Eurasia Press & News
Analysis: Turkey’s motivations for mending ties are driven by security concerns, domestic pressure over refugees, and wider geopolitics.
Talk about Turkish-Syrian normalisation did not start recently. Since Ankara long ago abandoned its regime change agenda in Damascus and began focusing intensely on fighting the US-backed People’s Defence Units (YPG) in northern Syria, many analysts concluded that the question has been about when, not if, Ankara and Damascus restore diplomatic relations.
In late 2022, Turkey was under significant Russian and Gulf Arab (mostly Emirati) pressure to officially mend fences with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s government, but for numerous reasons that never went through.
Current circumstances in the region, however, are prompting Ankara to accelerate its moves toward normalisation with Damascus, suggesting that this reconciliation process might be completed sooner rather than later.
Before this year is over, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Syrian counterpart might meet in Russia or an Arab country, such as Iraq, and Ankara and Damascus will formally restore relations 13 years after Turkey severed bilateral ties with Syria.
At least three key factors explain why Turkey is increasingly serious about re-establishing official relations with Assad’s government.
First is the fact that Ankara has concerns about the efforts of the YPG-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to establish a federal government in northeastern Syria. Second are regional conflict dynamics involving Iran, Hezbollah, and Israel. Third are the sensitive issues surrounding the status of millions of Syrian refugees in Turkey.
Dealing with the YPG
In May, the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) proposed a local election to vote on a referendum on “administrative organisation,” which intended to form an SDF-controlled administrative federal government in this part of Syria.
Ankara’s threats to launch a military operation and Washington’s requests that the SDF hold off led to the indefinite postponement of this referendum.
Nonetheless, the idea of such an “administrative organisation” deeply unsettled Turkish policymakers. Officials in Ankara would perceive any YPG-ruled canton in northern Syria as a grave threat to Turkey’s national security. Turkey sees the YPG as an offshoot of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which Turkey, the EU, and the US consider a terrorist organisation.
Having launched Operation Euphrates Shield, Operation Olive Branch, and Operation Peace Spring in 2016, 2018, and 2019, respectively, Turkey has demonstrated the extent to which it views any YPG presence near the Turkish-Syrian border as unacceptable. This is for two main reasons.
First, the YPG ruling an autonomous enclave could potentially give strategic depth to PKK militants, making it easier for them to infiltrate Turkey from Syria. Second, Ankara has long feared that an outcome of increased Kurdish autonomy in Syria would be greater demands from Turkey’s Kurds for their own greater autonomy in Kurdish-majority areas from Turkey’s central government.
In Ankara’s eyes, Turkish-Syrian normalisation and a revival of the 1998 Adana agreement could be a solution to Ankara’s perceptions of the YPG threat along Turkey’s southern border.
This is at a time in which the Damascus government wants to retake all land in Syria, meaning that the security interests of both governments vis-à-vis Syria’s Kurdish question could be advanced through normalisation.
Gaza war and Israel-Iran hostilities
With the Israel-Iran ‘shadow war’ giving way to direct state-to-state confrontations in April and fears of an all-out confrontation following Ismail Haniyeh’s assassination in Tehran late last month, Ankara has much at stake. Hostilities between Tel Aviv and Tehran further escalating and spiralling out of control could unquestionably create major challenges for Turkey.
In the event of such an extreme scenario, Tehran could be expected to further grow its paramilitary footprint in Syria. Such a development would strengthen the Islamic Republic’s position in the country at the expense of Turkish interests in pushing back against the expansion and consolidation of Iranian influence in the Levant.
Escalating Israeli-Iranian clashes have prompted Turkey to “act swiftly to ‘neutralise’ the Syrian arena” and this has involved Ankara “forging robust relations with Damascus and positioning Turkey to influence future developments that will shape the region’s fate,” according to a brief recently published by the Emirates Policy Center, an Abu Dhabi-based think tank.
“While the shockwave following 7 October initially put the [Turkish-Syrian] normalisation process on hold, Israel’s aggressiveness today, which has deeply shaken regional balances and created security risks, has fuelled the motivation for normalisation,” Dr Mustafa Caner, an assistant professor at Sakarya University Middle East Institute (ORMER), said in an interview with The New Arab.
“To put it more clearly, the risk of Israel extending the war to Lebanon and, consequently, to the Syrian front is a cause of concern for Turkey. Turkey prioritises a stable and secure political structure in its southern region. Therefore, it is crucial for Turkey and Syria to quickly strengthen a political framework that won’t generate additional security risks in the event of a possible war,” he added.
Syrian refugees in Turkey
The presence of 3.6 million registered Syrian refugees has led to serious political and social tensions in Turkey. There is growing pressure on authorities to push for the return of refugees to Syria. Erdogan has taken heat from his political opponents who demand that Turkey’s government send these refugees home while right-wing elements stoke fears about an ‘Arabisation’ of their country.
This contentious issue is relevant to Ankara’s interests in reconciling with Damascus. Similarly, some countries in the European Union, including Hungary, have also had motivations for bringing Assad’s regime in from the cold for this same reason of wanting to see Syrian refugees return home.
Public opinion polls show that a majority of Turkish citizens want Syrian refugees to leave. But, at the same time, most of these Syrians in Turkey do not want to do so. Therefore, there are probably no easy solutions.
“The Turkish government is already facing economic difficulties and, without further EU funding on the horizon, would like to ensure refugees’ safe return to Syria,” explained Dr Pınar Dost, a non-resident fellow at the Atlantic Council in Turkey and an associated researcher at the French Institute for Anatolian Studies, in an interview with TNA.
“The issue was also domestically politicised. While the government may choose not to extend Syrians’ Temporary protection status, according to international law the Turkish government cannot force them to return and but only facilitate voluntary returns,” she added.
“While most of the Syrians who settled in [Turkey] do not want to return and especially regime opponents are concerned about their security if they were obliged to return Syria, [the] Assad regime, already facing dire economic conditions, would not be willing to accept refugees’ return either.”
Noting how Erdogan believes that the issue of Syrian refugees hurt his Justice and Development Party (AKP) in the latest municipal elections, Defne Arslan, senior director and founder of the Atlantic Council in Turkey, said that she sees the status of these refugees in Turkey as a main factor motivating Ankara to keep dialogue open with Damascus.
“Unofficial reports give numbers [of Syrian refugees in Turkey] as high as six million. This is a big number for any country, but especially for [Turkey], which is struggling with its own economic and social problems. The official unemployment number is almost ten percent, with the youth unemployment rate even higher, at almost 18 percent. On top of that, discomfort is also growing in Turkish society due to cultural and language clashes and differences,” Dr Arslan told TNA.
“My sense is that, if there can be progress on the Ankara-Damascus normalisation and it looks like the deals are working and life is returning to ‘normal’ in Syria, some would want to leave,” Dr Barın Kayaoğlu, an associate professor of world history at the American University of Iraq, Sulaimani, told TNA.
However, even if Ankara and Damascus restore diplomatic relations, some experts doubt that more than a minority of these Syrian refugees in Turkey would return to their home country.
“The idea of mass deportation of Syrian refugees after normalisation is not realistic. Turkey’s official stance is focused on honourable and voluntary return. For this to happen, it is essential that weapons are completely silenced in Syria, a secure and prosperous environment is established, and the new constitution is accepted and implemented,” said Dr Caner.
“In other words, the safety of life and property for the refugees must be ensured,” he added.
Some Turks advocate for an arrangement whereby Turkey helps reconstruct and redevelop parts of war-torn Syria in exchange for Damascus providing the returned Syrian refugees with security guarantees. However, how Assad’s government would treat these Syrians who fled to Turkey years ago would likely be entirely out of Ankara’s control. Pretending otherwise is probably naïve.
Idlib
The status of the opposition-held Idlib governorate in north-western Syria will be a difficult issue to address in the process of Ankara-Damascus reconciliation. Since the regime lost control of Idlib nine years ago, a few armed factions – Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), National Liberation Front, Hurras al-Din, and Turkistan Islamic Party – have been operating in this province landlocked between Turkey’s Hatay province and Syria’s governorates of Aleppo, Hama, and Latakia.
HTS, an al-Qaeda-linked coalition of Sunni Islamist forces, currently dominates the province. Turkey, while maintaining a complicated relationship with HTS, has its own military presence in Idlib too.
Officials in Damascus have been rigid in their position that every inch of Idlib must come back under the Syrian government’s control. With Damascus wanting concessions from Ankara as part of a reconciliation agreement, it is a safe bet that Syria will demand that the Turkish military leave Idlib and that Ankara sever support for anti-regime groups in this part of Syria.
“Idlib, which hosts both opposition elements and some terrorist groups, poses significant challenges. The high population density, the presence of numerous armed groups, infrastructure problems, and issues with food and water make resolving the Idlib situation particularly difficult,” Dr Caner told TNA.
“Any attacks on Idlib by the regime, Iran, or Russia could not only result in a new wave of refugees but also create a catastrophic humanitarian situation. Normalisation could pave the way for the opposition in Idlib to begin dialogue with Damascus. While separating terrorist elements is a challenging process, it is not impossible,” he added.
Ultimately, it is difficult to imagine what Turkish-Syrian normalisation will, in practice, mean for Idlib’s future. Whether Ankara and Damascus could find an option for Idlib that both deem acceptable is unclear.
Other critical questions relate to Turkey’s relationship with HTS and how much influence Ankara has over the group, as well as the extent to which Turkey could leverage such influence when negotiating with Assad’s government.
In any event, what Turkey wants to avoid at all costs is a scenario whereby the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) and its allies launch an offensive against anti-regime groups in Idlib. Such a military assault on the opposition-held province could quickly result in a major outflow of Syrians in the area toward Turkey’s border.
Nature of reconciliation
When discussing Turkish-Syrian normalisation, it is probably unrealistic to expect the process to occur rapidly or for Ankara and Damascus’s bilateral affairs to return to what existed from the era of then-foreign minister Ahmet Davutoğlu’s “zero problems with neighbours” foreign policy strategy during the 2000s until the Syrian crisis erupted in 2011. It is also necessary to consider what normalisation between Turkey and Syria could actually mean in the current context.
Looking ahead, there is good reason to expect Turkey and Syria to reach a normalisation agreement that addresses the security concerns of both states as regional conflict dynamics intensify. But full-fledged Turkish-Syrian rapprochement is difficult to imagine in the foreseeable future.
There is much resentment on the Syrian government’s part toward Turkey’s leadership because of the support that Ankara gave anti-regime militias when Assad and his supporters were in a life-and-death struggle years ago. The role that Turkey played in the Syrian crisis will not be forgotten by pro-regime Syrians and their resentment will not go away immediately.
Likewise, many Turks will forever view Assad as a butcher who in a more just world would have met Slobodan Milošević’s fate.
“Before 2011, Turkey and Syria had such good relations that they held joint cabinet meetings. We no longer expect that. The normalisation between Turkey and Syria can be formulated as a common understanding on a security axis,” Dr Caner told TNA.
“For anything beyond that, structural and actor-based changes are needed in Syria. Therefore, a quick normalisation that signals a return to the pre-2011 situation does not seem possible.”
