Eurasia Press & News
In Western military thinking, air superiority has long been considered the key to victory. However, achieving complete dominance of the skies not only comes with excessively high costs but is also unrealistic, especially in a near-peer fight. It’s time to reconsider this assumption and focus on building an air force that can support the fight even when the skies are contested. As two Finnish air defense officers, we are more closely acquainted with this than most, sharing as we do a 1,300-kilometer-long border with Russia.
The argument presented in this article may be new to some but is also in the process of being developed by American and allied airpower thinkers. Gen. David W. Allvin, the chief of staff of the U.S. Air Force, has recently expressed similar views, notably on the War on the Rocks podcast earlier this year. Addressing air superiority, he remarked, “We need to understand that it can no longer be ubiquitous air supremacy for days and weeks on end. It has to be synchronized for the time and space and region of our choosing.” We believe this perspective is worth reiterating, as it does not yet seem to be widely embraced among air warfare professionals. Additionally, this approach has already been the modus operandi of one of NATO’s newest members. The Finnish air force has a deep-rooted tradition of fulfilling its mission in a non-permissive operational environment.
Insights from Ukraine
Drawing from the lessons of the Russo-Ukrainian war, NATO’s air component is prioritizing the development of the capabilities needed to conduct counter anti-access/area denial strategies, as well as the suppression of enemy air defenses. In addition to the commander of the Allied Air Command, Gen. James B. Hecker, analysts are advocating the importance of enhancing these capabilities in Europe. It is argued that the stalemate in Ukraine results from the absence of air superiority.
While air superiority would be exceptionally beneficial to either side, many other analysts point to other factors contributing to the lack of progress on the front lines. These factors include for example munition shortages, the pervasive presence of drones, and the inability to conduct combined-arms operations, none of which would be resolved solely through air superiority.
Suppressing enemy air defenses is challenging and air forces generally lack the capabilities and magazine depth to conduct such operations at scale. The U.S. Air Force may possess the necessary tools and skills, but even the most powerful air force in the world lacks extensive experience in operations against modern air defenses. Although usually used as a benchmark, achievements in the Gulf War do not adequately compare to the challenges faced by today’s airmen with regard to contemporary integrated air defense systems.
On the other hand, ground-based air defenses have proven to be extremely lethal. Both Russia and Ukraine have faced significant losses, and while we cannot be certain of the exact reasons behind each shoot-down, we know that ground-based capabilities have played a crucial role.
Given the lethality of modern integrated air defenses and other recent technological advancements, we argue that instead of aiming for the traditional objective of air superiority, the allied air component should shift its focus towards enhancing capabilities that support the broader joint force in contested airspaces, where dominance is never fully guaranteed. This approach not only resonates with Allvin’s views but also reflects the concept of “‘windows of dominance” articulated by retired Lt. Gen. David A. Deptula and Christopher J. Bowie. We believe there are several compelling reasons for this change in strategy.
First, the currently observed mutually denied air environment is likely to become the new status quo. Achieving total air dominance against a peer adversary seems unlikely given recent experiences. Second, there are more efficient and less risky ways to achieve some of the effects that were once the sole responsibility of the air component. Third, achieving air superiority alone does not address the myriad challenges present on today’s battlefield.
Peer Adversary
Russia managed to damage or destroy 75 percent of Ukraine’s fixed air defense assets at the very beginning of the 2022 offensive. They achieved this without a long-lasting air campaign using precision fires and air strikes deep into Ukrainian territory. Despite lacking the capability to conduct large-scale composite air operations, Russia still managed to inflict significant damage on Ukrainian air defenses. From this perspective, one might conclude that the West would have no problem achieving air superiority against a peer adversary, especially given the successes during the Gulf War in 1991.
We have a different view. Firstly, the experiences in the Gulf War hold little relevance on today’s battlefield. Although the Iraqi air defense system is often portrayed as extremely sophisticated and capable, it has been correctly noted that its actual performance bore little resemblance to the systems currently employed by Russia. A brief examination of the Iraqi air defenses’ force composition at that time reveals that their ground-based air defenses lacked the range and mobility of contemporary systems. While this difference may seem subtle, it is, in fact, a profound distinction between past and present capabilities. And by saying this we do not intend to take anything away from the achievements of the U.S.-led coalition.
It’s already known that fixed air defense assets are likely to be destroyed during the first hours of a conflict. As mentioned, this occurred in Ukraine and has happened elsewhere. However, what is often overlooked is that the mobile systems faced almost no losses during the same period. Only around 10 percent of the systems capable of redeployment were estimated to be affected. Unlike in Iraq, all contemporary ground-based air defense systems are mobile, although the time needed for redeployment varies from system to system.
Additionally, some take a rather one-sided approach to the problem. For instance, when discussing the suppression of enemy air defenses, it is often highlighted how strike packages penetrate defended areas with the help of electronic warfare capabilities. While this is certainly true, some tend to forget that adversaries might employ similar tactics and such capabilities of their own.
For example, Russia has passive sensors within its integrated air defenses. If incorporated effectively, these sensors can significantly reduce the time needed for active emissions by ground-based units, making them harder to detect and evade. Emission control is therefore relevant not only for ground-based air defenses but similarly for aircraft. Balancing situational awareness and survivability is thus a challenge for both sides. The same applies for offensive electronic warfare capabilities. The reality is more nuanced than often portrayed, and this is just one example.
The task of the air defender is indeed “far more complex than most-non specialist discussion would suggest.” On top of that, due to the mobile nature of present-day ground-based air defense systems and the situational awareness provided by a truly integrated system-of-systems, we argue that suppressing, let alone destroying, air defenses is far more challenging than many realize. This was already demonstrated in Kosovo in 1999, where air defenders, through tactical maneuvers, were able to enhance the survivability of ground-based systems and hamper the allies’ ability to suppress air defenses, even though the systems employed were largely the same as those used in Iraq years before. We believe that the current situation in Ukraine serves as further evidence of our claim.
It should also be considered that while Iraqi forces fired Scud missiles against allied forces during the Gulf War, the scale and accuracy of these attacks are not comparable to the Russians’ use of long-range precision fires against their opponents. When planning maneuvers against anti-access/area denial capabilities, it is essential to recognize that the opposing forces have a say as well. Their capabilities can reach far, as exemplified by the Russian Kinzhal ballistic missile, which is estimated to have a range of up to 2000 kilometers.
Analysts are quick to underline how the Russians managed to mislead not only themselves but many Western thinkers as well when they failed to replicate their successes from operations in Syria in Ukraine. At the same time, some seem to have no problem emphasizing their own capabilities to suppress air defenses based on decades-old experiences from the Persian Gulf. Therefore, we are slightly concerned that Iraq could become the West’s own Syria, in the sense that we might too eagerly apply and generalize lessons from a different context without sufficient criticism.
Alternative Methods
While the coalition forces managed to dominate the air domain during the Gulf War, considering the aforementioned perspectives this may not be the case in future conflicts. When properly orchestrated, modern multi-layered air defenses are extremely difficult to overcome.
We are not claiming that people are taking air superiority for granted, but there still may be a hint of overconfidence in our belief that NATO can overcome the core capability and development priority of the Russian armed forces, especially while at the same time acknowledging that the alliance is not even sufficiently prepared to do so.
The plan to target Russian integrated air defenses can also be seen to contradict the maneuverist approach, the philosophy that NATO has adopted to guide its operational art. One of the classical interpretations of the maneuverist approach is to exploit the adversary’s weaknesses rather than confront their strengths head-on. Directly engaging Russian air defenses means attacking one of their highest priorities, which could be seen more as an attritional way of war rather than a maneuverist one.
Therefore, larger questions arise. Should the alliance indeed prioritize the suppression of enemy air defenses above all else, even when there are no guarantees of success? Or would it be more beneficial to also explore alternative ways to support the joint force? After all, air superiority is merely a means to an end.
So, what is the actual objective of the air component? If it is to protect the joint force from airborne attacks, does air superiority truly achieve that in today’s threat environment? Or if it is to extend fires into enemy territory, are cruise missiles and ground-based fires not sufficient? While not perfect examples, Ukraine’s recurring ability to employ long-range fires with even quite rudimentary equipment offers a glimpse into what can be achieved with more technologically advanced weapons.
Or if it is to create situational awareness with highly advanced sensor suites, why risk manned aircraft when similar tasks can be done with smaller and simpler drones and space-based capabilities? Alternative methods may not work every time as well as the traditional way, but purely from the cost-benefit standpoint we believe the opportunity is attractive and worth at least investigating.
All in all, we believe that no one can be certain of the effort required to achieve air superiority. The alliance simply lacks a precedent for this against an opponent as capable as Russia, or any other similarly equipped adversary. While it might be premature to conclude that defenses will dominate future wars based on the war in Ukraine, what if that holds true in the air domain?
We are not implying that air force has become obsolete — far from it. However, pursuing any goal inevitably involves opportunity costs. Investing in one capability means that resources cannot be allocated to other competing capabilities. This balance between different skill sets is crucial, especially when Europe lacks, for example, deep strike capabilities and has a number of other equally important capability deficits. Therefore, we encourage making investments that have the most significant effect. Even as the alliance increases military spending, resources remain limited.
Beyond Air Superiority
True joint operations will be achieved only when personnel from each service are able and willing to identify the underlying factors affecting the battlefield beyond their own backgrounds and core competencies. To a hammer, every problem looks like a nail — and while this perspective is understandable, it is also one of the biggest obstacles to a truly aligned force employment and joint action.
This phenomenon is well-documented. Analysts and high-ranking officers within the air domain often view the inability to achieve air superiority as the greatest failure and the most critical factor leading to the prolonged conflict between the Russians and Ukrainians. However, there are equally frequent differing assessments, highlighting the complexity of the issue. Many of them do not view the lack of air superiority as a significant problem.
Air superiority cannot, for example, be used to capture and hold territory. Although this might seem outdated in the context of various effect-centric and multi-domain discussions, it remains an indisputable part of modern warfare. In this overall context, the role of airpower and crewed aviation remains substantial, but has this role been overstated?
As discussed, both Russia and Ukraine are already conducting aerial reconnaissance, target acquisition, and fire control using drones and satellites. Bombings are being replaced with cruise and artillery missiles, while ground troops are protected by ground-based air defenses. One might therefore ask if aircraft are even needed anymore? We definitely wouldn’t go that far, but there is nevertheless sound reasoning there.
Air superiority, once the exclusive realm of superpowers, is no longer their sole privilege. In what is now described by some as the air littoral, drones have transformed the battlefield, allowing smaller actors to achieve capabilities that were previously out of reach. At the same time, the nature of the airspace has become more complex and crowded, and complete freedom of action may no longer be achievable to anyone.
However, in high intensity peer-to-peer warfare, maneuver units conducting large-scale combat ground operations do not need an air force that can only operate effectively in uncontested airspace. Divisions and brigades need an air component that can support operations every day of the week, regardless of the threat environment. Hence, air superiority should not be considered a definitive requirement for air support but rather only a beneficial condition. Especially considering that during these turbulent times, there are no guarantees that the alliance will always have the comfort of choosing when and where the joint force is needed.
To make it clear, we are not suggesting that achieving air superiority is entirely unfeasible, especially bearing in mind that it is not a dichotomous issue but rather a continuum with various degrees of control. This concept is well-established and discussed widely in military doctrine. But it’s not that doctrines don’t allow for less ambitious and more realistic objectives regarding air superiority — rather, it’s about managing our expectations. Just as we don’t expect artillery to achieve complete destruction across the entire battlefield, infantry to repel the enemy at every point along the front, or command-and-control connections to be flawless, we shouldn’t expect air combat to be frictionless. War is not a game of perfection. Success lies in the ability to adapt and manage imperfections effectively.
Conclusion
The fastest path to defeat might be overestimating oneself while underestimating the opponent. The aim of this article is to provoke leaders and commanders to consider the possibility of not achieving air superiority. The alliance should have a Plan B, particularly in light of current experiences in Ukraine, which imply the need for alternative strategies. That said, we acknowledge that war is highly contextual and making generalizations is exceedingly difficult — specifically when it comes to Russia. It wouldn’t be the first time their military capabilities have fallen short of expectations. However, relying on that assumption alone would not be a prudent approach.
Fortunately, there are numerous ways to be supportive even without the ability to maneuver freely in contested airspace. These measures include denying the opponent from exploiting the air domain, employing long-range fires, intercepting enemy strikes, conducting intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and more. These actions contribute directly to mission success, unlike air superiority, which is only the first step. What follows is what truly matters and deserves thus further attention. An open-minded approach to addressing the actual operational objectives of the air component might lead to novel ideas on how to achieve them, which would be far more intriguing than pursuing an uncertain aim simply because it is what we are used to doing.
To clarify, since we serve in the forces of a frontline NATO nation and therefore represent those who would likely be among the first in line in a larger conflict, we would appreciate nothing more than the total dominance of the air domain. And if anyone can achieve it, it is this mighty 75-year-old alliance. However, given our understanding and experience with modern ground-based air defense and integrated air defenses in general, we emphasize the need to differentiate what can sometimes be described as wishful thinking from the harsh reality we are now witnessing on the battlefield. There is a difference between how things are and how they ought to be, and one shouldn’t confuse the two.
