Al-Jolani’s ‘Road to Damascus’ Moment? The Public Relations Offensive of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham

In the ten-day offensive that ultimately toppled the 54-year rule of the Assad regime in Syria, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) carefully tailored its messaging not only to Syrians and rebel fighters but also to its adversaries, such as Iran and Russia, and the international community.

HTS’s political affairs department has issued statements emphasizing its commitment to protecting various ethnic and religious communities, as it gained control over towns inhabited by these groups.

HTS has also sought to appease the international community, vowing to welcome international monitoring of the sites where the leftover chemical weapons stockpile of the Assad regime remains.

Al-Jolani’s rebranding efforts appear to be gaining traction, as evidenced by HTS’s political affairs department engaging in meetings with ambassadors from various regional and international nations.

In the ten-day offensive that ultimately toppled the 54-year rule of the Assad regime in Syria, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the Sunni Islamist rebel group, showcased its strategic approach to media operations and public relations. The group’s messaging was carefully tailored not just to Syrians, at home and exiled, and other rebel fighters, but also to its adversaries, including Iran and Russia, and other members of the international community.

Central to this effort was the shift in leadership style and political rhetoric by Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, leader of HTS and the key figure behind the offensive. In a symbolic break from his jihadist past, al-Jolani began using his birth name, Ahmed al-Shara, instead of his nom de guerre, signaling a deliberate distancing from his extremist history, which includes serving as the leader of al-Qaeda’s Syria branch, Jabhat al-Nusra. Al-Jolani may find it unwanted attention at this point, but two al-Qaeda franchise groups, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) publicly congratulated HTS for its takeover of the country. Uyghur jihadists in Syria recently released a video showing missiles seized from Assad’s arms depots and threatened China directly. One of the main concerns of Western countries is that under HTS, Syria will become a launching pad for transnational terrorist attacks. This is a concern al-Jolani is acutely aware of, and which his recent PR tactics are designed to assuage.

HTS’ recent shift formed part of an effective “charm offensive,” which, over the course of the last two weeks, has sought to present a more moderate and benevolent image. Key actions, such as restoring basic public services as it took control of towns and villages, freeing prisoners held in Assad’s notoriously brutal detention system, and issuing statements to the different minority groups within Syria, have further bolstered this image. All of this has helped to position HTS as a more inclusive force with an eye toward reconciliation and forging political consensus in Syria capable of stabilizing the country, which many analysts see as an impossible task.

Since the start of the lightning offensive by the Syrian opposition led by HTS on Wednesday, November 27, HTS has carefully managed perceptions of the offensive, for example, naming it operation “Deterrence of Aggression,” framing its march on Damascus as a defensive action in response to the Assad regime’s shelling of civilians in Idlib. Throughout the offensive, HTS’ political affairs department put out statements reiterating protection to the different ethnic communities, including Ismailis, Druze, Christians, Kurds, and Alawites – though the statement to the Alawite community focused mostly on separating from the Assad regime.

During his 24-year-long rule, Assad positioned himself as the “protector of minorities,” exploiting communal fears of militant Islamists and heightened sectarian tensions in the broader region, including in neighboring Iraq. Whether the new transitional government will be able to safeguard ethnic and religious minorities will be critical to assess HTS’ rebranding as a moderate and pragmatic Sunni Islamist militant group. Moreover, there are large swaths of the country still out of HTS’ control, and it remains uncertain if HTS will be able to prevail on whether the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) will abide by its vision. In the past week, there has been an uptick in reporting on clashes between the SNA and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a Kurdish group backed by the United States, with widespread accusations of human rights abuses, extrajudicial killings, and torture.

In various statements, al-Jolani has also reiterated the safety of defectors of the Assad regime and has announced that those who lay down their weapons and surrender themselves will be kept safe. Nonetheless, a statement by the HTS’ Department of Military Operations issued on December 10, called for justice and accountability, stating rewards will be provided to anyone who can provide information about senior army or security officials who have been involved in war crimes under the Assad regime. The statement came after the horrors of Sednaya prison, dubbed the “human slaughterhouse,” were revealed, as the rebel forces increasingly penetrated the complicated subterranean structure of the prison over the past few days.

HTS has also sought to address concerns from the international community. The U.S. Department of State, through its Rewards for Justice program, continues to offer a $10 million reward for information leading to the capture of Abu Mohammed al-Jolani. Additionally, concerns remain over the potential for extremist elements within or affiliated with HTS to commit acts of violence against minority groups in Syria.

Even if al-Jolani has truly moderated, which in and of itself is far from a certainty, and despite the current charm offensive, there are hardened jihadists within the broader umbrella of HTS, including militants from Central Asia. Khatiba Imam al-Bukhari, an Uzbek jihadist group active in Afghanistan and Syria, released a video from Latakia this week, demonstrating the diversity of militants operating in the country.

On December 7, HTS’ Department of Political Affairs issued a statement regarding the Assad regime’s chemical weapons stockpile. The group reiterated its commitment not to use such weapons, which they consider crimes against humanity. They also pledged to secure chemical weapons facilities to prevent access by malicious actors and expressed willingness to cooperate with the international community to monitor these sites. These sites, which contain Syria’s remaining chemical weapons, have long been a major concern for global security. In response, Israel has carried out several strikes on suspected chemical weapons facilities and strategic military installations. According to Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar, these actions aim to prevent the weapons from falling into the hands of extremists during Syria’s ongoing political transition.

A key component in the rebranding of HTS has been the rebranding of its leader, now signing documents with his birth name, Ahmed al-Shara, instead of his nom de guerre. He has carefully changed his appearance, shifting from traditional jihadist attire to a combination of more well-coiffed Western attire and military uniforms during the offensive. In an interview with CNN, al-Jolani portrayed his extremist past as foreign fighter in Iraq and his time with the Islamic State of Iraq as youthful indiscretions. In contrast, he then presented a vision of Syria in which minorities are an essential component of the social fabric and that true Islamic governance has simply not been seen yet. But there are mounting signs likely to give the U.S. and its allies pause in dealing with al-Jolani, even if he were to be de-listed as a specially designated global terrorist. For example, one of the individuals photographed at the Ummayyad mosque in Damascus this week was Abu Fatah al-Firghali, who was previously jettisoned from HTS for being too extreme. Incidents like this lead many to wonder exactly how sincere al-Jolani’s “Road to Damascus” conversion is in reality.

While the rebranding of HTS has become abundantly clear to international audiences over the past two weeks, HTS has changed significantly in its ideology and tactics throughout the civil war. In 2016, under Abu Mohammed al-Jolani’s leadership, the group broke ties with al-Qaida and rebranded as Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, shifting its strict global jihadist ideology aimed at establishing Islamic rule across the Muslim world to local Syrian objectives.

HTS has deliberately avoided targeting government buildings or dismantling the existing governmental structure. Instead, the group’s leadership has urged government employees to resume their duties and collaborated with Assad’s prime minister and government to facilitate a political transition. After appointing Mohammed Al-Bahir as a transitional prime minister, HTS appears to be working with the remnants of the government to run the government and maintain services. This approach suggests they may be seeking to separate the state apparatus from the Assad regime itself, possibly drawing lessons from the destabilization that followed the de-Ba’athification process in Iraq. Al-Bashir was, until his recent appointment, the prime minister of the HTS’ Syrian Salvation Government in Idlib.

In the meantime, al-Jolani’s rebranding seems to have resonated, with HTS’ political affairs department meeting with ambassadors from Bahrain, Egypt, Italy, Jordan, Oman, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia in Damascus this week.

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