What Do We Know About Self-Finance Terrorism?

Abstract: The landscape of terrorist financing has transformed owing to the self-starter phenomenon, characteristics of terrorist organizations, self-funded terrorism, and weapons of choice. On a different note, nationally and internationally, financial institutions still rely on traditional counterterrorist financing policies. These policies against the financing of terrorism were drafted as a result of the 9/11 attacks to identify large, complex attacks financed through the international financial system. Unfortunately, the policies have proven to be redundant in tracing the financial footprint of small cells and lone actors – such groups use little to no money to fund their activities. So far, the anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism policies have been studied from their ability to trigger suspicious reports and cost-of-compliance perspectives, but not from the perspective that seeks to answer why the existing system is insufficient at detecting self-funded terrorism.

Problem statement: Can the financial footprints of small cell groups be traced using the formal standards for countering terror finance that were established during the aftermath of 9/11?

So what?: The policymakers need to revise countering the financing of terrorism policies to include small cells that have successfully evolved under the radar of global counter-terrorism financing.

The Phenomenon of Self-Financing Terrorism

In terrorist financing, the role of funding is extensively discussed. Earlier, there was no distinction between legal and illegal money. This concept was, however, challenged after the multiple terrorist attacks in the USA on September 11, 2001. These attacks compelled scholars and policymakers to rethink the validity of the concept of neutrality of money[1] and further distinguish money as lawful, criminal, and grey based on the source of originality. The term grey money is used when the origin of money is unclear. In the modern economy, money is categorized according to different dimensions: white money, grey money, and dirty money. “White money” is derived from banks, investors, and fund managers, while “grey money” is accumulated from tax evasion and corruption. “Dirty money” represents the profits of crime. This kind of money is officially referred to as “proceeds of crime”. It includes proceeds that are sourced from illicit arms trafficking, illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs, human trafficking and smuggling, and other serious criminal offences.[2]

After categorizing money according to its source of originality, policymakers implemented anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism laws to restrict the use of money for illegal purposes. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) promulgated international standards to combat money laundering, terrorist financing, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.[3] Previously, the FATF recommendations had been concentrated on laundering the proceeds of crime, but with the September 11 terrorist attacks in the USA, the scope of the FATF expanded to capture the financing of terrorism, too.[4] The FATF has unique recommendations in place to curb terrorist financing, such as criminalizing the offence of terrorist financing, implementing targeted financial sanctions against terrorism and terrorist financing, and preventing non-profit organizations from being misused.

The Financial Action Task Force promulgated international standards to combat money laundering, terrorist financing, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

When analysing the unique recommendations on terrorist financing, it can be observed that the FATF has prohibited money from being used for terrorism, irrespective of whether it is white money, grey money, or dirty money. However, with the concept of self-financing terrorism, the distinction of money based on its originality has once again become a major point of discussion. With the trend of self-funding terrorist activities, it is necessary to overview the FATF recommendation to evaluate whether the present structure of countering the financing of terrorism is sufficient to curb self-funding terrorism.

The self-funding of terrorism is a relatively new phenomenon. There is no specific definition of what is meant by self-financing terrorism. The term “self-financing terrorism” is generally understood to mean funding one’s own terrorist activities through legitimate sources[5] and excluding money earned through criminal activities. In this paper, self-financing terrorism will be defined as small cells or lone actors using legitimate or apparently legitimate money to commit any form of terrorist activity, even without direct links to terrorist activities. The term “apparently legitimate money” applies when money is derived from legitimate sources but uses illegal methods to derive such legitimate money. For example, a bank loan has been obtained by producing forged documents.

The offence of self-financing terrorism compelled policymakers once again to rethink the use of legitimate money. As a method to counter the financing of terrorism, there are several recommendations implemented to restrict the use of legitimate money for terrorist activities in the form of donations to charity organizations or fund-raising activities conducted by terrorist organizations or transferring money via non-profit organizations.[6]

When analysing studies of territory-controlling terrorist groups, such as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), and new terrorism that is based on the concept of extremism,[7] it is observed that both forms of terrorism relied on donations, legitimate businesses, and criminality to finance their activities. While both forms derived money legitimately, the concept of “self-funding for terrorism” was not highlighted in the discussions of financing territory-controlling terrorist groups. It was revealed that the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) leaders encouraged foreigners to join the organization as terrorist fighters.[8] Since ISIL recruits people across borders, the organization encourages people to use their own money to enter the conflict zones in Iraq and Syria, which can also be perceived as ‘funding one’s own terrorist activities’. In such a situation, the funding requirement was limited to crossing borders.[9] IS leaders reassure their supporters that after crossing borders, they, as foreign terrorist fighters, will be looked after by the organisation.

The concept of funding one’s own terrorist activities benefits terrorist organizations and, on the other hand, a particular terrorist as well. When people use their own money to commit terrorist activities, it will not create any financial burden on the terrorist organization. Further, when individuals only need to self-fund for a specific purpose, i.e., ‘to cross international borders’, foreign terrorist fighters need money only to cover the basic expenses, such as transportation, accommodation, food, and clothing, until they have reached their destination or crossed borders.[10]

When people use their own money to commit terrorist activities, it will not create any financial burden on the terrorist organization.

Previous research[11] provides examples of how foreign terrorist fighters fulfil their financial needs, such as money derived through employment income, social assistance schemes, family loans, and bank accounts. These examples indicate that foreign terrorist fighters rely on legitimate money, which does not draw the attention of law enforcement agencies. The FATF[12] research only focused on the self-funding methods of foreign terrorist fighters and did not go into detail to examine whether the counter-terrorism measures in place are adequate to capture the financial footprint of self-funding methods.

When analysing the 2019 terrorist attacks in Sri Lanka, it was established that ISIL holds the capacity and capability to conduct attacks beyond its territory. The suicide terrorists involved in the 2019 terrorist attacks in Sri Lanka were neither reported as returning foreign terrorist fighters nor as people with past criminal records.[13] To date, it remains rather unclear as to how the Sri Lankan ISIL terrorist activities have been financed.

Suicide Terrorism on Easter Sunday 2019

For the purpose of this research, the financial flows of the hardcore terrorists, namely (1) Zahran Hazim, (2)Mohamed Ibrahim Inshaf Ahamed, (3)Mohamed Ibrahim Ilham Ahamed, (4)Alawdeen Ahmed Muad, (5)Atchchi Muhammadu Muhammadu Hasthun, (6)Mohamed Azam Mohamed Mubarak, (7)Abdul Lathif Jameel Mohammed, (8)Mohamed Nassar Mohamed Asad and (9)Fathima Ilham, who deployed suicide terrorist attacks on Easter Sunday in 2019, was analysed. It has to be noted that, after the Easter Sunday attacks, multiple explosions occurred again in the Sainthamaruthu area, functioning as reverberations of the Easter Sunday attacks. The relatives of Zahran Hazim, including his father and brother, conducted said aftershocks. It was claimed that these attacks were also funded by the same sources of financing and should, therefore, be taken as a whole for the purpose of analysis.

The central question of this research is to identify the self-funding terrorism that derives from legitimate sources. The sources of self-funding terrorism are diverse. The following examples provide an idea of what could be taken as sources of self-funding terrorism. To identify legitimate sources of money, the perpetrator’s educational level, vocational skills, or access to legitimate sources of money: bank loans, pawning, and financial assistance given by the government under schemes to eliminate poverty, such as Samurdhi, first needed to be understood. Further, the family background of the perpetrators was discussed to understand whether they earned money through inheritance. In those discussions, past criminal records were also assessed to identify the nexus between criminality and access to the proceeds of crime. The discussions finally led to an understanding of whether the perpetrators were affiliated with a terrorist organization or received money from external sources.

To identify legitimate sources of money, the perpetrator’s educational level, vocational skills, or access to legitimate sources of money: bank loans, pawning, and financial assistance given by the government under schemes to eliminate poverty first needed to be understood.

Formation of a Small Cell

It has become difficult to identify small cell groups because the formation of the small cell may be done by people who do not have past criminal records. Naufer Mawlawi, the extremist ideologist preacher, indoctrinated Zaharan Hazim, who was also a Mawlawi, to spread the propaganda of IS. Zaharan Hazim was the leader of the National Thowheed Jamant organisation and was famous for his charismatic public speaking skills. After becoming indoctrinated, Zahran Hazim delivered hate speeches through social media to increase his followers and led the Easter Sunday attacks. At the time of the suicide attacks in 2019, an open warrant was issued for his arrest at any time, irrespective of the jurisdiction.

Further, Abdul Lathif Jameel Mohammed was the other member who was known by law enforcement authorities but was not recognised as a perpetrator until the Easter Sunday attacks. He had traveled to the United Kingdom (UK) and Australia for academic purposes and attended extremist gatherings.[14] Abdul Lathif Jameel Mohammed was arrested by the Terrorist Investigation Division in 2018 and released after being questioned by law enforcement officers under suspicion of radicalization and a potential threat to society.[15]

When a name is given, it gives recognition to an entity. The members of the small cell were gathered with the common intention of charity and then terrorism, but there was no name given to this particular small cell after the attacks. After the Easter Sunday attacks, publicity was given to the National Thowheed Jamant organization, because this small cell did not have a name for recognition. Research reveals that terrorists engage in activities to achieve non-financial goals: ‘publicity, dissemination of an ideology, destruction of a society or regime, and simply spreading terror intimidation’.[16] Further, it was highlighted that terrorists make rational choices to damage ‘people, symbolism, economy, politics, nature, and image or publicity’.[17] However, research does not specify whether the intention of the terrorists was to give publicity to themselves or to their activities. At the time of the attack on Easter Sunday, the Sri Lankan small cell was not an affiliate of any terrorist organization. Still, it was later revealed that subordinates of the terrorists had pledged to the ISIL leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi to admit that the small cell was in alliance with the ISIL.

Research reveals that terrorists engage in activities to achieve non-financial goals: ‘publicity, dissemination of an ideology, destruction of a society or regime, and simply spreading terror intimidation’.

Although the small cell groups in Sri Lanka pledged to be in alliance with IS, the investigators revealed that the perpetrators carried out the Easter Sunday attacks without any assistance from an external party. During the interviews with the investigation officers, it was revealed that the Sri Lankan terrorists involved in the 2019 attacks had never attended formal terrorist training and acted without the command of the ISIL leadership. This pattern of committing terror aligns with previous findings[18] on ISIL: its followers adopt a self-starter approach to promote global Jihadist ideology. The same phenomenon can be applied to a new form of terrorism that stems from violent religious extremist groups. What is important with the self-starter phenomenon is operational autonomy. When terrorists operate spontaneously, there is no obligation on the main organization to fund the unaffiliated terrorist attacks. In other words, attacks by self-starter cells do not exert a financial burden on the terrorist organization.

The formation and financing of a small cell has become a new trend because it is different from known patterns of terrorism. As mentioned in the 9/11 Commission Report,[19] Al-Qaeda transferred money to the perpetrators through the formal banking system, along with directions from the network. This implied that Al-Qaeda did not rely on close-knit groups or alternative money remittance systems to transfer money and fund their activities. The formation of a small cell may come from a bloodline, a close-knit group, friends, or spouses of the members. It seems that a common prerequisite is that the members must have been in contact in a small cell for several years. This is useful information for law enforcement authorities to identify the trail of the perpetrators. As in a territory-controlling terrorist group such as the LTTE, the suicide bombers are part of a larger network, and the suicide squad is not built through personal connections or bloodlines. The LTTE investigations ended up revealing that the members of the suicide attack are connected as a chain and maybe (un)known to each other. In the Sri Lankan small-cell attacks, brothers, family members, friends, and spouses formed the small cell. For example, the Easter Sunday bomb attacks were deployed by eight suicide attackers, and out of them, two brothers named Mohamed Ibrahim Inshaf Ahamed and Mohamed Ibrahim Ilham Ahamed were involved. Later on, the same day, Fathima Ilham, who also committed suicide, was revealed to be the wife of the suicide bomber Mohamed Ibrahim Ilham Ahamed. In comparison with a terrorist organization, the pattern in a small cell seems to be that members are known to each other. Therefore, the formation of a small cell must be initiated by known people or exclusively by known people.

The LTTE investigations ended up revealing that the members of the suicide attack are connected as a chain and maybe (un)known to each other.

When transforming from territory-controlling terrorist groups to small cells, the organizational structure transforms from hierarchical to loosely structured. In the formation of a small cell, there may or may not be a leader. In contrast, terrorist organizations are structured and led by someone. The leader commands and financially supports activities. In a small cell, members work in parallel and create a loosely structured organization. In such a situation, there is no requirement to demand obedience from the rest of the members.

In a small cell, not only are members known to each other, they also speak a common language. In the Easter Sunday attacks, the members of the small cell were native Tamil speakers. It can be assumed that using a common language became an advantage in communicating freely with one another. This does not indicate that the members of the small cell were only able to speak Tamil, as they must have been precluded from learning through the internet or open sources as most of the information is available in English. Hastun, who is the hard-core terrorist of the Easter Sunday attacks, has manufactured explosives using the knowledge disseminated through the internet. However, it is unclear whether he accessed an English website or any other website, such as one in Arabic, to get the requisite knowledge. The common language of communication has been used as an advantage for committing crimes such as drug trafficking.[20] It can be assumed that the use of a common language has the same application with respect to terrorism and other criminal offences.

Members of the small cell descend from families with different financial backgrounds, but neither the family status nor the financial background of the members creates a barrier to forming a small cell. In the Easter Sunday bomb attacks, two terrorists were the sons of a leading spice trader named Mohammad Yusuf Ibrahim. Further, Abdul Latif Jamil Mohammed had gone to the UK and Australia for his higher education with self-funding, and the other members of the small cell descend from middle to low-income families.

Members of the small cell descend from families with different financial backgrounds, but neither the family status nor the financial background of the members creates a barrier to forming a small cell.

Sustainability of the Small Cell

Small cells were nurtured by members with different skills. These skills were used as an advantage to sustain and achieve their targets. Financing is one of the key aspects of terrorism, and the members who were employed or derived money through legal means utilized that money for their own terrorist activities. In the Easter Sunday attacks, it is claimed that Inshaf Ahamed funded the whole plot. Some of the members of the Easter Sunday attacks were engaged in financial businesses, and these businesses were used as covert businesses to circumvent their terrorist activities.

It appears not to be necessary that small cells earn money for their terrorist activities, as they can receive funds from other legal sources. Previous research[21] provides examples of how foreign terrorist fighters fulfil their financial needs by obtaining social assistance, family loans, and bank loans apart from their employment income. These examples indicate that foreign terrorist fighters rely on legitimate money, which does not draw the attention of law enforcement agencies. The FATF[22] research only focused on the self-funding methods for foreign terrorist fighters, but the small cell members who operate within the domicile to fulfil their financial needs as terrorists learn from each other and could also exploit these methods.

Past findings[23] on terrorist financing identify the methods of terrorist financing. However, these findings were concentrated on identifying terrorist financing in territory controlling terrorist groups. Territory-controlling terrorist groups need a relatively stable financial flow to maintain the territory under their command, advance troops, and achieve their targets. These organizations explore avenues where they can frequently get large volumes of money. In a small cell, less funding is required to operate compared to a territory-controlling terrorist group, as small cells do not need money to control the territory. The financing requirement of a small cell is limited to accomplishing a task. When the minimum funding requirement is met, it can be borne by the members of the small cell through legitimate sources.

Ideology

As far as terrorist financing is concerned, an organization’s financial needs depend on several factors, and ideology is one such factor. To understand a terrorist group or small cell in depth, it is required to identify the components of terrorism and to learn about the ideologies of the terrorist group or small cell. This will ideally lead to an understanding of how the terrorist’s thinking was framed or the fundamentals of the terrorist activities.

To understand a terrorist group or small cell in depth, it is required to identify the components of terrorism and to learn about the ideologies of the terrorist group or small cell.

The Australian National Security and the UK Home Office[24] state that the aim of Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, and the Taliban is to establish a territorial caliphate within their country or region. These terrorist organizations need money to administer their territories as shadow governments; therefore, territory-controlling terrorist groups require a stable and continuous financial flow to fulfil their needs. The ISIL is different as it adopts the global Jihadist ideology, which operates across the borders of Iraq and Syria. Because of the ideology of ISIL, terrorists need to think about financing terrorist attacks beyond their territories. As ISIL-affiliated groups operate beyond the borders of Iraq and Syria, these groups, including small cells, need to operate with their own money without depending on external sources. These factors reveal that ideology determines, to a certain extent, the financial needs of the terrorist organization or small cell. Put differently, ideology appears to be one of the factors in deciding whether to operate within the domicile or across borders.

There is a relationship between ideology and methods of funding. Innes and Levi[25] suggest that for an act to be labelled as terrorism, at least three necessary conditions must be fulfilled: political violence, communicative violence, and asymmetry of power. To accomplish these three components, funding becomes a sufficient condition. Terrorists need to bear the cost of creating terror. As proposed by Reimer and Redhead,[26] the choice of weapons is a crucial decision in terrorism. In self-funding terrorism, the choice of weapons was limited to edged weapons (knives or machetes), improvised explosive devices (IEDs), vehicles, and firearms. Reimer and Redhead fail to identify that suicide attacks can also be considered weapons, even though they do not fall under the strict terminology of ‘weapon’. There is a plethora of studies on suicide terrorism, as it seems affordable or inexpensive and serves the purpose of the terrorists.[27] On Easter Sunday, multiple attacks were conducted by nine suicide bombers in several places across the country.

For this research, the words suicide bombing and suicide attack are used interchangeably. Either term emphasizes the activity of suicide terrorism conducted by non-state actors. A suicide bombing is “an attack where the bomber’s death is the means by which the attack is accomplished”.[28] When discussing suicide terrorism, it is important to understand why (or why not) people become suicide terrorists and why organizations adopt suicide terrorism. Most researchers have focused on answering this question by trying to understand the root causes of suicide terrorism.[29] However, it is difficult to find the root causes as they come from different types of communities, different situations, and different times. As money is an unequally distributed resource, it is important to understand not only why people commit suicide bombing but also the cost-benefit analysis of suicide bombing.

When discussing suicide terrorism, it is important to understand why (or why not) people become suicide terrorists and why organizations adopt suicide terrorism.

Another factor that stresses the importance of revising the FATF policies is suicide terrorism. Suicide bombers can act as “smart bombs” because of their thinking ability. Smart bombers can deviate from the original plan to cause more damage if necessary. On this premise, suicide bombing can be considered as an accurate method with a mental component. When examining the cost-benefit of suicide bombing, it is important to understand why both terrorist organizations and individuals use suicide bombing as a method of terrorism. Studies on suicide terrorism are diverse.[30] Still, there are common perceptions on why suicide bombing is used by an individual, irrespective of their ideology. This advantage is not available with other methods, such as remote-controlled bombs. During the discussions, it was revealed that Abdul Lathif Jameel Mohammed had initially gone to Taj Samudra, a five-star hotel in Sri Lanka, to commit a suicide bombing, while the other perpetrators, named Zahran Hazim, Mohamed Ibrahim Inshaf Ahamed, and Mohamed Ibrahim Ilham Ahamed had gone to other five-star hotels, namely Cinnamon Grand Colombo, Kingsbury Hotel, and Shangri-La Hotel for their suicide missions. CCTV footage later released to the media shows that Abdul Lathif Jameel Mohammed attempted a few times to commit suicide bombings at the Taj Samudra Hotel but failed. Since the device had not been worked on, Abdul Lathif Jameel Mohammed deviated from the original plan, went to Tropical Inn, and thereafter committed suicide bombing on the same day. The explosion in Tropical Inn aggregated the circumstances of the Easter Sunday attacks, and Abdul Lathif Jameel Mohammed was able to complete the mission at a different time and location.

In addition, suicide bombing is inexpensive, as the organization does not need to make a contingency plan or escape plan to save the terrorist after the attack. This is the same with the suicide formation of small cells, as the small cells dissolve with the suicide attacks. There is no need to make a contingency plan. In a suicide mission, the members of the small cell do not encounter the risk of apprehension. Suicide bombing is more cost-effective than other terrorist methods. Where unaffiliated small cells and lone actors have limited funding, suicide terrorism provides a platform for terrorists to achieve their goals.

In a suicide mission, the members of the small cell do not encounter the risk of apprehension.

Suicide bombing is an effective tactic, but other terrorist methods such as kidnapping, extortion, and hi-jacking have been more commonly used. This suggestion would be valid if it were subject to two conditions. First, suicide bombing depends on the modus operandi of the terrorist organization. For example, the LTTE maintained a suicide squad named the Black Tigers; therefore, the LTTE tends to have more suicide attacks, whereas other terrorist groups such as Palestine Hamas and the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) deploy suicide attacks on an ad hoc basis.[31] Second, suicide attacks were used to reach the goal of the terrorist or terrorist organization. If the terrorist organization or terrorist focuses on a caliphate, such as ISIL or al-Qaeda, it is doubtful that other terrorist methods can secure the same level of public and political attention as suicide bombing.

Another significant aspect of suicide bombers is their level of education. Suicide bombers have a relatively high level of education.[32] When terrorist organizations deploy suicide bombers, their level of education may not be a significant factor. It is important that education provides an opportunity to enter high-yield jobs and further changes a person’s attitude towards the world, such as their concern for public goods: freedom and national independence.[33] When educated people are converted to suicide bombers, there is no necessity to finance their activities, as they have the potential to fund their own terrorist activities.

Targets

Terrorists rely on rational thinking rather than random choices to select their targets so as to maximize the utility function against the financial cost, opportunity cost, and benefits of terrorism. They make rational choices to damage ‘people, symbolism, economy, politics, nature, and image or publicity’.[34] Most of the targets in terrorism can be categorized as military, civilians, civil leaders, tourist destinations, iconic places, and physical places in the hearts of cities or ones that function as economically important places. The London bombing (on the transport network) highlighted the capacity of self-financed attacks, and therefore, the nature of small-cell attacks should not be underestimated.[35]

In the new form of terrorism, potential terrorists can be transformed into small cells or lone attackers even without formal training at a terrorist camp.[36] These terrorists have the capacity to undertake spontaneous attacks without the command of a terrorist group. In the suicide bombing on the transport network in London (2004), there was no evidence to assume that the suicide bombers had access to external sources of income. On this basis, the London bombing was categorized as a self-financed attack deployed by an unaffiliated small cell.

In the suicide bombing on the transport network in London (2004), there was no evidence to assume that the suicide bombers had access to external sources of income.

Similarly, in Sri Lanka, on Easter Sunday, within approximately one hour (between 08:25 am and 09:20 am), 6 suicide attacks were carried out in different parts of the country: Colombo, Negombo, and Batticaloa districts. The attackers targeted three churches, the Shrine of St. Anthony Church, St. Sebastian’s Church, and Zion Church, as well as three luxury hotels: the Cinnamon Grand Colombo, Kingsbury Hotel, and Shangri-La Hotel. Abdul Lathif Jameel Mohammed failed with the initial plan but later committed suicide at the Tropical Inn. On the same day, the wife of the suicide bomber, Mohamed Ibrahim Ilham Ahamed committed suicide with her children in their dwelling house complex in Dematagoda. Although the attacks were deployed in different places, they were coordinated and pre-planned as they exploded on the same day, and several explosions occurred within approximately an hour. As such, the attacks share similarities with those of September 11, 2001.

A target cannot be fulfilled without sound knowledge of explosives. Innes and Levi state, “There is an international trade in terrorist tradecraft”.[37] The underpinning thinking in this statement is that terrorists learn from each other “what works, what does not, and what is promising to them”.[38] However, the pace of terrorist tradecraft grows narrower with the self-starter phenomenon, as unaffiliated small cells and lone actors without any command or training from terrorist organisations can conduct terrorist attacks. In the series of coordinated suicide bomb attacks on Easter Sunday, the perpetrators used iron nails, ball bearings, and Triacetone Triperoxide (TATP) to make bombs. These chemicals cannot be strictly considered explosives because TATP is used for dual purposes. Commercially, TATP is used for industrial purposes such as bleaching and maturing flour and is available to the public. When compared with the LTTE, the LTTE used C4 for their explosions. According to the investigators, C4 was not freely available in Sri Lanka; it was difficult to find. Although the perpetrators had the expertise to make their own explosive devices, it is questionable whether they had the knowledge up to a standard level. Abdul Lathif Jameel Mohammed’s attempt to trigger the explosives at the Taj Samudra Hotel is an example that indicates that the explosives were made by so-called experts, as the circuit did not work accurately. Later, Abdul Lathif Jameel Mohammed was able to operate the device by himself. This incident alludes to the possibility that people with no expertise in manufacturing bombs and other explosive devices manufactured the explosives from freely available sources.

The suicide bombers in the Easter Sunday attacks used a common method of carrying explosives in a backpack to achieve their targets. This is different from the patterns of suicide bombing used by the LTTE. The LTTE used suicide vests to commit terror attacks. These suicide vests enable the LTTE cadres to reach their target without suspicion. Further, the LTTE carders were able to operate the suicide vest without any technical failure. This elaborates on the fact that the LTTE had the technical expertise to manufacture suicide vests accurately. The mode of transporting explosives to the hotspots within backpacks reflects that the small cells were at the primitive stage of manufacturing explosives. This may result from fulfilling every need through the members of the small cell without relying on the support of an external party.

The suicide bombers in the Easter Sunday attacks used a common method of carrying explosives in a backpack to achieve their targets. This is different from the patterns of suicide bombing used by the LTTE.

When the LTTE used suicide vests, it enabled them to reach military targets, local leaders, and strategically important places, such as the Central Bank of Sri Lanka and military commanders. Cyber situational crime prevention measures tightened the security of military places and very important people. Therefore, to reach such places and reach the target, the terrorists need accurate devices to explode without any mistakes. During the investigations, it was revealed that the small cell attackers in Sri Lanka chose Easter Sunday and places such as churches and luxury hotels, as these places were not protected as high-security zones and very important persons. Carrying a backpack to a hotel by a customer is normal in a hotel environment. Terrorists have analyzed the methods of reaching the chosen targets and maximized the usage of their resources to reach their targets.

Longevity of the Small Cell

Law enforcement authorities need to consider factors that affect the longevity of terrorist groups and deploy their financial resources accordingly. The Global Terrorism Index[39] proposes that half of the terrorist groups do not survive more than three years, but if the terrorist group exists for more than twelve years, it is difficult to stop. When terrorist groups are larger in size, use diverse methods of attack, embrace religious ideology, and operate activities based in the Middle East or Africa, they are better off. The formation of the small cells may be dissolved with their targets. As in Sri Lanka, all the members of the small cell involved in the Easter Sunday attacks committed suicide bombings.

While the operations of the small cells dissolve after reaching their targets, the operations of the terrorist organization remain even after the government’s military forces have defeated the terrorist organization. The appeal to the UK Proscribed Organizations Appeal Commission against the proscription of the LTTE as a terrorist organization shows that the Tamil diaspora still operates[40] even in the absence of military operations. Although the formation of a small cell dissolves within a short period, it leaves critical points for policymakers to consider: a small cell can be formed without any affiliation to a terrorist organization, and it can rely on internal sources, including financing of terrorism. In fact, small cells may remain as sleeping cells until they reach their targets. In such situations, identifying small cells may not be successful using the standard methods recommended by the FATF.

Conclusion

The FATF provides international standards for specific areas such as non-profit organizations, wire transfers, and money or value transfer services to prevent legal money transfer methods from being abused by terrorists. The FATF focused on identifying one aspect of terrorist financing, which was to curb the financial flow of territory-controlling terrorist groups. Justifiably so, seeing as territory-controlling terrorist groups explore several methods to maintain stable and continuous financial flows. Since international and national regulators know most of these methods, money transferred through channels like money or value transfer services and money transferred to non-profit or non-governmental organizations are vetted by financial institutions and service providers to detect possible terrorist financing methods. According to facts stated in the Global Terrorism Index,[41] ISIL remains a strong force. Therefore, it needs to identify whether the same methods of countering the financing of terrorism apply to the ideology of ISIL, which is to establish a global caliphate.

Since international and national regulators know most of these methods, money transferred through channels like money or value transfer services and money transferred to non-profit or non-governmental organizations are vetted by financial institutions and service providers to detect possible terrorist financing methods.

Cumulatively, the findings of this research do not strongly support the recommendations made by the FATF to curb the financing of terrorism. Most importantly, a recommendation to restrict legitimate money for own terrorist activities does not exist. Policy papers such as FATF[42] have emphasized that self-funding for terrorism is an emerging threat. The origin of this concept lies in the analysis of communications between foreign terrorist fighters, and the finding of this research extends that small cells have the autonomy to conduct terrorist attacks by themselves, even in their own domicile. The case study on the multiple attacks on Easter Sunday conducted by a small cell in Sri Lanka reveals that the attacks relied on the capabilities of the members of the cell to plan the entire attack. The activities particularly included manufacturing explosives to finance the terrorist activities, which the attackers then used on their own accord. What we can learn from such a situation is that small-cell terrorist attacks may take the form of suicide attacks, weapon attacks, knife attacks, and truck attacks. Equally, from these forms of attack, suicide attacks appear to be the more cost-effective option for small cells, as they require less if not any, contingency plans and planning. To counter the financing of terrorism, measures need to focus on the broad spectrum of terrorism, which ranges from established terrorist groups to emerging terrorist groups, even as small cells.

[1] D. Masciandaro, E. Takats and B. Unger, Black Finance: The Economics of Money Laundering, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd.

[2] Idem.

[3] FATF, 2012, “FATF Recommendations,” last accessed September 04, 2022, https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Fatfrecommendations/Fatf-recommendations.html.

[4] Idem.

[5] FATF, 2015, “Emerging terrorist financing risks,” last accessed April 23, 2023, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/methodsandtrends/documents/emerging-terrorist-financing-risks.html on 10/3/2021.

[6] R. Aryasinha, “Terrorism, the LTTE and the conflict in Sri Lanka,” Conflict, Security & Development 1 (2): 25-50; P. Chalk, “The Tigers abroad: How the LTTE diaspora supports the conflict in Sri Lanka,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs 9(2): 97-104; A. W. Weenink, “Situational prevention of terrorism. Remarks from the field of counterterrorism in the Netherlands on Newman and Clarke’s policing terrorism,” Trends in Organized Crime 15: 164-179.

[7] J. Argomaniz and R. Bermejo, “Jihadism and crime in Spain: a convergence settings approach,” European Journal of Criminology 16(3):351-368. doi: 10.1177/1477370819829653; A. Kupatadze and J. Argomaniz, “Introduction to special issue – Understanding and conceptualizing European jihadists: Criminals, extremists or both?,” European Journal of Criminology 16(3): 261-277, Doi:10.1177/1477370819829971.

[8] T. Keatinge and F. Keen, “A sharper image: Advancing a risk-based response to terrorist financing.“

[9] Idem.

[10] FATF, 2015, “Emerging terrorist financing risks,” last accessed April 23, 2023, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/methodsandtrends/documents/emerging-terrorist-financing-risks.html on 10/3/2021.

[12] Idem.

[13] P. Casaca, “Five lessons from the Jihadi Easter attacks in Sri Lanka,” South Asia Democratic Forum 144: 1-4.

[14] Select Committee of Parliament to look into and report to Parliament on the Terrorist Attacks that took place in different places in Sri Lanka on April 21, 2019, October 23, 2022, Easter Sunday Investigation Committee report.pdf.

[15] Idem.

[16] S. M. Irwin et al., “Modelling of money laundering and terrorism financing typologies,” Journal of Money Laundering Control 15(3): 316-335.

[17] O. E. Wetter and V. Wuthrich, “”What is dear to you?” Survey of beliefs regarding protection of critical infrastructure against terrorism,” Defense & Security Analysis 31(3): 185-198. doi: 10.1080/14751798.2015.1056941.

[18] T. Keatinge and F. Keen, “Lone-actor and small cell terrorist attacks: A new front in counter-terrorist finance,” June 15, 2022, https://static.rusi.org/201701_op_lone-actor_and_small_cell_terrorist_attacks.1.pdf; T. Keatinge, “Identifying foreign terrorist fighters: The role of public-private partnership, information sharing and financial intelligence,” April 20, 2022, www.rusi.org.

[19] Featured Commission Publications, “The 9/11 Commission Report: Final report of the National Commission on terrorist attacks upon the United States (9/11 Report),” January 10, 2022, https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/GPO-911REPORT.

[20] P. Reuter, “Drug market and organized crime,” The Oxford handbook of organized crime.

[21] FATF, 2015, “Emerging terrorist financing risks,” last accessed April 23, 2023, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/methodsandtrends/documents/emerging-terrorist-financing-risks.html on 10/3/2021.

[22] Idem.

[23] M. Levi, “Combating the financing of terrorism: A history and assessment of the control of ‘Threat Finance’,“ British Journal of Criminology 50: 650-669, S. Reimer and M. Redhead, “A new normal: countering the financing of self-activating terrorism in Europe,” June 15, 2023, https://rusi.org/publication/occasional-papers/new-normal-countering-financing-self-activating-terrorism-europe.

[24] Proscribed Organizations Appeal Commission, “TGTE wins appeal in the UK Proscribed Organizations Appeal Commission against proscription of LTTE as terrorist organization,” October 22, 2023, https://www.europeansanctions.com/2020/10/tgte-wins-appeal-in-the-uk-proscribed-organisations-appeal-commission-against-proscription-of-ltte-as-terrorist-organisation/; Australian Government, “Australian National Security,” January 15, 2023, https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/.

[25] M. Innes, and M. Levi, “Making and managing terrorism and counter-terrorism,” in: A. Liebling, S. Maruna and L. McAra, The Oxford Handbook of Criminology. Sixth edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 455-477.

[26] S. Reimer and M. Redhead, “Financial intelligence in the age of lone actor terrorism,” June 15, 2022, CRAAFT_+RB3_Reimer+Redhead.pdf.

[27] A. Kirby, “The London bombers as “self-starters”: A case study in indigenous radicalization and the emergence of autonomous cliques, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 30: 415-428; M.C. Horowitz, “The rise and spread of suicide bombing,” Annual Review of Political Science 18: 69-84; J. Azam, “Why suicide-terrorists get educated, and what to do about it,” Public Choice 153: 357-373.

[28] M.C. Horowitz, “The rise and spread of suicide bombing,” Annual Review of Political Science 18: 69-84.

[29] Idem.

[30] E. Sprinzak, “Rational fanatics,” Foreign Policy Sep/Oct 120: 66-73.

[31] Idem.

[32] J. Azam, “Why suicide-terrorists get educated, and what to do about it,” Public Choice 153: 357-373.

[33] Idem.

[34] O. E. Wetter and V. Wuthrich, “What is dear to you?” Survey of beliefs regarding protection of critical infrastructure against terrorism, Defense & Security Analysis 31(3): 185-198. doi: 10.1080/14751798.2015.1056941.

[35] A. Kirby, “The London bombers as “self-starters”: A case study in indigenous radicalization and the emergence of autonomous cliques,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 30: 415-428.

[36] Idem.

[37] M. Innes, and M. Levi, “Making and managing terrorism and counter-terrorism,” in: A. Liebling, S. Maruna and L. McAra, The Oxford Handbook of Criminology. Sixth edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 455-477.

[38] Idem.

[39] Global Terrorism Index 2022, January 13, 2023, https://visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/GTI-2022-web_110522-1.pdf.

[40] Home Office (updated 26 November 2021), “Policy paper: Proscribed terrorist groups or organizations,” January 24, 2023, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/proscribed-terror-groups-or-organisations–2.

[41] Global Terrorism Index. 2022.

[42] Ibid.