Chinese Lending Adapts to Central Asia’s Realities

China’s relationships with Central Asian borrowers are hardly one-size-fits-all. Chinese financial players have adapted and used different models, demonstrating the country’s flexibility as a lender.

Preface

China Local/Global

China has become a global power, but there is too little debate about how this has happened and what it means. Many argue that China exports its developmental model and imposes it on other countries. But Chinese players also extend their influence by working through local actors and institutions while adapting and assimilating local and traditional forms, norms, and practices.

With a generous multiyear grant from the Ford Foundation, Carnegie has launched an innovative body of research on Chinese engagement strategies in seven regions of the world—Africa, Central Asia, Latin America, the Middle East and North Africa, the Pacific, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. Through a mix of research and strategic convening, this project explores these complex dynamics, including the ways Chinese firms are adapting to local labor laws in Latin America, Chinese banks and funds are exploring traditional Islamic financial and credit products in Southeast Asia and the Middle East, and Chinese actors are helping local workers upgrade their skills in Central Asia. These adaptive Chinese strategies that accommodate and work within local realities are mostly ignored by Western policymakers in particular.

Ultimately, the project aims to significantly broaden understanding and debate about China’s role in the world and to generate innovative policy ideas. These could enable local players to better channel Chinese energies to support their societies and economies; provide lessons for Western engagement around the world, especially in developing countries; help China’s own policy community learn from the diversity of Chinese experience; and potentially reduce frictions.

Evan A. Feigenbaum

Vice President for Studies, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Introduction

Chinese lending to developing economies around the world has drawn scrutiny. Some analysts have even alleged debt-trap diplomacy.1 But in Central Asia, China’s relationships with its borrowers are hardly one-size-fits-all, and Chinese financial players have adapted and used different models, demonstrating the country’s flexibility as a lender.

What all Central Asian borrower countries have in common is that the ease of securing Chinese financing has made it difficult to repay their debts. And Beijing’s loans can be exceedingly opaque and come with strings attached.

Yet none of China’s Central Asian borrowers are uniform either in how much they owe or in how their dealings with Beijing are perceived domestically. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan do not perceive their debt service obligations as a political vulnerability or even economically threatening. By contrast, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are more fragile, but these are weaker states that, even without Chinese financing, would struggle to control political fallout from bad bets and where the economic fundamentals are often poor. For its part, Turkmenistan maintains that it has settled up with China.

But Beijing’s flexibility has allowed its borrowers to have some agency too. While Central Asia’s vulnerable states lack bargaining power, the wealthier players, like Astana and Tashkent, have more leverage. For example, they have been able to negotiate for more favorable terms, while others have to repay debts using natural endowments, such as resource exports, as collateral.

While debt to China is an endemic problem, the strength or weakness of the state is the key variable, not China’s supposedly one-size-fits-all debt-trap tactics. To bargain successfully with China, Central Asian nations will need to strengthen regional cooperation and build institutions that are supple yet strong enough to exercise the necessary agency. Success in economic statecraft with China begins at home.
Stable Partners

In the first half of 2023, Central Asia’s collective debt to China reached $15.7 billion, an amount representing 7.6 percent of the region’s external debt.2

Kazakhstan’s debt to China is the most manageable by the region’s standards. Central bank data show that as of January 1, 2024, Astana owed $9.2 billion,3 primarily to the China Export-Import Bank (Exim Bank).4 But debt to China accounts for only about 3.5 percent of Kazakhstan’s gross domestic product (GDP), a figure that has not changed much in three years.5

China is one of Kazakhstan’s ten largest creditors, along with the Netherlands, the UK, the United States, France, the offshore haven of Bermuda, and Russia. Other top lenders include multinational financial institutions, notably the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which is based in Beijing and of which Beijing is the largest shareholder.

In Uzbekistan, by contrast,6 where Tashkent’s political control is strong, society is not yet displaying much social or political ferment about the country’s growing external debt. As of July 1, 2023, China was Uzbekistan’s largest single creditor. Beijing is owed $3.8 billion by Tashkent, while Uzbekistan’s other major creditors, Japan and South Korea, have lent the country $2.1 billion and $900 million, respectively.7

Yet Uzbekistan has mitigated its credit risk by borrowing from various lenders: 36.8 percent of its debt in 2022 was owed to national and international financial institutions, such as the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank.8

Uzbekistan also manages the debt load by using Chinese loans to support industries that are profitable.9 For instance, in 2015, China lent Uzbekistan $350 million for the construction of a railway (which cost $1.6 billion in total) between the cities of Pop and Angren.10 The project, which connected the industrialized and populous Fergana Valley to the rest of the country, was sufficiently profitable that Tashkent was able to repay its project-related debt on time.

More curious is China’s lending to Turkmenistan. China has primarily invested in Turkmenistan’s energy projects and financed the construction of the Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline. Although official information on the amount of Chinese loans is not available, various estimates suggest that Ashgabat’s debt to China had amounted to approximately $12 billion.11 In 2021, Ashgabat declared that it had settled up with Beijing.12 Yet there are suggestions that Turkmenistan repaid its debts in kind, with gas supplies, which represents the scheme of investments for natural resources.13

And so, at the moment, it is the region’s two states with the weakest institutions, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, that are far more compromised.
Tajikistan

According to the Tajikistani Ministry of Finance, Dushanbe’s external debt totaled $3.2 billion, or 26.9 percent of GDP, as of January 1, 2024.14 The country’s largest creditor is China, to which it owes $900 million, most of it borrowed from China Exim Bank.15

Over the past year, Tajikistan has repaid $275 million of its external debt.16 About 58 percent of this money came from the state budget; the rest came from state companies such as Dushanbe International Airport and the power companies Barqi Tojik and Pamir Energy.17 It is no coincidence that most of these companies are involved in the production or sale of energy, areas of the economy that are monopolized by the state and exceedingly opaque.

Tajikistan’s finance minister, Faiziddin Qahhorzoda, maintains that the country has had no issues repaying its debt to China.18 Yet these assurances are impossible to confirm given the secrecy surrounding the state budget.

Even if Qahhorzoda is correct, and repaying the debt has not been difficult for Tajikistan, it is not clear why the country has had to resort to solutions as creative as indefinitely leasing two gold ore deposits to Chinese companies to pay for the construction of the Dushanbe-2 thermal power station.19

Notably, many Chinese companies are active investors in Tajikistan, with China’s 30 percent share of foreign investment in the country making it the largest foreign investor.20 Indeed, Chinese companies operate freely in Tajikistan, and some are in fact exempt from taxation by legislation.21

Dushanbe is even prepared to open potentially sensitive sectors of the economy to Chinese companies, as evidenced by parliament’s 2015 decision to allow Juntai-Khatlon-Sin Silu, a Sino-Tajikistani joint venture, to grow cotton in several parts of the Khatlon Region.22

Meanwhile, in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, any land deals with Chinese farmers, whether to buy or rent, are met with fierce resistance. In 2004, the government’s plans to lease land in Kyrgyzstan’s Issyk-Kul Region to Chinese developers for the creation of a tourist zone were dropped in the face of widespread opposition.23 In 2009, Kazakhstan was gripped by protests over reports that 1 million hectares of land would be leased to Chinese entities. In 2016, after another attempt to legally allow foreigners to lease land once again led to protests in Kazakhstan, then president Nursultan Nazarbayev imposed a moratorium on all land deals with foreign investors.24

By contrast, Tajikistan remains hospitable to Chinese farmers and gold miners. Local experts have not ruled out putting even more gold ore deposits under Chinese control as Dushanbe tries to repay its debt.25 Since there is no space for any free expression or protest in Tajikistan, due to severe political regime and violent suppressions of civil society’s representatives.

Such differences between the Central Asian states help explain China’s flexibility as a lender to the region. For Kyrgyzstan, using natural resource assets to repay its debt is a nonstarter given the prospect of unrest, which China would prefer to avoid out of fear of reputational damage. As such, China has taken a different tack with Bishkek.
Kyrgyzstan

At the end of 2023, Kyrgyzstan owed Exim Bank $1.7 billion, and China represented 36.7 percent of Kyrgyzstan’s external liabilities.26 Much of this money was borrowed under former president Almazbek Atambayev, who served from 2011 to 2017, and went toward energy and infrastructure projects.

Following the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic in 2020 and protests the same year that brought President Sadyr Japarov to power, Kyrgyzstan’s government asked creditors including China for more time to repay its debts. Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and the UAE, as well as Germany’s national development bank KfW and the international insurance company Euler Hermes (now Allianz Trade), all obliged without charging interest.27

China was more exacting, agreeing to give Kyrgyzstan six additional years while raising the loan’s interest rate by 2 percentage points, which would cost Bishkek an extra $3.8 million in interest payments.28 Unless Kyrgyzstan borrows more, its debt payments to Beijing will peak in 2025–2027, with 2035 the final repayment deadline.

In recovering Kyrgyzstan’s debt, China must tread lightly. It cannot treat Bishkek as it does Dushanbe; history is replete with examples of Sino-Kyrgyz projects that collapsed amid unrest. For instance, in 2020, demonstrations caused a logistics center project in the Naryn Region to be suspended.29 More generally, hundreds of protests took place in Kyrgyzstan in 2020,30 whereas people taking to the streets remains a rare occurrence in Tajikistan.

Bishkek may lack the funds to repay its debt to Beijing. However, public skepticism of China in Kyrgyzstan means repayment in kind is not an option as it has been for Tajikistan and possibly Turkmenistan. Unable to offer China assets or mining concessions, Kyrgyzstan must instead resort to tax reform, nationalizations, and other such measures to raise funds.31

That is not to say that China has not invested in Kyrgyzstan. Chinese banks operating in Kyrgyzstan offer loans at favorable interest rates in exchange for commitments to undertake projects with Chinese companies, a tempting yet problematic arrangement. In one notable case, a Bishkek thermal power station was modernized by TBEA Co. (formerly Tebian Electric Apparatus, 特变电工), a Chinese company, using Chinese financing. Controversially, in 2018 and again last winter, the station failed, leaving hundreds of thousands of homes without heat.32

Given the possibility of fallout, potential joint projects are thoroughly vetted by Beijing and Bishkek alike. Take the long-troubled proposal to build a railway from China to Uzbekistan via Kyrgyzstan (known as CKU), which has been in the works for twenty-five years. The railway is expected to cost up to $8 billion, up significantly from the original projection of $1.5 billion.33

With its external debt already high, Kyrgyzstan was wary of incurring more. The parties decided to create a joint venture: China’s share in the company will be 51 percent, and Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan will have equal shares of 24.5 percent. Additionally, the Chinese government pledged to give the consortium a $2.35 billion low-interest loan.34 Per a recent announcement, construction is expected to commence in October 2024.35

However, information about the final cost of the project varies. Kyrgyzstani Prime Minister Akylbek Japarov has given an estimate of about $8 billion, while Uzbekistani Deputy Transport Minister Jasurbek Choriyev has stated that it will cost only $5.1 billion.36 According to the CEO of the Kyrgyzstani state railway company Kyrgyz Temir Zholu, Azamat Sakiev, and the projected cost is even less, at $4.7 billion.37 All the while, there is no real guarantee that the project’s costs will not balloon past $8 billion.

China’s relations with Kyrgyzstan are increasingly opaque, and there is growing pressure not to broach the matter of Bishkek’s external debt. Japarov, Kyrgyzstan’s president, has appealed to his countrymen to “forget the issue of external debt,” maintaining that “even if our external debt increases to $10–15 billion, there is no need to worry.”38

All of this is playing out as Central Asian states jockey for a leading role in the transport and reexport of Chinese goods. In the first years after independence was achieved, the republics viewed Chinese investment with apprehension. Today, they are vying to be the region’s logistics hub in order to earn the associated (and desired) benefits.

In navigating this dynamic, China is unwilling to forgive debt outright. How exactly it recovers debt is a different story and one where it is prepared to exercise some discretion. Sometimes the Central Asian states themselves advise China about tailoring its approach to their specific circumstances.

At the start of 2023, Japarov proposed to Kyrgyzstan’s creditors that the country’s debts be forgiven; in exchange, Bishkek would undertake various green projects.39 While some European states have agreed to this arrangement, China has only expressed interest in what have been dubbed “debt-for-nature swaps,” which involves taking on debt in order to fund various green projects and climate-resilient infrastructure.

Chinese experts do not dismiss such deals out of hand. Yet they note the need for internationally recognized mechanisms for enforcing (and supporting) debt-for-nature swaps, which remain nascent. Wencai Zhang, a former Exim Bank vice president, has unequivocally declared that debt-for-nature swaps “are not feasible at the moment.”40
Adaptability and Flexibility

China, then, appears to prefer giving borrowers more time to repay their debts albeit at higher interest rates rather than forgiving debt in exchange for environmental commitments. Nonetheless, it seems ready to invest in select green projects.

In October 2023, at the Third Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation, China and the Central Asian states adopted a joint plan of action for developing green technology in the region.41 To be sure, Chinese investment in Central Asia’s green economy is not unprecedented. However, three to five years ago, China was focused on Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.42 Following the May 2023 China–Central Asia Summit, Kyrgyzstan—where China has historically primarily invested in mining, energy, and oil—is in the picture as well.

The summit saw an investment agreement signed on the construction of a 1,000-megawatt solar power plant in Kyrgyzstan’s Issyk-Kul Region.43 In the coming years, Chinese companies will help build a number of solar and wind power plants across Kyrgyzstan. In addition, Kyrgyzstan will host an assembly plant for Chinese electric vehicles, as will Tajikistan.

For all the extensive talk of green projects with China, these initiatives are still in the planning stages. In the meantime, China’s real cooperation with Central Asian states continues to be centered on polluting industries such as coal.

In 2023, it emerged that Kyrgyzstan’s government intended to bring six coal deposits under the control of Chinese investors—which it did, despite interest from domestic investors. At the same time, the state enterprise Kyrgyzkomir signed an agreement with two Chinese companies on the construction of coal logistics centers near the border with China.44

The state will retain licenses to three coal deposits, but 70 percent of the fuel produced will belong to Chinese investors.45 Over time, China will overtake Uzbekistan as the leading recipient of coal from Kyrgyzstan.

Stimulating noncommodity exports could help Central Asian states produce budget savings and expand their manufacturing sectors. The most compromised republics, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, have trade imbalances with China, where imports of finished goods from China account for more than 90 percent of trade turnover and the rest is exports of raw materials to China, as per International Trade Center data.46 Yet Beijing is in no rush to open its markets to Dushanbe and Bishkek, interested though they may be.

The situation is gradually changing for Kazakhstan, which by contrast has not struggled to repay its debts. In 2023, Kazakhstan’s exports to China increased by 34.7 percent to $14.7 billion.47 Indeed, Astana is exporting more and more types of goods to China. At the start of 2024, it celebrated the lifting of restrictions on the export of livestock products to China.48
Conclusion

Notwithstanding opportunities for countries to further their economic interests, Chinese lending is an increasingly sensitive issue across Central Asia. Securing Chinese financing was easy for the republics; repaying their debts has been less so. But while Beijing may be a flexible creditor that takes into account a borrower’s economic potential, political regime, and how amenable its political elites are, it makes few concessions and is loath to restructure debt—unless a well-positioned economy is able to leverage its stronger bargaining power.

Chinese lending is opaque, and details of Beijing’s loans are publicly hazy although perhaps well understood by the borrowers at the time of contracting. The specifics emerge publicly only after the fact, and more often than not, the loans come with strings attached, further complicating efforts to track these deals. The long repayment periods additionally encourage borrowers to pay their debts in kind, such as with access to natural resources, strategic assets and enterprises, or even land or tax breaks. Alternatively, borrowers may opt to pay higher interest rates over a longer repayment period.

The next decade, then, should test the ability of Central Asian states to effectively manage their external liabilities as well as China’s willingness to share the spoils of its economic miracle rather than exploit it. But one thing all developing economies can learn from Central Asia is that there is no substitute for the leverage that getting the fundamentals at home right can provide. Strong institutions, public understanding, a diversified loan portfolio, and sustainable projects have proven, at least in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, to be a better recipe for success with China than haphazard borrowing.
About the Author

Nargiza Muratalieva holds a PhD in political science and is a part-time associate professor in the International and Comparative Politics Department at the American University of Central Asia (AUCA). She is a contributor to the Spheres of Influence Uncovered project, part of the Berlin-based Network for Border Crossing Journalism. Her research is focused on international relations and regional cooperation in Central Asia.
Acknowledgments

The author wishes to extend sincere gratitude to the team at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace for their invaluable editorial assistance.
Notes

1 Anthony Rowley, “The Myth of China’s ‘Debt Trap’ Diplomacy,” Nikkei Asia, November 25, 2020, https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/The-myth-of-China-s-debt-trap-diplomacy.

2 Temur Umarov, “Druzhba za vliyaniye. Kak Rossiya i Kitay uzhivayutsya v Tsentral’noy Azii [Friendship for Influence: How Russia and China Coexist in Central Asia],” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 18, 2024, https://carnegieendowment.org/2024/04/18/ru-pub-92246.

3 National Bank of Kazakhstan, “Vneshniy dolg [External Debt],” National Bank of Kazakhstan, July 10, 2024, https://www.nationalbank.kz/ru/news/vneshniy-dolg.

4 Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Debt Management Department “Gosudarstvennyy i garantirovannyy gosudarstvom dolg, dolg po poruchitel’stvam gosudarstva na 1 aprelya 2024 goda [Government and Government-Guaranteed Debt, State-Guaranteed Debt as of April 1, 2024],” April 30, 2024, Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Kazakhstan, https://www.gov.kz/memleket/entities/minfin/documents/details/654274?directionId=261&lang=ru.

5 According to the authors calculations.

6 Temur Umarov, “What’s Behind Protests Against China in Kazakhstan?,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 30, 2019, https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2019/10/whats-behind-protests-against-china-in-kazakhstan?lang=en&center=russia-eurasia.

7 “Gosudarstvennyy dolg Uzbekistana dostig $31,5 milliardov [Uzbekistan’s state debt reached $31.5 billion],” KUN.UZ, November 8, 2023, https://kun.uz/ru/98921146.

8 “Gosdolg Uzbekistana sostavil $29,2 mlrd po itogam 2022 goda [Uzbekistan’s state debt amounted to $29.2 billion at the end of 2022],” gazeta.uz, August 17, 2023, https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2023/08/17/gov-debt/.

9 Interview with an Uzbekistani expert on China, Abbos Bobokhonov.

10 Abdullo Ashurov, “Uzbekistan postroil novyy nezavisimyj ot Tadzhikistana zh/d put’ [Uzbekistan built a new railway line independent of Tajikistan],” RFE/RL, Inc, February 24, 2016, https://rus.ozodi.org/a/uzbekistan-builts-new-rail-way-far-from-tajikistan-/27571735.html.

11 Roman Ivanov, “Turkmenistan spassya ot rossiyskikh dolgov i nabral kitayskikh — issledovanie [Turkmenistan escaped Russian debts and accumulated Chinese ones – research],” 365 Info, March 27, 2019, https://365info.kz/2019/03/turkmenistan-spasalsya-ot-rossijskih-dolgov-i-nabral-kitajskih-issledovanie.

12 “Zasedanie Kabineta Ministrov Turkmenistana [Meeting of the Cabinet of Ministers of Turkmenistan],” Turkmenistan State News Agency (TDH) – Turkmenistan Today, June 11, 2021, https://tdh.gov.tm/ru/post/27708/zasedanie-kabineta-ministrov-turkmenistana-6.

13 Kanat Altynbayev, “Central Asia risks debt bondage with China’s Belt and Road Initiative,” Caravanserai, October 24, 2019, https://central.asia-news.com/en_GB/articles/cnmi_ca/features/2019/10/24/feature-02.

14 Payrav Chorshanbiev, “Vneshniy dolg Tadzhikistana v 2023 godu vyros neznachitelno [Tajikistan’s external debt grew insignificantly in 2023],” Asia-Plus, February 16, 2024, https://www.asiaplustj.info/ru/news/tajikistan/economic/20240216/vneshnii-dolg-tadzhikistana-v-2023-godu-viros-neznachitelno.

15 “Tajikistan: The cost of Chinese debt,” Eurasianet, July 21, 2022, https://eurasianet.org/tajikistan-the-cost-of-chinese-debt.

16 Payrav Chorshanbiev, “Vneshniy dolg Tadzhikistana v 2023 godu vyros neznachitelno [Tajikistan’s external debt grew insignificantly in 2023],” Asia-Plus, February 16, 2024, https://asiaplustj.info/ru/news/tajikistan/economic/20240216/vneshnii-dolg-tadzhikistana-v-2023-godu-viros-neznachitelno.

17 “Kak Tadzhikistan budet obsluzhivat vneshniy dolg v 2023 godu? [How will Tajikistan service its external debt in 2023?],” Sputnik, February 7, 2023, https://tj.sputniknews.ru/20230207/tajikistan-dolg-2023-1054751768.html.

18 “Glava Minfina: Tadzhikistan poka chto ne sobiraetsya brat kredity u Kitaya [Finance Minister: Tajikistan is not going to take loans from China yet],” RFE/RL, Inc, February 2, 2022, https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31682587.html.

19 Payrav Chorshanbiev, “Zoloto vmesto deneg za TETs. Kitaytsam otdayut na razrabotku dva zolotonosnykh rudnika v Tadzhikistane [Gold instead of money for the CHP plant. Two gold mines in Tajikistan are being given to the Chinese for development],” Asia-Plus, March 29, 2019, https://asiaplustj.info/ru/news/tajikistan/economic/20190329/rudniki-vmesto-deneg-za-tets-kitaitsam-otdayut-na-razrabotku-dva-zolotonosnih-rudnika-v-tadzhikistane.

20 Payrav Chorshanbiev, “Izvestnye kitayskie kompanii interesuyutsya rynkami Tadzhikistana [Well-known Chinese companies are interested in the markets of Tajikistan],” Asia-Plus, April 14, 2023, https://asiaplustj.info/ru/news/tajikistan/economic/20230414/izvestnie-kitaiskie-kompanii-interesuyutsya-rinkami-tadzhikistana.

21 “Tadzhiksko-kitayskoe predpriyatie osvobodili ot tamozhennykh poshlin [Tajik-Chinese enterprise exempted from customs duties],” Halva.tj, December 31, 2021, https://halva.tj/news/tadzhiksko_kitayskoe_predpriyatie_osvobodili_ot_tamozhennykh_poshlin/.

22 Alisher Zarifi, “Tadzhiksko-kitayskoe predpriyatie vernule chast vzyatykh v arendu zemel v Khatlone [Tajik-Chinese enterprise returned part of the leased land in Khatlon],” RFE/RL, Inc, December 15, 2019, https://rus.ozodi.org/a/30326361.html.

23 “NGO vystupaiut protiv sdachi v arendu uchastka zemli v Issykkulskoy oblasti kitayskoy kompanii [NGOs oppose the lease of land in Issyk-Kul region to a Chinese company],” RFE/RL, Inc, August 11, 2004, https://rus.azattyk.org/a/2414637.html.

24 Farhat Аbilov, “Sem let “zemelnomu” mitingu v Atyrau [Seven years since the “land” rally in Atyrau],” Weekly Ak Zhaik Newspaper, April 24, 2023, https://azh.kz/ru/news/view/90791.

25 Author interview with Tajik journalist studying China’s policy in Tajikistan.

26 “Kitay kredituet Kyrgyzstan v dollarakh, dolya dolga v yuanakh vsego 2.1% [China lends to Kyrgyzstan in dollars, the share of debt in yuan is only 2.1%],” Аkchabar, June 3, 2024, https://www.akchabar.kg/ru/news/kitaj-samyj-krupnyj-kreditor-kyrgyzstana/.

27 “Vneshniy dolg Kyrgyzstana. Kakie strany soglasilis’ dat’ otsrochku po vyplatam [Kyrgyzstan’s external debt. Which countries agreed to defer payments],” Kaktus.media, November 27, 2020, https://oper.kaktus.media/doc/426870_vneshniy_dolg_kyrgyzstana._kakie_strany_soglasilis_dat_otsrochky_po_vyplatam.html.

28 “Otsrochka vyplat Kitayu po dolgam oboidetsya byudzhetu KR v $3.8 mln [Deferral of payments to China on debts will cost the Kyrgyz Republic budget $3.8 million],” Akchabar, October 6, 2021, https://www.akchabar.kg/ru/news/otsrochka-vyplat-kitayu-obojdetsya-byudzhetu-kyrgyzstana-v-38-mln/.

29 “V Kyrgyzstane sotni lyudey vyshli na aktsiyu protiv kitayskikh investitsiy [Hundreds of people took to the streets in Kyrgyzstan to protest against Chinese investments],” RFE/RL, Inc, February 18, 2020, https://rus.azattyq.org/a/30440767.html.

30 “Revolution and Rising Discontent: An Update on the Central Asia Protest Tracker,” The Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, May 11, 2022, https://oxussociety.org/revolution-and-rising-discontent-an-update-on-the-central-asia-protest-tracker/.

31 Nargiza Muratalieva, “Kyrgyzstan’s Path to Peak Repayments to China: Context and Dilemmas,” Diplomat Media, August 03, 2023, https://thediplomat.com/2023/08/kyrgyzstans-path-to-peak-repayments-to-china-context-and-dilemmas/.

32 “Rekonstruktsiya TETs i avariya: dve pravdy proizoshedshego [Reconstruction of the CHP plant and the accident: two truths of what happened],” RFE/RL Inc, October 3, 2018, https://rus.azattyk.org/a/kyrgyzstan_tez_atambaev_masaliev/29523280.html.

33 Aleksey Bantsykin, “V 8 mlrd dollarov oboidetsya stroitel’stvo zheleznoy “Kitay – Kyrgyzstan – Uzbekistan” [The construction of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway will cost $8 billion],” SK News, April 11, 2024, https://sknews.kz/news/view/v-8-mlrd-dollarov-oboydetsya-stroitelystvo-gheleznoy-kitay-kyrguzstan-uzbekistan.

34 “Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan & China: When is a done deal really done?,” Eurasianet, June 20, 2024, https://eurasianet.org/kyrgyzstan-uzbekistan-china-when-is-a-done-deal-really-done.

35 Nargiza Osmonova, “Zheleznaya doroga Kitay-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan: s kakimi trudnostyami stolknulsya proekt i kogda nachnetsya ego realizatsiya? [China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway: what difficulties did the project face and when will its implementation begin?],” RFE/RL Inc, May 6, 2024, https://rus.azattyk.org/a/32935019.html.

36 “Uzbekistan ozvuchil stoimost’ zheleznoy dorogi KNR-KR-RUz: na $3 mlrd men’she, chem zayavlyal Akylbek Zhaparov [Uzbekistan announced the cost of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway: $3 billion less than Akylbek Zhaparov claimed],” Economist.kg, May 6, 2024, https://economist.kg/transport/2024/05/06/uzbiekistan-ozvuchil-stoimost-zhielieznoi-doroghi-knr-kr-ruz-na-3-mlrd-mienshie-chiem-zaiavlial-akylbiek-zhaparov/.

37 “Kyrgyzstan poluchit ot Kitaya kredit na stroitel’stvo zheleznoy dorogi [Kyrgyzstan to receive loan from China for railway construction],” Kaktus.media, June 18, 2024, https://kaktus.media/doc/503519_kyrgyzstan_polychit_ot_kitaia_kredit_na_stroitelstvo_jeleznoy_dorogi.html.

38 Tatyana Kudryavtseva, “Prezident Kyrgyzstana predlozhil zabyt’ temu vneshnego dolga [The President of Kyrgyzstan proposed to forget the topic of external debt],” «24.kg» News Agency, April 13, 2024, https://24.kg/vlast/291459_prezident_kyirgyizstana_predlojil_zabyit_temu_vneshnego_dolga/.

39 “Sadyr Zhaparov obratilsya k organizatsiyam i stranam, pered kotorymi Kyrgyzstan imeet dolg [Sadyr Zhaparov addressed the organizations and countries to which Kyrgyzstan owes money],” Kaktus.media, January 8, 2023, https://kaktus.media/doc/473484_sadyr_japarov_obratilsia_k_organizaciiam_i_stranam_pered_kotorymi_kyrgyzstan_imeet_dolg.html.

40 African Climate Wire, “China experts open to debt for nature swaps but want an “internally agreed mechanism” first,” Climate Legal, August 16, 2023, https://africanclimatewire.org/update/china-experts-open-to-debt-for-nature-swaps-but-want-an-internally-agreed-mechanism-first/.

41 “Kitay i pyat’ stran Tsentral’noy Azii zapuskayut regional’nyy Plan deystviy po razvitiyu zelenykh tekhnologiy [China and five Central Asian countries launch a regional Action Plan for the development of green technologies],” China Global Television Network, October 20, 2023, https://russian.cgtn.com/news/2023-10-20/1715235264318865409/index.html.

42 Yunis Sharifli, “Green New Wave: How China Adapts to Central Asia’s Renewable Energy Landscape,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 19, 2024, https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2024/04/green-new-wave-how-china-adapts-to-central-asias-renewable-energy-landscape.

43 “Glava kabmina soglasoval s Kitayem usloviya stroitel’stva solnechnoy elektrostantsii na Issyk-Kule [The Head of the Cabinet agreed with China on the terms for the construction of a solar power plant on Issyk-Kul],” Economist.kg, November 25, 2023, https://economist.kg/enierghietika/2023/11/25/glava-kabmina-soghlasoval-s-kitaiem-usloviia-stroitielstva-solniechnoi-eliektrostantsii-na-issyk-kulie/.

44 Tatyana Kudryavtseva, “Kitayskie proekty v Kyrgyzstane. Kak pochti ves’ ugol’ okazalsya v odnikh rukakh [Chinese projects in Kyrgyzstan. How almost all of the coal ended up in the same hands],” «24.kg» News Agency, October 25, 2023, https://24.kg/ekonomika/278193_kitayskie_proektyi_vkyirgyizstane_kak_pochti_ves_ugol_okazalsya_vodnih_rukah/.

45 “Stalo izvestno, na kakikh usloviyakh kompanii iz Kitaya budut dobyvat’ ugol’ v Kyrgyzstane [It became known on what conditions Chinese companies will mine coal in Kyrgyzstan],” Economist.kg, October 28, 2023, https://economist.kg/novosti/2023/10/28/stalo-izviestno-na-kakikh-usloviia-kompanii-iz-kitaia-budiet-dobyvat-ughol-v-kyrghyzstanie/.

46 Trade Map, International Trade Centre, https://www.trademap.org.

47 “Analiz torgovli mezhdu Kazakhstaunom i Kitayem: prognoz pokazyvaet trend na uvelichenie [Analysis of trade between Kazakhstan and China: the forecast shows a trend towards an increase],” Zakon.kz, February 14, 2024, https://www.zakon.kz/finansy/6424414-analiz-torgovli-mezhdu-kazakhstanom-i-kitaem-prognoz-pokazyvaet-trend-na-uvelichenie.html.

48 “Kitay snimaet zaprety: zelenyy svet kazakhstanskomu myasu [China lifts bans: green light for Kazakh meat],” Agrosearch, February 9, 2024, https://agrosearch.kz/news/kitaj-snimaet-zaprety-zelyonyj-svet-kazahstanskomu-myasu.