Experts react: Hassan Nasrallah is dead. What’s next for Hezbollah, Israel, and Iran?

His end may be just the beginning. On Saturday, Hezbollah confirmed that its leader, Hassan Nasrallah, was killed in an Israeli air strike on Friday in the Beirut suburb of Dahiyeh, the site of the group’s headquarters. Nasrallah had run Hezbollah for more than thirty years, orchestrating and inspiring its campaign against Israel. His death is an enormous blow to Hezbollah, and it follows two weeks of ramped-up Israeli air strikes and covert operations against both leadership and rank-and-file of the Iran-backed group. Where does the beleaguered terrorist group go from here? Will Iran launch its own retribution against Israel? Below, Atlantic Council experts answer these questions and more.

Hezbollah’s leadership losses could complicate picking Nasrallah’s successor

The death of Nasrallah in an Israeli airstrike on his headquarters will deliver a massive blow to Hezbollah’s morale, especially coming at a time when Israel, which has damaged the group’s military infrastructure and left some of its top commanders dead, is waging a powerful offensive against the Iran-backed organization. Technically, as happened in the immediate aftermath of the assassination of Nasrallah’s predecessor Abbas Musawi in 1992, the party’s leading Shura Council should convene and elect a new secretary-general. The long considered favorite is Hashem Safieddine, head of Hezbollah’s executive council and a cousin of Nasrallah.

Hezbollah is a robust institution with a strong chain of command that should ensure continuity at the leadership level. An unknown factor, however, is who within the upper echelons of Hezbollah died alongside Nasrallah. If other significant leaders were killed, it could complicate—and perhaps delay for a while—the process of reestablishing command and control over the entire organization, potentially leaving the party vulnerable to Israel’s next moves.

Another pressing question is whether the death of Nasrallah will force Iran and Hezbollah to begin employing more advanced precision-guided missile systems that could potentially inflict far greater damage and casualties in Israel compared to the older, unguided rockets the group has been using until now. Or will cold rational logic continue to prevail, with Tehran ensuring a vengeful and angry Hezbollah does not fall into the trap of a full-force response against Israel? A response of that kind could lead to a major war, one that could erode Hezbollah’s capabilities and therefore reduce its deterrence effect for Iran. The coming days will tell.

—Nicholas Blanford is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.
Hezbollah is diminished, decapitated, and in disarray—but still dangerous

Israel’s assassination of the Hezbollah leader “is likely to inflame tensions,” according to the Washington Post, and it will keep the region “locked in a new cycle of violence,” according to the New York Times. Noting the civilians that died in the attack, including children, the US State Department spokesperson urged “all concerned to exercise maximum restraint.” If this all seems familiar that’s because it is—all three of those quotes are from more than thirty years ago, after the Israeli strike in 1992 that killed Hassan Nasrallah’s immediate predecessor, Abbas al-Musawi.

Today Hezbollah is diminished, decapitated, and in disarray. The details are yet to emerge, but my bet is that the strike that killed Nasrallah was a target of opportunity for Israel that presented itself only over the last week. It likely emerged due to Hezbollah’s increasingly sloppy communications protocols in the wake of Israel’s impressively effective pager and walkie-talkie bombing operations that killed dozens and blinded hundreds if not thousands of Hezbollah operatives, and the subsequent elimination of the senior chain of command of the Radwan Force, Hezbollah’s special operations unit. With these operations, along with the operations in Syria and Iran, the Israeli Defense Forces and Mossad have regained much of the credibility they lost on October 7.

Hezbollah launched the newest phase of its unending war against Israel on October 8, responding to Hamas’s unprecedented terrorist attack the day before with a promise that “our guns and our rockets are with you.” As such, it would have been military malpractice for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to pass up an opportunity to eliminate the leader of the enemy forces. It was nevertheless a courageous political decision. If the strike had been unsuccessful or if the intelligence had been wrong, the buck would have stopped with the prime minister. If a similar opportunity emerges to kill Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar, with a similar potential for civilian casualties, Netanyahu should absolutely take that as well—as those I speak with in the US government have concluded that a ceasefire is now unrealistic and that removing Sinwar appears to be the only way to bring the fighting in Gaza to a suitable close.

And make no mistake, the United States would have done exactly the same if, for example, in the weeks after 9/11 President George W. Bush had been told of a brief window for a strike against Osama bin Laden and the al-Qaeda high command—even if they were hiding in a deep basement under a densely populated part of Kabul. We would have accepted a similar number of civilian casualties as proportionate to the enormous military advantage that would have been gained, and the vast majority of the American public would have been overjoyed, just as the Israeli public is celebrating today. Moreover, especially with the benefit of hindsight, it is undeniable that if such an operation had been possible at the time, it would have saved countless lives—American, Afghani, and all those others who had the misfortune to live among any of the numerous al-Qaeda networks and inspired organizations over the subsequent decades.

Inside Khamenei’s dilemma

It is doubtful whether, since assuming his position as the supreme leader of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has faced such a dramatic decision. The assassination of Nasrallah puts Iran in a very difficult dilemma between a sharp reaction to Israel, which risks a regional war, and no reaction, which will deeply harm its Axis of Resistance armed proxy network. At the same time, it is likely that the question of Iran’s nuclear deterrence will be examined again, given the fact that Hezbollah was the main deterrence tool of Iran against Israel, preventing it from attacking its nuclear sites.

The implications of the dilemma for Iran and the Axis of Resistance are extremely significant. An Iranian reaction would endanger it in a war and create a very unwanted confrontation with the United States, but it would signal to the Axis the Iranian commitment to it, deter Israel from harming Iran, and be revenge for the assassination.

If Iran does not respond, then it may be perceived as a responsible actor who strives for a diplomatic solution. But such a move would seemingly damage deterrence against Israel—which also reportedly eliminated the commander of the Quds Force in Lebanon, Abbas Nilforoushan, who had replaced Hassan Mahdavi in April—and the entire Axis may doubt Iran’s commitment to it.

Any decision by Khamenei will have a profound impact on the continuation of the war. In any scenario, Tehran will seek to restabilize Hezbollah and rebuild its force. But without Nasrallah, it will be extremely complex.

—Danny Citrinowicz is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and a member of the Atlantic Council’s Iran Strategy Project working group. He previously served for twenty-five years in a variety of command positions units in Israel Defense Intelligence.
The beginning of the end of Iran’s Axis of Resistance

In the eighteen years since the 2006 war between Hezbollah and Israel, the Iranian-backed group massively grew its domestic political influence and its regional posture as the nucleus of the Tehran-sponsored network of organizations that were supposed to challenge Israel and US-aligned interests in the Middle East. Most importantly, Hezbollah bragged about the unprecedented growth of its arsenal of missiles, rockets, and drones. It boasted of its counterintelligence, special forces, infiltration, and its quasi-conventional capabilities, as well as its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. Nasrallah regularly described Israel as a house of cards and weaker than “a spider’s web.”

Within a period of ten days, however, almost the entirety of the group’s senior leadership, political and military, along with thousands of members and mid-level commanders, has been assassinated, eliminated, or rendered combat-ineffective—not to mention that the Israel Defense Forces have destroyed large quantities of strategic munitions that could have threatened Israeli cities and targets.

Nasrallah’s assassination and the decimation of Hezbollah, which appears to be in disarray, are a massive defeat for the “resistance” propaganda that Iran and its proxies have promulgated for the past two decades. Indeed, this assassination demonstrates the futility of Tehran’s investing billions of dollars in Lebanon, Gaza, Yemen, and Iraq to destabilize the region and attack Israel and US allies. The Islamic Republic bet big on these proxies, but their collapse in Gaza and Lebanon demonstrates how the region might be witnessing the beginning of the end of Iran’s Axis of Resistance.

—Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib is a resident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.
A possible lethal blow to Lebanese national unity

The assassination of Nasrallah might be lethal to Lebanese national unity. Divisions are already widening between those feeling relieved by the liquidation of the leader known as “Abu Hadi” and accusing the militia of holding the country hostage, and Hezbollah supporters in denial of the recent events and vowing revenge for the paramilitary leader. This might signal a threat to social peace in Lebanon and mark the end of the Taif Agreement of 1989, which put an end to the fifteen-year civil war in a country characterized by its religious and ethnic patchwork of eighteen recognized sects.

Videos circulating from the majority-Sunni city of Tripoli in Lebanon’s north show citizens removing Hezbollah stickers from the cars of displaced Shia populations. The sectarian rift might be compounded by the involvement of regional actors such as the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Units militias, who were recorded awaiting a Jihad Fatwa from the Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani to get involved in the conflict, while other reports noted that more than forty thousand Iranian proxy fighters are at the Syrian-Lebanese borders and ready to attack. Meanwhile, Syrians were filmed distributing sweets in Idlib and waving Syrian opposition flags in celebration.

The Taif Agreement, which instigated a caste-based quota system and encouraged generous Gulf investments, has held the country together for the past three-and-a-half decades. However, having already dragged the country into the unnecessary 2006 war, Hezbollah’s hijacking of the political system—combined with a deep economic crisis, a growing anti-refugee sentiment, and the threat of renewed confrontation with Israel—has fueled an extremely tense atmosphere closer to that of 1975, where existential divisions led to a costly civil war.

—Sarah Zaaimi is a nonresident senior fellow for North Africa and deputy director for communications at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East programs.
Israel needs two postwar plans for Lebanon

Israel has yet to decide on a comprehensive postwar plan for Gaza, but for its war with Hezbollah in Lebanon, it now needs not one but two postwar plans.

The next ninety-six hours are all but certain to see Hezbollah launch hundreds or thousands of rockets and missiles at Israel in response to the killing of Nasrallah and top Hezbollah commanders. The ability of the Israeli military and its missile defenses to disrupt or intercept these launches will be a greater test of Israel’s strategy than the April 13-14 effort that shot down almost all of Iran’s drones and missiles.

Israel will almost immediately face the choice whether to launch its planned ground invasion of southern Lebanon with the goal of doing what the United Nations Security Council failed to do after it passed Resolution 1701 in 2006: neutralize Hezbollah’s ability to launch short-range rockets and missiles at northern Israel so that tens of thousands of Israelis can go home. This campaign will have the—relatively—modest goal of destroying Hezbollah’s military sites and weapons caches south of the Litani River. Israel hopes for a ceasefire after which Hezbollah does not return its forces close to the border and the rocket and missile attacks stop. Israel could then withdraw its ground forces, Hezbollah would still exist as a major force in Lebanese politics, and an uneasy peace would return as it did after the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war. That’s one likely Israeli postwar plan.

The problem is that Israel’s campaign may not end like that. If Hezbollah or Iran inflict serious damage on Israel, Israeli leaders may face pressure from inside the current governing coalition and from the Israeli public to widen the war further to achieve the strategic defeat of Hezbollah. This would likely require a ground invasion of Hezbollah’s stronghold in the Bekaa Valley and a campaign, from the air and possibly on the ground, into urban areas of southern Beirut. Before Israel goes down that road, it should take seriously the need for a workable postwar plan built around their stated commitment that their war is against Hezbollah not the Lebanese state. But any postwar plan—or a failure to have one—will fundamentally re-write Lebanon’s political arrangements in which Hezbollah is a state within a state and other parts of Lebanese society suffer for this. Postwar planning for Gaza is simple by comparison to the second postwar Lebanon plan Israel will urgently need.

—Thomas S. Warrick is a senior fellow and director of the Future of DHS Project at the Atlantic Council. He served in the Department of State from 1997-2007 and as deputy assistant secretary for counterterrorism policy at the US Department of Homeland Security from 2008 to 2019.
The Lebanese government must now reclaim its sovereignty

Nasrallah, the senior leader of Iran’s crown paramilitary jewel in the region, is dead. As the streets of Lebanon split between cheers of rejoice and cries of anguish, two courses of action must be prioritized to ensure that escalation is prevented and that order is restored.

First, diplomacy must prevail. Now is the time for the international community, led by the United States, France, and the United Kingdom, to exert its full leverage on Israel to demand a complete and an immediate ceasefire in Lebanon. Within the last few days, what seemed to many Lebanese as empty speeches calling for a ceasefire were repeatedly ignored by Israel, which continued to violate its obligations under international humanitarian laws in the pursuit of its brutal aggressions on Lebanese territories. With Nasrallah dead and Hezbollah’s infrastructures eroded, insecurities and fears about what comes next fill the air. As a starter, the international community must act with urgency to ensure that an Israeli ground invasion of Lebanon is avoided.

Second, the Lebanese government must immediately act to reclaim its sovereignty. Since October 7, 2023, too many innocent civilians have lost their lives, thousands have been injured, and hundreds of thousands have been displaced—all with an absent government that could neither provide the necessary medical resources, nor safety shelters, nor, at the very least, offer timely and official statements calling for a state of national emergency or denouncing Israeli attacks. To do so, the Lebanese government should start by ensuring the unconditional implementation of UN Resolution 1701, electing a president who could restore Lebanese unity, and reaffirming the role of the Lebanese Armed Forces as the sole protector of Lebanese territories.

As the dust settles after a night of terror that loomed over Beirut, a new dawn appears for Lebanon. A nonstate paramilitary group has long depleted its institutions internally and acted on its behalf internationally to advance the foreign agenda of its Iranian benefactor. Now is the time for this Lebanese government to restore its grip on power over the country, making sure that the safety of its civilians is protected and its full authority over its internationally recognized territories is respected.

—Nour Dabboussi is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs.
Beware what may arise in Nasrallah’s place

The death of Nasrallah propels both the Lebanese dynamic and the conflict with Israel into new, uncertain territory. Hezbollah’s origins may suggest what happens next: Its antecedents arose amid the tumult and trauma of Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982. As with so many groups and actors who have laid waste to the region, from dictators to al-Qaeda, its political lifeblood is the conflict with Israel. So long as that thunders on—and particularly with the relentless toll on women and children from bombing by the Israel Defense Forces—there is space for a version of Hezbollah to move forward.

Of course, with so many of its senior commanders dead, the organization will reshape and reform. For all his faults, Nasrallah was a rational actor deeply socialized into the game of geopolitics. Despite fiery rhetoric around avenging the onslaught on civilians in Gaza, he never launched a major offensive against Israel or indeed the most sophisticated rockets within Hezbollah’s 130,000-strong arsenal. Alongside the death of Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s obituary may well be written. Equally, this could end up being a case of, “Be careful what you wish for.”

—Alia Brahimi is a nonresident senior fellow in the Middle East Programs
The injustice against Palestinians must end before the region can be stable

The loss of Nasrallah is undoubtedly a blow to Hezbollah and Iran, along with the eradication of Hezbollah’s communications network. But beware of what may come next. Over history, militant armed groups have often replaced leaders with ones who are more radical and extreme than the previous ones, especially when rage and the factors that allow for recruitment of fighters is amplified by death and injustice.

Israel and its allies must recognize that the ongoing injustices against the Palestinian people and the lack of a Palestinian state to allow for Palestinians to live a life of dignity is, and has been for decades, the main reason for instability in the region. This must change for there to be any semblance of stability.

The war on Gaza must end. The war on Lebanon must end. Despite all that Israel says, these are not wars on Hamas and Hezbollah, these are wars on all aspects of life, wars that will all but guarantee the next incarnations of Hamas and Hezbollah.

In Lebanon, the international community must work toward building a real and viable Lebanese state and Lebanese armed forces. The Lebanese have suffered enough at the hands of their corrupt and incompetent leaders, who in addition to bringing economic ruin upon the country paved the way for a non-state actor to be more powerful than the Lebanese army itself.

A permanent ceasefire in Gaza is imperative along with a plan for reconstruction, governance under the Palestinian Authority, and a plan to end Israel’s occupation and ensure Palestinian independence.

Hamas is all but decimated in Gaza. Hezbollah is shaken. There is an opportunity now to end all this unnecessary bloodshed. Forcing its end is in the hands of the United States and whether it is willing to force Israel to start to walk a path of peace.

—Arwa Damon is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs; president and founder of the International Network for Aid, Relief, and Assistance (INARA); and a former CNN correspondent.
The Houthis might now seek out a larger role in Iran’s network

The death of Nasrallah will not degrade the Houthis’ operations, despite the close relationship enjoyed between Hezbolllah and the Houthis. On the contrary, the Houthis will likely continue launching major attacks at Israel and Red Sea shipping, claiming that they are retaliating for the death of Nasrallah. Continued large-scale operations, as well as Hezbollah’s waning influence after the death of its most senior leader, could also position the Houthis and their leader, Abdel Malik al-Houthi, for a more prominent role within Iran’s network of proxies and allies.

This could materialize as the Houthis begin to operate and claim responsibility for attacks outside of Yemeni borders and take a more central role in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force’s strategy. Additionally, Iran will likely prioritize efforts to arm the Houthis with technologies that could increase the impact of Houthi operations, including advanced weaponry such as missiles obtained from other countries like Russia.

—Emily Milliken is the associate director of media and communications for the N7 Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.
Iran’s aircraft carrier of a proxy is sinking. How will Tehran respond?

Israel climbed another rung up the escalatory ladder. The main question remains: How does a battered, humiliated, and potentially leaderless Hezbollah respond? Will Iran respond in its place? Imagine Hezbollah as Iran’s version of an aircraft carrier battle group, complete with air, ground, and sea capabilities within mere miles of Israel. This key to Iran’s deterrence against an Israeli strike against Iranian nuclear facilities is sinking now, deeper each day.

The Israelis have tried to kill Nasrallah before in prior Lebanon campaigns. That they have been successful now is a testament to a vastly improved intelligence collection effort inside Lebanon. Israeli intelligence officers must have had precise real-time intelligence on Nasrallah to assist in such a strike. They were not always this proficient in Lebanon, in my experience. They seem to have learned—and improved from—the 2006 war. Perhaps we have all underestimated Israeli intelligence and military capabilities that seem to be highly tailored to a Lebanon campaign.

I would ignore the talk about why Israel did not inform the United States in advance of the specifics of the operation. Why would it? The United States would say don’t do it. And there would be operational security concerns, Israeli fears that the United States may leak such an operation to the press. Ultimately, the lack of Israeli notification is not surprising. In fact, this is very much the norm in the US-Israel relationship when it comes to covert or overt kinetic strikes. No one should make a big deal about this. US national security officials who work closely with the Israelis understand and expect this behavior. It is a non-issue.

—Marc Polymeropoulos is a nonresident senior fellow in the Forward Defense practice of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He worked for twenty-six years at the CIA before retiring in July 2019 at the senior intelligence service level.
‘Winning’ in the long term requires diplomacy and territorial compromise

The assassination of Nasrallah was an extraordinary action, on par with the devastating attack on Hezbollah’s communications. Clearly the organization has been infiltrated. This one-two punch may indeed bring Hezbollah to its knees and to the table, forcing the group to abide by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701, passed in 2006, which requires them to remain on the north side of the Litani River. This drawback would allow Israelis to return to their homes in the north. If so, this will strengthen Netanyahu’s claim to be “winning.”

For a time.

The truth is that US President Joe Biden and US leadership have been giving excellent counsel to the Israeli government: There is no long-term military solution to this conflict. How you fight this conflict matters. And there must be a credible “day after.”

What we can all count on—as was proved after 1982, 1987, 2000, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2014, 2021, and soon will be again—is that the Israeli military will not be able to keep the country safe. The font of this conflict is Netanyahu’s rejection of a two-state solution. New Palestinian and Lebanese youth intent on resistance will emerge and take up arms.

Israeli leadership should want better for their people than a mere break from the violence.

More is possible.

Winning is possible—but it comes via diplomacy and territorial compromise.

—Gina Abercrombie-Winstanley is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. Abercrombie-Winstanley served as the US ambassador to the Republic of Malta and as special assistant for the Middle East and Africa to the secretary of state. Her Middle East assignments included election monitoring in the Gaza Strip and an assignment where she supported gender equality in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as the first woman to lead a diplomatic mission there.
Nasrallah’s assassination could help restore peace—if these steps come next

The assassination of Nasrallah could prove to be an important building block to restore calm and eventually peace for the peoples of the Middle East and beyond as Iran’s destabilizing ambitions are curtailed. However, in order for this to happen, this successful military act must be accompanied by a regional peace strategy that leads to a two-state solution and restores the security to Israel that has been lost under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s leadership. The steps should be as follows:

A return of all remaining Israeli hostages in Gaza
An immediate ceasefire with Hamas
The withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza and the return of a Palestinian Authority-led government with support from regional Arab actors and the West
Reconstruction of the Gaza Strip, including—critically—the resumption of water and energy to short-term and long-term projects such as the Gas for Gaza project
A resumption of efforts to demarcate the Israeli-Lebanese land border alongside additional steps that lead to the cessation of hostilities between Israel and Lebanon

This could pave the way for Saudi Arabia and other countries in the region to join the Abraham Accords.

As Netanyahu and his extreme government will likely not be capable to follow such a course, Israel will be wise to ensure that this government departs the scene sooner rather than later.

—Ariel Ezrahi is a senior nonresident fellow at the Middle East Programs, the architect of the Gas for Gaza project, and the head of the Energy Transition Sub-Committee for MENA2050. He also works in the climate finance space.
Now is the time for Washington to demand a ceasefire

On September 26, the United States and France, followed by European and regional allies, called for a twenty-one-day ceasefire between Hezbollah and Israel, in order to create space for a negotiated settlement both in Lebanon and Gaza.

Not only have the Israelis rejected this call, but they proceeded with the elimination of Hezbollah’s chief. No surprise for that: they are exploiting a balance of forces clearly favorable to them. But it’s time now for Washington and its allies to demand from Israel a unilateral cessation of hostilities in Lebanon as a first step towards the implementation of a ceasefire. That would make more difficult any reaction by Iran and its proxies and—hopefully—provide the opportunity of a larger settlement.

—Michel Duclos is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East Programs, focused on Syria and the Levant. He served as ambassador of France to Syria from 2006 to 2009, among other diplomatic positions.
Netanyahu’s support will be bolstered further by the successful strike

After a year in which Israelis’ sense of security and deterrence had been shaken, the rapid succession of wins on a northern front of war with Hezbollah are significant. Israelis, many of whom have been distrustful of Netanyahu’s handling of Gaza and the hostage crisis, have been unified in their support of taking on Hezbollah. The made-for-television attacks against Hezbollah—from the pagers to the walkie-talkies to the stunning assassination of its notorious leader—have renewed Israeli confidence in their security apparatus.

Netanyahu, who had already begun rebounding in the polls with each attack on Hezbollah, will be bolstered further. But the tens of thousands of Israelis displaced in Israel’s north may not be returning home any time soon: Hezbollah’s arsenal remains entrenched, and Iran’s response will be determinative. Israel’s strategy of targeted assassinations may yield impressive headlines, but it has yet to yield impressive results.

—Carmiel Arbit is a nonresident senior fellow for Middle East Programs and the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council.
Israel is forcing Hezbollah’s remaining leaders out into the open

In 2003, during the second intifada, Hamas paused operations after Israel killed several of its leaders, many of whom played key roles in the organization’s founding. It seems when faced with the choice between escalation and loss of critical leadership, the group decided to take a knee. Israel likely had this past effect in mind as it embarked on its targeted killing campaign against Hezbollah in recent weeks. However, with the strike that killed Hassan Nasrallah, Israel likely aimed at a more permanent disruption of the organization’s operational capability.

Coupled with the other strikes against Hezbollah leadership and the recent disruption of its communication capabilities, Israel is forcing Hezbollah’s remaining leaders to find other, and sometimes more visible, means to direct operations, making them vulnerable to attack. Whether this approach will work remains to be seen.

The loss of Nasrallah, who has been a central figure in shaping Hezbollah’s strategy and maintaining its network of alliances, could result in short-term disorganization and internal power struggles. However, Hezbollah must now feel it will need to strike back to project strength, which is necessary to maintain morale within its ranks and demonstrate resilience to its supporters and adversaries. If it cannot, then Hezbollah’s sponsor, Iran, will have lost a vital deterrent capability, suggesting that the potential for a ceasefire soon is slim.

—C. Anthony Pfaff is currently a nonresident senior fellow with the Iraq Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and the research professor for the Military Profession and Ethics at the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College in Carlisle, PA.
Iran remains committed to a long-term war of attrition

The assassination of Nasrallah, who transformed Hezbollah into a dominant political force and regional power while serving as a key pillar of Iran’s “forward defense” strategy, delivers a critical and immediate blow to the Axis of Resistance. Although its full impact may take years to fully assess, the short-term significance is amplified by Tehran’s lack of a strong deterrent response. Comments over the last twenty-four hours from Iran’s supreme leader suggest that immediate retaliation is unlikely—an essential factor in understanding Tehran’s approach and the likely trajectory of the conflict in the months ahead.

While Israel has effectively employed a shock-and-awe campaign, targeting Hezbollah’s leadership since July, Iran remains committed to a long-term war of attrition. As Israel appears determined to intensify the conflict while Iran waits strategically, this divergence underscores the crucial role of regional powers, such as Saudi Arabia, alongside international actors, including the United States and France, in pushing for a ceasefire.

Regional and Western efforts should focus not only on achieving a ceasefire along the Lebanese-Israeli border but also in Gaza—and fostering a sustainable solution to prevent further escalation. Diplomacy may seem distant, but in light of the Iranian delegation’s recent rhetoric at the UN General Assembly, it may be an opportune moment for the United States and Western allies to engage Iran through diplomatic channels to decrease the chances of broader war.

—Masoud Mostajabi is the deputy director of the Iraq Initiative at the Middle East Programs of the Atlantic Council.
A pivotal, risky moment for Israel

The assassination of Hezbollah’s Nasrallah marks a significant shift in the Middle East’s power dynamics, weakening Iran’s influence on its most prominent proxy. While this development benefits Israel in the short term, the internal consequences for Israel could be far-reaching. The country now faces a pivotal moment. It can either continue down Netanyahu’s path of military aggression, or pursue a more diplomatic and sustainable approach to Palestine–one that would include ending its unlawful occupation, withdrawing its military troops and settlers from illegally annexed territories, and upholding Palestinian refugees’ right of return.

An emboldened Netanyahu poses a serious threat to the entire Middle East. His far-right government may now push for an even more radical form of what a United Nations official referred to as an effort to “expel civilian populations” from Gaza. Equally alarming is the potential for a ground invasion and reoccupation of southern Lebanon, or direct military strikes against Iran, actions that could quickly spiral into wider regional conflict.

Ultimately, Israel’s strategic advantage may buckle under the weight of its unchecked power. Its impunity has gone unchallenged for too long, and the window to alter course is closing. If Israel does not recalibrate, it risks becoming locked in perpetual conflict with its neighbors, with the prospects of sustainable peace and security for Israelis growing ever more distant.

—Emadeddin Badi is a nonresident senior fellow with the Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council.
The reshaping of Iran’s proxy network has major implications for Iraq

Israel’s decapitation of the terrorist organization Hezbollah will fundamentally reshape Iran’s terrorist network throughout the Middle East. This shift will have profound implications for Iranian proxies, including those that form the current government in Baghdad. Just as Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ Al-Sudani was eager to announce the withdrawal of US forces, he announced three days of official mourning for Nasrallah. The Iran-backed Coordination Framework brought Sudani to power and includes Hezbollah’s most important offshoot—Kata’ib Hezbollah. Hezbollah manages the Iraqi file through one of its key interlocutors, Mohammed Kawtharani, who has a ten million dollar bounty under the US State Department’s Reward for Justice program and who regularly travels to Baghdad to meet with Iraqi government officials. It remains unclear whether he suffered the same fate as Nasrallah.

But, like the broader Middle East, Iraq presents a contradiction for US policy and how to confront Iran’s regional terrorist objectives. Sudani’s ruling coalition includes at least three US-designated terrorist organizations, which have pressured him and thus the United States to announce a withdrawal. How can the United States disentangle itself from the Middle East while ensuring Iran and its proxies don’t achieve complete control of the region? These are key questions for the United States not just in Beirut but also in Baghdad.

—Matthew Zais is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. He previously served in the White House as the director for Iraq and Kurdish affairs on the National Security Council.
A real earthquake for Iran and Hezbollah

The death of Nasrallah is a severe blow from Israel politically and militarily, and the repercussions will lead to dangerous consequences and critical confrontations. The conflict is heading toward crises that are difficult to stop, and the Middle East is the biggest victim. Israel seems to have felt that Iran and Hezbollah had lost their appetite to go to war regardless of Tehran’s bold actions, so it took the opportunity to launch a major attack.

The last war that Iran entered directly was the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s, and Tehran learned that conventional warfare is not a pathway to success and that proxy warfare is better for achieving goals and creating instability. A similar approach should be expected this time as well.

Without a doubt, what happened today is a real earthquake for Iran and Hezbollah. After more than thirty years of one leader enjoying great powers in Lebanon and the region in general, the size of Hezbollah in the future is the important question. Who will decide the new leader? Because this position has a religious link and not just a political or military one, the negotiations will be complicated.

The possibility for regional conflict is heightened, mainly with the Axis of Resistance groups. Now is the time for a push for de-escalation.

—Hanar Marouf is a researcher on Iraq politics and a former Millennium Leadership Program fellow.
The ideology underpinning Hezbollah ‘cannot die’

It was raining in Tehran this morning when a billboard featuring Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah appeared with the phrase: “Hezbollah is alive.” Within hours, Nasrallah would be announced dead along with others, including Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Deputy Commander for Operations Abbas Niloforoshah. Whether the clerical establishment already knew Nasrallah was dead when the billboard debuted is uncertain. However, that message carried meaning given the hierarchical nature of the militant group and that it is rooted in an ideology—Khomeinism—that cannot die. As Ali Larijani, former speaker and advisor to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, noted, “The resistance has strong leaders and cadres, and every leader who is martyred will have a replacement.”

Nevertheless, over a matter of weeks, the Islamic Republic’s crown-jewel proxy has been severely maimed from the top down—an unexpected turn of events in the lead-up to the first anniversary of the Gaza war. A high-ranking Arab official told me in December that Nasrallah was the “new Qasem Soleimani” and not Esmail Qaani, his replacement as Quds Force commander. And while Hezbollah’s ideology can’t die, Nasrallah’s death is a big blow to the Resistance Axis and Tehran’s forward defense strategy.

There are five days of mourning for Nasrallah in Iran, two days more than there were for Soleimani—perhaps to spend more time planning a response. Since the conflict between Iran and Israel came out of the shadows with Iran’s April 13 direct retaliation in Israel in response to the killing of Revolutionary Guard commanders in its embassy compound in Syria, the gloves have been off. It’s unclear what direction the leadership in Tehran is thinking about taking. Since the communications attacks, Hezbollah has reportedly been frustrated at Iran’s lack of response and was concerned Tehran had deserted the group. Those voices are now growing louder, even in Tehran—aside from some reported public celebrations by anti-regime Iranians. Regime supporters gathered in Palestine Square on September 27, chanting in Arabic, “Death to Israel,” and in Persian, “Brothers of the IRGC, revenge, revenge!”

Now, with Nasrallah and much of Hezbollah’s upper echelons gone, will the Resistance Axis alongside Iran respond to Israel directly, or will Iran practice strategic patience? One thing is certain: With the clerical establishment feeling exposed as its proxies in Lebanon and the Gaza Strip take such detrimental blows, the notion of Iran’s going all the way in its nuclear program is becoming increasingly likely. There will be a response. What that looks like is unfamiliar territory in a post-October 7 world.

—Holly Dagres is a nonresident senior fellow specializing in Iranian affairs, the editor of the Middle East Programs’ IranSource and MENASource publications, and the curator for the weekly newsletter, The Iranist.
The shake-up in Lebanese politics is an opportunity

Nasrallah’s life choices made anything but a violent end unlikely. As he and many other high-level fellow Hezbollah members lie dead after the Israeli attack, the question is, what will the Islamic Republic of Iran do? And what should the West do?

It is highly doubtful that the Islamic Republic will do anything. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei knows well that the Iranian public will not stand behind him if he were to enter a conflict to avenge Nasrallah. Some Iranians are distributing sweets on the streets in celebration of Nasrallah’s death. Khamenei also knows that a miscalculation could dissipate even the slim support the regime has. Iranians will not fight for Nasrallah, but they will fiercely defend their homeland if Israel or anyone else attacks.

Nasrallah’s death loosens Hezbollah’s stranglehold on Lebanese politics. The West should use this opportunity to help Lebanon get out of the economic quagmire it has been in for years and siphon off the Gen Z’ers and Millennials who would have otherwise joined the movement for lack of other opportunities. Even the mightiest empire falls apart when its erstwhile fighters find better things to do than die for its cause. Economics can trump ideology.

—Nadereh Chamlou is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s empowerME initiative and an international development advisor.