocratic ones if a restive population is suffering from a poor economy with hundreds of thousands of young men unable to find work (including many veterans with post-traumatic stress). This is a possible scenario that Putin faces if he achieves only an unstable ceasefire. Thus, Putin likely believes he needs a total victory to install a puppet government in Kyiv that does not threaten Russia’s imperial conquests and forces Western recognition of those conquests. Then he could demobilize his army, switch from a wartime to a peacetime economy, and receive loans and credits from abroad to prevent a serious economic downturn. Putin probably also knows that such a victory is not yet on the horizon.
This is why continuing the war may be the safest bet for Putin until he achieves his desired two-fold victory over Kyiv and its Western allies. However, this bet too has risks. In 2025, Russia’s National Wealth Fund, a “rainy-day” reserve that has allowed the Kremlin to weather sanctions and a lack of FDI, could exhaust itself. To keep funding the war and social needs, the Kremlin must further increase taxes or find other ways to obtain funds, such as the mandatory purchase of government bonds as in Soviet times. This occurs already in the business world. Russian banks are required to extend credits to defense industries that may never be repaid. This off-the-books method of financing the war fuels inflation and could wreck Russia’s banking system if defense firms default on loans when government contracts end. Besides this, Russia faces another macroeconomic challenge if low oil prices persist. Russia’s Ministry of Economic Development estimatesthat the price of Urals crude oil could fall to $56 a barrel in 2025. This will further stress Russia’s state budget because it is based on estimated revenues of Russian crude being sold at $69 a barrel. Whether it is engaged in war or peace, the Kremlin faces risks of economic stagnation or stagflation along with military stalemate. The Kremlin needs a victory sooner rather than later. Otherwise, Russians may repeat the catchphrase title from the late Soviet-era film by Stanislav Govorukhin, We Cannot Live Like This, and take action to change a situation they find intolerable.
Ukraine in the Balance
Ukraine faces equally tough challenges in trying to regain its territorial integrity. It may be willing to delay achieving that goal but is unlikely to abandon it. After three years of war, no Ukrainian political party or figure could argue against that goal and still win an election. Hence, there can be no compromise on war aims, although there may be patience. Ukraine also has many political and economic challenges. While it has made progress in democratic governance, it still faces endemic corruption and one day will have to restart regular political discourse via elections to deal with political, social, and economic issues that require the consent of the electorate. It must also address a military situation defined by two major factors: limited reserves of manpower and a possible cutoff of US military aid.
The failed Ukrainian counteroffensive of 2023, the early culmination of its 2024 offensive toward Kursk, and the slow but continued progress of Russian forces in Donbas indicate that the Ukrainian army has limited reserves to either exploit success or counterattack and regain ground. This can be attributed to three major factors: Ukraine’s limited population in comparison to Russia’s, the size of the battlefield, and the decision not to draft young men under 25 years old. The first two factors are constants. Ukraine’s population will not increase relative to Russia’s, and it too must man a 600-mile front line in southeast Ukraine plus guard against Russian incursions from the northeast or along its 674-mile border with Belarus. The third factor regarding drafting its youth can change and would increase Kyiv’s manpower pool. The reason the Ukrainian government has yet to do so is based on long-term national defense considerations. Like Russia, Ukraine is in demographic decline, and it is particularly evident in the smaller number of 20–24-year-olds in its population as the chart below shows.
Source: populationpyramid.net
Ukraine’s population is expected to decrease as the century continues from 38 million people today to 31 million by 2050. Ukraine must carefully calculate the use of its most critical resource—its people. So far, it has decided to conserve part of its military-age population, fearing that the struggle with Russia will be a long one. The flip side of this decision is that, by depriving itself now of sufficient forces, a long struggle may become a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Ukraine has made up for the imbalance of forces on the battlefield with better morale, tactics, training, and especially equipment such as drones that now account for eighty percent of Russian casualties. Since 2022, the Ukrainian army has transitioned itself under fire from a force equipped predominantly with Soviet-era equipment to one that primarily uses NATO weapons and ammunition. However, a cutoff of US aid will greatly harm Ukraine’s military situation. Aid provided by the previous US administration and voted for by the last US Congress will end this summer. After Ukraine and the United States signed a minerals deal on April 30, the Trump administration gave its first approval for the sale of $50 million military equipment to Ukraine. Still, it has yet to present a major aid package to Congress for 2025, and past administration statements leave much doubt about future support. If previous statements to cut Ukrainian aid as part of a “deal” with Russia to end the war come to pass, this will greatly impair Ukraine’s ability to defend itself especially from air attack.
This last point is important because air attacks against Ukraine’s civilian population and energy infrastructure are key to Putin’s strategy to destroy Ukrainian morale and force its government to capitulate. The Kremlin understands that it is unlikely to destroy the Ukrainian army without also destroying its own. As the chart below indicates, Russian losses steeply increased in 2024 without any appreciable increase in occupied territory. Furthermore, Russian forces are still far from major urban areas such as Kyiv, Dnipro, Odessa, Zaporizhzhia, etc. Past battles for much smaller cities like Bakhmut and Mariupol have shown Russia it cannot afford other such urban combat “victories” to compel Ukraine to surrender.
Unable to seize major urban areas or cross the Dnipro River, Russia seeks to wear down Ukraine’s army and destroy civilian morale to create a sense of hopelessness and unrest that will lead to the installation of a compliant government. This is consistent with previous Russian actions in Chechnya and Syria, as well as Soviet strategy in Afghanistan that targeted the civilian population to end resistance.
Facing these challenges, what is Ukraine’s theory of victory to counter Russia’s strategy?
In the first years of the war, Ukraine’s theory of victory was to destroy the Russian army in the field. This was a plausible strategy based on the Russian army’s weaknesses in logistics and leadership. However, the successful counterattacks of 2022 could not be repeated in 2023 as the Russian army was given time to adapt and build fortifications. It did not fall apart as it might have if it had been hit harder earlier. Today, it appears that Ukraine’s strategy has bifurcated. It still aims to destroy Russia’s army by concentrating long-range firepower on its logistics and command and control, hoping to collapse it from within. However, Ukraine is also trying to set conditions to cause a political collapse of Russian will. This may have influenced Ukraine’s decision to invade Russia proper in 2024. The Kursk offensive embarrassed Moscow but culminated too quickly from a lack of reserves, so it did not achieve the desired political effects. Ukraine today fights on two fronts, military and political, hoping that the Russian army will eventually break from heavy losses, brutal treatment by its own officers, and limited logistics or that the Russian economy will collapse due to factors mentioned earlier causing political unrest that undermines its ability to wage war. To achieve the latter goal requires continued sanctions and even their tightening. This is why Kyiv signed a minerals agreement to encourage the current administration to continue American support. Ukraine’s strategy requires time, luck, and the support of allies, especially the United States. But is it in the United States’ interest to help Ukraine not just survive but win?
The United States: Where Should it Turn?
There are those in the United States who think not. Some believe Ukraine cannot win and further aid only prolongs the war. Others believe that Ukraine distracts from Taiwan and Asia in general by diverting scarce US military resources. Another outlook is that Ukraine belongs in Russia’s sphere of influence, and therefore, Moscow has the right to create its own security sphere.
The first school of thought is too deterministic, reducing war to a series of computations and ignoring the lessons of history that it is also a clash of wills filled with unpredictable events and not subject at times to rationality. Small forces have defeated larger ones. Russian/Soviet history confirms this, as does American history. A recent example is the victory of Syrian rebel forces over the Assad regime and its Russian and Iranian military allies. That victory also illustrates that autocratic regimes are often brittle and can appear strong even when they are near collapse. This was true of Assad’s regime as well as the Soviet Union in the 1980s. The Soviet Union dissolved in 1991 partly because Ukrainians decided to leave it. Kyiv is betting it can bring down another autocratic regime. However, Ukraine’s determination to keep fighting is based on hope and fear. Russian atrocities including murders, rapes, and medieval style pillage and brigandry show what to expect if Russia wins. In occupied areas, Ukrainians see civic leaders murdered, people tortured, children kidnapped, property destroyed or stolen, and basic freedoms of speech, press, religion, and assembly crushed. Ukraine is on a treadmill too, knowing that if it stops fighting, part of it will be lost forever, and the other part will become like Belarus once it is “denazified” by Russia.
To follow this first school of thought would harm American security interests by undermining relationships with allies and partners (current and future) and their willingness to buy American arms and support the United States in its future endeavors.
Another negative aspect would be increased nuclear proliferation. The example of the United States ceasing support to a democratic nation fighting against an aggressor may cause other states to believe security must now come from their own nuclear weapons and not from reliance on America’s nuclear umbrella. Yet, nuclear weapons programs would take money away from needed investments in conventional forces without providing added security. Unless a state has the money and means to field survivable nuclear forces with a credible second-strike capacity (via mobile missiles suitably hidden or a fleet of nuclear submarines with some constantly at sea), its nuclear forces become a tempting preemptive target. While increased spending on conventional forces by American allies and partners benefits the United States, nuclear proliferation may increase nuclear risks if forces are vulnerable. Once the “nuclear proliferation taboo” is broken, the chance that nuclear weapons could be used against the US or allied forces increases.
The other school of thought that aid sent to Ukraine should instead be sent to Asia ignores the differences between the threats in these two regions. Russia uses land power to attack or intimidate neighbors. Defending Ukraine requires military aid mostly optimized for ground combat or air defense. The threat to American interests in Asia comes largely from China’s naval and air power. Defending Asian allies and partners requires air and naval forces, although there is an overlap in air defense requirements. Foreign leaders throughout the Pacific have advised the United States that the best way to deter China is to defeat Russia. They fear the example of Russia outlasting the West in Ukraine will motivate a better armed and resourced China to attempt similar aggression against Taiwan and elsewhere.
Some who believe Asia is more important than Europe also believe that the United States must side with Russia against Ukraine to decouple Moscow from Beijing. This is known as the “reverse Kissinger” approach. It theorizes that if the United States provides enough concessions to Russia, the Kremlin will jettison its alliance with China and join the United States to balance against Beijing.
This realpolitik approach is unrealistic. Today’s great power triangle and international situation is completely different from when Nixon initiated his opening to China in 1971. Furthermore, that move did not change the geopolitical balance as much as Nixon hoped since China did not pressure North Vietnam to end the Vietnam War on American terms. Nixon’s opening to China was only possible because of a rare alignment of geopolitical stars. China was in turmoil after the Cultural Revolution, and its rivalry with the Soviet Union over leadership of the Communist movement had led to border clashes and the threat of a preemptive Soviet nuclear strike. Then, Beijing needed Washington because Moscow was an existential threat. Now, Moscow does not need Washington because Beijing is not (yet) that threat.
Moscow and Beijing are no longer divided by a common ideology but united by a mutual desire to maintain their autocratic systems and a common loathing of the West. There is no guarantee that if Washington ended aid to Ukraine and lifted sanctions on Russia that this would change Moscow’s view of the United States as its main opponent. Nothing prevents Putin from pocketing concessions and continuing his close relationship with Beijing. The mutual economic and military benefits that Russia and China enjoy from their relationship outweigh anything the United States can offer. Furthermore, even if the United States made major concessions to appease Russia, the Kremlin cannot count on these being permanent due to the constant ebb and flow of American electoral politics. Putin probably understands that China is a long-term threat to Russia’s territorial integrity in its far east. If so, why would he want to anger the world’s second largest economic and military power just to please the United States? Moreover, he has always seen the greatest threat to his hold on power as coming from the Western democracies and not from a fellow autocrat. It is the same mistake Joseph Stalin made allying with Adolf Hitler instead of the Western democracies in 1939.
The actual result of a “reverse Kissinger” strategy would not be the United States separating Russia from China but Russia and China separating the United States from its liberal, democratic allies in Europe and Asia. This leads to another view of why the United States should abandon Ukraine to Russia.
This viewpoint was recently described in a Foreign Affairs essay and posits that the United States, Russia, and China should not compete but collude to manage international order within definable spheres of influence. The three powers would be the ultimate arbiters of order in their respective spheres in a modern-day version of the Melian dialogue.
This concept is flawed in numerous ways. It assumes the rest of the world will accept the diktats of the Big Three. It ignores the complexity of modern economic supply chains and would severely weaken America’s ties with trading partners. It is a fanciful idea, but it has real consequences if allowed to become a guidepost for American policy with Ukraine. Such a policy would have the United States betray allies and partners to depend on the goodwill of its enemies. Any practitioner of realpolitik would see that this would tilt the balance of power against the United States. America would still have two powerful enemies, but it would be stripped of allies.
Conclusion: What Should Be Done?
What result of the Russo-Ukrainian War is best for American national security, and what policy should America pursue to achieve it?
The best result will be one that ensures Russia neither benefits from its invasions of Ukraine nor is ever encouraged again to change a border by force. The best policy to achieve this would be to provide Ukraine the necessary means in terms of offensive and defensive firepower to overcome its manpower deficit with Russia while continuing to make Russia face economic consequences for its aggression. This might threaten Russia’s autocratic regime (the one thing Putin holds most dear) and warn China of the consequences of similar aggression in Asia. American aid should be designed to help Ukraine achieve its war aims be it within a year, five years, or a generation. Europe can provide enough support to keep Ukraine from collapsing, but only the United States can provide the resources for it to win. It cannot do this by providing aid that is too little, too late, and too regulated. Instead, a new aid package will need more air defense, long-range strike assets, and fewer restrictions on the use of the latter.
While American aid may not guarantee Ukrainian victory, Washington should not impose defeat on Ukraine based on unrealistic theories that weaken the United States in the long run by favoring enemies over allies. Tactics, such as voting against a United Nations (UN) resolution condemning Russian aggression against Ukraine as an expedient to gain Russia’s trust, are counterproductive and misread the men who occupy the Kremlin. Such actions are seen by these men as weakness (they know they are the aggressors and are proud of it) and create a belief that the United States can be further manipulated into providing more concessions. It also reinforces Putin’s belief that he can win this war. Appeasing Russia at the UN or offering to recognize its conquest of Crimea only makes America look weak in Moscow’s eyes and therefore undermines its ability to deal with Russia and, by extension, China from a position of strength.
To understand better why the United States should support an evolving democracy against an aggressor bent on its destruction, one should look to an earlier time, a different conflict, but a similar situation and arguments. Before Israel was even formally a state—but already threatened with destruction—its political leadership, the Jewish Agency, sent a young lady and former Milwaukee school teacher to America to raise funds to buy weapons to defend itself. On January 2, 1948, that lady arrived in Chicago to give a speech. She was not a public speaker and was uncomfortable with her mission. When the toastmaster of the event called on her to speak, she moved hesitantly to the podium and spoke these words.
“You cannot decide,” she said, “whether we should fight or not. We will. . . . That decision is taken. Nobody can change it. You can only decide one thing: whether we shall be victorious in this fight or whether [our enemy] will be victorious.”That speaker was Golda Meir. Her fundraising was successful and helped provide the arms to create the nascent Israeli army.
The parallels between Meir’s speech and Ukraine’s needs are clear. Either the United States helps Ukraine, or it will be complicit in its destruction. Such complicity will damage US national security by strengthening enemies, driving away allies, harming international trade, increasing nuclear proliferation, encouraging new wars of territorial conquest, and ending America’s role as the leader of the Free World. The international system, as chaotic and dangerous as it is, would become even more dangerous for America from the consequences that will follow if the United States forces Ukraine into an unjust arrangement with Russia via either action or inaction. There would be less stability and fewer allies for the United States, American investments abroad would be less safe, and Americans at home would be less prosperous. Therefore, what the United States should strive for in Ukraine is not peace at any price, because that will be bad for both countries, but a deal that makes America stronger by making its enemies weaker.
