Iran Update, February 11, 2025

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu threatened to resume military operations in the Gaza Strip if Hamas fails to release Israeli hostages on February 15.[1] Netanyahu made this announcement after he convened a security cabinet meeting on February 11 to discuss the second phase of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement.[2] Hamas stated on February 10 that it would postpone the release of Israeli hostages, which would be a violation of the ceasefire agreement.[3] Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz instructed the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) on February 10 to prepare for any “possible scenario” in the Gaza Strip.[4] The IDF deployed its 252nd Division to the buffer zone along the Israel-Gaza Strip boundary on February 11, bringing the total number of divisions there to three.[5] Hamas could use the remaining hostages to pressure Netanyahu to negotiate again if the IDF resumed operations in the Gaza Strip.

Hamas is trying to set informational conditions to be able to blame Israel for a potential breakdown of the ceasefire. Senior Hamas official Osama Hamdan said on February 10 that Hamas’ decision to postpone the release of hostages is a “warning” to Israel.[6] Hamdan claimed that Hamas will comply with its ceasefire obligations so long as Israel fulfills its obligations. This statement seeks to preemptively blame any breakdown in the ceasefire on an alleged Israeli failure to fulfill its ceasefire obligations. Hamas has, however, itself violated the ceasefire agreement by postponing the release of Israeli hostages.

The Iraqi Federal Supreme Court rejected on February 11 recent lawsuits that sought to suspend the implementation of the General Amnesty Law.[7] The Iraqi Federal Supreme Court temporarily suspended the implementation of the General Amnesty Law, the Personal Status Law, and the Property Restitution Law on February 4 after several parliamentarians, including members of the Iranian-backed State of Law Coalition, submitted lawsuits to the Federal Supreme Court.[8] The General Amnesty Law grants amnesty to many Iraqis, including many Sunnis who were arrested under Article 4 of the Anti-Terrorism Law.[9] The Federal Supreme Court’s rejection of the lawsuits is notable given that the court has historically delivered rulings in favor of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias and politicians.[10]

Iranian-backed Shia political parties will very likely continue to try to prevent the implementation of the General Amnesty Law, despite the court ruling. State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki stated on February 1 that “we will not allow terrorists to leave prisons,” in reference to the individuals who would be released from prison under the General Amnesty Law.[11] Iranian-backed Badr Organization Secretary General Hadi al Ameri has also previously expressed strong opposition to the General Amnesty Law.[12] These Iranian-backed militia leaders’ statements about the General Amnesty Law suggest that they will strongly challenge the Federal Supreme Court ruling.

The recent Federal Supreme Court ruling highlights existing fissures between the various judicial institutions in Iraq. The Supreme Judicial Council, which is constitutionally responsible for managing Iraqi courts, supervising judges, and forming policies to govern judicial operations, rejected on February 5 the Federal Supreme Court’s decision to temporarily suspend the implementation of the General Amnesty, Personal Status, and Property Restitution laws.[13] The Court of Cassation, which legally reports to the Supreme Judicial Council, reportedly overturned the Federal Supreme Court’s February 4 decision on February 10.[14] The Supreme Judicial Council is led by Iranian-backed Judge Faiq Zayden.[15] Federal Supreme Court head Judge Jasem Mohammad Abbood is tied to the Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Badr Organization and Maliki.[16]

Some Iraqi Sunni political actors are attempting to reduce the influence of Iranian-backed Shia parties in Ninewa Province, northern Iraq. Iraqi media reported on February 8 that the United Ninewa Bloc attempted to remove Ninewa Provincial Council Chairman Ahmed al Hasoud.[17] The United Ninewa Bloc is an alliance of Sunni parties that includes the Azm Alliance (led by Muthanna al Samarrai), Sovereignty Alliance (led by Khamis al Khanjar), and Progress Party (led by Mohammad al Halbousi).[18] Hasoud is a member of the National Contract Bloc, which is led by Popular Mobilization Committee Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh.[19] The Ninewa Future Bloc, which is affiliated with the Iranian-backed Shia Coordination Framework, opposed the efforts to remove Hasoud.[20] Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish groups have long vied for control in Ninewa Province. Sunni and Kurdish residents have long been resentful of Shia groups’ presence and influence in areas of the province. The Popular Mobilization Forces control some positions along the border between Syria and Ninewa Province.[21]

Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Prime Minister Masrour Barzani met with Sovereignty Alliance head Khamis al Khanjar to discuss developments in Iraq and KRG-Iraqi federal government relations on February 8.[22]

Key Takeaways:

Gaza Strip: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu threatened to resume military operations in the Gaza Strip if Hamas fails to release Israeli hostages on February 15. Hamas is trying to set informational conditions to be able to blame Israel for a potential breakdown of the ceasefire.
Iraq: The Iraqi Federal Supreme Court rejected on February 11 recent lawsuits that sought to suspend the implementation of the General Amnesty Law. Iranian-backed Shia political parties will very likely continue to try to prevent the implementation of the General Amnesty Law, despite the court ruling.
Iraq: Some Iraqi Sunni political actors are attempting to reduce the influence of Iranian-backed Shia parties in Ninewa Province, northern Iraq.

Syria

The Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) has engaged the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) near Tishreen Dam and Qara Qozak Bridge east of Aleppo since CTP-ISW’s last data cutoff on February 10.[23] The SNA and SDF exchanged artillery fire on both sides of the bridge and dam.[24] Turkish aircraft conducted at least 15 airstrikes targeting SDF positions near the bridge and dam.[25] Turkish drones also targeted SDF positions east of the dam.[26] An anti-SDF source reported that SNA forces advanced to the eastern side of Qara Qozak Bridge before withdrawing.[27]

Three IDF brigades will remain in southern Syria indefinitely, according to a correspondent for the state-funded, IDF-supported Israeli Army Radio.[28] The correspondent visited IDF outposts in Yarmouk Valley along the Syria-Golan Heights-Jordan border with the 890th Paratroopers Brigade on February 11.[29] The correspondent reported that the IDF is constructing nine outposts along the Syria-Golan Heights border.[30] Israeli forces are staying in abandoned Assad regime military infrastructure during the construction.[31] The IDF has placed markers to indicate the boundaries of closed military zones and established checkpoints at the entrances of Syrian villages to ”direct movements.”[32] The correspondent said that Israeli forces have ”quiet, unofficial coordination” with local security forces and coordinate fully with Jordanian border forces.[33] Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara emphasized in January 2025 that Israeli forces must return to the 1974 disengagement line in the Golan Heights and that UN forces should deploy to the buffer zone.[34]

Lebanese media reported on February 11 that HTS-led Syrian interim government forces sent reinforcements to three locations along the Syria-Lebanon border.[35] HTS-led forces deployed to the Syria-Lebanon border on February 6 after smugglers kidnapped HTS fighters during a counter-smuggling operation.[36] HTS-led forces and smugglers have clashed near the border since February 6.[37] Lebanese media reported that the Lebanese Armed Forces closed the Qald al Sabaa border crossing between Lebanon and Syria on February 11.[38]

Lebanese media claimed on February 11 that HTS fighters killed Lebanese national Khader Karam Zaiter after kidnapping him for ransom.[39] Khader Karam Zaiter was the nephew of Lebanese parliamentarian and Amal movement member Ghazi Zaiter. Both men are members of the al Zaiter clan.[40] French-language Lebanese media reported on February 11 that armed members of the al Zaiter clan and al Jaafar clan gathered in northern Hermel in response to the kidnapping.[41] Both clans have reportedly been involved in drug and weapons smuggling and reportedly have ties to Hezbollah.[42]

Syrian media circulated reports on February 11 that the Syrian Defense Ministry appointed two non-Syrian HTS loyalists to senior military positions. The Defense Ministry reportedly appointed HTS Shura Council member Brigadier General Abdul Rahman al Khatib as commander of the Republican Guard in Damascus.[43] The Republican Guard was a majority Alawite elite force under the Assad regime and was responsible for protecting the regime against internal threats.[44] The Defense Ministry also reportedly appointed the former head of the ”Deterrence Aggression” operation room, which led the overthrow of the Assad regime, as the head of the “Damascus Division.” This division possibly refers to the Syrian Arab Army 4th Division.[45]

Anti-SDF media reported on February 11 that 45 Iraqi families left al Roj camp in Hasakah Province.[46] Many Iraqi and Syrian nationals, as well as individuals who traveled to or were born in Islamic State-controlled territory in Syria, reside in al Roj camp.[47] US Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander Michael Kurilla visited the al Hol internally displaced persons camp in Hasakah Province on January 16 and emphasized CENTCOM’s support for the repatriation of al Hol and al Roj residents.[48] CTP-ISW previously reported that the mass release of displaced persons risks providing new opportunities to ISIS by dispersing a vulnerable population into areas where ISIS is active.[49]

Iraq

Axis of Resistance objectives:

Strengthen Iranian and Axis of Resistance influence over the Iraqi state and society
Harden the Iraqi government against internal dissent

The Iraqi federal government is “facing difficulties” in its efforts to disarm Iranian-backed Iraqi militias due to militia demands for senior positions in the government, according to unspecified sources speaking to Iraqi media on February 11.[50] The militias reportedly seek senior positions in the Iraqi security establishment, including national security adviser, National Intelligence Service head, and Popular Mobilization Commitee chairman. The sources claimed that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have inflated the number of militia members who would join the Iraqi security establishment during negotiations with the Iraqi federal government. The sources added that most members of the Iranian-backed Shia Coordination Framework support the integration of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the security establishment..[51] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the integration of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the Iraqi security establishment would increase Iranian influence therein and fail to reduce the threat that these militias pose to the United States and its partners in the Middle East.[52]

Iraqi President Abdul Latif al Rashid filed a lawsuit against Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani and Finance Minister Taif Sami due to the Iraqi federal government’s failure to pay Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) employee salaries.[53] Rashid filed the lawsuit on January 20, before the Iraqi federal government and KRG agreed on February 3 for the federal government to resume salary payments for KRG employees.[54] Rashid may have announced his lawsuit to appeal to his Kurdish base. Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada Secretary General Abu Alaa al Walai condemned Rashid’s lawsuit on February 11.[55]

Iraqi media reported on February 11 that Turkey struck Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) positions in Gargash Village, northern Duhok Province, Iraqi Kurdistan.[56]

Arabian Peninsula

Axis of Resistance objectives:

Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areas
Destroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of Yemen
Erode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza Strip

Nothing significant to report.

The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Axis of Resistance objectives:

Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip
Rebuild and reestablish Hezbollah in southern Lebanon
Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

The Gaza Strip

See topline section.

Lebanon

Lebanese media reported on February 11 that the IDF moved to a valley south of Aita al Shaab, Bint Jbeil District, along the Israel-Lebanon border.[57] Lebanese media reported that the IDF demolished infrastructure in Aita al Shaab.[58]

Israeli media reported on February 11 that the United States rejected an Israeli request to further extend the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire agreement, which would enable the IDF to maintain positions in Lebanon.[59] The United States announced on January 25 a ceasefire extension that requires the IDF to withdraw from Lebanon by February 18.[60]

West Bank

The IDF continued its counterterrorism operation in the northern West Bank on February 11.[61] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades (AAMB)and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) attacked Israeli forces in Tulkarm and Jenin governorates with improvised explosive devices (IED) and small arms.[62] Hamas, PIJ, and the “Youth of Revenge and Liberation” claimed that they fired small arms in a combined attack targeting the IDF in Tulkarm on February 10.[63] PIJ announced on January 22 the formation of joint operations rooms in the West Bank with Hamas and AAMB fighters.[64]

Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign Policy

The Iranian Parliament began interpellating Economic Affairs and Finance Minister Abdol Naser Hemmati on February 11.[65] Interpellation is a formal parliamentary request for a government minister to appear before Parliament to justify government policy, which may result in a vote of no confidence against the relevant minister.[66] Hemmati’s interpellation comes amid worsening economic conditions in Iran. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei categorically rejected nuclear negotiations with the United States in a speech on February 7, after which the value of the Iranian rial dropped to 940,000 rials per one US dollar.[67] Parliament frequently interpellates ministers and previously interpellated former Economic Affairs and Finance Minister Ehsan Khandouzi in 2021.[68]

Senior Iranian military officials emphasized on February 11 that the Iranian regime will resist US President Donald Trump’s “maximum pressure” policy.[69] Supreme Leader Military Adviser Major General Yahya Rahim Safavi emphasized that Iran has increased non-oil exports by five percent and expanded the number of countries that it exports oil to despite international sanctions.[70] Safavi highlighted Iranian involvement in economic alliances, including the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS, as well as Iran’s strategic agreements with China and Russia. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Intelligence Organization Chief Brigadier General Mohammad Kazemi separately emphasized this organization’s willingness to help the Iranian regime and private sector mitigate the impact of sanctions.[71]

Iranian Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri met with Omani Armed Forces Chief of Staff Vice Admiral Abdullah bin Khamis al Raisi in Tehran on February 11 to discuss strengthening military ties.[72] Bagheri emphasized the need for greater military cooperation between Iran and Oman.[73] Bagheri invited Oman to participate in the Marine Security Belt exercise and emphasized the importance of securing the Strait of Hormuz and Sea of Oman.[74] The Marine Security Belt exercise is a joint naval exercise that includes Iran, Russia, and China and aims to enhance maritime security and improve naval cooperation in the Indian Ocean and Gulf of Oman.[75] Raisi will visit an Iranian armed forces exhibition and meet with other unspecified military officials during his visit to Iran.

Anti-regime media circulated videos on February 10 of anti-regime protests in Dehdasht, Kohgiluyeh and Boyer Ahmad Province, Iran. The protesters reportedly chanted “Death to the Islamic Republic” and “Death to Khamenei.”[76] Anti-regime media reported that Iranian security forces clashed with the protestors and arrested at least two individuals. Social media users reported road closures and internet disruptions in the area.[77] Some social media users claimed that the protests started on February 8.[78] CTP-ISW cannot independently confirm these reports. The protests coincide with the 46th anniversary of the Iranian Revolution. The protests also come amid worsening economic conditions and US President Donald Trump’s reimposition of ”maximum pressure” sanctions on Iran.[79]

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

[1] https://x.com/IsraeliPM/status/1889377668677718474

[2] https://x.com/IsraeliPM/status/1889377637295935943

[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-10-2025

[4] https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/1888990097669849471

[5] https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1889372691062501379

[6] https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/1889035343187333168

[7] Https://almadapaper dot net/395935/

[8] https://almadapaper dot net/395212/ ; https://www.ninanews dot com/Website/News/Details?key=1181645 ;

https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%B1%D8%B3%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%86-%D9%8A%D8%B7%D8%B9%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86-%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%83%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9 ;

https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%83%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%AA%D9%84%D9%82%D9%89-%D8%B7%D8%B9%D9%86%D8%A7-%D8%AB%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9

[9] https://www.newarab dot com/news/iraqi-parliament-debates-controversial-amendment-amnesty-law

[10] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/profile-iraqi-federal-supreme-court

[11] https://www.newarab dot com/news/iraqi-parliament-debates-controversial-amendment-amnesty-law ; https://www.rudawarabia dot net/arabic/middleeast/iraq/010220253

[12] https://aawsat dot com/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A/4539866-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%81%D9%88-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%AE%D9%84-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A

[13] https://generisonline.com/understanding-the-hierarchy-and-roles-within-the-judicial-system-of-iraq/ ; https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%83%D9%85%D8%A9%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%AF-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B6%D8%A7-%D8%A8%D8%B4-%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A7-%D9%8A-%D9%84%D9%84%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AB%D8%A9

[14] https://x.com/mohanadaadnan/status/1888968764898639942

[15] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/four-us-designated-terrorist-groups-rush-support-judge-faeq-zaidan

[16] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/profile-iraqi-federal-supreme-court

[17] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%86%D9%88%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A8%D9%84-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%B6-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%AC%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D9%88-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%B5%D9%88%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%B8%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%AA-%D9%84%D8%B7%D8%A7-%D9%81%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%AF%D8%A9

[18] https://www.mawazin dot net/Details.aspx?jimare=241052

[19] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%86%D9%88%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A8%D9%84-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%B6-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%AC%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D9%88-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%B5%D9%88%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%B8%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%AA-%D9%84%D8%B7%D8%A7-%D9%81%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%AF%D8%A9

[20] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%86%D9%88%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A8%D9%84-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%B6-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%AC%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D9%88-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%B5%D9%88%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%B8%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%AA-%D9%84%D8%B7%D8%A7-%D9%81%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%AF%D8%A9

[21] https://www.iraqicivilsociety.org/archives/4368 ; https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/what-ninevehs-municipal-council-reveals-about-iran-turkey-power-struggle-iraq

[22] https://www.rudawarabia dot net/arabic/kurdistan/080220253

[23] https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1889039815762690518 ;

[24] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/135560 ; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/135569 ; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/135557

[25] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/135569 ; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/135603

[26] https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1889039815762690518

[27] https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1889039815762690518/history

[28] https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1889245368719659297 ; https://t.me/moriahdoron/19327

[29] https://t.me/moriahdoron/19307

[30] https://t.me/moriahdoron/19308

[31] https://t.me/moriahdoron/19308

[32] https://t.me/moriahdoron/19315

[33] https://t.me/moriahdoron/19317 ; https://t.me/moriahdoron/19322

[34] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-16-2025

[35] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/113821

[36] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-february-6-2025

[37] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-february-6-2025 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-february-7-2025 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-february-8-2025 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-february-9-2025 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-february-10-2025

[38] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/113820

[39] https://x.com/AlakhbarNews/status/1889274166685143084 ; https://t.me/bintjbeilnews/129557 ; https://www.annahar dot com/Lebanon/Politics/194217/ابن-شقيقة-نائب-لبناني-جثة-مصابة-بطلقات-ناري

[40] https://x.com/AlakhbarNews/status/1889274166685143084 ; https://carnegieendowment.org/middle-east/diwan/2021/10/an-investigation-in-lebanon-has-led-to-armed-clashes-reminiscent-of-the-civil-war?lang=en

[41] https://today.lorientlejour dot com/article/1447416/precarious-calm-at-lebanese-syrian-border-lebanese-army-deploys.html

[42] https://diyaruna.com/en_GB/articles/cnmi_di/features/2023/02/01/feature-01 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1887465945737625803 ; https://today.lorientlejour dot com/article/1447238/jaafar-clan-claims-to-have-withdrawn-its-men-calls-on-the-state-to-handle-issue.html

[43] https://x.com/ALBADIA24/status/1889302526832345153

[44] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/SyrianArmy-DocOOB.pdf

[45] https://x.com/ALBADIA24/status/1889296890627272975

[46] https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1889270622842212476

[47] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/five-years-after-caliphate-too-much-remains-same-northeast-syria

[48] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-january-17-2025-678b0b08eaeb8

[49] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/isis-poised-exploit-mass-releases-displaced-persons-syrian-camp ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-january-24-2025

[50] https://almadapaper dot net/395929/

[51] https://almadapaper dot net/395929/

[52] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate010925

[53] https://www.kurdistan24 dot net/ar/story/823974/%D8%B1%D8%A6%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%85%D9%87%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%B9-%D8%AF%D8%B9%D9%88%D9%89-%D9%82%D8%B6%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B6%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%88%D8%B7%D9%8A%D9%81-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%8A-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%83%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A9

[54] https://www.kurdistan24 dot net/ar/story/823154/%D8%AD%D9%83%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A9-%D9%83%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%AF%D8%A3-%D8%A8%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%B9-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA%D8%A8-%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B8%D9%81%D9%8A%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%B4%D9%87%D8%B1-%D9%83%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A ; https://www.kurdistan24 dot net/ar/story/823974/%D8%B1%D8%A6%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%85%D9%87%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%B9-%D8%AF%D8%B9%D9%88%D9%89-%D9%82%D8%B6%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B6%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%88%D8%B7%D9%8A%D9%81-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%8A-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%83%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A9

[55] https://x.com/aboalaa_alwalae/status/1889234401310941685

[56] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D9%83%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%B3%D9%80%D9%80%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA/%D8%B7%D8%A7-%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%81-%D9%85%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%B9-%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AF%D9%87%D9%88%D9%83

[57] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/113795

[58] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/113809

[59] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/israel-asked-to-extend-idf-deployment-in-lebanon-but-us-plans-to-stick-to-feb-18-deadline-official-says/

[60] https://www.axios.com/2025/01/26/israel-lebanon-ceasefire-extended-trump-white-house

[61] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1889341814441709789

[62] https://t.me/sarayatulkarm/979 ; https://t.me/sarayatulkarm/980 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/8261 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/8264

[63] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/8259 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/8260

[64] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-january-22-2025

[65] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/11/23/3255975

[66] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-17-2023

[67] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-7-2025 ;
https://www.rferl dot org/a/33311057.html;
https://alanchand dot com/en/currencies-price/usd

[68] https://www.iranintl dot com/en/202112305037

[69] https://sepahnews dot ir/fa/news/23683; https://sepahnews dot ir/fa/news/23678; https://www.leader dot ir/fa/content/27964; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-4-2025

[70] https://sepahnews dot ir/fa/news/23683

[71] https://sepahnews dot ir/fa/news/23678

[72] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/11/23/3255914

[73] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/11/23/3256150

[74] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/11/23/3256150

[75] https://apnews.com/article/iran-russia-china-joint-naval-drill-53a1b3a6f9fd2c4199d2ad7d8cd5a49e

[76] https://x.com/chawshin_83/status/1889370463819747389 ; https://x.com/IranIntl_Ar/status/1889240224330330232

[77] https://x.com/xBx73mOl77qBATH/status/1889057878801088688 ; https://x.com/Yasmin4freedom/status/1889107216990396827

[78] https://x.com/chawshin_83/status/1889370463819747389 ; https://x.com/Strand123/status/1889407932540002615 ; https://x.com/ashk_shadi/status/1888318463967375682 ; https://x.com/Yasmin4freedom/status/1889107216990396827

[79] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-february-4-2025 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-december-23-2024