There was talk. How dependent is Ukraine on American military aid?

Donald Trump said that the decision to stop military aid to Ukraine and stop sharing intelligence after the scandal in the White House had no effect on the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The restrictions were in effect for only a week and were then lifted just as unexpectedly. Trump is using military aid maneuvers more as a lever of pressure on Volodymyr Zelensky, believing that Kiev cannot afford to quarrel with Washington. But in reality, the significance of American aid is great only for some categories of weapons. In general, the United States is far from being the first in meeting the needs of Ukrainian troops. Moreover, in three years of war, the Americans have sent fewer tanks to Ukraine than Poland, fewer air defense systems than Germany, and fewer combat aircraft than North Macedonia or Slovakia.

How much aid did the US provide to Ukraine?
According to calculations by the Kiel Institute for World Economics (IfW Kiel), the most authoritative source on foreign aid to Ukraine during the war, the total amount of funds allocated by the United States amounted to €114 billion (for the period from January 24, 2022 to December 31, 2024). Europe allocated more – €132 billion. If we take only military aid (excluding humanitarian and financial aid), the Americans are slightly ahead of the Europeans – €64 billion against €62 billion. In any case, these figures do not “match” the estimates of the size of American aid to Ukraine from Donald Trump, who cites figures in the range of $300 billion to $500 billion.

The US has allocated and distributed €114 billion in aid to Ukraine, Europe — €132 billion
American aid to Ukraine has been authorized by five separate acts of Congress . Funding and coordination of the aid takes place within the U.S. government under the general name Operation Atlantic Resolve (OAR). Since 2022, Congress has allocated $182 billion in Ukraine-related programs through 14 different agencies, with the largest amount through the U.S. Department of Defense: $123.9 billion.

But of these $182 billion, only $83 billion has actually been spent (disbursed). Together with the contracted (obligated), but not yet paid obligations, the amount is $140.5 billion. The remaining money is in the status of reserved and, judging by the efforts that the Trump administration is making to save budget funds, most likely will not be spent and will simply burn up ($2.7 billion has already burned up under Biden, since they did not have time to distribute it).

American security support to Ukraine follows a pattern: Congress appropriates funds to the executive branch, and then the President, the Department of Defense, and the State Department use them through three different mechanisms: USAI , PDA , and FMF .

The largest channel of assistance to Ukraine is the supply of military equipment and ammunition from the PDA. The cost of all announced PDA packages is $34 billion, and $45.8 billion has been allocated to replace the military property sent (the difference is mainly explained by the fact that the Ukrainian side is receiving equipment and ammunition ordered and received many years ago, and new, more expensive ones are being purchased in their place; thus, the PDA mechanism, among other things, helps to update the material base of the American army). According to US officials, 90% of the nomenclature within the announced PDA packages has already been delivered to Ukraine. According to plans, the full implementation of deliveries was expected by August 2025 and concerned, first of all, armored vehicles.

The second-largest expenditure under the OAR umbrella has no direct connection to the fighting in Ukraine at all. A total of $44.8 billion is allocated to the so-called European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) and U.S. European Command to forward-deploy U.S. forces and maintain depots and other related infrastructure on allied soil in Eastern Europe.

In third place in the volume of American aid to Ukraine are the supplies of new weapons and ammunition under contracts concluded with industry within the framework of USAI (the total amount of announced packages is $33.2 billion). Supplies under USAI take much longer than under PDA, and according to calculations , the execution of contracts in the interests of the Armed Forces of Ukraine with a monthly volume of $700 million to $1.1 billion will last until 2028.

Within the FMF, $6.7 billion was allocated, and these funds were mainly used to replenish the stocks of Ukraine’s allied countries after they delivered military equipment, and to meet the urgent needs of the Ukrainian troops themselves, but out of the total amount (as of the end of 2024), only $1.8 billion was spent.

Finally, some military products and related services are purchased by the Ukrainian government on commercial terms under the FMS . In particular, contracts for the maintenance of F-16 fighters , the supply of spare parts for previously delivered American weapons systems, the manufacture and shipment of three HIMARS MLRS units to Ukraine (at Germany’s expense ), and so on were concluded under this procedure.

It turns out that the total amount of allocated and contracted American funds for Ukraine cannot exceed $140.5 billion, the announced deliveries of military products are estimated at $72 billion, and the equipment, weapons and ammunition actually transferred to the Ukrainian military are just over $50 billion.

Equipment, weapons and ammunition transferred to the Ukrainian military from the US are valued at $50 billion
Is this a lot or a little? For comparison, the war in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2021 cost the United States $2.1 trillion, the war in Iraq and Syria from 2003 to 2023 cost even more – $2.9 trillion. Most of the specified expenses were spent on supporting the operations of the American military and social payments to veterans (including future ones), but even if we take only direct military aid to the Afghan and Iraqi armies, it turns out to be quite indicative.

The Afghan security forces received a total of over $80 billion from the Americans from 2001 to 2020. In total, between 2003 and 2016, the Americans supplied 76,000 different combat vehicles (including 22,000 Humvees and about 1,000 MRAPs ), 110 helicopters (Mi-17 and MD-530), 98 aircraft (transport, reconnaissance and light attack aircraft), not counting small arms, communication systems, ammunition and other equipment and gear. The bulk of all this property went to the Taliban when the Afghan army collapsed in just a few weeks, and the pro-American regime in Kabul ceased to exist.

American security assistance to Iraq from 2003 to 2023 is estimated at over $34 billion. Over $20 billion was spent over the 10 years from 2003 to 2013 through the Iraq Security Forces Fund . Unlike Ukraine, the Americans supplied Iraq with modern combat aircraft (over 20 F-16 fighters), a significant number of tanks (almost 150 M1A1 Abrams), light helicopters (such as the Bell 407GX), and other weapons and equipment, although the supplies were largely paid for from the Iraqi budget with US credit support.

Thus, the US government has spent less money on the Ukrainian Armed Forces to date (around $50 billion) than on the security forces in Afghanistan (over $80 billion), and only one and a half times more than in Iraq ($34 billion), albeit over a much shorter period. At the same time, both in Afghanistan and Iraq, local armed forces were confronted by insurgent groups, and the fighting was mainly carried out with the direct support of the Americans and their Western allies (including limited contingents from Ukraine). Afghanistan eventually came under the control of the Taliban, hostile to the US, while Iraq saw the emergence of a stable government oriented toward the equally hostile Iran, as well as numerous pro-Iranian paramilitary groups. The Ukrainian Armed Forces, for their part, held out in a confrontation with one of the strongest regular armies in the world, with external material and technical support, but strictly with their own human and organizational resources.

The US spent less on aid to the Ukrainian Armed Forces than it allocated to security forces in Afghanistan
Comparing US spending with military aid from Europe, according to European officials, in 2024 alone, the EU, the UK and Norway sent Ukraine $25 billion in military aid, which exceeds the US. The total amount of military aid transferred from Europe was estimated at €45 billion at the end of 2024, which is about the same as US support ($50 billion).

What role does American aid play for the Ukrainian Armed Forces?
During that same Oval Office spat , Donald Trump told Volodymyr Zelensky: “The problem is that I gave you the opportunity to be a tough guy . And without the United States, you wouldn’t be a tough guy . Your people are very brave, but you either make a deal or we leave. And if we leave, you’re going to fight. I don’t think you’re going to like it. But you’re going to fight. You don’t have a bargaining chip right now.”

It is difficult to agree that it was Trump who gave the Ukrainian troops the opportunity to resist the Russian Armed Forces, since he has not yet announced a single new package of military aid and immediately after the scandal suspended the shipment and delivery of equipment and weapons under previously concluded contracts, as well as the exchange of intelligence.

However, a week later, Trump just as suddenly lifted his ban after a meeting of Ukrainian and American delegations in Saudi Arabia, where the parties agreed in principle to a 30-day truce. It is even more difficult to seriously consider the Ukrainian Armed Forces a “tough guy” “pumped up” with American weapons, because the Biden administration has done too little to achieve this with its extremely indecisive policy of military-technical cooperation with Ukraine.

For example, the US has not supplied Ukraine with a single combat aircraft (F-16 fighters are being transferred by Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and Belgium), unlike North Macedonia (four Su-25 attack aircraft) and Slovakia (more than 10 MiG-29 fighters). The Americans have also not sent a single modern helicopter, limiting themselves to transferring 20 former Russian Mi-17V5, previously acquired for the Afghan army and, after the fall of the pro-American regime, transferred by the Afghan military to neighboring countries so that they would not fall into the hands of the Taliban.

The US has not transferred a single combat aircraft to Ukraine
According to IfW calculations , the United States occupies a rather modest place in the structure of deliveries of armored vehicles, artillery and air defense systems by Western allies (as of December 31, 2024).

The US has transferred only 76 of 922 tanks to Ukraine (in value terms, $634 million out of $2.4 billion), with only 31 of them being American M1A1SA Abrams, and another 45 being refurbished Soviet T-72EA. No new American tank deliveries are expected, while Australia (49 M1A1 AIM Abrams tanks) and Croatia (30 M-84A4 tanks) have announced plans to do so.

In the IFV category , the US accounts for 352 of 1,294 vehicles (in value terms, $669 million out of $2.1 billion), and we are talking about the truly well-proven M2A2 ODS Bradley vehicles. In both quantity and value terms, America is in first place, but Ukraine’s other allies account for 2/3 of the total.

In the category of artillery systems of the main calibers – 152 mm and 155 mm – the United States is in first place in the number of guns delivered (201 out of 704) and in second place in their estimated cost after Germany ($977 million out of $4.5 billion). But the overwhelming majority (142 units) in the structure of American deliveries are towed M777 howitzers, and not the self-propelled wheeled and tracked artillery units that are comparatively more in demand in the conditions of the Ukrainian war. However, for example, the Ukrainian publication “Military” believes that towed artillery has such important advantages as ease of camouflage and digging long-term shelters, as well as less vulnerability to detonation of ammunition, which is usually stored separately from the gun. The announced plans to supply the world’s most advanced self-propelled guns Archer from Sweden (18 units) and self-propelled guns Caesar from Denmark and France (60 units) will make the US contribution even smaller.

In the category of multiple launch rocket systems, we can finally see the critical dependence of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the United States. American HIMARS account for almost half of all similar systems supplied to Ukraine in quantitative terms (39 out of 82 units) and almost 70% in value terms ($588 million out of $857 million). For a long time, HIMARS were essentially the only means of high-precision long-range strikes against the rear of the Russian Armed Forces, but at the same time, their use on Russian territory was not allowed. Of course, the Ukrainian Armed Forces are completely dependent on the supply of ammunition for HIMARS, some of which have already run out – like ATACMS missiles , and the supply of new ones is apparently limited to the volumes already contracted under USAI.

In the category of air defense systems, the Americans delivered only 17 of 77 systems to Ukraine (in value terms, $1.5 billion out of $9.1 billion), and are hopelessly inferior to Germany. But it is in this category that the dependence on the United States is most significant, since only American Patriot air defense systems are capable of intercepting Russian missiles flying along ballistic trajectories, and only the United States produces SAMs suitable for intercepting this type of missile . The European SAMP/T systems transferred to the Ukrainian Armed Forces also have the functionality to intercept ballistic targets, but there is a debate on this issue in the expert community .

Among other categories of military aid, a significant share of American supplies is noticeable only for combat armored vehicles, including MRAP, as well as engineering and other specialized equipment. The modest size of the aid only emphasizes the huge stockpiles of equipment in the United States (which cannot be said about European allies). According to the Military Balance 2025 reference book, the American fleet of Abrams tanks of various modifications numbers 2,640 units in combat units and over 1,500 tanks in storage (31 units were delivered to Ukraine), the fleet of Bradley infantry fighting vehicles of various modifications numbers 2,285 units in combat units and over 2,000 vehicles in storage (declared deliveries to Ukraine – 352 units). Of the 2,600 F-16 fighters in service in the United States and allied countries, the Americans have not allocated a single one to Ukraine.

The US has 2,640 Abrams tanks in active service and over 1,500 in storage. Ukraine has received 31 tanks
As for ammunition, over the three years of the war the US supplied the Ukrainian army with about 4.4 million artillery rounds of the main calibers: 3 million of 155 mm caliber, 1 million of 105 mm caliber, 400 thousand of 152 mm caliber, 40 thousand of 122 mm caliber. As far as can be judged, no other country provided comparable volumes, although, for example, only within the framework of the “Czech initiative” Ukraine was sent 1.6 million artillery rounds, including 500 thousand of 155 mm caliber. For comparison, during the same time, according to some estimates , 8 million shells were delivered from the DPRK to Russia alone – almost twice as much as the Americans sent to Ukraine.

What will happen to the front without US help?
During the conversation in the White House, Donald Trump repeatedly pointed out to Zelensky that he had no “cards” or “trump cards” without the Americans. After the aid was suspended, The Wall Street Journal published the following assessment, citing current and former Western officials: without American aid, given the current intensity of the fighting, the Ukrainian Armed Forces would hold out at least “until the summer.” Ukrainian sources gave the Financial Times even more gloomy forecasts — at the level of 2-3 months.

Meanwhile, Ukrainian troops have already fought without US assistance: in the first months after the Russian Armed Forces’ invasion in the spring of 2022 and from October 2023 to April 2024, when Congress stalled on approving funding. The bill was blocked by Trump’s Republican supporters. Looking at the graph of announced aid packages under the PDA and USAI, it is clear how support has steadily declined since the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ failed counteroffensive in the summer of 2023 until it ceased completely in early 2024.

It was in the fall and winter of 2023–2024 that the Russian command completely seized the initiative on the battlefield, launching a slow but almost continuous offensive in Donbass that continues to this day. The fact that other Western allies were unable to promptly compensate for the lack of American aid also played a role. In the second half of 2023, European partners sent even slightly less funds than at the beginning of the year, when preparations were underway for the Ukrainian counteroffensive.

In other words, during the period of the actual halt of American aid, the Kremlin managed to weaken the Ukrainian defense to such an extent that only in recent months have the stabilization measures of the Ukrainian Armed Forces allowed them to stop the advance of the Russian Armed Forces in the main direction of attack towards Pokrovsk and Mirnograd. But even the extremely modest results of the offensive achieved during this time (about 50 km in depth in the most successful direction at the cost of about 100 thousand killed) allow Putin to speak at peace talks from a position of strength.

The halt in US aid to Ukraine in the fall of 2023 helped the Kremlin seize the initiative on the battlefield
When US Vice President J.D. Vance insistently asked Zelensky to show “respect” at the White House and say “thank you,” he probably forgot that it was Trump and his supporters who essentially created a shortage of resources for the Ukrainian army to turn the tide of the war in their favor or at least return to the state of “positional stalemate.”

Since the current American administration, in all likelihood, is not going to pass new acts on financial support for Ukraine through Congress, the key question is what threatens the Ukrainian Armed Forces with either a final cessation of military aid at some stage of the peace talks by Trump’s voluntaristic decision, or its gradual drying up as contracts concluded under Biden are fulfilled.

In the winter of 2023–2024, the ratio of artillery fire intensity was estimated at a level of tenfold superiority of the Russian Armed Forces. Now, even with a complete cessation of American supplies, such a failure is not expected due to the growth of production in Europe and purchases in third countries. In addition, since the Ukrainian Armed Forces are on the defensive, the functions of artillery are largely replaced by FPV drones and mines, the production of which does not depend on American aid.

According to expert estimates , the Ukrainian Armed Forces require 75-90 thousand artillery rounds per month for defense, and 200-250 thousand per month for major offensive operations. In 2025, Europe plans to produce 2 million artillery rounds, which will more than cover at least Kiev’s defensive needs.

Without American aid, it will be much more difficult to equip new brigades with equipment and restore the combat potential of already formed units, but this problem was evident even before Trump. In September 2024, Zelensky said that the military equipment received from partners was not enough to staff even four of the 14 new brigades recruited. The Ukrainian Armed Forces had to spend reserves on current needs, while, at Trump’s request, Congress blocked the adoption of aid to Ukraine. Now Kiev’s main hopes are associated with European funding, including for the purchase of weapons in the United States.

Without American aid it will be much more difficult to equip new brigades with equipment
There is practically nothing to replace American supplies with to intercept Russian missiles flying on ballistic trajectories, and difficulties will also arise with high-precision and long-range aviation and artillery ammunition, maintaining the combat readiness of already delivered equipment and weapons systems, control and communications if access to Starlink is still limited. But even in the worst-case scenario, the collapse of the Ukrainian army and the collapse of the front will not happen simply because the US share in the current provision of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, according to various estimates ( 1 , 2 , 3 ), is 20-30%, and the share of Ukrainian suppliers themselves is approaching half or has already reached this level.

Check Also

Why Turkey looks to make another deal with the EU

BRUSSELS ­– Despite domestic political turmoil, Ankara’s timing to pitch closer ties with the EU …