Eurasia Press & News
Israeli intelligence and information superiority contributed to striking several strategic targets of Hezbollah, whether at the leadership level or in the infrastructure. Accordingly, this paper seeks to read the Israeli strategy towards the party before and after the war in the Gaza Strip, which contributed to a large extent to weakening its ability and undermining it from a proportionate response and corresponding escalation.
The confrontations between Israel and Hezbollah are entering a new phase that goes beyond the threshold of limited escalation or the framework of the rules of engagement followed since the outbreak of the war in the Gaza Strip, indicating that the two parties are in the midst of a gradual escalation that threatens to reach the threshold of “open war”, which regional and international powers and actors have been warning against, and which has been considered over the past 11 months as one of the worst scenarios that the region may face. However, the confrontations and events preceding them revealed an aspect of the features of those confrontations, specifically in Israel achieving intelligence superiority in contrast to Hezbollah’s decline in response in kind to the unprecedented Israeli escalation since 2006, which indicates an imbalance in the balance of deterrence between the two parties, in a way that leaves effects on the current gradual escalation path between them, and on the various parties of the “resistance” axis and the “unity of arenas” strategy. Reading the recent developments and expanding the understanding of them requires a return to the Israeli strategy towards Hezbollah and Iran before the war in the Gaza Strip, which contributed to a large extent to weakening the party’s capabilities and exposing it to Israel, in light of which it is possible to propose paths of gradual escalation between the two parties.
Israeli Campaign Between Wars
After the war with Hezbollah in 2006, Israel formulated a defensive, preemptive and preventive strategy, which it called the “Campaign Between Wars.” That war, the losses inflicted on Israel, and the threat Hezbollah presented at various levels constituted a turning point in Israel’s strategic thinking regarding the nature of its dealings with the party on the one hand, and the risks associated with Iranian influence, whether its nuclear and missile programs, or its network of agents who, after 2012, formed a strategic cordon around it, extending from Iraq to Syria, then Lebanon and all the way to the Mediterranean Sea, in addition to Yemen in the Red Sea. This hybrid form of threats forced Israel to make a major change in its defensive doctrine, moving it from a permanent focus on the operational aspect to achieving superiority in the information and intelligence aspect and advanced intelligence operations on the ground. Which was built on the findings of the Winograd Commission to investigate the 2006 war, which revealed pressure points in the army, including lack of preparedness, strategic and operational planning, increasing reliance on the air force, and the weakness of the ground forces in achieving the war’s objectives at that time in a complex operational environment.
The “campaign between the wars” came as a development in the methods of confronting the hybrid challenges on its borders, and a practical expression of the advance preparation for war against Iran and its agents, specifically “Hezbollah”. It relies primarily on joint work between intelligence units, the air force, and the Israeli army, as it is based on intensifying intelligence activity with the aim of obtaining accurate information and then converting it into surgical military action if necessary. This has included targeting everything that Israel classifies as a strategic threat, whether related to the Iranian nuclear and missile program, or the Iranian positioning in Syria, and it has even extended to Syrian chemical and biological weapons. Since 2015, there has been a clear focus on “Hezbollah”, especially in preventing the arrival of advanced weapons to it from Iran via Syria, in a way that could upset the balance of power between it and Israel, and add operational complications to Israel during major war campaigns between the two parties, such as the party obtaining air defense systems that restrict the movement of Israeli warplanes in Lebanese airspace, or strengthening its arsenal of weapons and precision missiles capable of striking strategic civilian and military installations. Israel considered this to be a major game changer and a strategic threat.
In contrast to Israel’s experience in the 2006 war with Hezbollah, the campaign between the wars carried out operations without significant losses, and continued without the risk of being dragged into war or receiving retaliatory strikes, as Hezbollah did not consider the Israeli strikes against its elements and sites in Syria to be an infringement on its red lines set in the Lebanese arena. During 2023, Israeli strikes against Hezbollah in Syria constituted 24% of the total strikes, 5% targeted arms transfers, and 24% targeted Iranian targets, none of which were responded to by the party. But the effectiveness of this campaign is not only measured by these tactical aspects, but also by its contribution to establishing a high-quality intelligence infrastructure against Hezbollah and Iran. It seems to have increased Israel’s ability to recruit high-level agents within their networks, and raised its level of knowledge of the nature of the relationship between Hezbollah and Iran on the one hand, and to uncover and track the supply chains of weapons and military equipment to the party on the other hand. This is in addition to the role of technology in supporting Israeli intelligence operations in the air and space, espionage, hacking calls, intercepting communications, and other capabilities.
Undermining the initiative factor of Hezbollah and Iran
Joint operations between intelligence units and the Israeli army against Hezbollah and Iran continued after the outbreak of the war in the Gaza Strip, and have become a familiar form of Israeli operations against Hezbollah and various parties of the “axis of resistance” since the party’s first participation in the escalation on October 8, 2023. In addition to Israel maintaining its goals of preventing Hezbollah from obtaining weapons or Iran and its agents from strengthening their presence in Syria, it targeted the Aleppo and Damascus airports three times between October 14-22 . Israel added a new layer to its goals, in preventing Lebanon from turning into a second war front parallel to the main war front in the Gaza Strip, which prompted it to send part of the reserve forces to its northern borders, and respond in kind to Hezbollah’s attacks , and work to weaken its capabilities and prevent it from implementing its plans in a way that prevents a military escalation based on surprising Israel, by intensifying surgical military operations by taking advantage of the accumulated knowledge and information it obtained during decades of following the “campaign between the wars” strategy. It is possible to note the Israeli tactics during the first months of the war, which relied on high-value goals to achieve two basic pillars, which are:
First: Limiting the relationship between Iran and Hezbollah, and Iran’s ability to provide support to the party, by striking the Iranian leaders responsible for communication, logistical and intelligence support between Iran and Hezbollah, especially in Syria. Local organizations have counted more than 100 Israeli attacks on Syria, during which 27 Revolutionary Guard commanders were killed, including 14 high-ranking ones, and 51 members of the Lebanese Hezbollah, including them;
1- Mohammad Ali Atayi Shorjeh, advisor to the “Axis of Resistance” and Banah Taghizadeh, a specialist in the IRGC’s aerospace unit, in a missile attack on the Sayyida Zeinab area on December 2, 2023.
2- Razi Mousavi, responsible for coordinating Iran’s agents in Syria and transporting Iranian weapons through Syria to Lebanon, who was killed in a missile attack in the Sayyida Zeinab area on December 25, 2023.
3- Hojatollah Amidvar, the IRGC intelligence and Quds Force official, who was killed along with other commanders, namely Aghazadeh, Hossein Mohammadi, Saeed Karimi, and Mohammad Amin Samadi, in an airstrike targeting a building in Damascus on January 20, 2024.
4- Saeed Alidadi, head of the Revolutionary Guards’ communications unit, who was killed in an airstrike while supervising the transfer of a weapons shipment that was on its way to Hezbollah, according to local sources, on February 2, 2024.
5- Behrouz Vahedi, the official in the Quds Force’s communications unit and his assistant, on March 26, 2024.
6- The killing of Mohammad Reza Zahedi, the commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard in Syria, Lebanon and Palestine, along with 6 other commanders, in the bombing of the Iranian consulate in Damascus in early April 2024 .
7- Ahmad Reza Afshari, military advisor to the IRGC Aerospace Force, who was killed in an airstrike in Syria on August 26, 2024.
Second: Creating a gap at the level of the first-line leaders of the units tasked with operations in southern Lebanon, which are the units (Aziz, Badr, and Nasr) and responsible for the three military axes in southern Lebanon (western, central, and eastern), as Israel assassinated most of the first-line leaders of those military units in the party, including;
1- Assassination of Wissam al-Tawil, commander of the Radwan unit, and responsible for military operations in southern Lebanon, on January 8, 2024.
2- The assassination of Sami Taleb, commander of the Victory Unit responsible for operations in the central region of the border strip with Israel in the south, on June 12, 2024.
3- Assassination of Muhammad Nimah, commander of the Aziz unit responsible for artillery and drones, on July 3, 2024.
4- Assassination of a group of leaders responsible for securing the advance of these units, and the striking and targeting operations inside Israel, including Hassan Fares, commander of the anti-tank missile unit, on August 7, 2024.
Achieving shock at various levels
The data on the escalation between Israel and Hezbollah developed significantly after mid-June 2024 , especially with the war in the Gaza Strip entering a new, less intense phase. In light of the difficulties surrounding reaching a ceasefire agreement in the Strip, Israel’s attention turned to the need to resolve the escalation front in the north, and to shift Israeli military effort and weight towards it, so as not to find itself in the middle of an open, multi-front war of attrition that could last for years. However, Israeli measures took on a dimension coinciding with its announcement of the end of operations in general in the Gaza Strip on August 16, 2024, as they revealed new methods and goals to resolve the escalation with Lebanon, by striking various leadership, operational and operational levels in the party, neutralizing the methods of communication and contact within it, and waging a psychological war against the party and its incubating environment.
At the leadership level : On July 31, 2024, Israel assassinated Fouad Shukr, head of Hezbollah’s operations room or chief of staff, in a targeted building in the southern suburb. It then assassinated Ibrahim Aqil, head of the operations division and commander of the Radwan Force, along with the entire high command of the force in a raid that targeted a meeting of theirs in the suburb on September 20, 2024. Meanwhile, the party’s third-in-command, Ali al-Karaki, survived a raid that targeted him on September 23, and assassinated Ibrahim Qubaisi, commander of the party’s missile system, on September 24. It is likely that this series of assassinations prompted the rest of the leadership structure, especially the party’s secretary-general, to adopt strict security arrangements that could limit follow-up and coordination with all field data.
On the operational level : The explosions of pagers and wireless devices in the hands of Hezbollah elements on September 17-18, 2024, resulted in the injury of more than 3,500 people. According to the Lebanese Minister of Health, the two incidents resulted in the death of 39 people. Therefore, the majority of these were Hezbollah elements who were neutralized from participating in the escalation, and most of them were field officials and liaison and coordination officers in the party. This led to the loss of means of communication not only within the party but also between its elements and Iran.
On the psychological level : The Israeli preemptive strike against Hezbollah’s plans in response to the killing of Fouad Shukr on August 25 , and then the unprecedented penetration of the party by bombing the pagers and wireless devices, caused a shock within the party. Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah revealed this psychological dimension in a speech on September 19, 2024, saying that “the party received a strong blow from Israel.”
In fact, Israeli tactics since the outbreak of the war on October 7 and up until today have followed a series of measures that lead to one another through:
1- The increasing assassinations of field commanders and unit leaders have reduced the party’s reliance on modern means of communication, and reliance on analog devices such as pagers and landlines. According to security sources, Hezbollah distributed pagers hours before they were detonated, considering them old and safe technologies against attempts at spying, tracking and hacking.
2- The assassinations of the three unit commanders in southern Lebanon led to increased involvement of the operations commanders in coordinating missions to compensate for the leadership gap, which increased their movements in the field and their meetings with lower-ranking commanders, which facilitated their penetration and led to their assassination.
3- The pager and wireless explosions undermined Hezbollah’s confidence in communicating using any imported or electronic devices, which prompted the operations commanders to meet with their units in person, and this appears to be what happened in the case of targeting the leadership structure of the Radwan unit in a meeting described as “rare.”
4- The pager and wireless device explosions led Israel to uncover the activity of various Hezbollah elements, their locations and deployments, and a number of the party’s strategic sites. It is likely that all of this was added to the Israeli target bank against the party, and it may include what Israel announced about attacking 1,600 Hezbollah targets in 200 areas in Lebanon on September 24, 2024 alone.
Shift to gradual escalation
The recent Israeli measures were primarily aimed at expanding the level of escalation for Israel, narrowing Hezbollah’s space for response and margin of maneuver, and pushing it to exclude the option of war in order to prevent the escalating deterioration of its security and military capabilities. To date, the party has been reluctant to declare war. Although Israel treats Lebanon as a war front, it has intensified its airstrikes and expanded their geographical area from southern Lebanon to the Bekaa and the southern suburbs of Beirut since September 22, 2024, targeting open areas and residential and civilian neighborhoods, resulting in more than 600 deaths and nearly 3,000 injuries, and directed strikes at Hezbollah’s infrastructure, including missile launch pads and weapons storage facilities, with a heavy focus on the southern suburbs of Beirut as the party’s stronghold in Lebanon. In contrast, Hezbollah continued to engage within a limited geographical area with limited exceptions, intensifying its attacks on the Golan Heights and Upper Galilee, and limiting itself to targeting military installations such as the Ramat David Air Base and the Rafael Company in Haifa.
Finally , the unprecedented Israeli escalation against Hezbollah places the scene in front of three paths, as follows:
The first track : establishing the security belt / buffer zone
The Israeli escalation aims primarily to separate the Lebanese front from the one in the Gaza Strip, and it is likely that Israeli military pressure on Hezbollah will lead it to seriously address the American and French calls to implement UN Security Council Resolution 1701, in a way that leads to calm. Especially since the intensive Israeli air campaign has added a new burden on the party, represented by the displacement from the cities and villages of the south to central and northern Lebanon, and press reports indicate that more than half a million people have left their homes.
On the other hand, there is a possibility that the Israeli operations will move to a new phase, including a ground attack, if Hezbollah sticks to its position, to create a security belt and a buffer zone that will keep Hezbollah away from the Israeli border, and enable the settlers to return to their settlements. This is reinforced in the process with the transfer of the 98th Commando Division from the Gaza Strip to the command on the northern front, and the army’s announcement on September 25 of the call-up of two reserve brigades to the northern front.
But such a step, if not followed by a diplomatic path, could threaten to drag Israel into a long-term war of attrition, especially since the blows suffered by Hezbollah and its leaders will not prevent the party from continuing to clash with Israel, especially if it has forces inside Lebanon.
The second path : Continuing the war until achieving a decisive victory against the party
The continuation of the Israeli escalation against Hezbollah for more than a month and the emergence of real signs of Hezbollah’s inability to respond in kind or keep up with the escalation with escalation and inflict losses on Israel or succeed in targeting strategic facilities and sites in it, may push Israel to continue the war to destroy its target bank, leading to achieving a strategic decision in Lebanon, undermining Hezbollah’s capabilities, harming its relations with Iran and ending the deterrence equations that existed in the past. In this path, the Israeli strikes against the party may continue for months, but this path may lead at some point to an attempt by Iran and its agents to expand their involvement in the war, especially since the Iraqi armed factions have recently intensified their targeting of Israel, and have hit a Golani Brigade observation base with a drone on September 23, 2024.
The third path : absorbing the shock and restoring the party’s deterrence
Hezbollah is likely to carry out qualitative military operations against strategic targets in Israel, as despite the logistical and security difficulties and the absence of a number of its leaders, it still retains a large part of its military capabilities and its ability to direct qualitative strikes against military targets. Cells within the party of elite elements below the leadership level can plan and direct secret operations, whether using the party’s capabilities in Lebanon or abroad. These operations may be carried out using drones and missiles, or precision weapons, or by different methods such as planting explosives in Israel, as happened previously in the Megiddo Junction incident or the explosive device planted by a party cell in the Yarkon Park, which was aimed at assassinating former Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon, according to what was revealed by the Hebrew Walla website.
