Eurasia Press & News
CNN, citing two anonymous military sources , reported that the Pentagon has begun to allocate smaller amounts of military aid to Ukraine due to a “noticeable depletion of its own reserves.” At the same time, almost $6 billion that Congress allocated from the US Department of Defense reserves to support Ukraine in the spring of 2024 remains unspent. Due to the peculiarities of US legislation, this amount will “burn out” on October 1, because the new fiscal year will begin. The Insider’s security and defense columnist Colby Bedworth believes that the lack of military aid to Ukraine is due to the indecisiveness and inconsistency of the Biden administration. At the same time, providing Kiev with adequate military support will require the efforts of not only the US, but also European countries.
Race against time
Ukraine’s future is being decided not only on the front lines, but equally in the political battles in Washington. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, the United States has been the largest provider of military aid to Kyiv. But as the current fiscal year approaches on October 1, there are growing doubts in the United States about Washington’s ability to continue providing such support.
The problem lies in the wording of one of the provisions of the US Code , which allowed the Pentagon to provide Ukraine with military aid worth tens of billions of dollars.
The Biden administration is pressing Congress to urgently approve continued aid, but in many ways it has created this dangerous situation. Congress’s slowness should come as no surprise to the president, a longtime senator himself. Yet the White House continues to risk Ukraine’s future by creating conditions in which support extensions must be agreed upon at the last minute. This is not the first time, and it will probably not be the last.
Congress’ slowness should come as no surprise to the president, who himself was a longtime senator.
Section 506 of the Foreign Assistance Act , better known as the Presidential Drawdown Authority, allows the head of state to transfer military equipment and munitions from the U.S. Department of Defense stockpile to allies in an emergency situation “up to $100 million per fiscal year.” Of course, $100 million in weapons isn’t a lot, which is why Congress has already raised the limit five times since 2022 at the president’s request.
In the spring, the Ukraine Security Supplemental Appropriations Act (USSAA) increased the cap for fiscal year 2024 from $100 million to $7.8 billion. Since the act was passed in April, President Biden has transferred $1.875 billion in weapons to Ukraine, leaving $5.925 billion in reserve. However, at midnight on October 1, fiscal year 2025 will begin, and decisions made in the previous fiscal year will no longer be in effect. The $100 million cap will go back into effect.
On October 1, the 2025 fiscal year will begin, and the limit of almost $6 billion will simply burn out.
This is certainly an undesirable outcome, but there are precedents. At the end of fiscal year 2022, the Biden administration was more than $2 billion behind on arms transfers, despite calls from Republicans in Congress to spend all of the funds. The balance was about 25% of the amount authorized in the 2022 Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act. That fall, Ukraine found itself in a race against time, launching simultaneous offensives in the Kharkiv and Kherson regions to push back Russian forces before they could bring in reserves and bad weather put an end to the active maneuvers. While both offensives were successful, Ukraine could have made even more progress had it received $2 billion in additional equipment and ammunition.
Special Provisions
The current situation is even more complicated. The amount of money approved by Congress is set to expire in a few weeks, and a staggering 76% of it remains unspent. The Biden administration had requested $7 billion in military aid to Ukraine for fiscal year 2024. Congress approved even more: $7.8 billion. But the White House unnecessarily capped the size of the aid packages. Since April, Ukraine has received an average of only $200 million in weapons per month, compared with an average of $600 million per month in fiscal year 2023.
White House Unnecessarily Caps Aid Package Sizes
Ukraine’s needs today are certainly not three times smaller than they were a year ago; in fact, they have increased. With the $7.8 billion approved at the end of April, Ukraine could receive $1 billion worth of equipment and ammunition monthly, and that would still not exhaust all the US’s available resources.
In an attempt to avoid a repeat of September 2022, the Biden administration has asked Congress to extend the remaining $5.925 billion. Congress is being asked to amend the 2024 USSAA to extend the arms transfer authority into fiscal year 2025. This would preserve the remaining funds until they are exhausted or Congress again amends Section 506, as noted above.
The request was among a list of “special provisions” that the administration sent to Congress ahead of the temporary funding. Since Congress has yet to pass legislation to fund the government through fiscal year 2025, these are temporary measures to keep it funded. While most lawmakers are likely to support these measures to avoid a government shutdown ahead of the presidential election, such decisions are always controversial. There is a chance that the measures will be rejected, or that this particular White House amendment will be rejected.
Tactics without strategy
The question arises: why didn’t the Biden administration ask for this amendment to be included in USSAA 2024 in the first place? It was already obvious in the spring that there would be a problem with spending the funds allocated for aid to Kyiv by September. When Congress drafted the bill, they could have avoided this situation by including provisions allowing the $7.8 billion to be spent over two fiscal years. With the war in Ukraine now in its third year, the importance of long-term planning is becoming increasingly clear.
But the Biden administration continues to make decisions on the fly. For two years, the White House refused to commit to a clear strategy until Congress finally obligated the administration to produce one. That request was long ignored. The White House submitted a report on the strategy three months late.
It is no coincidence that the strategy report, completely classified in violation of the law, was released only after the Biden administration missed all deadlines and filed a request for “special provisions” in temporary funding. Congress demanded specific data on military assistance to Ukraine, as well as on how this assistance would help defeat Russia. If such a report had been written honestly and in good faith, it would have contradicted the current White House practice of providing Ukraine with the minimum necessary support.
A few $200 million-a-month military aid packages are not enough to even support the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ defense, let alone conduct large-scale offensive operations. Given that the 2023 counteroffensive was supported by packages averaging $600 million each, achieving more convincing battlefield success will likely require even more resources.
Several military aid packages worth $200 million per month are not enough even to maintain the defense of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, let alone an offensive
But given the limited resources available for military aid, it will need to be distributed gradually. In the worst-case scenario, if the $6 billion in weapons is not extended, there will be billions left over after the cost of the previous two fiscal years’ aid packages is recalculated. These measures, already approved by Congress, are permanent and will allow aid to continue into the new calendar year.
This mechanism provides the Biden administration with a backup plan in case Congress does not extend the aid into the next fiscal year. Once the White House notifies Congress of a new arms transfer, the aid does not have to be delivered immediately. While Ukraine would certainly benefit from a larger aid shipment now, the most likely scenario is for the administration to announce the full $6 billion but deliver the weapons gradually.
If Congress extends the 2024 military aid, the president’s authority to release it must remain in effect until the sixth supplemental Ukraine Authorization Act is passed to ensure continued support into 2025. The next U.S. president will not take office until late January, meaning the current authority must remain in effect until at least the end of March to give the new Congress time to negotiate with the president and draft and pass legislation.
This means that Kyiv will likely continue to receive fewer weapons than it needs to maintain an effective defense. Ukraine’s needs continue to far exceed its available resources. The Biden administration has exacerbated this problem by woefully mismanaging the funds it has been given.
Comprehensive assistance
As discussed earlier, Raytheon could have been tapped to supply Ukraine with new Patriot air defense systems using the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI) funds, but the Pentagon was not interested. USAI is designed to fund long-term projects, such as air defense, but is also used for more urgent purchases. For example, the initiative has already been used to purchase Soviet-era ammunition for the Ukrainian Armed Forces. In this regard, USAI could help replenish stockpiles of weapons that the United States cannot supply.
A Czech initiative to purchase artillery ammunition from international suppliers could benefit greatly from additional funding, but the U.S. government has yet to back the project. The shortage of ammunition for existing weapons remains the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ most serious material problem, but there is little sense in the White House and the Pentagon of how urgent the issue is. With more than $4 billion in USAI funds remaining available through the end of the next fiscal year, even a small portion of those funds could provide Ukraine with a large supply of artillery ammunition more quickly.
In addition to weapons and ammunition, Ukraine simply needs more aid of any kind. It is impossible to wage a full-scale war with a limited budget. Aid to Ukraine is sometimes viewed as the supply of individual systems and technologies, instead of taking into account the needs of the Ukrainian Armed Forces as a whole. No technology, be it air defense systems , artillery, armored vehicles, aviation or long-range weapons, can ensure victory in a war on its own.
The “coalitions of opportunity” formed under the auspices of the Contact Group on Ukraine’s Defense have been a useful mechanism for strengthening Kiev’s military capabilities in a comprehensive manner, but the assistance provided by all coalition members, including the United States, remains insufficient. Key weapons systems transferred so far are in the tens or hundreds, while victory will require thousands. Unfortunately, a solution to this problem remains elusive in the near term, but the new administration will need to realistically assess how much funding it will need to request from Congress. At a minimum, it should be $24 billion under the president’s arms transfer authority, $60–70 billion for weapons replenishment, and $24 billion for USAI and the Foreign Military Financing Program.
Ukraine’s armed forces certainly have their shortcomings in areas such as organization, training, and command, but these are factors beyond the control of Western leaders. What Ukraine’s allies can control is the amount of material assistance they provide. As winter approaches, the short-term goal should be to put maximum pressure on Russian logistics. President Biden has an opportunity to set an example for future White House occupants by lifting all restrictions on Ukraine’s use of the weapons it has provided and delivering significant additional missiles.
The combination of GMLRS , ATACMS , and JASSM cruise missiles could deal a serious blow to Russian forces if deployed en masse in the fall and winter. The U.S. can focus on providing offensive firepower, while European countries that lack such capabilities should focus on equipping and training Ukrainian ground forces for offensive operations next summer. This process needs to begin now.
The whole world
In addition to the Coalitions of Opportunity, Western countries could individually or collectively sponsor one of the Ukrainian brigades, committing to train and fully equip it. This would give Ukraine a combat-ready force that would be ready for major offensive operations in the future.
Europe, Canada, Australia, and other countries may soon find themselves shouldering even more responsibility. While U.S. aid to Ukraine is likely to continue in the short term, the outcome of the presidential election in November will have a significant impact on the war’s future course.
Former President Trump is confident that he can quickly negotiate an end to the war. But it is hard to see how that will benefit Ukraine in the long term if Russia still occupies significant portions of its sovereign territory. Vice President Harris will continue the Biden administration’s policy of consistently refusing to reveal its own policy agenda while continuing to defend the current administration’s achievements. While this predictability is encouraging, Ukraine cannot win a war if it is given only the minimum support needed to prevent a Russian breakthrough.
Ukraine cannot win the war if it is given only minimal support
In any case, both America’s allies and the bipartisan majorities in Congress that support Ukraine will have to convince the next president that Ukraine needs decisive support. The best way to end the war quickly, on terms that are favorable to Ukraine, is to provide much larger amounts of aid. Encouragingly, production of some key munitions, such as 155mm artillery rounds , is expected to ramp up by 2025. The necessary weapons systems will be available. The only question, as always, is whether there is the political will to deliver them.
