Iran Knows It Cannot Win a War against Israel

[T]he likelihood of Iran launching another attack against Israel in retaliation for Haniyeh’s assassination appears to be receding, not least because Tehran is well aware that, in any major military confrontation with Israel, it will inevitably be the loser.

Israeli officials also believe that the initial assault will not originate from Iran. The latest intelligence assessment by Israeli officials, reported on August 7, indicates a shift in expectations regarding the source of the anticipated attack.

Cooperation between Israel and Russia has often resulted in the Russians turning a blind eye when Israel attacks Iranian positions in Syria, even though Russia and Iran are supposed to be allies working together in their joint venture to keep Syria’s Assad regime in power.

In responding to Iran’s desperate plea for more arms, therefore, Putin may be reluctant to take any action that could upset his delicate relationship with Israel.

For all Iran’s threats to retaliate against Israel for assassinating key Hamas and Hezbollah leaders, the key concern for the ayatollahs will be that, in any confrontation with the Israeli military, they have no chance of winning.

Tensions between Iran and Israel have risen considerably since Israel was accused of carrying out the assassination of Hamas Political Bureau leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran shortly after the swearing in ceremony for Iran’s President Masoud Pezeshkian last month.

Although Israel rarely confirms or denies its involvement in overseas assassinations, the Iranian regime has been quick to accuse Israel of killing Haniyeh, who reportedly died after a bomb exploded in his guest apartment in northern Tehran. A senior Hezbollah commander, Fuad Shukr, was assassinated in Beirut the previous day, in an operation for which Israel took credit.

Since then, the Iranian regime, together with the Hezbollah terrorist group it supports in southern Lebanon, have vowed to exact vengeance against Israel, prompting fears among Western diplomats that Tehran is seeking to provoke a major war in the Middle East.

Speaking at the UN shortly after the assassinations, Amir Saeed Iravani, Iran’s ambassador, warned that Tehran would not hesitate to exercise its right to self-defence, pointing a finger at Israel for the assassination Haniyeh on Iranian soil.

In a letter to the United Nations on July 31, Iravani described the attack as “a severe infringement on [Iran’s] sovereignty” that violated international law, adding: “The Islamic Republic of Iran will not hesitate to exercise its inherent right to self-defense.”

The prospect of a major escalation in hostilities has prompted the US, the UK and France to warn their nationals to leave Lebanon in anticipation of conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, which has been launching near-daily attacks against northern Israel since October 7. Western military forces have been put on standby in the region to facilitate the evacuation of Western civilians if required.

Even so, the likelihood of Iran launching another attack against Israel in retaliation for Haniyeh’s assassination appears to be receding, not least because Tehran is well aware that, in any major military confrontation with Israel, it will inevitably be the loser.

Only a few days ago, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken warned that Iran was preparing a two-prong attack against Israel, with Tehran launching another missile assault from Iranians soil, while Hezbollah launched an attack from southern Lebanon.

That assessment has now been scaled down, with US officials reporting that Hezbollah is likely to carry out its own attack against Israel independent of whatever action Iran may be considering.

After days of waiting for Iran to launch an attack, Israeli officials also believe that the initial assault will not originate from Iran. The latest intelligence assessment by Israeli officials, reported on August 7, indicates a shift in expectations regarding the source of the anticipated attack.

Iran’s reluctance to become involved in another direct confrontation with Israel is based on the humiliation it suffered in April, when its efforts to launch a combined missile and drone attack against Israel ended in ignominious failure. Of the 300 or so missiles and attack drones launched at Israel, only one managed to reach its target, causing minimal damage, with the majority of the projectiles being intercepted by Israel and its allies before reaching their targets.

Of even greater concern for Iran was the ease with which Israeli warplanes penetrated Iran’s air defences to carry out a retaliatory attack against an Iranian air base on the outskirts of the central Iranian city of Isfahan, long regarded as the cradle of Iran’s nuclear programme.

By targeting Isfahan, the Israelis were sending a clear signal to the ayatollahs that their prized nuclear installations — which Western intelligence says are being used to develop nuclear weapons — are vulnerable to attack by the Israelis.

Iran’s concern about its military vulnerabilities explains why the ayatollahs have now turned to Russia to provide military assistance in their hour of need.

Iran has previously played a key role in supporting Russia’s military campaign in Ukraine, where Iranian attack drones are regularly used to target key Ukrainian infrastructure.

With the prospect of renewed hostilities with Israel, the Iranians clearly believe that it is payback time so far as their alliance with Russia is concerned, a point they were keen to make during the recent visit to Tehran by Sergei Shoigu, Russia’s former defence minister and a key ally of Russian President Vladimir Putin.

During Shoigu’s talks with Pezeshkian and senior Iranian security officials, the Iranians called on Russia to provide advanced air defence systems, as well as Su-35 fighter jets.

The Russians, though, will need to tread carefully in deciding how much support to provide their Iranian allies.

Putin long enjoyed a strong personal relationship with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, one of Moscow’s few bilateral ties that survived the Russian leader’s disastrous decision to invade Ukraine in 2022.

From Israel’s perspective, moreover, there is a strategic necessity to maintain ties with the Russian military, as the Russians continue to control most of the airspace in Syria as a result of their military intervention to keep the brutal regime of dictator Bashar al-Assad in power.

Cooperation between Israel and Russia has often resulted in the Russians turning a blind eye when Israel attacks Iranian positions in Syria, even though Russia and Iran are supposed to be allies working together in their joint venture to keep Syria’s Assad regime in power.

In responding to Iran’s desperate plea for more arms, therefore, Putin may be reluctant to take any action that could upset his delicate relationship with Israel.

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