Eurasia Press & News
Introduction
In today’s rapidly changing geopolitical landscape, Armenia and Iran are seeking to strengthen their connections regarding economic, political, and security matters. And despite the United States signing a Strategic Partnership Charter with Armenia in January to enhance cooperation in energy, defense, security, and diplomacy, Tehran asserts that U.S.-Armenia relations will not impact its relationship with Armenia.
Iran is in a significantly different position today compared to just a few months ago. Following the collapse of the Assad regime last December and the uncertainty surrounding its proxy, Hezbollah, in Lebanon, Iran may need to realign its regional priorities.
Historically Iran and Armenia have had a very healthy and cordial relationship. Iran and Armenia’s relationship can be seen as a mutually beneficial economic collaboration built around investments, trade agreements, and infrastructure projects. Iran today remains Armenia’s third largest trading partner, and an estimated 30% of Armenia’s international trade runs through Iran. During the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, Iran tried to broker a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan, hoping to establish itself as a regional negotiator.
Now with Iran’s future in the Middle East appearing more uncertain, it may begin to play a greater role with its neighbor to the north. One area where Iran might increase its focus is the Zangezur Corridor, a proposed transport route running through southern Armenia designed to connect Azerbaijan with its exclave, the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic. Here, Armenia and Iran have found common ground in their opposition to Azerbaijan’s proposed corridor. At the same time, recent diplomatic meetings between Iran and Armenia, signalling each other’s willingness to work across a multitude of issues, coupled with Iran’s increased economic activity with the Eurasian region, indicate a potential pivot towards deeper cooperation that could reshape the region.
A Brief History
Armenia and Iran share a rich history spanning over 2,500 years. We can find the first mention of the word “Armenia” from the Persian king Darius during the 4th century BC. Up until the early 19th century, Yerevan was part of the Qajari (Persian)Empire. In Yerevan, the Blue Mosque, the residence of the viceroy of the Shah is preserved to this day as a religious and cultural center. In the 1990s the Armenian government renovated the Blue Mosque for services for Armenia’s Iranian Muslim community. In Iran, there remains a strong Armenian diaspora of around 60-80,000 people, while the Armenian Apostolic Church operates its three dioceses in Atrpatrkan, Tehran, and Isfahan.
Since the beginning of diplomatic relations between the two countries in 1992, Iran and Armenia have strived to maintain a strong relationship. The two countries have shown a strong history of working together on issues surrounding energy, transport, environmental protection, inter-regional, scientist-education, and cultural spheres.
February Meetings
On Saturday, February 22, the head of Iran’s Trade Promotion Organization (TPO) Mohammad Ali Dehaqan Devi met with Armenian Deputy Economy Minister EdgarZakaryan and Armenia’s Ambassador Grigor Hovhannisyanin Tehran. They emphasized Iran and Armenia’s strong relationship while highlighting the need to increase trade relationships between the two countries. Iranian officials stressed their country’s interest in strengthening trade relations with the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEA). Zakaryan highlighted the significant potential for economic collaboration between the two neighboring countries, stressing the importance of this in achieving their trading objectives, saying “Armenia is prepared to collaborate with Iran across various sectors to strengthen mutual trade relations,”.
Just two days later on February 24 Iranian Foreign Minister Seyyed Abbas Araghchi and Armenian Foreign Minister Arat Mirzyoan were present in Geneva to attend a high-level meeting of the UN Human Rights Council and the UN Disarmament Conference. While in Geneva, they held a bilateral meeting to discuss relations between their two countries. Here they reaffirmed their desire to strengthen bilateral ties concerning trade and economic growth. Araghchi emphasized the need to protect state sovereignty in the South Caucus region and for continued cooperation and coordination in security and stability. Mirzoyan, on his side, emphasized Armenia’s commitment to strengthening ties with Iran across various sectors, including economic, trade, cultural, and transportation areas. Araghchi reaffirmed Tehran’s readiness to support peace efforts between Armenia and Azerbaijan. “We strive for peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan and are ready to support this process.
EAEU
On February 28 Mehr News Agency, a semi-official news agency of the government of Iran, reported that the Iranian parliament has approved the agreement to create a free trade zone between Iran and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). This comes just two months after Iran was granted observer status in the EAEU. Iranian Minister of Industry, Mines, and Trade, Mohammed Atabk said, “The free trade agreement with Eurasia allows us to export 87% of our goods to the Eurasian Economic Union member states at zero tariffs and import goods from these countries at zero tariffs. The total population of the Eurasian Economic Union member states is 240 million people, so it is a huge market that can be used,”. The free trade agreement between the Eurasian Economic Union and Iran should take effect by April or early May.
The EAEU is a regional, political, and economic union made up of the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, and the Russian Federation. The EAEU provides for the free movement of goods, services, capital, and labor, while pursuing a unified policy across various sectors, including transport, industry, agriculture, energy, and foreign trade.
Iran’s exports to the member states of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) rose by 22 percent, amounting to $1.631 billion, in the first ten months of the current Iranian calendar year (from March 20, 2024, to January 19, 2025). Economic analysts have suggested that the Iran-EAEU Free Trade Agreement could exceed $10 billion annually within a few years. In addition to trade, the agreement may promote joint ventures, knowledge sharing, and technology transfer in sectors like energy, transportation, and manufacturing.
The Iran-EAEU Free Trade Agreement is a significant step forward, emphasizing regional economic cooperation in an increasingly interconnected global economy. As it nears implementation, the agreement is expected to reshape economic ties between Iran and the Eurasian region.
Nagorno Karabakh and the Zangezur Corridor
During the initial days of the Nagorno-Kabrabkah conflict, Iran had sought to create a peace plan between Azerbaijan and Armenia. In a televised address Iran’s Ayatollah Khamenei spoke about Azerbaijani territorial recognition yet made clear that the rights and security of Armenians “must be ensured”. Armenia and Azerbaijan eventually came to a settlement brokered via the OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe) Minsk Group. Armenia claims it did not explicitly reject Iran’s attempts at brokering peace but instead preferred going through the OSCE Minks Group.
During the 2020 Karabakh War, Azerbaijani media accused Iran of supporting Armenia with arms and fuel. Recently, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev has criticized Iran for fuel transfers to the Nagorno-Karabakh region. Azerbaijan’s suspicion of Iran was only further enforced when in July 2024, it was reported that Iran and Armenia had signed a secret arms deal worth $500 million, which includes drone and air defense missiles, among other various military equipment.
Following Azerbaijan’s victory in the Karabakh War, a trilateral ceasefire agreement alongside Russia was signed that included provisions for the opening of transportation routes. This provision, article 9 stated, “All economic and transport connections in the region shall be unblocked. The Republic of Armenia shall guarantee the security of transport connections between the western regions of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic in order to arrange unobstructed movement of persons, vehicles and cargo in both directions.” Azerbaijan strongly believes that Article 9 gives it the right to open the Zangezur Corridor.
Armenia, however, is firmly against this belief, claiming that it does not view the Zangezur Corridor as a route or a corridor. Armenia’s opposition to the corridor is founded on its concerns over national security, sovereignty, and historical grievances. Yet, Armenia has found a partner in Iran in its opposition to the corridor. Motivated by worries that the initiative could diminish its status as a key regional transit center and weaken its strategic influence in the South Caucasus, Iran is strongly against the creation of the Zangezur Corridor.
Iran’s Opposition to the Zangezur Corridor
Friendly Relations with Armenia: Iran has historically maintained friendly relations with Armenia and supports Armenia’s sovereignty.
Reduced Energy Demand: A pipeline built along the Zangezur pipeline would carry more oil and gas to southern Europe and reduce European demand for Iranian hydrocarbons.
Challenges in Sanction Negotiations: A weakened Iran could complicate the country’s efforts to negotiate relief from international sanctions.
Transit Role for Azerbaijani Citizens: Iran acts as a transit country for Azerbaijani citizens traveling to Nakhchivan, providing Tehran with leverage over Azerbaijan.
Pan-Turkish Aspirations: Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev has said the corridor could be used to unite the Turkish world, with an estimated 16% of Iran’s population being ethnically Azerbaijani, there are fears that the Zangezur Corridor could led to demands for greater autonomy or even create separatist movements within Iran.
Post-Assad Era: As Iran’s supply lines to the Levant face increasing threats, the Zangezur Corridor could further isolate Iran and significantly diminish its influence in the South Caucasus.
