Deteriorated Situations

Türkiye

Govt blamed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and Syrian affiliate for deadly Istanbul bombing that killed six, launching strikes in Syria and Iraq and threatening new ground operations.

Govt attributed Istanbul attack to PKK and Syrian affiliate People’s Protection Units (YPG). In first street bombing targeting civilians since 2017, explosion 13 Nov in bustling Istanbul street killed six and injured at least 81 civilians; officials immediately blamed “the [PKK and YPG]”. Security forces 14 Nov announced arrest of alleged bomber and Syrian national Ahlam Albashir and 49 other suspects; PKK and YPG-led Syrian Democratic Forces 14 Nov separately denied involvement. Govt 28 Nov claimed new evidence linking plot to YPG.

Military announced new operations in Syria and Iraq. Following bomb attack, military 20 Nov began “Operation Claw Sword”, conducting airstrikes in northern Syria and Iraq against scores of alleged PKK and YPG targets (see Syria and Iraq). President Erdoğan next day signalled possible ground incursions in both countries and 28 Nov stated govt was “determined to root out the PKK” in both; threat of ground incursion in northern Syria appeared more likely than in Iraq, and could trigger displacement and fuel escalatory cycle of violence with YPG (see Syria). Retaliatory cross-border attacks from northern Syria increased: notably, rocket attack 21 Nov killed three civilians in Gaziantep province. Earlier, operations against PKK within country concentrated on rural areas of Bitlis, Tunceli and Hakkari provinces.

Tensions with Greece remained elevated. Erdoğan 16 Nov reiterated threats that Türkiye “can come suddenly one night” and criticised Greece’s alleged militarisation of Aegean islands; Greece’s FM Nikos Dendias same day condemned threat. Meanwhile, Greek military 10 Nov reported Turkish armed drone flew over Greek islet of Kandelioussa. Turkish Oil Exploration Company 25 Nov said drillship was planning new mission in eastern Mediterranean, triggering uproar in Greek media.

In other important developments. Security forces arrested at least 90 individuals countrywide with alleged links to Islamic State. Ruling party officials 6 Nov met Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), signalling manoeuvring ahead of 2023 elections. Ankara continued efforts to normalise relations with Israel, Armenia and Egypt.

Israel/Palestine

Double bombing rocked Jerusalem amid heightened volatility in West Bank, and victory of far-right coalition could bring even more destabilising policies in near future.

Deadly bombings struck Jerusalem as Israeli and Palestinian violence continued in West Bank. In first such attack since 2016, unclaimed bombings at two bus stops in Jerusalem during rush hour 23 Nov killed one Israeli teenager and wounded at least 18, and raised prospect of further attacks. In West Bank, near-daily clashes between Israeli forces and Palestinians continued, as Israel conducted over 170 raids in West Bank and killed at least 18 Palestinians, bringing deaths in 2022 to at least 205. Palestinians killed several Israelis; notably, 15 Nov killed three in Ariel settlement. In incident that may portend greater state-sanctioned settler violence, 30,000 Israeli settlers 19 Nov entered Hebron where hundreds vandalised Palestinian properties and attacked Palestinians. Shin Bet head mid-month reportedly warned of imminent collapse of Palestinian Authority. Meanwhile, in first launches since Aug ceasefire, Gaza-based militants 3 Nov fired rockets into Israel; Israeli aircraft next day struck alleged Hamas rocket-making facility in Gaza.

Right-wing coalition led by former PM Netanyahu won Israeli elections. In 1 Nov Israeli elections, voters elected most right-wing parliament in Israel’s history, as former PM Benjamin Netanyahu’s bloc won 64 of 120 Knesset seats with 14 going to ultra-conservative, anti-Arab Religious Zionist alliance. President Herzog 13 Nov tasked Netanyahu with forming govt, which may give far-right members control of police and army; possible policies such as encouraging formation of Jewish militias could ignite violence in mixed Arab-Jewish cities and occupied territories, while potential visit by far-right leader to Jerusalem’s Holy Esplanade could dramatically inflame tensions.

In other important developments. In East Jerusalem, Israeli authorities confiscated or demolished around dozen Palestinian-owned buildings. UN decolonization committee 11 Nov adopted Palestinian-drafted resolution requesting International Court of Justice to provide legal opinion on Israel’s occupation. Defence minister 14 Nov revealed U.S. Justice Dept opened investigation into killing of U.S.-Palestinian journalist Shireen Abu Akleh. Syrian state media reported Israeli strikes 13, 19 Nov killed six Syrian soldiers (see Syria).

Lebanon

Country entered presidential vacuum, which may persist indefinitely so long as political blocs fail to find compromise, while absence of new govt further impaired efforts to address economic crisis.

Country entered presidential vacuum, which could extend for months or years. Parliamentary blocs made no tangible progress on appointing replacement for outgoing President Michel Aoun, whose six-year term ended on 31 Oct. House Speaker Nabih Berri convened parliamentary voting sessions on 10, 17 and 24 Nov, but none made progress; Michel Moawad favoured by anti-Hizbollah camp in his best showing 10 Nov received 44 votes in first round, short of 86 required for outright first-round win, as pro-Hizbollah alliance continued to return blank votes and refrained from offering alternative candidate amid lack of agreement within bloc.

Presidential vacuum boded ill for forming empowered govt. Prospects of forming new govt without president’s election remained exceedingly dim, as politicians generally accept that caretaker govt exercising presidential prerogatives cannot approve new cabinet. Further weakening current caretaker administration, PM Mikati had late Oct announced that he will convene cabinet only “for urgent matters” during vacuum. Constant debates over presidential choices and constitutionality of govt activity could absorb most of political leadership’ already minimal policymaking capacity, allowing economic crisis to deepen.

State budget entered into force amid concern over worsening economic crisis. Country’s 2022 state budget 15 Nov came into effect, one of several International Monetary Fund (IMF) requirements to unlock potential financial aid package. Notably, budget ended long-defunct official exchange rate of 1,507.5 Lebanese pounds to $1 and adopted significantly higher exchange rates for customs (15,000 pounds for $1); ten-fold increase in customs fees could fuel another bout of inflation, thereby reducing purchasing power and increasing poverty amid soaring energy prices at onset of winter; measure also raised concern that projected state revenue will be less than anticipated. World Food Programme 22 Nov announced it had earmarked $5.4bn in food assistance for next three years, noting food prices are 16 times higher than Oct 2019, when Lebanon’s economic crisis became widely apparent.

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